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`PATENT
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`APPLICATION FOR
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`UNITED STATES PATENT
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`IN THE NAME OF
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`Shlomo Touboul
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`0F
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`FINJAN SOFTWARE, LTD.
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`SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROTECTING A COMPUTER AND A I
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`NETWORK FROM HOSTILE DOWNLOADABLES
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`DOCKET NO. 40492.00002
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`Please direct communications to:
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`Intellectual Property Department
`Graham 8: James LLP
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`600 Hansen Way
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1043
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`(650) 856-6500
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`Express Mail Number EM096316525US
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`1313'1248340100
`11069711556113049200002
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`'1
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`Ennfigalbsasus
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`CS-1022
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`Cicso Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.
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`PATENT
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`SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROTECTING A COMPUTER AND A NETWORK
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`FROM HOSTILE DOWNLOADABLES
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`5
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`PRIORITY REFERENCE TO PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
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`This application claims benefit of and hereby incorporates by reference
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`provisional application serial number 60/030,639, entitled “System and Method for
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`Protecting a Computer from Hostile Downloadables," filed on November 8, 1996, by
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`inventor Shlomo Touboul.
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`INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION
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`This application hereby incorporates by reference related U.S. patent application
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`serial number 081790,097, entitled “System and Method for Protecting a Client from
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`Hostile Downloadables,” filed on January 29, 1997, by inventor Shlomo Touboul.
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`BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
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`1.
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`Field of the Invention
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`This invention relates generally to computer networks, and more particularly
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`provides a system and method for protecting a computer and a network from hostile
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`Domfloadables.
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`PATENT
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`2.
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`Descri tion of the Back ound Art
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`The Internet is currently a collection of over 100,000 individual computer
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`networks owned by governments, universities, nonprofit groups and companies, and is
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`expanding at an accelerating rate. Because the Internet is public, the Internet has become
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`a major source of many system damaging and system fatal application programs,
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`commonly referred to as “viruses."
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`Accordingly, programmers continue to design computer and computer network
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`security systems for blocking these viruses from attacking both individual and network
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`computers. 0n the most part, these security systems have been relatively successful.
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`However, these security systems are not configured to recognize computer viruses which
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`have been attached to or configured as Downloadable application programs, commonly
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`referred to as “Downloadables.” A Downloadable is an executable application program,
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`which is downloaded from a source computer and run on the destination computer.
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`Downloadable is typically requested by an ongoing process such as by an Internet
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`browser or web engine. Examples of Downloadables include JavaTM applets designed for
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`use in the JavaTM distributing environment developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.,
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`JavaScript scripts also developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc., ActivelllTM controls
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`designed for use in the ActiveXT'“ distributing environment developed by the Microsoft
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`Corporation, and Visual Basic also developed by the Microsoft Corporation. Therefore, a
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`system and method are needed to protect a netw0rk from hostile Downloadables.
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`SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
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`The present invention provides a system for protecting a network from suspicious
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`Downloadables. The system comprises a security policy, an interface for receiving a
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`Downloadable, and a comparator, coupled to the interface, for applying the security
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`policy to the Downloadable to determine if the security policy has been violated. The
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`Downloadable may include a JavaTM applet, an ActiveXTM control, a Java'Scriptm script,
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`or a Visual Basic script. The security policy may include a default security policy to be
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`applied regardless of the client to whom the Downloadable is addressed, a specific
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`security policy to be applied based on the client or the group to which the client belongs,
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`or a specific policy to be applied based on the clientfgroup and on the particular
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`Downloadable received. The system uses an ID generator to compute a Downloadable
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`ID identifying the Downloadable, preferably, by fetching all components of the
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`Downloadable and performing a hashing function on the Downloadable including the
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`fetched components.
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`Further, the security policy may indicate several tests to perform, including (1) a
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`comparison with known hostile and non-hostile Downloadablcs; (2) a comparison with
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`Downloadables to be blocked or allowed per administrative override; (3) a comparison of
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`the Downloadable security profile data against access control lists; (4) a comparison of a
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`certificate embodied in the Downloadable against trusted certificates; and (5) a
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`comparison of the URL from which the Downloadable originated against trusted and
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`untrusted URLs. Based on these tests, a logical engine can determine whether to allow or
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`block the Doumloadable.
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`The present invention fiu'ther provides a method for protecting a computer from
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`suspicious Downloadables. The method comprises the steps of receiving a
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`Downloadable, comparing the Downloadable against a security policy to determine if the
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`security policy has been violated, and discarding the Downloadable if the security policy
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`has been violated.
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`It will be appreciated that the system and method of the present invention may
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`I provide computer protection from known hostile Downloadables. The system and
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`method of the present invention may identify Downloadables that perform operations
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`deemed suspicious- The system and method of the present invention may examine the
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`Downloadable code to determine whether the code contains any suspicious operations,
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`and thus may allow or block the Dovmloadable accordingly.
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`BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
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`FIG. ‘
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`IS a block diagram illustrating a network system, in accordance with the
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`present inventi::;/
`FIGyz‘is a block diagram illustrating details ofthe internal network security
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`system of FIG. 1;
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`FIG}.is‘fiJQdiagramillustratingdetails ofthesecurityprogramandthe
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`security database of FIG. 2;
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`FIGYmdiagram illustrating details ofthe security policies ofFIG. 3;
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`FIG.4,545 a block diagram illustrating details of the security management console
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`of FIG. 1;
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`FIGchhartillustrating a method ofexamining for suspicious
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`Downloadables, in accordance with the present invention;
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`security policy of FIG. 6A?
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`FIG. 613 i-s// a flowchart illustrating details ofthe step for finding the appropriate
`FIGf/{giwchartillustratingamethodfordeterminingwhetheranincoming
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`Downloadable is to be/fdeemed suspicious;
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`Downloadable;2nd
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`FIG/(.8 is a flowchart illustrating a method 800 for generating a Downloadable ID
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`for identifying a Downloadable.
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`PATENT
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`DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT
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`FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a network system 100, in accordance with
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`the present invention. The network system 100 includes an external computer network
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`105, such as the Wide Area Network (WAN) commonly referred to as the lntemet,
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`coupled via a communications channel 125 to an internal network security system 110.
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`The network system 100 further includes an internal computer network 115, such as a
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`corporate Local Area Network (LAN), coupled via a communications channel 130 to the
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`internal network computer system 1 10 and coupled via a communications channel 135 to
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`a security management console 120.
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`The internal network security system 110 examines Downloadables received from
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`external computer network 105, and prevents Downloadables deemed suspicious from
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`reaching the internal computer network 1 15. It will be further appreciated that a
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`Downloadable is deemed suspicious if it performs or may perform any undesirable
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`operation, or if it threatens or may threaten the integrity of an internal computer network
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`115 component. It is to be understood that the term “suspicious” includes hostile,
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`potentially hostile, undesirable, potentially undesirable, etc. Security management
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`console 120 enables viewing, modification and configuration of the internal network
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`security system 110.
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`FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating details of the internal network security
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`system 1 10, which includes a Central Processing Unit (CPU) 205, such as an Intel
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`PentiumG microprocessor or a Motorola Power PC‘9 microprocessor, coupled to a signal
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`bus 220. The internal network security system 110 further includes an external
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`PATENT
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`communications interface 210 coupled between the communications channel 125 and the
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`signal bus 220 for receiving Downloadables from external computer network 105, and
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`an internal communications interface 225 coupled between the signal bus 220 and the
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`communications channel 130 for forwarding Domfloadables not deemed su5picious to
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`the internal computer network 1 15. The external communications interface 210 and the
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`internal communications interface 225 may be functional components of an integral
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`communications interface (not shown) for both receiving Downloadables from the
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`external computer network 105 and forwarding Downloadables to the internal computer
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`network 1 15.
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`Internal network security system 110 fiu'ther includes Input/Output (U0)
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`interfaces 215 (such as a keyboard, mouse and Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) display), a data
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`storage device 230 such as a magnetic disk, and a Random-Access Memory (RAM) 235,
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`each coupled to the signal bus 220. The data storage device 230 stores a security
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`database 240, which includes security information for determining whether a received
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`Downloadable is to be deemed suspicious. The data storage device 230 further stores a
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`users list 260 identifying the users within the internal computer network 115 who may
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`receive Downloadables, and an event log 245 which includes determination results for
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`each Downloadable examined and runtime indications of the internal network security
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`. system 110. An operating system 250 controls processing by CPU 205, and is typically
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`stored in data storage device 230 and loaded into RAM 235 (as illustrated) for execution.
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`A security program 255 controls examination of incoming Downloadables, and also may
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`be'stored in data storage device 230 and loaded into RAM 235 (as illustrated) for
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`execution by CPU 205.
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`FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating details of the security program 255 and the
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`security database 240. The security program 255 includes an ID generator 315, a policy
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`finder 317 coupled to the ID generator 315, and a first comparator 320 coupled to the
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`policy finder 317. The first comparator 320 is coupled to a logical engine 333 via four
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`separate paths, namely, via Path 1, via Path 2, via Path 3 and via Path 4. Path 1 includes
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`a direct connection fromthe first comparator 320 to the logical engine 333. Path 2 -
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`includes a code scanner coupled to the first comparator 320, and an Access Control List
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`(ACL) comparator 330 coupling the code scanner 325 to the logical engine 333. Path 3
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`includes a certificate scanner 340 coupled to the first comparator 320, and a certificate
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`comparator 34S coupling the certificate scanner 340 to the logical engine 333. Path 4 -
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`includes a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) comparator 350 coupling the first
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`comparator 320 to the logical engine 3330. A record-keeping engine 335 is coupled
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`between the logical engine 333 and the event log 245.
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`The security program 255 operates in conjunction with the security database 240,
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`which includes security policies 305, known Downloadables 307, known Certificates
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`309 and Downloadable Security Profile (DSP) data 310 corresponding to the known
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`Downloadables 307. Security policies 305 includes policies specific to particular users
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`260 and default (or generic) policies for determining whether to allow or block an
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`incoming Downloadable. These security policies 305 may identify specific
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`Downloadables to block, specific Downloadables to allow, or necessary criteria for
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`allowing an unknown Downloadable. Referring to FIG. 4, security policies 305 include
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`PATENT
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`policy selectors 405, access control lists 410, trusted certificate lists 415, URL rule bases
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`420, and lists 425 of Downloadables to allow or to block per administrative override.
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`Known Downloadables 307 include lists of Downloadables which Original
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`Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) know to be hostile, of Downloadables which OEMs
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`know to be non-hostile, and of Downloadables previously received by this security
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`program 255. DSP data 310 includes the list of all potentially hostile or suspicious
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`computer operations that may be attempted by each known Downloadable 307, and may
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`also include the respective arguments of these operations. An identified argument of an
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`operation is referred to as “resolved." An unidentified argument is referred to as
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`“unresolved.” DSP data 310 is described below with reference to the code scanner 325.
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`The ID generator 315 receives a Downloadable (including the URL from which it
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`came and the userID of the intended recipient) from the external computer network 105
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`via the external communications interface 210, and generates a Downloadable ID for
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`identifying each Downloadable. The Downloadable ID preferably includes a digital
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`hash of the complete Downloadable code. The ID generator 315 preferably prefetches
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`all components embodied in or identified by the code for Downloadable ID generation.
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`For example, the ID generator 315 may prefetch all classes embodied in or identified by
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`the JavaTM applet bytecode to generate the Downloadable ID. Similarly, the ID generator
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`315 may retrieve all components listed in the INF file for an ActiveXm control to
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`compute a Downloadable ID. Accordingly, the Doumloadable ID for the Downloadable
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`will be the same each time the ID generator 315 receives the same Downloadable. The
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`ID generator 315 adds the generated Downloadable ID to the list of known
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`Downloadables 307 (if it is not already listed). The ID generator 315 then forwards the
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`Downloadable and Downloadable ID to the policy finder 317.
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`The policy finder 317 uses the userID of the intended user and the Downloadable
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`ID to select the specific security policy 305 that shall be applied on the received
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`Downloadable. If there is a specific policy 305 that was defined for the user (or for one
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`of its super groups) and the Downloadable, then the policy is selected. Otherwise the
`generic policy 305 that-was defined for the user (or for one ofits super groups) is
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`selected. The policy finder 31'}:l then sends the policy to the first comparator 320.
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`The first comparator 320 receives the Downloadable, the Downloadable ID and
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`the security policy 305 from the policy finder 31?. The first comparator 320 examines
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`the security policy 305 to determine which steps are needed for allowing the
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`Downloadable. For example, the security policy 305 may indicate that, in order to allow
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`this Downloadable, it must pass all four paths, Path 1, Path 2, Path 3 and Path 4.
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`Alternatively, the security policy 305 may indicate that to allow the Downloadable, the it
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`must pass oniy one of the paths. The first comparator 320 responds by forwarding the
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`proper information to the paths identified by the security policy 305.
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`Path 1
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`In path 1, the first comparator 320 checks the policy selector 405 of the security
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`policy 305 that was received from the policy finder 317. If the policy selector 405 is
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`. either “Allowed" or “Blocked,” then the first comparator 320 forwards this result
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`directly to the logical engine 333. Otherwise, the first comparator 320 invokes the
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`comparisons in path2 andfor path 3 andlor path 4 based on the contents of policy selector
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`405. It will be appreciated that the first comparator 320 itself compares the
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`Downloadable ID against the lists of Downloadables to allow or block per administrative
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`override 425. That is, the system security administrator can define specific
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`Downloadables as “Allowed” or “Blocked.”
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`Alternatively, the logical engine 333 may receive the results of each of the paths
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`and 'based on the policy selector 405 may institute the final determination whether to
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`allow or block the Downloadable. The first comparator 320 informs the logical engine
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`333 of the results of its comparison.
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`Bath;
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`In path 2, the first comparator 320 delivers the Downloadable, the Downloadable
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`ID and the security policy 305 to the code scanner 325. If the DSP data 310 of the
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`received Downloadable is known, the code scanner 325 retrieves and forwards the
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`information to the ACL comparator 330. Otherwise, the code scanner 325 resolves the
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`DSP data 310. That is, the code scanner 325 uses conventional parsing techniques to
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`decompose the code (including all prefetched components) of the Downloadable into the
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`DSP data 310. DSP data 310 includes the list of all potentially hostile or suspicious
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`computer operations that may be attempted by a specific Downloadable 307, and may
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`also include the respective arguments of these Operations. For example, DSP data 310
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`may include a READ from a specific file, a SEND to an unresolved host, etc. The code
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`scanner 325 may generate the DSP data 310 as a list of all operations in the
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`Downloadable code which could ever be deemed potentially hostile and a list of all files
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`to be accessed by the Downloadable code. It will be appreciated that the code scanner
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`325 may search the code for any pattern, which is undesirable or suggests that the code
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`was written by a hacker.
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`An Exam 1e List of O erations Deemed Potentiall Hostile
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`0
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`File operations: READ a file, WRITE a file;
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`0 Network operations: LISTEN on a socket, CONNECT to a socket, SEND data,
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`RECEIVE data, VIEW INTRANET;
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`I Registry operations: READ a registry item, WRITE a registry item;
`0 Operating system Operations: EXIT WINDOWS, EXIT BROWSER, START
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`PROCESSITHREAD, KILL PROCESSITHREAD, CHANGE PROCES SITI-IREAD
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`PRIORITY, DYNAMICALLY LOAD A CLASSILIBRARY, etc.; and
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`a Resource usage thresholds: memory, CPU, graphics, etc.
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`In the preferred embodiment, the code scanner 325 performs a full-content inspection.
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`15
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`However, for improved speed but reduced security, the code scanner 325 may examine
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`only a portion of the Downloadable such as the Downloadable header. The code scanner
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`325 then stores the DSP data into DSP data 310 (corresponding to its Downloadable ID),
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`and sends the Downloadable, the DSP data to the ACL comparator 330 for comparison
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`with the security policy 305.
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`The ACL comparator 330 receives the Downloadable, the corresponding DSP
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`data and the security policy 305 from the code scanner 325, and compares the DSP data
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`against the security policy 305. That is, the ACL comparator 330 compares the DSP data
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`of the received Downloadable against the access control lists 410 in the received security
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`policy 305. The access control list 410 contains criteria indicating whether to pass or fail
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`the Downloadable. For example, an access control list may indicate that the
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`Downloadable fails if the DSP data includes a WRITE command to a system file. The
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`ACL comparator 330 sends its results to the logical engine 333.
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`Path 3:
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`In path 3, the certificate scanner 340 determines whether the received
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`Downloadable was signed by a certificate authority, such as VeriSign, Inc, and scans for
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`a certificate embodied in the Downloadable. The certificate scanner 340 forwards the
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`found certificate to the certificate comparator 345. The certificate comparator 345
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`retrieves known certificates 309 that were deemed trustworthy by the security
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`admmistrator and compares the found certificate with the known certificates 309 to
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`determine whether the Downloadable was signed by a trusted certificate. The certificate
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`comparator 345 sends the results to the logical engine 333.
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`Pat—114:
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`In path 4, the URL comparator 350 examines the URL identifying the source of
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`the Downloadable against URLs stored in the URL rule base 420 to determine whether
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`the Downloadable comes from a trusted source. Based on the security policy 305, the
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`URL comparator 350 may deem the Downloadable suspicious if the Downloadable
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`comes from an untrustworthy source or if the Downloadable did not come from a trusted
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`source. For example, if the Downloadable comes from a known hacker, then the
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`Downloadable may be deemed suspicious and presumed hostile. The URL comparator
`
`350 sends its results to the logical engine 333.
`
`The logical engine 333 examines the results of each of the paths and the policy
`
`selector 405 in the security policy 305 to determine whether to allow or block the
`
`Downloadable. The-policy selector 405 includes a logical expression of the results
`received from each ofthe paths. For example, the logical engine 333 may block a
`
`Downloadable if it fails any one of the paths, i.e., if the Downloadable is known hostile
`
`(Path 1), ifthe Downloadable may request suspicious operations (Path 2), ifthe
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`Downloadable was not signed by a trusted certificate authority (Path 3), or if the
`
`Domfloadable-did-came from an untrustworthy source (Path 4). The logical engine 333
`
`may apply other logical expressions according to the policy selector 405 embodied in the
`
`security policy 305. If the policy selector 405 indicates that the Downloadable may pass,
`
`then the logical engine 333 passes the Downloadable to its intended recipient.
`
`Otherwise, if the policy selector 405 indicates that the Downloadable should be blocked,
`
`then the logical engine 333 forwards a non-hostile Downloadable to the intended
`
`recipient to inform the user that internal network security system 110 discarded the
`
`original Downloadable. Further, the logical engine 333 forwards a status report to the
`
`record-keeping engine 335, which stores the reports in event log 245 in the data storage
`
`device 230 for subsequent review, for example, by the MIS director.
`
`15
`
`20
`
`FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating details of the security management console
`
`120, which includes a security policy editor 505 coupled to the communications channel
`
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`PATENT
`
`135, an event log analysis engine 510 coupled between communications channel 135 and
`
`a user notification engine 515, and a Downloadable database review engine 520 coupled
`
`to the communications channel 135. The security management console 120 further
`
`includes computer components similar to the computer components illustrated in FIG. 2.
`
`The security policy editor 505 uses an IfO interface similar to HQ interface 215
`
`for enabling authorized user modification of the security policies 305. That is, the
`
`security policy editor 505 enables the authorized user to modify specific security policies
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`305 corresponding to the users 260, the default or generic security policy 305, the
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`Downloadables to block per administrative override, the Downloadables to allow per
`
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`administrative override, the trusted certificate'lists 415, the policy selectors 405, the
`
`access control lists 410, the URLs in the URL rule bases 420, etc. For example, if the
`
`authorized user learns of a new hostile Downloadable, then the user can add the
`
`Downloadable to the Downloadables-to block per system override.
`
`The event log analysis engine 510 examines the status reports contained in the
`
`15
`
`20
`
`event log 245 stored in the data storage device 23 0. The eyent log analysis engine 510
`
`determines whether notification of the user (e.g., the security system manager or MIS
`
`director) is warranted. For example, the event log analysis engine 510 may warrant user
`notification whenever ten (10) suspicious Downloadables have been discarded by
`
`internal network security system 110 within a thirty (30) minute period, thereby flagging
`
`a potential imminent security threat. Accordingly, the event log analysis engine 510
`
`instructs the user notification engine 515 to inform the user. The user notification engine
`
`515 may send an email via internal commmtications interface 220 or via external
`
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`communications interface 210 to the user, or may display a message on the user’s
`
`display device (not shown).
`
`FIG. 6A is a flowchart illustrating a method 600 for protecting an internal
`
`computer network 115 from suSpicious Downloadables. Method 600 begins with the ID
`
`generator 315 in step 602 receiving a Downloadable. The ID generator 315 in step 604
`
`generates a Downloadable ID identifying the received Downloadable, preferably, by
`
`generating a digital hash of the Downloadable code (including prefetched components).
`
`The policy finder 317 in step 606 finds the appropriate security policy 305
`
`10
`
`corresponding to the userID specifying intended recipient (or the group to which the
`
`intended recipient belongs) and the Downloadable. The selected security policy 305
`
`may be the default security policy 305. Step 606 is described in greater detail below
`
`with reference to FIG. 6B.
`
`The first comparator 320 in step 608 examines the lists of Downloadables to allow
`
`‘15
`
`or to block per administrative override 425 against the Downloadable ID of the incoming
`
`Downloadable to determine whether to allow the Downloadable automatically. If so,
`
`then in step 612 the first comparator 320 sends the results to the logical engine 333. If
`
`not, then the method 600 proceeds to step 610. In step 610, the first comparator 620
`
`examines the lists of Downloadables to block per administrative override 425 against the
`
`20
`
`Downloadable ID of the incoming Downloadable for determining whether to block the
`
`Downloadable automatically. If so, then the first comparator 420 in step 612 sends the
`
`results to the logical engine 333. Otherwise, method 600 proceeds to step 614.
`
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`In step 614, the first comparator 320 determines whether the security policy 305
`
`indicates that the Downloadable should be tested according to Path 4. If not, then
`
`method 600 jumps to step 618. If so, then the URL comparator 350 in step 616
`
`compares the URL embodied in the incoming Downloadable against the URLs of the
`
`URL rules bases 420, and then method 600 proceeds to step 618.
`
`In step 618, the first comparator 320 determines whether the security policy 305
`
`indicates that the Downloadable should be tested according to Path 2. If not, then
`
`method 600 jumps to step 620. Otherwise, the code scanner 235 in step 626 examines
`
`the DSP data 310 based on the Downloadable ID of the incoming Downloadable to
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`determine whether the Downloadable has been previously decomposed. If so, then
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`method 600 jumps to step 630. Otherwise, the code scanner 325 in step 628 decomposes
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`the Downloadable into DSP data. Downloadable decomposition'is described in greater
`
`detail with reference to FIG. 7. In step 630, the ACL comparator 330 compares the DSP
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`data of the incoming Downloadable against the access control lists 410 (which include
`
`15
`
`the criteria necessary for. the Downloadable to fail or pass the test).
`
`In step 620, the first comparator 320 determines whether the security policy 305
`
`indicates that the Downloadable should be tested according to Path 3. If not, then
`
`method 600 returns to step 612 to send the results of each ofthe test performed to the
`
`logical engine 333. Otherwise, the certificate scanner 622 in step 622 scans the
`
`20
`
`.Downloadable for an embodied certificate. The certificate comparator 345 in step 624
`
`retrieves trusted certificates from the trusted certificate lists (TCL) 415 and compares the
`
`embodied certificate with the trusted certificates to determine whether the Downloadabie
`
`has been signed by a trusted source. Method 600 then proceeds to step 612 by the
`
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`18
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`
`PATENT
`
`certificate scanner 345 sending the results of each of the paths taken to the logical engine
`
`333. The operations of the logical engine 333 are described in greater detail below with
`
`reference to FIG. 6C. Method 600 then ends.
`
`One skilled in the art will recognize that the tests may be performed in a different
`
`order, and that each of the tests need not be performed. Further, one skilled in the art
`
`will recognize that, although path 1 is described in FIG. 6A as an automatic allowance or
`
`blocking, the results of Path 1 may be another predicate to be applied by the logical
`
`engine 333. Further, although the tests are shown serially in FIG. 6A, the tests may be
`
`performed in parallel as illustrated in FIG. 3.
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`FIG. 6B is a flowchart illustrating details of step 606 of FIG. 6A (referred to
`
`herein as method 606). Method 606 begins with the policy finder 317 in step 650
`
`determining whether security policies 305 include a specific security policy
`
`corresponding to the userID and the Downloadable. If so, then the policy finder 317 in
`
`15
`
`step 654 fetches the corresponding specific policy 305. If not, then the policy finder 317
`
`in step 652 fetches the default or generic security policy 305 corresponding to the
`
`userID. Method 606 then ends.
`
`FIG. 6C is a flowchart illustrating details of a method 655 for determining
`
`20
`
`whether to allow or to block the incoming Downloadable. Method 655 begins with the
`
`logical engine 333 in step 660 receiving the results from the first comparator 320, from
`
`the ACL comparator 330, from the certificate comparator 345 and from the URL
`
`comparator 350. The logical engine 333 in step 662 compares the results with the policy
`
`13111248310100
`1 10697” 556!40492.00002
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`PATENT
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`selector 405 embodied in the security policy 305, and in step 664 determines whether the
`
`policy selector 405 confirms the pass. For example, the policy selector 405 may indicate
`that the logical engine 333 pass the Downloadable if it passes one ofthe tests ofPath 1,
`
`Path 2, Path 3 and Path 4. If the policy selector 405 indicates that the Downloadable
`
`should pass, then the logical engine 333 in step 666 passes the Downloadable to the
`
`intended recipient. In step 668, the logical engine 333 sends the results to the record-
`
`keeping engine 335, which in turn stores the results in

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