throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper No. 7
`
` Entered: March 11, 2016
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`SYMANTEC CORP.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`____________
`
`
`Before JAMES B. ARPIN, ZHENYU YANG, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
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`

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`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Symantec (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
`inter partes review pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311 of claims 1, 7, 11, 15, 16,
`41, and 43 of Patent No. US 6,154,844 to Touboul et al. (Ex. 1001, “the ’844
`patent”). Pet. 1. Finjan, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
`Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We review the Petition under
`35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be
`instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner
`would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the
`petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`For the reasons that follow and on this record, we are not persuaded
`that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing
`the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds.
`Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review.
`
`A. The ’844 Patent
`
`The ’844 patent, titled “System and Method for Attaching a
`Downloadable Security Profile to a Downloadable,” issued November 28,
`2000, from U.S. Patent Application No. 08/995,648 (“the ’648 application”),
`filed December 22, 1997. Ex. 1001, [21], [22], [45], [54].
`The ’844 patent is directed to systems and methods “for attaching a
`Downloadable security profile to a Downloadable to facilitate the protection
`of computers and networks from a hostile Downloadable.” Ex. 1001,
`1:23–27. “A ‘Downloadable’ is an executable application program . . .
`downloaded from a source computer and run on [a] destination computer.”
`Id. at 1:44–47. “Examples of Downloadables include Java™ applets . . . ,
`
`
`
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`JavaScript™ scripts . . . , ActiveX™ controls . . . , and Visual Basic
`[scripts].” Id. at 1:49–55. “Downloadables may also include plugins, which
`add to the functionality of an already existing application program.” Id. at
`1:56–57.
`According to the ’844 patent, “the Internet has become a major source
`of many system damaging and system fatal application programs, commonly
`referred to as ‘viruses,’” and “programmers continue to design computer and
`computer network security systems for blocking these viruses.” Id. at
`1:32–39. Although, “[o]n the most part, these security systems have been
`relatively successful,” the ’844 patent explains, “these security systems are
`not configured to recognize computer viruses which have been attached to or
`configured as Downloadable application programs, commonly referred to as
`‘Downloadables.’” Id. at 1:40–44. The subject matter of the ’844 patent,
`accordingly, “provides systems for protecting a network from suspicious
`Downloadables.” Id. at 1:62–63. “The network system includes an
`inspector for linking Downloadable security profiles to a Downloadable, and
`a protection engine for examining the Downloadable and Downloadable
`security profiles to determine whether or not to trust the Downloadable
`security profiles.” Id. at 1:65–2:2. In particular, according to the ’844
`patent, the system and method “may examine the Downloadable code to
`determine whether the code contains any suspicious operations, and thus
`may allow or block the Downloadable accordingly.” Id. at 2:54–3:2.
`Further, “because the system and method . . . link a verifiable Downloadable
`security profile a Downloadable, the system and method may avoid
`decomposing the Downloadable into the Downloadable security profile on
`the fly.” Id. at 3:3–7.
`
`
`
`3
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`
`In the operation of a preferred embodiment of the ’844 patent, a
`developer obtains or generates an uninspected Downloadable and transmits
`the Downloadable to the inspector for “hostility inspection,” along with a
`developer certificate used to authenticate the developer. Ex. 1001, 3:55–65.
`The inspector includes a “content inspection engine” for examining a
`received Downloadable (e.g., the signed Downloadable from the developer),
`for generating a Downloadable security profile (“DSP”) based on a rules
`base, and for attaching the DSP to the Downloadable. Id. at 3:66–4:4. The
`DSP “preferably includes a list of all potentially hostile or suspicious
`computer operations that may be attempted by the Downloadable, and may
`also include the respective arguments of these operations.” Id. at 4:4–7.
`Preferably, the content inspection engine performs a full-content inspection,
`and generating a DSP includes searching the Downloadable code for
`undesirable patterns and patterns suggesting the code was written by a
`hacker, as well as comparing a Downloadable against Downloadables
`known to be hostile, Downloadables known to be non-hostile, and
`Downloadables previously examined by the content inspection engine. Id. at
`4:7–17. After performing content inspection, the inspector attaches an
`inspector certificate to the Downloadable, verifying the authenticity of the
`DSP attached to the Downloadable, and transmits the signed, inspected
`Downloadable to a web server. Id. at 4:65–5:5. The web server then may
`transmit the Downloadable via a network gateway to a computer client. Id.
`at 5:11–13.
`
`B. Priority Date of the ’844 Patent
`
`The Related U.S. Application Data field on the front page of the ’844
`patent includes a reference to Provisional Application No. 60/030,639 (“the
`
`
`
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`’639 provisional”), filed November 8, 1996. Ex. 1001, [60]. Separately, in
`a section entitled “PRIORITY REFERENCE TO RELATED
`APPLICATIONS,” the ’844 patent states that the ’648 application “claims
`benefit of and . . . incorporates by reference [the ’639 provisional]; patent
`application Ser. No. 08/964,388, . . . filed on Nov. 6, 1997 . . . ; and patent
`application Ser. No. 08/790,097, . . . filed on Jan. 29, 1997.” Id. at 1:7–17.
`That statement, however, does not indicate how the ’648 application and the
`earlier applications are related to one another (e.g., as continuations,
`continuations in part, or divisionals). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(2) (1997)
`(“Any nonprovisional application claiming the benefit of one or more prior
`filed copending nonprovisional applications . . . must contain or be amended
`to contain in the first sentence of the specification following the title a
`reference to each such prior application . . . indicating the relationship of the
`applications.”).
`In March 2003, Patent Owner filed a “Petition to Amend Priority
`Claims Listed in Patent” (Ex. 1005, 1–3). Patent Owner’s petition
`acknowledges that the ’639 provisional had expired before the filing date of
`the ’648 application and that priority “cannot be claimed directly from this
`application,” but asserts that “priority is still achieved through the chain of
`priority” and requests that “[r]eference to the indirect claim of priority to the
`provisional application” be added. Ex. 1005, 2. Notably, the proposed
`amendment also does not indicate the relationship among the applications as
`required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(a)(2).
`Petitioner points out that the Office never ruled upon Patent Owner’s
`petition and contends that the petition was improper, in any event, under the
`rules in effect at the time the ’648 application was filed. Pet. 4. Petitioner
`
`
`
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`IPR2015-01894
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`further contends that, even assuming arguendo that the ’844 patent did
`include a priority claim to the referenced earlier applications, the challenged
`claims still would not be entitled to the benefit of earlier priority based on
`any of those applications, because the specifications of those earlier
`applications differ from the ’648 application and lack sufficient disclosure
`with respect to the claimed subject matter of the ’844 patent to satisfy the
`requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Pet. 4–5. Patent Owner does not provide
`any substantive response to these arguments in its Preliminary Response, but
`merely contends that the ’844 patent claims the benefit of and incorporates
`the earlier applications by reference. Prelim. Resp. 3.
`In light of Petitioner’s arguments and the absence of any substantive
`response thereto by Patent Owner, we are persuaded that the present record
`does not establish that the challenged claims are entitled to the benefit of any
`filing date earlier than December 22, 1997. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am. Inc. v.
`iLife Techs., Case IPR2015-00106, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Apr. 29, 2015)
`(Paper 12) (“Patent Owner must come forward with evidence and
`argument—either in its Preliminary Response or, if trial is instituted, in its
`Response—showing why the challenged claims is supported by the written
`description of the priority application.”); Polaris Wireless, Inc. v.
`TruePosition, Inc., Case IPR2013-00323, slip op. at 29 (PTAB Jun. 4, 2013)
`(Paper 9) (explaining that there is no presumption of earlier priority where
`the specifications of the earlier applications are not the same).
`
`C. Related Proceedings
`
`The ’844 patent is the subject of a district court action between the
`parties, Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 3:14-cv-02998 (N.D. Cal. 2014), and
`also has been asserted in five other district court actions: Finjan, Inc. v.
`
`
`
`6
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`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`FireEye, Inc., 4:13-cv-03133 (N.D. Cal. 2013), Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat
`Systems, Inc., 5:13-cv-03999 (N.D. Cal. 2013), Finjan, Inc. v. Proofpoint,
`Inc., 3:13-cv-005808 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 3:14-cv-
`01197 (N.D. Cal. 2014), and Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 5:15-
`cv-03295 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Pet. 1; Paper 4, 1. Petitioner also has filed
`petitions seeking inter partes review of other patents involved in the above-
`referenced Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp. district court action. Pet. 1. Blue
`Coat Systems, Inc. also has filed a petition seeking inter partes review of the
`’844 patent on the grounds as presented in the instant Petition. Case
`IPR2016-00498, Paper 3.
`
`D. Illustrative Claim
`
`Among the challenged claims, claims 1, 15, 41, and 43 are
`independent. Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below:
`1. A method comprising:
`receiving by an inspector a Downloadable;
`generating by the inspector a first Downloadable security
`profile that identifies suspicious code in the received
`Downloadable; and
`linking by the inspector the first Downloadable security profile
`to the Downloadable before a web server makes the
`Downloadable available to Web clients.
`Ex. 1001, 11:13–20. Independent claims 15 (inspector system), 41
`(computer-readable storage medium), and 43 (inspector system)
`include similar limitations. Id. at 11:62–12:2, 14:8–18, 14:35–42.
`Each of claims 7 and 11 depends directly from independent claim 1,
`and claim 16 depends from independent claim 15.
`
`
`
`7
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`
`E. References Relied Upon
`
`Petitioner relies on the following references:
`
`Exhibit
`
`Reference
`
`1006 US 5,825,877, issued Oct. 20, 1998 (filed June 11, 1996)
`(“Dan”)
`
`1007 US 5,978,484, issued Nov. 2, 1999 (filed Apr. 25, 1996)
`(“Apperson”)
`
`1008 US 5,313,616, issued May 17, 1994 (“Cline”)
`
`1009 US 5,623,600, issued Apr. 22, 1997 (filed Sept. 26, 1995)
`(“Ji”)
`
`1010 Rangachari Anand et al., A Flexible Security Model for
`Using Internet Content, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y PROC.
`16TH SYMP. ON RELIABLE DISTRIBUTED SYS. (1997)
`(“Anand”)
`
`Pet. 6–7. Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Jack W. Davidson,
`Ph.D. (Ex. 1017).
`
`F. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`Petitioner challenges the patentability of the challenged claims on the
`following grounds:
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Basis
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Dan
`
`§ 103
`
`1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 41, and 43
`
`Apperson, Cline, and Ji
`
`§ 103
`
`1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 41, and 43
`
`Anand and Cline
`
`§ 103
`
`1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 41, and 43
`
`Pet. 8.
`
`
`
`8
`
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`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review proceeding, claims of an unexpired patent
`are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification
`of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); In re Cuozzo
`Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted
`sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). Under
`this standard, we presume that claim terms have their ordinary and
`customary meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that
`the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). A patentee, however, may rebut this
`presumption by acting as his own lexicographer, providing a definition of
`the term in the specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Petitioner proposes constructions for three limitations recited in
`means-plus-function format in independent claim 43: “means for receiving,”
`“means for generating,” and “means for linking.” Pet. 14–17. Patent Owner
`responds to each of Petitioner’s proposed constructions, offering competing
`constructions for the second and third of those limitations. Prelim. Resp.
`5–10. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3), the parties identify specific
`portions of the ’844 patent’s specification that they allege describe the
`structures corresponding to the claimed functions. Neither party, however,
`explains how the construction of these limitations is material to our decision
`of whether to institute a trial. On this record and for purposes of this
`Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.
`
`
`
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`See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
`1999) (stating that claim terms need only be construed to the extent
`necessary to resolve the controversy).
`
`B. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`1. Overview
`
`Petitioner argues that claims 1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 41, and 43 of the ’844
`patent are rendered obvious by the references described above. See supra
`Sec. I.F. A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such
`that the subject matter[,] as a whole[,] would have been obvious at the time
`the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
`said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
`406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of
`underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of
`the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
`prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art1; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations.2 Graham v. John Deere
`Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). On this record and for the reasons set forth
`below, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable
`
`
`1 Petitioner proposes a definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.
`Pet. 13–14; see Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 27–29. Patent Owner does not challenge this
`definition. For purposes of this Decision and to the extent necessary, we
`adopt Petitioner’s definition.
`2 Although Patent Owner presents arguments regarding secondary
`considerations (Prelim. Resp. 45–48), we need not reach those arguments
`because we find that Petitioner’s evidence and arguments regarding the
`obviousness of the challenged claims are deficient.
`
`
`
`10
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`likelihood of prevailing in the challenges to claims 1, 7, 11, 15, 16, 41, and
`43 of the ’844 patent.
`
`2. Obviousness over Dan
`
`a. Dan
`
`Dan teaches a form of authentication in which a trusted third party,
`referred to in a preferred embodiment as a certification agency (“CA”), signs
`a certificate to identify the author of a program and to secure its integrity.
`Ex. 1006, 1:40–43, 49–51. The program code is associated with the
`certificate and an access control list (“ACL”). Id. at 1:43–45. The ACL
`describes the permissions and resources required by the code and is provided
`by the developer (referred to as the “code production system,” or “CPS”).
`Id. at 1:45–51, 2:20–28. The ACL also includes a Logical Resource Table
`(“LRT”), which “contains a row for each call to an external routine required
`by the code,” along with a listing of associated parameters, as well as a
`Physical Resources Table (“PRT”), containing the physical resources
`required by the code. Id. at 3:49–4:15. Once the CA issues the certificate, it
`is not possible for any party to modify either the code or the ACL without
`invalidating the certificate. Id. at 1:51–55. A client downloading the code
`or ACL can verify the integrity of the code and ACL, and the system can
`enforce the access list, such that the permissions and resources are not
`exceeded. Id. at 1:56–59.
`b. Discussion
`Petitioner contends that Dan renders obvious each of claims 1, 7, 11,
`15, 16, 41, and 43 of the ’844 patent. Pet. 17–30. Petitioner equates the
`program code in Dan with the “Downloadable” recited in the challenged
`
`
`
`11
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`claims, Dan’s CA with the claimed “inspector,” and the external routines
`identified by the LRT of Dan’s ACL with “suspicious code.” Id. at 19–23.
`Petitioner variously identifies the ACL, PRT, and LRT tables as the claimed
`DSP that identifies suspicious code in the Downloadable. Id. at 23–24.
`Petitioner contends that, “[a]lthough Dan does not expressly teach that this
`[DSP] is generated by the CA (i.e., inspector), this would have been
`obvious” to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 24. Petitioner
`explains:
`Dan teaches that the CA (i.e., inspector) can verify an ACL (i.e.,
`Downloadable security profile) associated with a Downloadable
`provided by a Code Production System (CPS). [Ex. 1006,] 4:19–
`25, 2:18–43. In particular, Dan teaches that this verification of
`the ACL by the CA may be used as an alternative to enforcement
`by a client. [Id. at] 4:23–25. Thus, a [person of ordinary skill in
`the art] would have understood that such verification at the CA
`could be performed in the same manner as the enforcement at the
`client using the functions associated with the ACL enforcer. [Id.
`at] 3:38–41 (“Before allowing access to any resource, the
`executor invokes the ACL enforcer for checking the validity of
`the access.”), 4:59–61, 5:5–10, and 5:17–22; [Ex. 1017] ¶ 116–
`118 (explaining that enforcement is akin to verification).
`In particular, it would have been obvious to a [person of
`ordinary skill in the art] that these same verification/enforcement
`techniques (e.g., static and dynamic code analyzes) could be used
`by the CA in Dan to generate the ACL (i.e., Downloadable
`security profile) instead of verifying an existing ACL that was
`provided by a CPS. [Id. at] ¶ 119. A [person of ordinary skill in
`the art] would have been motivated
`to generate
`the
`Downloadable security profile at the CA for a number of reasons,
`including in situations where the CPS is untrusted or does not
`provide an ACL. [Id. at] ¶ 120.
`Pet. 24–25.
`
`
`
`12
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`
`Petitioner also asserts that, because Dan teaches that the CA links the
`ACL to the program code before the code is made available from a server to
`clients, Dan teaches “linking [by the inspector] the first DSP to the
`Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available to
`web clients,” as required by each of the challenged independent claims. Id.
`at 26–27.
`Patent Owner responds, inter alia, that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated that Dan discloses either “[means for] generating [by the
`inspector] a first Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious
`code in the received Downloadable” or “[means for] linking the first
`Downloadable security profile to the Downloadable before a web server
`makes the Downloadable available to web clients,” as required by each of
`the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 12–20.
`With respect to the “generating” step, Patent Owner raises four
`arguments: First, ACLs are not DSPs, and Petitioner’s broad interpretation
`of DSP is “completely at odds” with the teachings of the ’844 patent and
`U.S. Patent No. 6,092,194 (Ex. 1003, “the ’194 patent”), incorporated by
`reference therein,3 which demonstrate that ACLs not only are distinct from
`DSPs, but are instead what the generated DSPs are compared against. Id. at
`13–14 (citing Ex. 1003, 6:5–19, Fig. 3). Second, ACLs, including Dan’s
`ACL, are not DSPs, because they do not identify suspicious code in the
`received Downloadable. Id. at 14. Whereas Petitioner relies on the
`existence of an LRT in ACL to explain how the ACL identifies suspicious
`
`
`3 The ’194 patent issued from the ’388 application, which as noted above, is
`stated to be incorporated by reference in the ’844 patent. See Ex. 1003, [21];
`Ex. 1001, 1:12–15.
`
`
`
`13
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`code in the received Downloadable, Patent Owner contends, Dan’s LRT
`merely contains the logical resources “required” by the code, and nowhere
`does Dan state that the LRT further includes identification of suspicious
`code for any of the required calls. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 3:49–66). Third,
`“nothing suggests that Dan discloses an inspector that generates the claimed
`DSP.” Id. at 16. Whereas “Petitioner relies on Dan’s [CA] to be the
`claimed inspector and the ACL to be the claimed DSP that identifies
`suspicious code,” Patent Owner continues, “the Petition acknowledges that
`the Dan’s [CA] never generates the Dan’s ACL,” and “[i]ndeed, Dan’s [CA]
`is designed to avoid any need to ever generate an ACL as they are always
`received from the code producer who authored of the associated code.” Id.
`(citing Pet. 20, 24; Ex. 1006, 2:25–37, Fig. 1). Finally, Patent Owner
`contends that Dan’s “ACL enforcer” does not generate a DSP, but “only
`‘ensures that the permissions and resources specified in the ACL for the
`code are provided and no additional permissions/resources are allowed.’”
`Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1006, 4:15–18).
`With respect to the “linking” step, Patent Owner contends that, at least
`because “Dan does not disclose generating a first Downloadable security
`profile that identifies suspicious code in the received Downloadable,” Dan
`also “cannot disclose [‘]linking the first Downloadable security profile to the
`Downloadable before a web server makes the Downloadable available to
`web clients.’” Id. at 20.
`We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated on this record that Dan teaches or suggests an inspector
`generating a DSP that identifies suspicious code in a received
`Downloadable, and that Dan, therefore, also does not teach or suggest
`
`
`
`14
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`linking such a DSP to the Downloadable. Id. at 12–20. The portions of Dan
`cited by Petitioner describe methods and systems in which a developer or
`code producer (i.e., Dan’s CPS) provides an ACL to a certification agency
`(Dan’s CA) along with a program for certification. See, e.g., Ex. 1006,
`1:45–51, 2:20–28. Whereas Petitioner identifies the CA as the claimed
`“inspector” and the received program as the claimed “Downloadable” (Pet.
`20), there is no indication in the cited portions of Dan that the CA “identifies
`suspicious code” in the received program. Rather, the CA is disclosed to
`sign a certificate identifying the author of a program and to secure the
`integrity of the program and its ACL. Ex. 1006, 1:40–43, 1:49–51, 2:34–37.
`Neither of those functions requires inspecting the content of the code to
`identify suspicious code. And in fact, we discern nothing in Dan that would
`preclude Dan’s CA from providing a signed certificate if a CPS were to
`provide to the CA even code infected with a known virus, so long as the
`CPS also provided therewith an ACL accurately identifying the permissions
`and resources required by the code.
`Moreover, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that it
`would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the
`“same verification/enforcement techniques (e.g., static and dynamic code
`analyzes [sic]) could be used by the CA in Dan to generate the ACL (i.e.,
`Downloadable security profile) instead of verifying an existing ACL that
`was provided by a CPS.” Pet. 25. Dan teaches that “ACL enforcement may
`be static or dynamic” (Ex. 1006, 4:19 (emphasis added)), not “static and
`dynamic code analy[sis],” as Petitioner suggests (Pet. 25). Whereas
`Petitioner cites Dr. Davidson’s declaration as “explaining that enforcement
`is akin to verification” (Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 116–18)) we find on this
`
`
`
`15
`
`Patent Owner Finjan, Inc. - Ex. 2013, p. 15
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`record no evidence suggesting that either enforcement or verification is akin
`to code analysis. Additionally, although the static and dynamic enforcement
`methods described by Dan differ in the location and timing of the described
`enforcement function (i.e., at the CA before execution vs. at the client
`system at the time of execution) (Ex. 1006, 4:19–26), we discern no
`evidence that either method of ACL enforcement involves generating a DSP
`that identifies suspicious code.
`On this record, Petitioner has not identified sufficient evidence that
`Dan teaches or suggests all of the limitations recited in independent claims
`1, 15, 41, and 43, and, in particular, “generat[ing] . . . a first Downloadable
`security profile that identifies suspicious code in [a] Downloadable” and
`“linking . . . the first Downloadable security profile to the Downloadable
`before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.”
`Consequently, we are not persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail at trial in showing that the subject
`matter of those claims or of dependent claims 7, 11, or 16 would have been
`obvious over Dan.
`
`3. Obviousness over Apperson, Ji, and Cline
`
`a. Apperson
`
`Apperson relates generally to a “method and system for distributing
`and executing executable code,” wherein, before sending the code to a
`client, a “distributing authority” associates a “privilege request code” with
`the executable code. Ex. 1007, Abst. The privilege request code indicates
`“a set of privileges or privilege categories that the executable code might
`perform on the client machine” during execution, including, for example,
`
`
`
`16
`
`Patent Owner Finjan, Inc. - Ex. 2013, p. 16
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`file input/output, network operations, registry read/write rights, graphics
`operations, window management operations, and user list read/write rights.
`Id. at Abst., 2:44–47, 4:33–41. To prevent modification of the software code
`and associated privilege request code, “[t]he distributing authority digitally
`signs the executable code and the privilege request code, and also provides a
`certificate that can be traced by the client to a known certifying authority.”
`Id. at 2:47–53. As part of the signing process, Apperson teaches that the
`privilege request code may be concatenated with (appended to) the code. Id.
`at 4:44–54, 8:17–25, Fig. 2.
`
`b. Ji
`
`Ji describes a system for detecting and eliminating viruses on a
`computer network, wherein a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) proxy server is
`used to scan incoming and outgoing files for viruses and to transfer those
`files if they do not contain viruses. Ex. 1009, Abst. Ji discloses a method
`for processing a file before transmission into or from a network, including
`the steps of receiving a data transfer command and file name; transferring
`the file to a proxy server or system node; performing virus detection on the
`file; and determining whether the file contains any viruses. Id. at Abst.,
`3:4–11. If the file does not contain any viruses, the file is transferred from
`the system to a recipient node. Id. at Abst., 3:11–12. If the file does
`contains a virus, the file is deleted or some other preset action is performed.
`Id. at Abst., 3:13–14.
`
`c. Cline
`
`Cline describes a method for certifying the portability of software
`between computer systems, including certification tests to ensure that
`
`
`
`17
`
`Patent Owner Finjan, Inc. - Ex. 2013, p. 17
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`application programs will run on any conforming computer system
`regardless of the vendor. Ex. 1008, 2:66–3:5. The certification tests include
`a static analysis, in which the object code of an application program is
`analyzed against a “conformance database” of allowable external calls to
`determine whether any illegal or erroneous calls are being made, and a
`dynamic analysis, in which the application program is analyzed as it is being
`run to determine any runtime errors in the calls. Id. at 3:6–16. If no errors
`are detected in either analysis, the application program then is certified to be
`compatible and transportable without change between all certified
`compatible computer systems. Id. at 3:16–21.
`
`d. Discussion
`
`Petitioner contends that the combination of the teachings of Apperson,
`Ji, and Cline would have rendered obvious the subject matter of claims 1, 7,
`11, 15, 16, 41, and 43 of the ’844 patent. Pet. 30–52. In particular,
`Petitioner contends that Apperson’s distributing authority corresponds to the
`claimed inspector system and that Apperson describes the need for code
`inspection to ensure the safety of distributed code. Id. at 31. To the extent
`that Apperson does not explicitly disclose that the distributing authority
`“receives a Downloadable,” Petitioner contends that feature is taught by Ji.
`Id. at 33–34. Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious for a person
`of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Apperson and Ji,
`because both references are directed to protecting computer systems from
`viruses and malicious code, and such a combination would have merely
`amounted to combining well-known prior art elements. Id. at 34–35.
`Further, Petitioner asserts, to the extent that Apperson and Ji do not
`teach a content inspection engine to “generate” privilege request codes for a
`
`
`
`18
`
`Patent Owner Finjan, Inc. - Ex. 2013, p. 18
`
`

`

`IPR2015-01894
`Patent 6,154,844
`
`Downloadable, this feature is taught by Cline. Id. at 36. According to
`Petitioner, “Cline is concerned with verifying/certifying external calls made
`by and executable (i.e., those functions not defined within the executable
`itself) such as system calls and library calls,” and “[l]ike Apperson, Cline
`explains that these system calls correspond to the same types of ‘suspicious
`operations’ exemplified by the ’844 patent (e.g., network, window
`management, or file operations).” Id. at 36–37. Petitioner also contends it
`would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine
`the teachings of Apperson and Ji with those of Cline. Id. at 39. According
`to Petitioner, “Apperson in view of Ji teaches receiving a Downloadable
`over a network and associating it with a

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