Paper: 22
`Entered: February 14, 2019
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`RUIZ FOOD PRODUCTS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MACROPOINT LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2017-02016 (Patent 8,275,358 B1)
`IPR2017-02018 (Patent 9,429,659 B1)
`____________
`
`Before MEREDITH C. PETRAVICK, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`NATHAN A. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss and
`Terminating the Proceedings
`37 C.F.R. § 42.72
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-02016 (Patent 8,275,358 B1)
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`
`In the Petitions for Inter Partes Review (Paper1 2 or “Pet.”), Petitioner
`identified FourKites, Inc. as a real party in interest and acknowledged that
`FourKites had filed a complaint for declaratory judgment of invalidity
`against the patents challenged in these proceedings. Pet. 5–6. Petitioner
`argued, though, that FourKites’s declaratory-judgment complaint did not bar
`institution under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) because FourKites’s complaint had
`been dismissed without prejudice. Id. Among other authority, Petitioner
`cited the Federal Circuit’s decision in Graves v. Principi, 294 F.3d 1350,
`1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “dismissal of an action
`without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been
`brought” (id. (quoting Graves, 294 F.3d at 1356)), and cited a precedential
`Board decision to argue “dismissal without prejudice of the declaratory
`judgment ‘nullifies the effect of the service of the complaint and, as a
`consequence, does not bar’ Petitioner from pursuing this IPR under
`35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1).” Id. at 6 (quoting Oracle Corp. et al. v. Click-to-Call
`Tech. LP, Case IPR2013-00312, slip op. at 17 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2013) (Paper
`26) (precedential)).
`Patent Owner did not address § 315(a)(1) in its Preliminary Response,
`and the Board instituted inter partes review in these proceedings with
`Decisions mailed in March 2018. Paper 7. Subsequent to the institution of
`these proceedings, the Federal Circuit held that service of a complaint for
`patent infringement can trigger the time-bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)
`even if the complaint was later dismissed without prejudice, distinguishing
`Graves and vacating the final written decision in Oracle Corp. v. Click-to-
`
`
`1 We refer to the papers in IPR2017-02016 as representative, unless
`otherwise noted.
`
`
`
`2
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`
`Call Techs. LP, Case IPR2013-00312, 2014 WL 5490583 (PTAB Oct. 28,
`2014) (Paper No. 52). Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d
`1321, 1325, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2018) (en banc in relevant part).
`Patent Owner subsequently filed Motions to Dismiss, arguing that
`Click-to-Call reversed the precedent cited by Petitioner and that these
`proceedings are barred under § 315(a)(1) in light of Click-to-Call. Paper 18.
`For the reasons explained below, we determine the time-bar provision of
`§ 315(a)(1) applies to the facts at issue and the Board lacks jurisdiction over
`these proceedings. Accordingly, we terminate these proceedings. See
`37 C.F.R. § 42.72.
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`Section 315(a)(1) is titled “Inter Partes Review Barred by Civil
`Action” and reads as follows: “An inter partes review may not be instituted
`if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the
`petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity
`of a claim of the patent.” As noted in the Petition, it is undisputed that
`(i) FourKites, Inc. is a real party in interest to the Petitions filed in these
`proceedings, (ii) FourKites, Inc. filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
`judgment of invalidity of the challenged patents before the date on which the
`Petitions were filed, and (iii) FourKites, Inc.’s declaratory-judgment
`complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Pet. at 3, 5–6 (citing FourKites,
`Inc. v. MacroPoint, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-02703-CAB (N.D. Ohio)).
`Arguing that the en banc holding of Click-to-Call applies to both
`time-bar provisions of § 315,2 Patent Owner argues that the undisputed facts
`
`
`2 In addition to the time bar in § 315(a)(1), § 315(b) is titled “Patent Owner’s
`Action” and states that “[inter partes] review may not be instituted if the
`3
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`give rise to a time bar under § 315(a)(1). Paper 18, 1–3. According to
`Patent Owner, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Click-to-Call rejects the
`principle of a dismissal-without-prejudice exception to both time-bar
`provisions of § 315. Id.; Reply Br. 1–5.
`Petitioner argues that Click-to-Call is not applicable to § 315(a)(1)
`and that controlling authority provides that the dismissal without prejudice
`of FourKites’s complaint does not create a bar under § 315(a)(1). Paper 20
`at 1, 5–8; accord Pet. at 5–7. Specifically, Petitioner contends that for
`purposes of § 315(a)(1), controlling authority provides that dismissal
`without prejudice renders an action as if it had never been filed, and
`Petitioner argues that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Click-to-Call is
`strictly and purposely limited to § 315(b). Paper 20 at 1, 7–9 (citing Click-
`to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1334–36, 1345–46, 1348; Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration
`Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Clio USA, Inc. v. The Procter
`and Gamble Co., Case IPR2013-00438, slip op. at 8 (PTAB. Jan. 9, 2014)
`(Paper 9)).
`As alternative arguments, Petitioner asserts that FourKites’s complaint
`should not trigger the time bar of § 315(a)(1) because, according to
`Petitioner, (i) FourKites’s complaint was ostensibly a counterclaim within
`the meaning of § 315(a)(3) (id. at 13–14), (ii) Patent Owner waived its
`objections to institution by failing to raise § 315(a)(1) prior to institution of
`these proceedings (id. at 14–15), and (iii) Patent Owner had argued that the
`
`
`petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on
`which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served
`with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set
`forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under
`subsection (c).”
`
`
`
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`district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over FourKites’s complaint
`(id. at 12–13).
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Section 315(a)(1) and Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice
`
`
`
`1. Legal Standards
`
`With the relevant facts undisputed, Patent Owner’s Motion turns on
`interpretation and application of § 315(a)(1). See Paper 20 at 9 (“The
`question at this time is the statutory construction of § 315(a) . . . .”). “As in
`any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of
`the statute.” Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
`Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)). “The first step ‘is to determine
`whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
`regard to the particular dispute in the case.’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
`534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
`340 (1997)). “In so doing, we ‘must read the words in their context and with
`a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Click-to-Call, 899
`F.3d at 1329 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)
`(internal quotation omitted)). “Where a statute’s language carries a plain
`meaning, the duty of an administrative agency is to follow its commands as
`written . . . .” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 128 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
`
`2. The Time Bars of § 315
`
`“Section 315 governs the relationship between IPRs and other
`proceedings conducted outside the IPR proceeding.” Applications in
`Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
`
`
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`accord 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
`Kyl) (“Subsections (a) and (b) of sections 315 and 325 impose time limits
`and other restrictions when inter partes and post-grant review are sought in
`relation to litigation.”). Among other subsections, § 315(a)(1) and § 315(b)
`condition the Director’s authority to institute inter partes review on the
`timely filing of a petition as measured against civil actions filed in district
`court. Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1330 (citing Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom
`Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc)).
`For § 315(b), timeliness is measured from actions taken by a patent
`owner. Section 315(b) establishes a one-year period triggered from the date
`a patent owner effectively serves a complaint alleging infringement against
`the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner, and after the
`one-year period, the Director lacks authority to institute inter partes review
`from a petition filed by the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy
`challenging the asserted patent. Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1341; Wi-Fi One,
`878 F.3d at 1374.
`For § 315(a)(1), on the other hand, timeliness is measured from
`actions of a petitioner or real party in interest—the act of filing a civil action
`challenging the validity of a claim of the patent triggers the bar of
`§ 315(a)(1). Under the plain language of § 315(a)(1), the Director may not
`institute inter partes review if the petitioner or real party in interest filed a
`civil action challenging the validity of a patent claim before the petition’s
`filing date.
`Section 315(a) additionally addresses civil actions for patent invalidity
`in § 315(a)(2) and § 315(a)(3). In contrast to § 315(a)(1)’s bar against
`institution arising from civil actions filed before a petition’s filing date,
`
`
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`§ 315(a)(2) contemplates that a petitioner or real party in interest may file a
`civil action challenging the validity of the patent “on or after the date on
`which the petitioner files a petition for inter partes review of the patent.”
`The legislative history of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act explains
`that § 315(a)(2) was added to afford an accused infringer the opportunity to
`file a declaratory-judgment action in its choice of venue while also pursuing
`inter partes review, although § 315(a)(2) provides that the civil action will
`be automatically stayed. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
`(statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The purpose of allowing the declaratory-judgment
`action to be filed is to allow the accused infringer to file the first action and
`thus be presumptively entitled to his choice of venue.”).
`In addition, § 315(a)(3) provides an exception to the bar against
`institution in § 315(a)(1). Section 315(a)(3) provides that a counterclaim
`challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil
`action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of
`§ 315(a)(1). Such counterclaims are subject to the one-year period provided
`in § 315(b). See 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011 (statement of
`Sen. Kyl) (explaining that § 315(a) and § 325(a) “do not restrict the rights of
`an accused infringer who has been sued and is asserting invalidity in a
`counterclaim. That situation is governed by section 315(b) . . . .”).
`
`3. The Plain and Unambiguous Language of § 315
`
`The Federal Circuit analyzed the language of § 315(b) in Click-to-
`Call, finding the statutory language plain and unambiguous. 899 F.3d at
`1330–32. Although much of the analysis in Click-to-Call centered on the
`language “served with a complaint” in § 315(b), language which is not
`
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`included in § 315(a)(1), the Federal Circuit’s decision is instructive in our
`analysis of § 315(a)(1).
`First, the Federal Circuit noted that the statute does not contain any
`exceptions or exemptions for complaints served in civil actions that are
`subsequently dismissed, with or without prejudice. Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d
`at 1330. The statutory language of § 315(a)(1) also does not contain any
`exceptions or exemptions for complaints that are filed before a petition and
`later dismissed.
`Next, the Federal Circuit explained that § 315(b) does not contain any
`indication that application of its time bar is subject to any subsequent act or
`ruling. Id. The same is true for § 315(a)(1). Unlike § 315(a)(2) which
`expressly references dismissal of a petitioner’s civil action as one reason to
`lift the subsection’s automatic stay, nothing in § 315(a)(1) contains any
`indication that application of its time bar is subject to any subsequent act or
`ruling.
`As the Federal Circuit observed regarding § 315(b), Congress could
`have included an exception for actions that were filed but later dismissed
`without prejudice, but it did not. Id. at 1331. In contrast, Congress did
`address dismissal of a civil action in § 315(a)(2), but that subsection
`expressly applies to civil actions filed on or after the filing date of a petition.
`Id. Congress could have similarly addressed dismissal of a civil action filed
`before a petition’s filing date, but Congress did not include any similar
`language in § 315(a)(1).
`In sum, just as the Federal Circuit held that the language of § 315(b) is
`plain and unambiguous, we find no ambiguity in the statutory language of
`§ 315(a)(1). See Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1330–32. As written,
`
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`§ 315(a)(1) only considers whether a petitioner or a real party in interest
`filed a civil action challenging the validity of a patent claim before filing a
`petition for inter partes review of that patent. Because the language of
`§ 315(a)(1) carries a plain and unambiguous meaning when read in the
`context of the overall scheme of the America Invents Act, the Board is
`bound to apply § 315(a)(1) as written. SAS Inst, 128 S. Ct. at 1355; King,
`135 S. Ct. at 2489.
`
`4. The “Background Legal Principle” of Dismissal Nullifying Filing
`
`Without arguing that the statutory language is ambiguous, Petitioner
`contends that § 315(a)(1) does not apply here because of “a ‘background
`legal principle’ that dismissal of an action without prejudice leaves the
`action as if it had never been filed.” Paper 20 at 7; cf. id. at 1–2 (arguing
`that alternative to its position that dismissal without prejudice avoids the bar
`of § 315(a)(1), “the Board should find that the FourKites countersuit was not
`a ‘civil action’ for purposes of the statute” because it was a counterclaim
`under § 315(a)(3)). According to Petitioner, Click-to-Call rejected that
`background legal principle for § 315(b) but not for § 315(a)(1). Id. at 7.
`We disagree. Although Click-to-Call did not address § 315(a)(1),
`Click-to-Call rejected application of the purported background legal
`principle in the absence of ambiguity in statutory language. As explained in
`Click-to-Call, “where the statutory scheme is clear, we are not to ‘invent an
`atextual explanation for Congress’s drafting choices.’” 899 F.3d at 1335
`(quoting SAS, 128 S. Ct. at 1357). “Where, moreover, the proposed atextual
`explanation is the alleged existence of a ‘background legal principle,’ that
`
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`principle must be both firmly established and unequivocal before it can
`justify ignoring the plain text of the statute.” Id.
`The background legal principle on which Petitioner relies is the same
`background legal principle addressed in Click-to-Call—that a dismissal
`without prejudice leaves the parties in the same legal position as if the
`underlying complaint had never been filed. See id.; Paper 20 at 7.
`Addressing whether the background legal principle is “firmly established
`and unequivocal,” Click-to-Call explains that the background legal principle
`is “anything but unequivocal.” 899 F.3d at 1335. As such, even though
`Click-to-Call acknowledged that the background legal principle applies for
`certain other purposes, contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the background
`legal principle cannot justify applying an exception to the plain,
`unambiguous statutory language of § 315(a)(1). See id.
`Moreover, each of the prior Board decisions cited by Petitioner
`(Paper 20 at 8, 10–12) as supporting application of a dismissal-without-
`prejudice exception to § 315(a)(1) predates the en banc decision in Click-to-
`Call and relies on essentially the same reasoning rejected by the Federal
`Circuit. Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1333–35 (distinguishing Graves v.
`Principi, 294 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002) and Bonneville Assocs. Ltd. v.
`Barram, 165 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999), among other authority). In Click-
`to-Call, the Federal Circuit explained that the Board erred by relying on
`Graves, Bonneville, and similar authority to conclude that voluntary
`dismissal without prejudice of a civil action tolls § 315(b). 899 F.3d at
`1335. The Federal Circuit explained that Graves and Bonneville stand for
`the legal principle that voluntary dismissal does not toll a statute of
`limitations such that a subsequently filed action or appeal must still be
`
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`brought within the original limitations period; as stated by the Federal
`Circuit, the Board turned those decisions on their head by extending that
`principle to hold that it does toll the time bar of § 315(b) indefinitely. Id.
`Even though Click-to-Call did not directly address § 315(a)(1),
`contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the Click-to-Call reasoning applies
`equally to prior Board decisions that extended Graves and Bonneville to toll
`the application of § 315(a)(1)’s time bar.
`
`B. Petitioner’s Alternative Arguments
`
`1. FourKites’s Complaint as a “Counterclaim” Under § 315(a)(3)
`
`As noted above, § 315(a)(3) provides that “[a] counterclaim
`challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil
`action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of this
`subsection.” In other words, § 315(a)(3) provides that a counterclaim of
`invalidity does not constitute a civil action challenging the validity of a
`patent for the purposes of § 315(a)(1) and does not trigger the bar against
`institution in § 315(a)(1).
`According to Petitioner, “FourKites’[s] countersuit was a direct
`response to [Patent Owner’s] suit against [Petitioner]” and therefore
`FourKites’s complaint “would be considered a ‘counterclaim’ under the
`common legal definition of the word.” Paper 20 at 14. Petitioner cites no
`case law to support that argument, offering only a dictionary definition
`defining “counterclaim” as “[a] claim for relief asserted against an opposing
`party after an original claim has been made.” Id. (citing Ex. 1028 (excerpts
`of Black’s Law Dictionary 353 (7th ed. 1999))).
`
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`
`Beginning again with the statutory language, we find no ambiguity in
`the term “counterclaim” as used in § 315(a)(3). Even though it can be
`appropriate to look to dictionaries to discern the ordinary meaning of a term
`used in a statute (see Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 868
`F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), the ordinary meaning of “counterclaim”
`does not support Petitioner’s argument—the cited definition, like the Federal
`Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to counterclaims as claims “against an
`opposing party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13.
`FourKites was not a party to the lawsuit between Patent Owner and
`Petitioner in the Eastern District of Texas. To the contrary, FourKites filed
`its declaratory-judgment complaint (i) as the plaintiff, (ii) in as a separate
`action, (iii) in a different jurisdiction, the Northern District of Ohio,
`(iv) naming Patent Owner as the defendant. Ex. 1024 at 1 (“Plaintiff
`FourKites, Inc. (‘FourKites’), for its Complaint against Defendant
`MacroPoint LLC . . . .”).
`Regardless of the timing and the subjective motivation for filing the
`declaratory-judgment complaint, FourKites’s complaint was not a
`counterclaim under the ordinary meaning of the term, and we find no
`ambiguity in the statutory language that could justify interpreting
`“counterclaim” in § 315(a)(3) to include FourKites’s complaint. See
`157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
`(explaining that § 315(a) and § 325(a) “do not restrict the rights of an
`accused infringer who has been sued and is asserting invalidity in a
`counterclaim”).
`Petitioner also incorrectly asserts that “requir[ing] that a
`‘counterclaim’ be asserted in the same proceeding as an allegation of
`
`
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`infringement . . . would render § 315 internally inconsistent” because
`§ 315(a)(1) refers to a civil action filed by either a petitioner or its real party
`in interest, “[y]et, a real party in interest could not readily avail themselves
`to the protections of § 315(a)(3) under such an interpretation.” Paper 20 at
`14. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, § 315(a)(1) uses the terms
`“petitioner” and “real party in interest” without regard to whether one or the
`other (or both) is a defendant in a civil action for patent infringement. See
`35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (providing that any person who is not the owner of the
`patent may file a petition seeking inter partes review). Similarly,
`§ 315(a)(3) applies only to “counterclaims,” regardless of whether those
`counterclaims were filed by a petitioner or a petitioner’s real party in
`interest. Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments are inconsistent with the
`provision of § 315(a)(2), which provides that a petitioner or real party in
`interest may file a civil action challenging the validity of a claim without
`triggering the bar of § 315(a)(1), as long as the petitioner or real party in
`interest files its civil action on or after the filing date of the petition.
`Indeed, the provisions of § 315 are consistent and unambiguous. In
`sum, a petitioner or real party in interest is free to file claims of patent
`invalidity in a civil action; to avoid the bar of § 315(a)(1), however, those
`claims must be either filed as a counterclaim or filed on or after the filing
`date of the petition.
`
`2. Patent Owner’s Failure to Raise § 315(a)(1) Prior to Institution
`
`Petitioner argues that Patent Owner waived any objection to
`institution under § 315(a)(1) by failing to object prior to the Board’s
`Decision to Institute. Paper 20 at 14–15. As explained by the Federal
`
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`Circuit, however, the time bar of § 315(a)(1) is a jurisdictional issue. Wi-Fi
`One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en
`banc) (“the timely filing of a petition . . . is a condition precedent to the
`Director’s authority to act” and “sets limits on the Director’s statutory
`authority to institute”); accord Click-to-Call, 899 F.3d at 1325 (“Because the
`subject petition was time-barred, the Board lacked jurisdiction to institute
`[inter partes review] proceedings.”). Statutory jurisdiction cannot be
`waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject
`matter jurisdiction . . . can never be forfeited or waived.”); see GTNX, Inc. v.
`INTTRA, Inc., 789 F.3d 1309, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting an
`argument that the bar against institution of a post-grant review under
`§ 325(a)(1) had been waived).
`
`3. Arguments Raised in District Court
`
`Petitioner argues that because Patent Owner filed a motion to dismiss
`FourKites’s declaratory judgment complaint for lack of subject matter
`jurisdiction, that complaint should not constitute a “civil action” under
`§ 315(a)(1). Paper 20 at 12–13 (citing InVue Security Prods., Inc. v.
`Merchandising Techs., Inc., Case IPR2013-00122, slip op. at 9 (PTAB June
`27, 2013) (Paper 17)). As cited by Petitioner, the Board’s decision in InVue
`Security Products held that a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
`matter jurisdiction indicated that “the district court never had authority to
`hear the case” and that the time bar of § 315(a) did not apply “under the
`particular circumstances” of that case. IPR2013-00122, Paper 17 at 9 (citing
`Gould, Inc. v. U.S., 67 F.3d 925, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1995) and Graves, among
`other decision).
`
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`
`As an initial matter, we note that InVue Security Products was decided
`before the Federal Circuit’s decision in Click-to-Call. Without addressing
`how InView Security Products might be decided under the authority
`established by Click-to-Call, it suffices to say that the particular
`circumstances of a complaint dismissed for lack of subject matter
`jurisdiction are not before us here—the district court did not dismiss
`FourKites’s declaratory-judgment complaint for lack of subject matter
`jurisdiction.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`Having considered each of the parties’ arguments in light of the facts
`at issue and applicable law, we determine that institution of the Petitions was
`barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) and the Board therefore lacks jurisdiction
`over these proceedings.
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`It is:
`ORDERED that these proceedings are terminated.
`
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`IPR2017-02016 (Patent 8,275,358 B1)
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`For PETITIONER:
`
`James P. Murphy
`Matthew Frontz
`Ryan Murphy
`POLSINELLI PC
`jmurphy@polsinelli.com
`mfrontz@polsinelli.com
`rmurphy@polsinelli.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`Mark C. Johnson
`Luis A. Carrion
`Kyle Fleming
`RENNER OTTO
`mjohnson@rennerotto.com
`lcarrion@rennerotto.com
`kfleming@rennerotto.com
`
`
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`16
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