Case 1:16-cv-00681-RGA Document 67 Filed 11/28/17 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 3091
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELA WARE
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`NICHIA CORPORATION,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`TCL MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGY
`HOLDINGS, LTD., et al.,
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`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 16-681-RGA
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNEL LLP, Wilmington, DE; Brian
`P. Egan, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNEL LLP, Wilmington, DE; Kenneth A. Gallo,
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, Washington, DC; David Cole
`(argued), PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, Washington, DC;
`Catherine Nyarady (argued), PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, New
`York, NY; Daniel J. Klein, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, New
`York, NY.
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Arthur G. Connolly III, CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP, Wilmington, DE; Ryan P. Newell,
`CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP, Wilmington, DE; Mary Akhimien, CONNOLLY
`GALLAGHER LLP, Wilmington, DE; Raymond N. Nimrod, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
`& SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, NY; James M. Glass (argued), QUINN EMANUEL
`URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, NY; Gregory C. Wyckoff(argued), QUINN
`EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, New York, NY.
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
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`November~ 2017
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`NICHIA EX2022
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`Case 1:16-cv-00681-RGA Document 67 Filed 11/28/17 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 3092
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`ANDRE~~
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`Presently before the Court is the issue of claim construction of multiple terms in U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,915,631 (the "'631 patent"), U.S. Patent No. 7,901,959 (the '"959 patent"), U.S.
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`Patent No. 8,309,375 (the '"375 patent"), and U.S. Patent No. 7,855,092 (the '"092 patent").
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`The Court has considered the parties' joint claim construction brief (D.I. 54), associated joint
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`appendix (D.1. 55), and supplemental briefing. (D.I. 60, 63). The Court heard oral argument on
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`October 31, 2017. (D.I. 66) ("Tr.").
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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
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`On August 8, 2016, PlaintiffNichia Corp. filed this action against Defendants TCL
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`Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd. and TTE Technology, Inc. alleging infringement of the
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`'631, '959, '375, and '092 patents. (D.1. 1).
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`II.
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`LEGALSTANDARD
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`"It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to
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`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips v. AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (internal quotation marks omitted). "' [T]here is no magic formula or
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`catechism for conducting claim construction.' Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate
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`weight to appropriate sources 'in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law."'
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`SoflView LLC v. Apple Inc., 2013 WL 4758195, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1324) (alteration in original). When construing patent claims, a court considers the
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`literal language of the claim, the patent specification, and the prosecution history. Markman v.
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`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370
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`(1996). Of these sources, "the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction
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`analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`"[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning ....
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`[Which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
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`question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application."
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`Id at 1312-13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a
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`claim term is its meaning to [an] ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id at 1321
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`(internal quotation marks omitted). "In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as
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`understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim
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`construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted
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`meaning of commonly understood words." Id at 1314.
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`When a court relies solely upon the intrinsic evidence-the patent claims, the
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`specification, and the prosecution history-the court's construction is a determination of law.
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`See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). The court may also
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`make factual findings based upon consideration of extrinsic evidence, which "consists of all
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`evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
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`dictionaries, and learned treatises." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-19 (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). Extrinsic evidence may assist the court in understanding the underlying technology,
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`the meaning of terms to one skilled in the art, and how the invention works. Id Extrinsic
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`evidence, however, is less reliable and less useful in claim construction than the patent and its
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`prosecution history. Id.
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`"A claim construction is persuasive, not because it follows a certain rule, but because it
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`defines terms in the context of the whole patent." Ren is haw PLC v. Mar poss Societa 'per
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`Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that "a claim interpretation that would
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`exclude the inventor's device is rarely the correct interpretation." Osram GMBHv. Int'! Trade
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`Comm 'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`III.
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`PA TENTS AT ISSUE
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`1. The '631 Patent
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`The '631 patent is directed to a light emitting device containing a semiconductor light
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`emitting component and a phosphor. (' 631 patent, abstract). Claim 1 reads as follows:
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`1. A light emitting diode comprising:
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`an LED chip having an electrode;
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`a transparent material covering said LED chip, and
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`a phosphor contained in said transparent material and absorbing a part of
`light emitted by said LED chip and emitting light of wavelength different
`from that of the absorbed light;
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`wherein the main emission peak of said LED chip is within the range from
`400 nm to 530 nm,
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`a concentration of said phosphor in the vicinity of said LED chip is larger
`than a concentration of said phosphor in the vicinity of the surface of said
`transparent material, and
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`said phosphor diffuses the light from said LED chip and suppresses a
`formation of an emission pattern by a partial blocking of the light by said
`electrode.
`
`(Id. at 30:59-31 :6) (disputed terms italicized).
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`2. The '959 Patent
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`The '959 patent is also directed to a light emitting device containing a semiconductor
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`light emitting component and a phosphor. ('959 patent, abstract). Claim 1 reads as follows:
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`1. A liquid crystal display comprising:
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`a back light having a light emitting diode;
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`a liquid crystal injected between glass substrates; and
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`a color filter,
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`wherein said light emitting diode comprising:
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`an LED chip,
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`a transparent material covering said LED chip, and
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`a phosphor contained in said transparent material and absorbing a part of
`light emitted by said LED chip and emitting light of wavelength different
`from that of the absorbed light,
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`wherein said LED chip emits light having a spectrum with a peak in the
`range from 420 to 490 nm, said phosphor emits light having a spectrum
`with a peak in the range from 530 to 570 nm and a tail continuing beyond
`700 nm, and said spectrum of the light emitted from said phosphor and
`said spectrum of the light emitted from said LED chip overlap with each
`other to make a continuous combined spectrum,
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`wherein a concentration of said phosphor in the vicinity of said LED chip
`is larger than a concentration of said phosphor in the vicinity of the
`surface of said transparent material.
`
`(Id at 31 :2-24) (disputed terms italicized).
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`3. The '375 Patent
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`The '375 patent is directed to a method for manufacturing a light emitting device.
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`('375 patent, abstract). Claim 1 reads as follows:
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`1. A method for manufacturing a light emitting device comprising:
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`preparing a light emitting component having an active layer of a
`semiconductor, said active layer comprising a gallium nitride based
`semiconductor containing indium and being capable of emitting a blue
`color light having a spectrum with a peak wavelength within the range
`from 420 to 490 nm;
`
`preparing a phosphor capable of absorbing a part of the blue color light
`emitted from said light emitting component and emitting a yellow color
`light having a broad emission spectrum comprising a peak wavelength
`existing around the range from 510 to 600 nm and a tail continuing
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`beyond 700 run, wherein selection of said phosphor is controlled based on
`an emission wavelength of said light emitting component; and
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`combining said light emitting component and said phosphor so that the
`blue color light .from said light emitting component and the yellow color
`light .from said phosphor are mixed to make a white color light, wherein a
`chromaticity point of the white color light is on a straight line connecting a
`point of chromaticity of the blue color light and a point of chromaticity of
`the yellow color light, and
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`wherein a content of said phosphor in said light emitting device is selected
`to obtain a desired chromaticity of the white color light.
`
`(Id at 30:55-31:14) (disputed terms italicized).
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`4. The '092 Patent
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`The '092 patent is directed to a device for emitting white-color light. ('092 patent,
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`abstract). Claims 1, 8, and 9 contain disputed terms. Those claims read as follows:
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`1. A device for emitting white-color light comprising:
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`(i) a light emitting diode including:
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`an LED chip comprising a gallium nitride compound semiconductor
`containing indium and being capable of emitting a blue color light, and
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`a phosphor capable of absorbing a part of the blue color light and emitting
`a light having longer wavelength than the blue color light,
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`the blue color light and the light .from said phosphor being mixed to make
`the white-color,
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`(ii) a control unit for converting an input to pulse signals,
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`(iii) a driver receiving said pulse signals from said control unit to drive
`said LED chip,
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`wherein the brightness of the white-color light from said light emitting
`diode is controlled by a width of said pulse signals.
`
`(Id at 31:6-21) (disputed terms italicized).
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`8. The device according to claim 1, wherein said device comprises a dispersive
`member for dispersing light .from said light emitting diode.
`
`(Id at 32:1-3) (disputed terms italicized).
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`9. The device according to claim I, wherein said device comprises a reflective
`member for reflecting light from said light emitting diode.
`
`(Id. at 32:4-6) (disputed terms italicized).
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`IV.
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`CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`1. "transparent material" ('631 patent, claims 1 and 11; '959 patent, claims 1 and 9)
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`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: "unitary transparent material"
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`b. Defendants' proposed construction: no construction needed, alternatively, it
`should be defined according to its ordinary meaning: "material that allows light to
`pass through"
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`c. Court's construction: no construction needed
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`The parties dispute whether the "transparent material" recited in the '631 and '959
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`patents can be made of several components. (D.I. 54 at 21, 29, 33). They do not dispute the
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`meaning of "transparent." (See id. at 29; Tr. at 11: 19-21 ).
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`Plaintiff argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention,
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`would have understood "transparent material" to refer to "a unitary material that is transparent."
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`(D.I. 54 at 21). According to Plaintiff, nowhere does the '631 patent suggest that a "transparent
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`material" can be made of different components. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the two
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`types of transparent materials described in the patents, the "coating material" and the "molding
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`material," "are treated as distinct components of the invention in both the specification and
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`drawings." (Id. at 21-22).
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`Defendants respond that the '631 patent specification "explicitly describes 'the present
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`invention' as including non-unitary 'transparent materials.'" (Id. at 26). Defendants point to the
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`specification, which states in part, "Also, the molding material 104 may be made in a structure of
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`multiple layers of different materials being laminated." (Id. (quoting '631 patent, 16:58-62)).
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`I see no support in the intrinsic record for Plaintiffs attempt to import into the claims a
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`limitation that the "transparent material" be unitary. The patents never refer to a "unitary
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`transparent material," or anything of the sort. To the contrary, as Defendants note, both patents
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`describe a "molding material," that is, a "transparent material," being made "in a structure of
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`multiple layers of different materials being laminated." ('631patent,16:58-60; '959 patent,
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`16:58-60). That a "transparent material" can be made of "multiple layers of different materials"
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`suggests the material need not be unitary. Further, at the Markman hearing, Plaintiff seemed to
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`be referring to how the "transparent material" is manufactured, rather than to its structure. (See
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`Tr. at 18:3-8). The patents at issue, however, do not claim a process for manufacturing a
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`"transparent material." How the material is manufactured, therefore, has no bearing on the
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`construction of this term. I do not otherwise find it necessary to construe this term, since a jury
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`will have no trouble understanding it. The term is not limited, however, to a "transparent
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`material" that is "unitary," and Plaintiff is prohibited from making an argument to that effect.
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`2. "main emission peak" ('631 patent, claim 1)
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`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: plain and ordinary meaning, alternatively,
`"peak emission wavelength"
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`b. Defendants' proposed construction: "peak emission wavelength"
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`c. Court's construction: "peak emission wavelength"
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`Plaintiff argues there is no reason for the Court to construe this term. (D.I. 54 at 36).
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`Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants that their proposed construction may provide clarity to the
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`factfinder. (Id). If the Court construes "main emission peak," however, Plaintiff will accept
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`Defendants' proposed construction. (Id). Since the parties agree that "peak emission
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`wavelength" is a proper construction of this term, I will adopt that construction.
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`3. "diffuses" ('631 patent, claim 1; '959 patent, claims 5 and 13)
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`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: "scatters by reflections off of phosphor
`particles"
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`b. Defendants' proposed construction: no construction needed, alternatively,
`"scatters"
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`c. Court's construction: "scatters"
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`The parties dispute whether the term "diffuses" includes all possible methods of
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`diffusion, or only diffusion by reflection. (Id. at 37, 40). To support its proposed construction,
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`Plaintiff argues the phosphor's role of reflecting light "is important to achieving the further claim
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`limitation that the phosphor acts to 'suppress[] a formation of an emission pattern by a partial
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`blocking of the light by said electrode.'" (Id. at 39 (quoting '631patent,31:5-6)). Plaintiff
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`further asserts that its construction "is [] consistent with the common definition of the term
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`'diffuse' in this context, which focuses on the reflection oflight." (Id. (citing Merriam-
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`Webster's Dictionary)). According to Plaintiff, Defendants' proposed construction is wrong
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`because any scattering of light at "random trajectories by the phosphor is insufficient because it
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`does not scatter the unabsorbed light from the LED chip." (Id.).
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`Defendants counter that their proposed construction is consistent with the claim language,
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`which shows "a clear intent to distinguish between the broader term 'diffusion' from the
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`narrower one, 'reflection."' (Id. at 41). Defendants note that while claim 5 of the '959 patent
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`refers to the phosphor "diffus[ing]" light, claim 21 refers to the phosphor "reflect[ing]" light.
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`(Id.). Defendants further argue that the dictionary definition proffered by Plaintiff is misleading.
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`(Id. at 42). They explain that Plaintiff omits a portion of the definition describing diffusion by
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`refraction. (Id.). According to Defendants, other dictionaries, including those tailored to
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`physics, confirm that "diffuses" means "scatters." (Id). Finally, Defendants argue that
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`Plaintiffs construction is not supported by the specification, and the portions of the specification
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`to which Plaintiff cites "are completely irrelevant to specific diffusion techniques." (Id. at 43).
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`I will not adopt Plaintiffs proposed construction. Plaintiff appears to be asking the Court
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`to rewrite the claim language. The intrinsic record provides no support, however, for Plaintiffs
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`contention that when the patent uses the word "diffuses," the patentee actually meant "reflects."
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`Rather, as Defendants note, the '959 patent uses the terms in different contexts, which
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`demonstrates that the patentee understood them to have different meanings. While claim 5 of the
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`'959 patent refers to the phosphor "diffus[ing]" light, claim 21 refers to the phosphor
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`"reflect[ing]" light. ('959 patent, 31 :34, 32:43). Neither patent specification sheds any
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`additional light on the meaning of the term "diffuses." The parties agree, however, that
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`"diffuses" is a broader term than "reflects." (Tr. at 32:9-18; 39:10-12). They also agree that
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`"diffuses" ordinarily means "scatters." I will therefore construe "diffuses" to mean "scatters."
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`This construction is consistent with the use of the words "diffuses" and "reflects" in the '959
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`patent specification. The parties do not argue that "diffuses" should be construed differently for
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`the '631 patent.
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`4. "overlap with each other to make a continuous combined spectrum" ('631 patent,
`claim 3; '959 patent, claims 1 and 9)
`
`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: "partly extend over each other and each
`contributes a peak to a continuous combined emission spectrum of the light
`emitted by the light emitting diode"
`
`b. Defendants' proposed construction: no construction needed, otherwise it should
`be defined by its ordinary meaning: "partly extend over each other to make a
`continuous combined spectrum"
`
`c. Court's construction: "partly extend over each other to make a continuous
`combined spectrum"
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`The parties' dispute over this term is twofold. First, the parties disagree about whether
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`the construction should include the language, "each contributes a peak to a continuous combined
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`emission spectrum." (D.I. 54 at 56). Second, they dispute whether the construction should
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`include, "of the light emitted by the light emitting diode." (Id.).
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`To support its proposed construction, Plaintiff points to claim 4 of the '631 patent and
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`claims 1 and 9 of the '959 patent, which require that the LED chip and the phosphor emit light
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`having a spectrum with a peak within a certain range. (Id. at 55). Further, Plaintiff points to
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`Figures l 8A to l 8C in the '631 patent, which show the spectrum of light emitted by the
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`phosphor, the spectrum of light emitted by the blue LED chip, and the continuous combined
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`spectrum created when they overlap. (Id.). Citing to Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, Plaintiff
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`contends that its construction is consistent with the common meaning of the term "overlap." (Id.
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`at 57). Finally, Plaintiff argues that including "of the light emitted by the light emitting diode" is
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`necessary in order "to avoid misinterpretation of the claim language" (id. at 60), and, more
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`specifically, to clarify where the light emitted from the LED device is measured. (Tr. at 77:7-
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`13).
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`Defendants counter that the claim term "simply requires that two light sources - here,
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`blue light from the LED and yellow light from the phosphor - overlap to create a combined
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`emission, e.g., white color light." (D.I. 54 at 58). According to Defendants, this term should be
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`construed consistent with its plain meaning. (Id.). Defendants argue that Plaintiff is "attempting
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`to add superfluous language into the claim," without identifying anything in the specification or
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`the prosecution history that requires the additional language. (Id. at 58-59). Defendants assert
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`that the figures to which Plaintiff points "merely confirm what the claims already say," rather
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`than support Plaintiffs proposed construction. (Id. at 59). Finally, Defendants dispute whether
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`Plaintiffs proposed language, "of the light emitted by the light emitting diode," is needed to
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`clarify the claim. (Id.). Defendants argue, "There is no question that the light produced by the
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`'combined spectrum' must be emitted by the 'light emitting diode.'" (Id.).
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`Nothing in the language of this term suggests the "continuous combined emission
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`spectrum" must have two peaks. Plaintiff has not provided any basis upon which the Court may
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`depart from the plain meaning of the term. See GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. Agilight, Inc., 750
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`F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel
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`departure from the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal."). Rather,
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`Plaintiff seeks to import a limitation into the claims by relying on Figures l 8A to l 8C from the
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`patent specification. I see no reason, however, to import such a limitation from the specification.
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`Similarly, the plain meaning of the term does not suggest the "continuous combined emission
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`spectrum" must be "of the light emitted by the light emitting diode." The claim term describes
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`the LED chip emitting light and the phosphor emitting light, but nowhere mentions the resulting
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`light being emitted from the light emitting diode. (See '631 patent, 31 :9-15; '959 patent, 31: 13-
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`20, 32:1-8). Nevertheless, the patent claims make clear that the LED chip and the phosphor are
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`both part of the light emitting diode, and thus the proposed language is not clarifying, merely
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`redundant. I therefore see no reason to include this additional language in the definition of the
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`term. I will adopt Defendants' proposed construction.
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`5. "the blue color light from said light emitting component and the yellow color light
`from said phosphor are mixed to make a white color light" ('375 patent, claim 1)
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`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: "the part of the blue color light from said light
`emitting component that is transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor
`and the yellow color light from said phosphor are combined and each contributes
`a part of an emission spectrum that creates a white color light"
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`b. Defendants' proposed construction: no construction needed I indefinite-the
`terms "blue color light," "yellow color light," and "white color light" are
`indefinite
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`If construed, "the part of the blue color light from said light emitting component
`that is transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the yellow color
`light from said phosphor are combined to create a white color light"
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`c. Court's construction: "the part of the blue color light from said light emitting
`component that is transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the
`yellow color light from said phosphor are combined to create a white color light"
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`At the Markman hearing, Plaintiff indicated the parties have agreed that terms four
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`through six can be grouped together for the purposes of claim construction. (Tr. at 4: 10-17).
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`The parties more or less make the same arguments with respect to "each contributes a part of an
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`emission spectrum," as they do for "each contributes a peak to a continuous combined emission
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`spectrum." For different reasons than those stated above, however, I will not adopt Plaintiffs
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`proposed construction for this term.
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`The additional language in Plaintiffs proposed construction is redundant. That part of
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`the blue color light and the yellow color light "each contributes a part of an emission spectrum"
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`is apparent from the claim language. The claim states that the light from those two sources is
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`"mixed to make a white color light," that is, each contributes a part to the resulting white color
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`light. I therefore see no reason to add this language to the definition of the term. Thus, I will
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`adopt Defendants' proposed construction, "the part of the blue color light from said light
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`emitting component that is transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the yellow
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`color light from said phosphor are combined to create a white color light."
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`6. "the blue color light and the light from said phosphor being mixed to make the
`white-color" ('092 patent, claim 1)
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`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction: "the part of the blue color light from said LED
`chip that is transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the light
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`from said phosphor are combined and each contributes a part of an emission
`spectrum that creates the white-color"
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`b. Defendants' proposed construction: no construction needed I indefinite-the
`terms "blue color" and "white-color" are indefinite
`
`If construed, "the part of the blue color light from said LED chip that is
`transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the light from said
`phosphor are combined to create the white-color"
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`c. Court's construction: "the part of the blue color light from said LED chip that is
`transmitted without being absorbed by said phosphor and the light from said
`phosphor are combined to create the white-color"
`
`The parties dispute whether the construction of this term should include the language,
`
`"each contributes a part of an emission spectrum." This is the same dispute as above. For the
`
`reasons explained earlier, I will adopt Defendants' proposed construction for this term.
`
`7. "dispersive member for . .. " ('092 patent, claim 8) and "reflective member for . .. "
`('092 patent, claim 9)
`
`a. Plaintiff's proposed construction:' not means-plus-function, not indefinite, and
`should be given their plain and ordinary meanings
`
`If the Court construes the terms as means-plus function:
`
`Term
`"dispersive
`member for"
`
`Function
`"dispersing light
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`"reflective member "reflecting light
`for"
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`
`Corresponding Structure
`"dispersive sheet 706, as described in
`Figures 7-9, and lines 7:20-26, 20:7-
`60 (and equivalents)"
`"reflector 705, reflector film 707, a
`surface being substantially covered
`with a reflective material, or barium
`titanate dispersed in an acrylic binder
`as white color reflector, as described
`in Figures 7-9, 5:13-32, 7:20-26,
`20:7-60, 27:36--44, and 30:3-11 (and
`equivalents)"
`
`1 (D.I. 60 at I, 2).
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`Case 1:16-cv-00681-RGA Document 67 Filed 11/28/17 Page 15 of 19 PageID #: 3105
`
`b. Defendants' proposed construction:2 means-plus-function
`
`Term
`"dispersive
`member for"
`
`"reflective member
`for"
`
`Function
`"dispersing light
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`"reflecting light
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`
`c. Court's construction: means-plus-function
`
`Term
`"dispersive
`member for"
`
`"reflective member
`for"
`
`Function
`"dispersing light
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`"reflecting light
`from said light
`emitting diode"
`
`Corresponding Structure
`"dispersive sheet 706, as described in
`Figures 7-9, and lines 7:20-26, 20:7-
`60 (and equivalents)"
`"reflector 705, reflector film 707, or
`barium titanate dispersed in an acrylic
`binder as white color reflector, as
`described in Figures 7-9, 5:13-32,
`7:20-26, 20:7-60, 27:36-44, and
`30:3-11 (and equivalents)"
`
`Corresponding Structure
`"dispersive sheet 706, as described in
`Figures 7-9, and lines 7:20-26, 20:7-
`60 (and equivalents)"
`"reflector 705, reflector film 707, or
`barium titanate dispersed in an acrylic
`binder as white color reflector, as
`described in Figures 7-9, 5:13-32,
`7:20-26, 20:7-60, 27:36-44, and
`30:3-11 (and equivalents)"
`
`The parties dispute whether "dispersive member" and "reflective member" should be
`
`construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112(t) as means-plus-function limitations.
`
`"Dispersive member" and "reflective member" are presumptively not subject to
`
`construction under§ 112(t) because they do not recite the word "means." See Williamson v.
`
`Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "When a claim term lacks the word
`
`'means,' the presumption can be overcome and § 112[(t)] will apply if the challenger
`
`demonstrates that the claim term fails to 'recite sufficiently definite structure' or else recites
`
`'function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function."' Id. at 1349
`
`(quoting Watts v. WL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). "What is important is ...
`
`2 (D.I. 54 at 72, 75; D.I. 63 at 1).
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`Case 1:16-cv-00681-RGA Document 67 Filed 11/28/17 Page 16 of 19 PageID #: 3106
`
`that the term, as the name for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art."
`
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`
`Defendants argue that both terms are purely functional and thus should be construed
`
`pursuant to § 112(f). (D.I. 54 at 70). Specifically, Defendants argue, "The word 'member' is a
`
`word that has no specific meaning to a person of ordinary skill in this art, and does not identify
`
`any specific structure that disperses or reflects light." (Id. at 70-71). Defendants further contend
`
`that neither "dispersive" nor "reflective" imparts structure to the term "member." (Id. at 71).
`
`Rather, these prefixes merely describe the functionality of dispersing and reflecting light. (Id.).
`
`Defendants go on to identify specific structures in the patent specification that according to
`
`Defendants, are linked to the claimed functions. (Id. at 73, 75). Further, Defendants cite to
`
`several cases and the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure to support the proposition that
`
`'"member for' is a phrase that imparts no structure, and may be construed as a means-plus-
`
`function limitation." (Id. at 71).
`
`Plaintiff counters that Defendants have failed to show that § 112(f) applies. (Id. at 77).
`
`According to Plaintiff, a person of ordinary skill in the art "would understand that the 'dispersive
`
`member' and the 'reflective member' may take various structural forms and are not meant to be
`
`limited to just the specific forms described in certain embodiments in the specification and their
`
`equivalents." (Id.). A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand a "dispersive
`
`member," for example, "to mean a structure that contains or is made of a dispersive material, is
`
`applied to or is a surface, and is situated to disperse light." (Id. at 78). If the Court finds§ 112(f)
`
`applies, Plaintiff asserts that the corresponding structure should also include, "a surface being
`
`substantially covered with a reflective material." (D.1. 60 at 2).
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`Case 1:16-cv-00681-RGA Document 67 Filed 11/28/17 Page 17 of 19 PageID #: 3107
`
`I agree with Defendants that "dispersive member" and "reflective member" are means-
`
`plus-function limitations. Defendants have overcome the presumption that these terms are not
`
`subject to§ 112(f) by demonstrating that the claims fail to "recite sufficiently definite structure."
`
`See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
`
`As an initial matter, I note that bo