throbber
Apple Inc.
`v.
`Uniloc 2017 LLC
`Case IPR2017-01993
`(Patent 9,414,199)
`
`Hearing Before Miriam L. Quinn,
`Kerry Begley, and
`Charles J. Boudreau
`
`December 4, 2018
`
`

`

`Independent Claim 1
`
`1. A method for delivering information to two or more user devices, the
`method comprising:
`retrieving the information from one or more data records that
`associate the information with one or more predetermined
`locations, a predetermined maximum amount of time, a
`predetermined likelihood, and one or more predetermined actions;
`and
`for each of the two or more user devices:
`predicting whether the user device will be at any of the one or more
`predetermined locations within the predetermined maximum
`amount of time with at least the predetermined likelihood; and
`in response to the predicting that the user device will be at any of the
`one or more predetermined locations within the predetermined
`maximum amount of time with at least the predetermined
`likelihood, performing the one or more predetermined actions;
`wherein at least one of the actions includes delivering the
`information to the user device.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Dependent Claims 2−5
`
`2. The method of claim 1 wherein predicting comprises:
`analyzing a location history of the user device.
`3. The method of claim 1 wherein predicting comprises:
`analyzing a location history of the user device for
`day-and time-based patterns related to a current
`time and a current day.
`4. The method of claim 1 wherein predicting comprises:
`analyzing a location history of the user device for
`movement patterns related to a current location of
`the user device.
`5. The method of claim 1 further comprising: analyzing
`a location history of the user device for patterns that
`involve day-and time-based and movement related
`to a current time, a current day, and a current
`location of the user device.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Claim Construction Dispute
`
`The onlyclaim construction proposed and defended in the
`briefing for “within the predetermined maximum
`amount of time” (claim 1) is the following:
`
`a predetermined maximum quantity of time starting
`from when the “predicting” calculation is executed
`
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 6−14; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`4
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`Ex. 1001, ’199 patent, col. 1 lines 47−64
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 6−14; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`5
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`Ex. 1001, ’199 patent, col. 2 lines 17−27
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 6−14; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`6
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`Ex. 1001, ’199 patent, col. 5 lines 25−28.
`
`Id., col. 5 lines 34−39.
`Id., col. 4 lines 48−50.
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 6−14; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`7
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`“predicting whether the user device will be at any of the one or more
`predetermined locations within the predetermined maximum amount
`of time with at least the predetermined likelihood”
`
`Current Time
`Current Day
`Current Location
`
`Current Context
`
`(Within) Maximum Quantity of Time
`
`Predicting Calculation Executed
`
`(predicting … will be at any of the one or more predetermined locations ...)
`
`TIME
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 6−14; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`future times
`(relevant to present time)
`
`present time
`
`8
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`Petitioner has the burden of proof, including for its alternative arguments
`based on a construction of “within the predetermined maximum amount of
`time” to mean “a maximum time period calculated from the current
`time to the predicted time of arrival at a predetermined location”
`Pet. 68
`
`IPR2017-01993, Resp. (Paper 14) at p. 11.
`
`Pet. 70
`
`9
`
`

`

`The “current context” of the ’199 patent
`
`One problem with Petitioner’s undefended construction is
`that the claim language does not define the “predetermined
`maximum amount time” as expiring based on a predicated
`time of arrivalat a predicated location.
`
`Current Time
`Current Day
`Current Location
`
`Current Context
`
`Predicting Calculation Executed
`
`(Within) Maximum Quantity of Time
`
`(predicting … will be at any of the one or more predetermined locations)
`
`Petitioner excludes this time
`TIME
`IPR2017-01993, Resp. (Paper 14) at p. 11 n.9.
`
`Predicted time of arrival …
`
`10
`
`

`

`No Proof of Prosecution History Disclaimer
`
`Petitioner has not met its exacting burden to prove the prosecution
`history gives rise to any disclaimer that allegedly defeats the only
`proposed and defended construction.
`Petitioner presents the following new argument in its Reply:
`(Reply 8.)
`The quoted pros. history does not disclaim the “current context”
`description Petitioner admitsis encompassed by claim 1:
`(’199 patent,
`1:47−19.)
`
`IPR2017-01993, Sur-Reply (Paper 21) at p. 5-7.
`
`11
`
`

`

`No Proof of Prosecution History Disclaimer
`
`During prosecution, the PTAB summarized Applicant’sarguments
`successfully raised on appeal as follows:
`
`Pros. History, EX1002, pp. 22 of 234.
`IPR2017-01993, Sur-Reply (Paper 21) at p. 5-7.
`
`12
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`Interpreting the claims as reflecting the thematic “current context” of
`the ’199 patent is entirely fatal to the Petition:
`It is undisputed that the Blegenmodel relies on a “specified time
`period” defined by fixed start and stop times that both occur in the
`future, such as an afternoon on a future date. (Resp. at 15; Pet. 17.)
`It is undisputed that the “offer period” in Monteverde requires
`calculation in advance of a period that starts at a future time. (Id. 17.)
`The Petition argues that the proposed combination of Charlebois
`with Gillies would require modification (allegedly based on Froloff)
`at least to the extent the “predicting” limitations require a maximum
`time period calculated from the current time. (Resp. 20; Pet. 68, 70.)
`The Board has already found the Petition does not meet even the
`lower threshold burden for institution based on the proposed
`combination with Froloff . (Resp. 27, citing Paper 10 at 42.)
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 14−28; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`13
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`It is undisputed that the Blegenmodel relies on a “specified time
`period” defined by fixed start and stop times that bothoccur in the
`future, such as an afternoon on a future date. (Resp. at 15; Pet. 17.)
`Ex. 1004 (Blegen) ¶61.
`
`DI (Paper 10) at 18−19.
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 14−28; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`14
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`It is undisputed that the “offer period” in Monteverde requires
`calculation in advance of a period that starts at a future time. (Id. 17.)
`
`DI (Paper 10) at 22.
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 14−28; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`15
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`The Petition argues that the proposed combination of Charlebois
`with Gillies would require modification (allegedly based on Froloff)
`at least to the extent the “predicting” limitations require a maximum
`time period calculated from the current time. (Resp. 20; Pet. 68, 70.)
`Pet. 68
`
`Pet. 70
`
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 14−28; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`16
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`The Board has already found the Petition does not meet even the
`lower threshold burden for institution based on the proposed
`combination with Froloff . (Resp. 27, citing Paper 10 at 42.)
`
`IPR2017-01993, Response (Paper 14) at 14−28; Sur-Reply (Paper 21).
`
`17
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`
`The new and inconsistent arguments Petitioner attempts to
`introduce in its Reply do not cure the conceded deficiencies of
`Gillies. (Compare Pet. 68 and 70 with Reply 14−15.)
`
`In the Petition, the curt application of Gillies against the
`“predicting” limitations relies exclusively on a specific iteration
`(LTCC) of what Gillies refers to as equation (5), where the time
`period (D1) is defined to start at a future time on an upcoming
`Saturday as follows:
`“D1 = the Saturday of the sale event, e.g., 9:00 am start time
`and 6:00 pm end time.”
`EX1008 ¶¶ 53, 62–63; Pet. 60–61 (citing same); Ex. 1003 ¶¶
`182 (copying the Petition).
`In addressing what Petitioner refers to as Element [1c], the
`Froloff) if claim 1 is construed to require a current context.
`(Pet. 68, 70; see also Slide 15, supra.)
`IPR2017-01993, Resp. 22-23 (citingEX1008 ¶¶ 53, 62–63; Pet. 60–61; EX1003 (Robins Dec.) ¶¶ 182.
`
`Petition argues a Gillies must be modified (allegedly by
`
`18
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`The new and inconsistent arguments Petitioner attempts to
`Gillies describes its “location criterion” as “a target areain
`introduce in its Reply do not cure the conceded deficiencies of
`which a potential recipient terminal should be within(or
`Gillies. (Compare Pet. 68 and 70 with Reply 14−15.)
`outside of) in order for the broadcast information to be
`pertinent.” (EX1008 ¶32.) This is distinguishable from the
`recitation “predicting whether the user device will be atany
`of the one or more predetermined locations.” (Resp. 25.)
`Gillies equation or “Eq” (1) is distinguishable because it
`applies a “set” of multiple “time periods” and corresponding
`“target area” criterion, where each one of the multiple time
`periods is defined in part by its own respective start time and
`stop time. (Resp. 26, citing EX1008 ¶33.) Consistent with that
`description, equation (1) specifically identifies the set as
`including at least three distinct time periods (D1, D2, and D3):
`IPR2017-01993, Resp. 24-27.
`
`19
`
`

`

`The Petition fails to prove any
`theory that applies the “current context”
`The new and inconsistent arguments Petitioner attempts to
`introduce in its Reply do not cure the conceded deficiencies of
`Gillies. (Compare Pet. 68 and 70 with Reply 14−15.)
`
`IPR2017-01993, Resp. 26-27.
`
`20
`
`

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