`571-272-7822
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`
`Paper 33
`Entered: January 17, 2019
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA. INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01801
`Patent 8,995,433 B2
`
`____________
`
`
`
`Before, JENNIFER S. BISK, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`ON PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`IPR2017-01801
`Patent 8,995,433 B2
`
`
`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On January 31, 2019, the Board issued a Final Written Decision in
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`this proceeding. Paper 31 (“Final Dec.”). In that Final Written Decision, we
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`determined that Petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence
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`that claims 15, 712, 1417, 25, and 26 of the ’433 patent are
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`unpatentable. Id. at 90. On March 4, 2019, Patent Owner filed a Request
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`for Rehearing. Paper 32 (Req. Reh’g). Patent Owner argues one point.
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`Patent Owner takes issue with our findings concerning the recited “instant
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`voice message,” and more particularly with respect to the “attaches”
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`limitation that is recited in claim 9.
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`According to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), “[t]he burden of showing a
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`decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,”
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`and the “request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the
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`Board misapprehended or overlooked.” The burden here, therefore, lies with
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`Patent Owner to show we misapprehended or overlooked the matters it
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`requests that we review. We are not persuaded that Patent Owner has shown
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`that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters raised in the Request for
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`Rehearing. We address each of Patent Owner’s arguments in turn.
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`II. ANALYSIS
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`Claim 9 recites “wherein the instant voice messaging application
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`attaches one or more files to the instant voice message.” We determined that
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`the term “instant voice message” refers to a voice message that is
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`transmitted in real time and received accordingly, when the recipient is
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`available. Final Dec. 12. Also, we construed the term “attaches . . . to the
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`instant voice message” to mean indicating that another file (or files) is
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`associated with the “instant voice message.” Id. at 16.
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`IPR2017-01801
`Patent 8,995,433 B2
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`For claim 9, we found that although Griffin did not explicitly describe
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`attaching a file to a speech chat message, Griffin’s explanation of Figure 4
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`teaches or suggests to a person of ordinary skill in the art that a speech chat
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`message would also have the attachment capability. Id. at 68. We agreed
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`with Petitioner’s contention and evidence that Griffin expressly disclosed
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`attaching a file to a text message. Id. at 6768. Therefore, our statement
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`that Griffin did not explicitly describe the attachment was intended simply to
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`highlight that Griffin expressly disclosed attachment to a text message but
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`was not as explicit in disclosing the same with regard to the speech chat
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`message. Patent Owner characterizes this as a “concession” that Griffin
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`does not teach the limitation. Req. Reh’g 34. This is not a fair
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`characterization of the Final Written Decision, which states that despite the
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`lack of explicit wording, a person of ordinary skill in the art, would
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`understand, given Griffin’s other disclosures, that Griffin teaches the
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`limitation. This understanding is evidenced by the descriptions of Figure 4
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`and Dr. Haas’s testimony in this regard. Final Dec. 6768 (citing Ex. 1005,
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`Fig. 4, items 401, 407, 6:3844, 12:6367; Haas Decl. ¶¶ 191).
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`Patent Owner argues that Griffin does not disclose attaching one or
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`more files to “data content.” Req. Reh’g 4. According to Patent Owner,
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`Griffin distinguishes between message 400 and message content 406, and
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`Griffin does not teach attachments 407 are attached to the message content
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`406 itself. Id. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. First, we
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`could not have misapprehended or overlooked Patent Owner’s argument
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`regarding Griffin’s “attachment” because Patent Owner did not make any
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`arguments in this proceeding concerning Griffin’s attachment 407. We
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`noted in our Final Written Decision that Patent Owner did not address any of
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`Patent 8,995,433 B2
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`the disclosures that Petitioner relied on to argue that Griffin teaches the
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`attachment of a file to a speech chat message. See Final Dec. 69 (addressing
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`that Patent Owner’s arguments concerning this limitation focused on the
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`explicit disclosure of attaching to a text message, not a speech chat message,
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`and that Patent Owner’s further arguments did not address the further
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`evidence and arguments Petitioner proffered that Griffin teaches the
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`“attaches” limitation).
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`Second, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s characterization of
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`Griffin. According to Patent Owner, Griffin does not teach that attachment
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`407 is “attached” to the “message content.” Griffin, however, explains that
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`the payload of the message “may” contain attachments, such as icons and
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`ring-tones, implying that the attachments need not be included in the
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`outbound chat message itself. Ex. 1005, 6:5052. What is important here is
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`that Griffin associates the attachment with the speech chat message that is
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`embodied by message 400. When Griffin includes the attachment in the
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`payload of the message, such an attachment is associated not only with the
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`message 400 (by virtue of the attachment being part of message 400), but
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`also is associated also with the audio file, in the data content of the
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`message.1 We have noted Mr. Easttom’s testimony that in a conventional
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`method, as long the system is aware that the “two are meant to be together,”
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`a document is “attached” to an audio file. Ex. 1040, 139:1019. And we
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`1 We noted in our Final Written Decision that the parties focused their
`argument on the scope of “attaching” rather than the structure or content of
`the “instant voice message,” which is an issue in other related proceedings,
`but not germane to the arguments the parties presented for the’723 patent.
`Final Dec. 15 n.3.
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`further credited Dr. Haas’s testimony that the speech chat message would
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`include the fields necessary to indicate that files are attached, much like
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`Griffin discloses for the text message. Final Dec. 6869 (citing Haas Decl.
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`¶ 191). Therefore, Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive and do not
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`show error in our determination that Griffin alone teaches the “attaches”
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`limitation. Arguments by Patent Owner regarding Zydney’s voice container
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`are not persuasive, because we did not rely on the voice container of Zydney
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`for this limitation.
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`Patent Owner further argues that the Board erred in construing the
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`“attaches” limitation. Req. Reh’g. 56. In particular, Patent Owner
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`contends that we construed the term when neither party expressly set forth a
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`construction for the term. Id. Patent Owner also complains that it “was not
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`provided due process ability to respond to the Board’s construction and point
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`out why it is incorrect.” Id. at 56.
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`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that we
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`misapprehended the parties’ arguments regarding the scope of the term or
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`that it was not proper for us to construe the term. We expressly construed
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`the term in this proceeding consistent with the claim language requiring the
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`attachment to an audio file and the Specification’s description of
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`embodiments in which an instant voice message is in the form of audio file.
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`Final Dec. 1316. We considered, and rejected as incorrect, Patent Owner’s
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`argument that attaching a file to an “audio file,” rather than to an instant
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`voice message, required more than an association. Id. at 1516. Our
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`analysis thus highlighted the challenge presented by this and the related
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`cases in which the claims sometimes required an attachment of a file to the
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`instant voice message and sometimes required an attachment of a file to the
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`audio file. Based on the foregoing, we stand by our decision to construe
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`“attachment” based on the parties’ arguments during trial and at oral
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`argument. Patent Owner has been given ample opportunity to address the
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`term “instant voice message” and the related “attachment” limitation as this
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`is an issue that spans multiple related matters and was extensively discussed
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`at oral argument. See Tr. 75:2087:3.
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`Patent Owner now raises an argument that “associating” and
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`“attaching” have “distinct and separate meanings” because a claim in a
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`related patent recites these terms individually. Req. Reh’g 5. But this is not
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`persuasive because Patent Owner does not provide any support for the
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`contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art understands “attaching”
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`as being narrower than or different from associating the two recited files.
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`Further, the Specification does not show any embodiment of how
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`“associating” is performed and how the “associating” is technically any
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`different from the description of linking a file to the instant voice message.
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`In conclusion, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner has shown that
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`we misapprehended or overlooked the matters raised on rehearing and we
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`see no reason to disturb our Final Written Decision in this proceeding.
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`III. ORDER
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`Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.
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`IPR2017-01801
`Patent 8,995,433 B2
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`For PETITIONER:
`
`Naveen Modi
`Joseph E. Palys
`Phillip W. Citroen
`Michael Wolfe
`PAUL HASTINGS
`naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`josephpalys@paulhastings.com
`phillipcitroen@paulhastings.com
`michaelwolfe@paulhastings.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`
`Brett Mangrum
`Ryan Loveless
`ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP
`brett@etheridgelaw.com
`ryan@etheridgelaw.com
`
`Sean D. Burdick
`UNILOC USA, INC.
`sean.burdick@unilocusa.com
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