Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 7246
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 2:16-cv-693-JRG-RSP
`
`v.
`
`LEAD CASE
`
`CENTURYLINK COMMUNICATIONS
`LLC, et al.
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`WINSTRON CORPORATION, et al.,
`
`
`
`ALACRITECH, INC.,
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`v.
`
`DELL INC.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`INTEL CORPORATION,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Intervenor.
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:16-cv-692-JRG-RSP
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`MEMBER CASE
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:16-cv-695-RWS-RSP
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`MEMBER CASE
`
`
`
`ALACRITECH’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`INTEL Ex.1040.001
`
`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 2 of 38 PageID #: 7247
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`“FAST-PATH PROCESSING” / “SLOW-PATH PROCESSING” (’205:1,8,31) .............1
`
`“A DESTINATION [] IN THE MEMORY OF THE COMPUTER” / “A
`DESTINATION [IN] MEMORY” / “A DESTINATION . . . ON THE HOST
`COMPUTER SYSTEM” (’205:1,8,22,31,36; ’241:1,22; ’699:1,2,7,13,20;
`’880:5)..................................................................................................................................5
`
`“CONTEXT [FOR COMMUNICATION]” (’036:1,3-7; ’072:1,2,7,9,15,16,19) ..............8
`
`“STATUS INFORMATION” (’072:2,3,9,10,14,15,17)....................................................11
`
`“DATABASE” (’880:13,32) .............................................................................................13
`
`VI.
`
`“OPERATION CODE” (’880:1,17,32,34,45) ...................................................................14
`
`VII.
`
`“PREPENDING” / “PREPENDED” (’036:4; ’241:7,9,12,15,17,18; ’072:1,9,15;
`‘104:1,21-23) .....................................................................................................................14
`
`VIII. “SIGNIFICANT” / “SUBSTANTIALLY” TERMS (’205:22,31) ....................................15
`
`IX. WITHOUT AN INTERRUPT DIVIDING (’241:1,18,22) ...............................................16
`
`X.
`
`“TRAFFIC CLASSIFIER” (’880:41,42) ...........................................................................18
`
`XI.
`
`“FLOW” TERMS (’880:1,9,10,12,22,23,32,35,42,43) .....................................................19
`
`XII.
`
`“[FLOW] RE-ASSEMBLER” ('880:41,43) ......................................................................21
`
`XIII. “PACKET BATCHING MODULE” (’880:41) ................................................................22
`
`XIV. “MEANS FOR RECEIVING/SENDING, BY THE NETWORK INTERFACE
`DEVICE…” TERMS (’104:22) ........................................................................................24
`
`XV.
`
`“MEANS, COUPLED TO THE HOST COMPUTER…” (’205:31) ................................27
`
`XVI. “FIRST MECHANISM” / “SECOND MECHANISM” (’241:1,3,4,5,7,8,17) .................28
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`INTEL Ex.1040.002
`
`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 3 of 38 PageID #: 7248
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page
`
`Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
`707 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................14
`
`Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp.,
`490 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................26, 27, 28
`
`Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc.,
`749 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................10
`
`Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc'n Co. LP,
`838 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................3
`
`Customedia Techs., LLC v. DISH Networks Corp.,
`No. 2:16-CV-129-JRG, 2017 WL 568669 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2017) ..............................15, 18
`
`Freeny, et al. v. Murphy USA Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-791-RSP, 2015 WL 294102 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2015) .....................................11
`
`Freeny v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-00361-WCB, 2014 WL 4294505 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2014)..............................4
`
`Genband USA LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Ltd.,
`No. 2:14-CV-33-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 4722185 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2015) .............................23
`
`Infernal Tech., LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc.,
`No. 2:15-CV-1523-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 5415429 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2016) ...........13, 16, 17
`
`Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas Corp.,
`649 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..........................................................................................25, 30
`
`Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc.,
`302 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................2
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
`379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..........................................................................................18, 22
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) .......................................................................................................11, 17
`
`Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC,
`403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................8
`
`O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................15
`
`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 6:15-cv-01095, 2017 WL 897172 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017) ............................................24
`
`
`
`ii
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`INTEL Ex.1040.003
`
`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 4 of 38 PageID #: 7249
`
`PerDiemco, LLC. v. Industrack LLC,
`No. 2:15-CV-00726-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 6662865, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2016),
`report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-00726-JRG-RSP,
`2016 WL 6652728 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) ............................................................12, 16, 17
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................ passim
`
`In re Skvorecz,
`580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................20
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Sycamore IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Corp.,
`2017 WL 1045949 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2017) ..........................................................................4
`
`TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`514 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................24, 25, 26
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc.,
`Case No. 2:15-cv-1187-JRG-RSP,
`2016 WL 3647977 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2016) .........................................................19, 22, 23, 29
`
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................15
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)........................................................................19, 24, 26, 29, 30
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`MPEP § 2173.05(e) ........................................................................................................................20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`INTEL Ex.1040.004
`
`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 5 of 38 PageID #: 7250
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`NOTE ON CITATIONS
`
`The patents-in-suit, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,124,205 (“the ’205 patent”); 7,237,036 (“the ’036
`
`patent”); 7,337,241 (“the ’241 patent”); 7,673,072 (“the ’072 patent”); 7,945,699 (“the
`
`’699 patent”); 8,131,880 (“the ’880 patent”); 8,805,948 (“the ’948 patent”); and
`
`9,055,104 (“the ’104 patent”) are attached as Exhibits A through H, respectively.
`
`References to the patents-in-suit are indicated by column and line number, or by claim
`
`number. For example, “’205 4:3-10” refers to Column 4, lines 3-10 of the U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,124,205. All emphases to patent citations are added unless otherwise noted.
`
`The original applications for the ‘205 patent, the ‘241 patent, and the ‘072 patent are
`
`attached as Exhibits I, J, and K, respectively.
`
`The Declaration of Paul S. Min in Support of Plaintiff’s Claim Construction Brief is
`
`attached as Exhibit L. References to Dr. Min’s opening declaration are designated “Min
`
`1st Decl.” followed by the paragraph number.
`
`The Rebuttal Declaration of Paul S. Min in Support of Plaintiff’s Claim Construction
`
`Brief is attached as Exhibit M. References to Dr. Min’s rebuttal declaration are
`
`designated “Min 2nd Decl.” followed by the paragraph number.
`
`The Declaration of Mr. Mark R. Lanning Regarding Claim Construction is attached as
`
`Exhibit N. References to Mr. Lanning’s opening declaration are designated “Lanning 1st
`
`Decl.” followed by the paragraph number.
`
`The Rebuttal Declaration of Mr. Mark R. Lanning Regarding Claim Construction is
`
`attached as Exhibit O. References to Mr. Lanning’s rebuttal declaration are designated
`
`“Lanning 2nd Decl.” followed by the paragraph number.
`
`iv
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`INTEL Ex.1040.005
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 6 of 38 PageID #: 7251
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`The March 14, 2017 Deposition of Mark Lanning is attached as Exhibit P. References to
`
`Mr. Lanning’s deposition are designated “Lanning Dep.” followed by page an line
`
`numbers. A reference to “Lanning Dep., 14:2-5” therefore means pages 14, lines 2-5 of
`
`Mr. Lanning’s deposition.
`
`“Random House” refers to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1999), which
`
`is attached as Exhibit Q.
`
`“Webster’s Computer” refers to Webster’s New World Dictionary of Computer Terms,
`
`8th ed. (2000), which is attached as Exhibit R.
`
`“American Heritage” refers to The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd ed. (1994), which
`
`is attached as Exhibit S.
`
`“Microsoft” refers Microsoft Computer Dictionary, 4th ed. (1999), which is attached as
`
`Exhibit T.
`
`“’809 Provisional” refers to Provisional application No. 60/061,809, which is attached as
`
`Exhibit U.
`
`“’296 Provisional” refers to Provisional application No. 60/098,296, which is attached as
`
`Exhibit V.
`
`“Request to Provoke Interference” refers to the June 19, 2003 Request to Provoke
`
`Interference filed during the prosecution of the ’880 patent, which is attached as Exhibit
`
`W.
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`“Def. 4-2” refers to Intervenor and Defendants’ Preliminary Claim Constructions and
`
`Extrinsic Evidence, dated January 31, 2017, which is attached as Exhibit X.
`
`v
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`INTEL Ex.1040.006
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 7 of 38 PageID #: 7252
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`The parties’ proposals reflect fundamentally different approaches to claim construction.
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`Alacritech construes terms in accordance with their plain meanings in light of the surrounding
`
`claim language, the specification, and the remainder of the intrinsic evidence as required by
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp. In contrast, Defendants make little effort to ascertain plain meaning and
`
`largely ignore the surrounding claim language, instead seeking to limit each claim term to an
`
`embodiment in the specification or in an earlier application. When Defendants find two or more
`
`embodiments of a particular claimed invention, they assert the corresponding term is indefinite
`
`rather than recognizing that the term’s plain meaning encompasses multiple embodiments. And
`
`when Defendants purport to find no embodiments that use the exact language as the claims, they
`
`assert the term is indefinite for being “inconsistent” with the specification—an improper attempt
`
`to convince this Court to find the claims invalid for lack of written description. Defendants’
`
`proposals should be rejected, and Alacritech’s constructions adopted.
`
`I.
`
`“FAST-PATH PROCESSING” / “SLOW-PATH PROCESSING” (’205:1,8,311)
`
`Fast-path
`processing
`
`Slow-path
`processing
`
`Alacritech: “the protocol stack of
`the host computer performs little
`or no network layer or transport
`layer processing”
`Alacritech: No construction
`necessary
`
`Defendants: “a mode of operation in which the
`network interface device performs all physical
`layer, data link/MAC layer, network/IP layer,
`and transport/TCP layer processing”
`Defendants: “a mode of operation in which the
`host performs at least some of the network/IP
`layer and transport/TCP layer processing”
`
`
`The parties dispute whether claims reciting “fast-path processing” preclude a host
`
`computer from performing any data link, network, or transport layer processing. Alacritech’s
`
`construction is lifted directly from the specification, which states that “handling the connection
`
`such that protocol stack [] of the host performs little or no network layer or transport layer
`
`processing [] is called ‘fast-path processing’.” (‘205 39:39-45.) When “the specification…
`
`
`1 For ease of reference, the headings list the asserted claims that contain the dispute term(s).
`E.g., ‘205 patent claims 1, 8, and 31.
`
`
`
`1
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`INTEL Ex.1040.007
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 8 of 38 PageID #: 7253
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`reveal[s] a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee…the inventor’s lexicography
`
`governs.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Jack Guttman,
`
`Inc. v. Kopykake Enterprises, Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As Defendants’ own
`
`expert acknowledged, the inventors explicitly defined “fast-path processing” as when the
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`“protocol stack [] of the host performs little or no network layer or transport layer processing.”
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`(Lanning Dep., 186:23-187:5; 195:11-196:5; 199:4-15.) Thus, that lexicography governs.
`
`The surrounding claim language confirms that during “fast-path processing,” the protocol
`
`stack of the host may perform some (a little) network or transport layer processing. Claim 31 of
`
`the ’205 patent, for example, requires that “the portion be[] fast-path processed such that the data
`
`is placed into the destination memory on the host computer without the protocol stack of the
`
`host computer doing significant network layer or significant transport layer processing.”
`
`Claim 31 thus allows the host protocol stack to perform insignificant (a little) processing in the
`
`fast path. The other independent claims reciting “fast-path processing,” claims 1 and 8, require
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`that fast-path processing occur “without the protocol stack of the host computer performing any
`
`network layer processing or any transport layer processing on the response” (claim 1) or “on the
`
`packet” (claim 8). They thus allow a fast path wherein the host protocol stack processes
`
`information other than “the response” or “the packet.” (Min 1st Decl. ¶ 61.)
`
`The rest of the intrinsic evidence confirms that during “fast-path processing,” the host’s
`
`protocol stack may perform a little network or transport-layer processing. For example, the ’809
`
`Provisional, which the ’205 patent incorporates by reference (’205 1:10,33), states that
`
`Alternatively, the fast-path may receive a header and data that is a complete
`request, but that is also too large for a header buffer. This results in a header and
`data buffer being passed to the host. This latter flow is identical to the slow-path
`flow, which also puts all the data into the header buffer or, if the header is too
`small, uses a large (2K) host buffer for all the data. This means that on the
`
`
`
`2
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`INTEL Ex.1040.008
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 9 of 38 PageID #: 7254
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`unsolicited receive path, the host will only see either a header buffer or a header
`and at most, one data buffer.
`
`(’809 Provisional at 13.) As Dr. Min observed—and Mr. Lanning did not dispute—the host
`
`protocol stack in this embodiment of fast-path processing thus processes (“sees”) one buffer.
`
`(Min 1st Decl. ¶ 65; compare Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 20 (ignoring the “alternative” embodiment).)
`
`The ’809 Provisional similarly recites a fast-path embodiment where “a transport driver can
`
`‘indicate’ a small amount of data to a client above it while telling it that it has more data to
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`come,” thus requiring that the host’s protocol stack process the “small amount of data” to
`
`evaluate whether there is “more data to come.”2 (’809 Provisional at 7-8; Min 1st Decl. ¶ 65.)
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`Other portions of the specification similarly confirm that in the fast path, the host’s protocol
`
`stack may perform a little network layer or transport layer processing. (’205 3:48-51, 3:63-4:4,
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`8:8-60, 11:18-30, 17:6-34, 18:16-37; see also Min 1st Decl. ¶ 63.)
`
`In contrast, Defendants’ construction seeks to preclude the host protocol stack from
`
`performing any network or transport layer processing in the fast path. Defendants’ expert argues
`
`that the inventors’ lexicography should be disregarded because the supposed lack of
`
`embodiments would leave a person of skill unable to determine what “little” network layer or
`
`transport layer processing entails. (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 13.) Mr. Lanning is incorrect: as
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`discussed above, the claims themselves provide guidance as to how to perform “little” network
`
`layer or transport layer processing during the fast-path, e.g. “without the protocol stack of the
`
`host computer performing any network layer processing or any transport layer processing on the
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`response” as recited in claim 1 or “on the packet” as recited in claim 8. Cox Commc'ns, Inc. v.
`
`
`2 Defendants’ expert attempts to dismiss this passage as not disclosing host transport-layer
`processing (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 20), but ignores the next paragraph detailing that “our host
`transport driver will pass that address to the INIC which will DMA the remainder of the data
`into its final destination.” (‘809 Provisional at 8 (emphasis added).) The “transport driver”
`performing transport-layer processing thus resides on the host.
`
`
`
`3
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`INTEL Ex.1040.009
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 10 of 38 PageID #: 7255
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`Sprint Commc'n Co. LP, 838 F.3d 1224, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that “the dispositive
`
`question in an indefiniteness inquiry is whether the claims, not particular claim terms,” are
`
`indefinite). As also discussed above, the intrinsic evidence discloses embodiments where the
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`host protocol stack performs some processing.3 Both the claims and the specification provide
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`examples of “little processing” that serve as points of comparison for skilled artisans and which
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`are consistent with the purpose of the invention to reduce the burden on the CPU/host protocol
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`stack, not to eliminate host processing entirely. In light of these disclosures, a person of skill
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`would thus understand that the fast-path should “reliev[e] the host computer from certain time
`
`and resource-consuming, repetitive network layer and transport layer processing.” (Min 1st Decl.
`
`¶ 63.) Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we
`
`have rejected the proposition that claims involving terms of degree are inherently indefinite”);
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`Freeny v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00361-WCB, 2014 WL 4294505, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28,
`
`2014) (reciting cases where terms of degree were not found indefinite).
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`Mr. Lanning also asserts that because the inventors’ definition of “fast-path processing”
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`was not in the 1997 Provisional, “it cannot apply to Claims 1 and 8.” (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 14.)
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`However, constructions need not be supported by the earliest-filed application.4 The Court’s
`
`decision in Sycamore IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Corp., 2017 WL 1045949 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16,
`
`2017) is instructive. There, the defendants argued that “the claims of the ’405 patent must be
`
`construed as limited to the disclosure made in the provisional application.” Id. at *4. The court
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`disagreed, finding that “defendants' argument puts the cart before the horse” and that “[t]he
`
`
`3 Mr. Lanning further asserts that the supposed lack of “little processing” fast-path
`embodiments would cause a person of skill to disregard the inventors’ explicit lexicography.
`(Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 15.) Even if Mr. Lanning were correct about the lack of embodiments—and
`he is not—“the inventor's lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
`4 In any event, the ’809 Provisional discloses “little processing” embodiments, as recited above.
`
`
`
`4
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`INTEL Ex.1040.010
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 11 of 38 PageID #: 7256
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`proper method of construing the limitations of the ’405 patent is to begin with the language of
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`the claims and the specification of the patent itself.” Id. The Court further found that
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`While it may or may not be the case that new matter was added to the non-
`provisional application, that is an issue that goes to the priority date to which the
`'405 patent is entitled; it does not govern the construction of the '405 patent, at
`least with respect to terms the meaning of which is clear in the non-provisional
`application that issued as the '405 patent.
`…
`Even if [defendants’ assertion that the provisional application does not support the
`construction of the term] is true, however, the result would be the denial of
`priority to the date of the provisional application, not a construction of the '405
`patent that is contrary to what is clearly conveyed by the claims and specification
`of that patent…. And that is an issue for another day.
`
`Id. at *5-6 (emphasis added); see also id. at *2 (noting that “[t]he claim construction issue
`
`presented by the parties is intertwined with a priority dispute, which has not been briefed and is
`
`not yet ripe for decision.”) Defendants’ attempt to interject a priority determination into this
`
`claim construction proceeding should be disregarded.
`
`The parties’ dispute as to “slow-path processing” is derivative. Since “slow-path
`
`processing” only appears in claims that also recite “fast-path processing,” a person of skill would
`
`view the former as an alternative to the latter. (Min 1st Decl. ¶ 63.) Mr. Lanning does not
`
`disagree (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 28), and Defendants’ proposal appears to be worded so as to
`
`simply cover processing that does not meet its proposed construction for “fast-path processing.”
`
`Since the parties’ dispute would be resolved by the Court’s construction of “fast-path
`
`processing,” “slow-path processing” need not be construed.
`
`II.
`
`“A DESTINATION [] IN THE MEMORY OF THE COMPUTER” / “A
`DESTINATION [IN] MEMORY” / “A DESTINATION . . . ON THE HOST
`COMPUTER SYSTEM” (’205:1,8,22,31,36; ’241:1,22; ’699:1,2,7,13,20; ’880:5)
`
`Alacritech: “a single contiguous block or
`several associated blocks of memory in the
`computer”
`
`
`Defendants: “the location in host memory where
`data resides when all MAC layer, network layer,
`and transport layer processing is complete”
`
`
`
`5
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`INTEL Ex.1040.011
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`

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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 12 of 38 PageID #: 7257
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`The parties dispute whether the “destination” terms should have their plain meaning as
`
`confirmed by the inventors (Alacritech), or whether they should have additional limitations
`
`imported from some of the embodiments (Defendants). The plain and ordinary meaning of
`
`“destination” is “the place to which a person or thing travels or is sent.” (Random House; see
`
`also Webster’s Computer: “The record, file, document, or disk to which information is copied or
`
`moved, as opposed to the source.”) In the context of memory, the inventors confirmed that the
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`destination can be a single contiguous block or several associated blocks:
`
`All the data from the session layer message may be deposited into a single
`contiguous block of host memory (referred to as a destination) in some
`embodiments or may be deposited into several associated blocks (that together
`are referred to as a destination) of host memory in other embodiments.
`
`(‘699 6:64-7:2.) “[T]he inventor's lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
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`When the inventors sought to require or exclude certain processing steps prior to
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`information arriving at the “destination [in] memory,” they did so explicitly. For example, claim
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`1 of the ‘699 patent requires that data be transferred into the destination “without processing the
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`network layer headers or the transport layer headers by the computer,” and claim 22 of the ‘205
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`patent requires the transfer to destination memory occur “with the protocol stack of the host
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`computer doing substantially no network layer or transport layer processing.” See also ‘205
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`claim 1 (similar requirement). The inventors similarly sometimes—but not always—imposed
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`restrictions on the “destination [in] memory” itself. For example, claim 1 of the ‘699 patent
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`recites “information that is later stored in the destination will be controlled by an application
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`running on the computer that is above the transport layer.” See also ‘699 claims 7, 13.5 In
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`contrast, claim 1 of the ‘205 patent recites “a destination memory” that contains no such
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`5 Claim 5 of the 699 patent further limits claim 1 by reciting that “transferring [] the data to the
`destination includes transferring the data as a contiguous block,” thereby excluding destinations
`that are several associated blocks. See also ‘699 claims 9, 15. The corresponding independent
`claims are presumed to be broader. Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1314-15.
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`
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`6
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`INTEL Ex.1040.012
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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 13 of 38 PageID #: 7258
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`limitations. See also ‘205 claims 8, 22, 31, 36. Thus, when the inventors sought to preclude
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`additional protocol processing, they did so by requiring that the application—and not the
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`protocol stack—control the “destination.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. None of the asserted
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`claims recite or even suggest that “all MAC layer, network layer, and transport layer processing
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`is complete” when data enters the “destination [in] memory,” and importing that requirement
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`would render the actual recited restriction on the “destination [in] memory” superfluous.
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`The specifications similarly support Alacritech’s construction. Most importantly, the
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`inventors explicitly defined it as such in the ’699 patent, as recited above. Similarly, the ’241
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`patent discloses embodiments that “find[] and reserv[e] a destination for data from the message
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`associated with the packet” without reciting any other requirement imposed on that destination.
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`(’241 10:8-11; see also 9:66-10:23 and Fig. 4B.) Additionally, the ’205 patent states that “a
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`destination [] where the data is to be placed [] may be on the host computer, or on another
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`computer, or on another device, or elsewhere on network.” (’205 38:67-39:4; see also id. at
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`9:1-7 (describing destinations on the INIC file cache).) Thus, the “destination [in] memory”
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`need not be on the host, in accordance with Alacritech’s construction.
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`In contrast, Defendants propose that the “destination [in] memory” terms be limited to
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`host memory. Defendants’ expert makes no effort to tie Defendants’ proposal to the plain
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`meaning of “destination in memory.”6 Instead, Mr. Lanning asserts that because certain
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`embodiments disclose a host destination, all instances of “destination” should be so limited.
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`(Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 85.) However, claims are not confined to the embodiments of the
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`invention—particularly here, where other embodiments describe non-host memory destinations.
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`
`6 Defendants apparently neglected to inform Mr. Lanning of many aspects of claim
`construction, including that claim terms are to be given their plain meanings, that the inventor
`may act as his own lexicographer, or that it is improper to read limitations from the embodiments
`into the claims. (compare Lanning 1st Decl. ¶¶ 8-11 to Min 1st Decl. ¶¶ 16-23.)
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`
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`7
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`INTEL Ex.1040.013
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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 14 of 38 PageID #: 7259
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`Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1323; see also Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403
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`F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (claims may embrace “different subject matter than is
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`illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification”). Defendants’ construction is further
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`inconsistent with the surrounding claim language: while some claims recite that the “destination
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`memory” be on a “host computer” (e.g., ‘205 claim 1), other claims reciting a “destination in
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`memory” do not even mention a host (e.g., ‘241 claim 1). Defendants’ proposal thus ignores the
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`claims’ requirements regarding when the “destination” is on the host.
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`Defendants also propose that “destination” be construed as “final destination” by
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`precluding any subsequent MAC, network, or transport layer processing. (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶¶
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`83-84.) But the claims only recite a “destination,” not a “final destination.” That the
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`specification sometimes refers to a “final destination” demonstrates that the inventors were
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`aware of the distinction between that and a “destination,” not that the latter should be construed
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`as the former. Even if “the specification does not disclose any other destination in the host
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`memory” (Lanning 2nd Decl. ¶ 83)—which is incorrect—the Federal Circuit has “expressly
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`rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the
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`patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment. That is not just because section
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`112 of the Patent Act requires that the claims themselves set forth the limits of the patent grant,
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`but also because persons of ordinary skill in the art rarely would confine their definitions of
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`terms to the exact representations depicted in the embodiments.” Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1323
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`(internal citations omitted; emphasis added). Alacritech’s construction should be adopted.
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`III.
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`“CONTEXT [FOR COMMUNICATION]” (’036:1,3-7; ’072:1,2,7,9,15,16,19)
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`Alacritech: “data regarding an active connection” Defendants: Indefinite
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`Alacritech’s construction of “context” accords with the plain meaning of the term as
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`informed by the claims and specification. In contrast, Defendants appear to contend that claims
`
`
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`8
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`INTEL Ex.1040.014
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`Case 2:16-cv-00693-JRG-RSP Document 181 Filed 04/04/17 Page 15 of 38 PageID #: 7260
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`have to be limited to one particular embodiment or, finding more than one embodiment, that they
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`are “internally inconsistent” and indefinite. This position ignores both logic and the law.
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`The plain meaning of “context” is “the set of circumstances or facts that surround a
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`particular event, situation, etc.” (Random House; see also American Heritage: “the
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`circumstances in which an event occurs”; Min 1st Decl. ¶ 74.) The surrounding claim language
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`confirms that a “context for communication” is data regarding a connection or communication.
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`For example, claim 1 of the ’036 patent requires that “the context includ[e] a media access
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`control (MAC) layer address, an Internet Protocol (IP) address and Transmission Control
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`Protocol (TCP) state information.” Claim 1 of the ‘072 patent requires “a context that includes
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`protocol header information for the connection,” claim 9 requires “a context including protocol
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`information and status information for a network connection,” and claim 15 recites “a context
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`that includes status information and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and TCP ports for the
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`connection.” All recited components are “data regarding an active connection,” per Alacritech’s
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`construction.
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`The specification confirms that a “context for communication” is data regarding that
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`connection. For example, the ’036 patent recites that “the context summariz[es] various features
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`of the connection, such as protocol type and source and destination addresses for ea