Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 1 of 30 PageID #: 2153
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 6:15-cv-01168-JRG
`§ LEAD CASE
`§
`§
`§
`§ Case No. 6:15-cv-01175-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:15-cv-01169-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00099-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00100-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00101-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00223-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00224-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00225-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00324-JRG
`§ Case No. 6:16-cv-00380-JRG
`§
`§
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`UNILOC USA, INC., et al,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`AVAYA INC.,
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`SHORETEL, INC.,
`HUAWEI ENTERPRISE USA, INC.,
`NEC CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
`UNIFY INC.,
`FACEBOOK, INC.,
`VIBER MEDIA S.A.R.L.,
`WHATSAPP INC.,
`OOVOO, LLC,
`TANGOME, INC. d/b/a TANGO,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Page 1 of 177
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1020
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 2 of 30 PageID #: 2154
`
`I. 
`II. 
`III. 
`IV. 
`V. 
`
`VI. 
`
`
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`E. 
`
`F. 
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1 
`APPLICABLE LAW .......................................................................................................... 3 
`AGREED TERMS AND PHRASES .................................................................................. 6 
`DISPUTED TERMS AND PHRASES ............................................................................... 6 
`“voice over internet protocol” / “VOIP” (’948 patent claims 6, 24; ’000
`A. 
`patent claims 6, 20) ................................................................................................. 6 
`“publicly switched telephone network” / “PSTN” (’948 patent claims 5,
`25; ’000 patent claim 5) .......................................................................................... 7 
`“conference call server” (’948 patent claims 1, 23, 51; ’000 patent claims
`1, 23; ’194 Patent claim 1) ...................................................................................... 8 
`“application sharing capability” (’948 patent claims 9, 10, 52, 53; ’000
`patent claims 9-10) ................................................................................................ 10 
`“cellular communications path” (’948 patent claims 8, 29; ’000 patent
`claim 8) ................................................................................................................. 13 
`“without requiring registration with a conference call server for
`establishing the voice communication by the potential members including
`the first party and the at least one other party” (’194 Patent claim 1) .................. 14 
`“instant messaging (IM)” (’948 patent claims 1, 2, 23, 51; ’000 patent
`claims 1, 2, 23; ’194 Patent claims 1) ................................................................... 19 
`“said display for the first party” (’194 Patent claim 4) ......................................... 23 
`H. 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 25 
`
`G. 
`
`
`
`i
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 3 of 30 PageID #: 2155
`
`Cases 
`Alloc, Inc. v. ITC,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................ 4, 20
`AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 5
`Bell Atlantic Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp.,
`262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 4
`Boston Sci. Corp. v. Cook Inc.,
`No. 1:10-cv-11646-DPW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54189 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2016) .............. 22
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................ 4
`Dayco Prods. v. Total Containment, Inc.,
`258 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................ 14
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
` 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................. 4
`Dow Chem. Co. v. NOVA Chems. Corp. (Can.),
`809 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2015) ................................................................................... 5
`Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp.,
`216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................. 7
`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
`626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................ 5, 20
`Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:10-cv-561 LED-JDL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89764 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2012) .......... 10
`Harris Corp. v. Ixys Corp.,
`114 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................ 5, 22
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................... 4
`Luv N’ Care, LTD. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V.,
`No. 2:11-CV-512, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95198 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013)............................ 10
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ......................................... 3
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120, 189 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2014) .................................................................................. 5
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................ 5, 20
`Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
`806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`
`
`ii
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303, (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................. 3, 4
`Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.,
`274 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 4
`Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys.,
`329 F.3d 823 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 14
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) ................................................................................................................. 3
`U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
`103 F.3d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 5
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................ 4, 9
`W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
`721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 ......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 5 of 30 PageID #: 2157
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`Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(a), Plaintiffs Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.
`
`(collectively “Uniloc”), respectfully submit this claim construction brief in support of their
`
`proposed constructions for the disputed terms. All citations to Exhibits herein are to the Exhibits
`
`attached to the accompanying Declaration of Aaron S. Jacobs in Support of Plaintiff’s Opening
`
`Claim Construction Brief (“Jacobs Decl.”).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`In this case, Uniloc alleges that the consolidated Defendants Avaya, Inc. (“Avaya”),
`
`ShoreTel Inc. (“ShoreTel”), Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), Huawei Enterprise USA, Inc.
`
`(“Huawei”), NEC Corporation of America (“NECAM”), Unify Inc. (“Unify”), Facebook, Inc.
`
`(“Facebook”), Viber Media S.a.r.l. (“Viber”), WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”), ooVoo, LLC
`
`(“ooVoo”) and TangoMe, Inc. d/b/a Tango (“Tango”) (collectively “Defendants”), infringe the
`
`following claims of the Asserted Patents:
`
`U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,804,948 (“the ’948 Patent”)
`(against Avaya, Cisco, Huawei, ShoreTel)
`
`
`7,853,000 (“the ’000 Patent”)
`(against Avaya, Cisco, Huawei, ShoreTel)
`
`
`8,571,194 (“the ’194 Patent”)
`(against all Defendants)
`
`
`
`
`Claims
`
`1-2, 5-10, 12, 18-25, 29, 51-
`53, 65
`
`
`1-2, 5-10, 12, 18-23
`
`
`1-5
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`In general, the Asserted Patents disclose and claim various embodiments for “initiating
`
`conference calls via an instant messaging system to reduce the effort required to initiate and
`
`manage the call.” Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at Abstract. The Asserted Patents are related and share a
`
`
`
`1
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`common specification.1 As explained in the Background section of the Asserted Patents, certain
`
`disclosed embodiments address “the problem of integrating telephony products into software.”
`
`Id. at 2:33-34. A number of technologies, such as private branch exchange (“PBX”), were
`
`encumbered by multiple deficiencies. Id. at 2:33-47. For example, passing the correct telephony
`
`commands to the PBX was problematic due to the fact that “no two PBX’s are alike.” Id.
`
`Further, PBX technology often required “system integrators” and had reduced scalability (i.e.,
`
`expansion) opportunity. Id.
`
`Some systems inefficiently required all users who wanted to join a conference call to dial
`
`in to a central number and enter a passcode, which inhibited setting up spontaneous conference
`
`calls and were subject to serious security risks. Other systems that enabled host-initiated calls
`
`were also inefficient, for example, in that they typically required someone (such as the host) to
`
`separately join each participant to the call, such as by taking the time to dial or otherwise enter a
`
`respective telephone number for each one of the conference call participants. Id. at 3:4-15. The
`
`above non-limiting examples are among the various technological problems that certain
`
`embodiments of the Asserted Patents overcome.
`
`As disclosed in the specification of the Asserted Patents, certain embodiments make
`
`novel use of instant messaging technology to trigger initiation of a host-initiated conference call.
`
`For example, in the embodiment described with reference to Figure 1, when a “conference call
`
`requester” desires to initiate a conference call, the conference call requester may use a “network
`
`access device” (“NAD”) to send a “conference request message.” See, e.g., id. at 6:22-50. The
`
`conference request message may identify multiple parties as potential participants or “targets”
`
`
`1 The ’000 Patent is a continuation of the ’948 Patent and the ’194 Patent is a continuation of the
`’000 Patent. For the sake of convenience, Uniloc will cite only to the’948 patent’s specification
`when the ’948 patent is one of the patents with the relevant text, claim term or phrase.
`
`
`
`2
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`for a conference call. Id. In certain instances, the identification of the parties may be automatic
`
`and at least partially based, for example, on a determination of the availability of the targets.
`
`See, e.g., id. at Fig. 2 (illustrating initiation of a conference call); 6:60-7:26 (describing Figure
`
`2); 7:34-38 (“The IM [Instant Messaging] service in communication with User A’s NAD could
`
`be implemented to be aware of the ongoing IM session, such that the software would determine
`
`the list of conference call targets from the list of parties presently in the IM session.”); 9:26-30
`
`(“A shared application server may also be connected to allow information generated during a
`
`shared application session to be accessed by the conference call server as required, such as to
`
`determine a list of parties involved in a shared application session.”); 9:55-62 (allowing for
`
`presence monitoring). The conference request message may be received and processed at a
`
`server, for example, which may then initiate, or request initiation of, a conference bridge
`
`between the conference call requester and the conference call targets. Id. 6:51-59.
`
`III. APPLICABLE LAW
`Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
`
`(1996). In a case where subsidiary facts are in dispute, the Court will need to make factual
`
`findings about the extrinsic evidence, i.e., factual underpinnings. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
`
`Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
`
`The Court’s claim analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s decision in
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As set forth therein, the claims define
`
`the invention and the scope of the right to exclude. Id. at 1312. The words of the claims are
`
`generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, i.e., the meaning that would have been
`
`given by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Id. at 1313.
`
`“[U]nless compelled to do otherwise, a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary
`
`
`
`3
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`meaning as understood by an artisan of ordinary skill.” Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274
`
`F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`In claim construction, courts examine the intrinsic evidence to define the patented
`
`invention’s scope. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`This intrinsic evidence includes the claims, specification and prosecution history. Phillips, 415
`
`F.3d at 1314. In addition, a court may rely on extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries and
`
`treatises, to shed light on the claimed technology. Id. at 1317. However, such evidence is
`
`considered “less significant than the intrinsic record” and “less reliable than the patent and its
`
`prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. at 1317-18.
`
`Where the inventor has acted as his own lexicographer, “the inventor’s lexicography
`
`governs.” Id. at 1316; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
`
`(“The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or
`
`when it defines terms by implication.”). The inventor acts as a lexicographer when he defines a
`
`claim term in the specification expressly, Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582, or implicitly by
`
`“consistently and clearly us[ing] a term in a manner either more or less expansive than its general
`
`usage in the relevant art, thereby expanding or limiting the scope of the term in the context of the
`
`patent claims.” Alloc, Inc. v. ITC, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Bell Atlantic Network
`
`Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that courts may not import limitations from
`
`embodiments disclosed in the specification in order to limit or otherwise vary the meaning of the
`
`claim language. See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`
`
`4
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`Of course, not every claim limitation requires construction. U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
`
`Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has cautioned
`
`courts against positing constructions that “contribute nothing but meaningless verbiage to the
`
`definition of the claimed invention.” Harris Corp. v. Ixys Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1997). “[A] district court is not obligated construe terms with ordinary meanings, lest trial courts
`
`be inundated with requests to parse the meaning of every word in the asserted claims.” O2
`
`Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
`
`also id. at 1362 (“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every
`
`limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.”).
`
`A finding that a claim term “needs no construction” or has the “plain and ordinary
`
`meaning” may be inadequate where the plain and ordinary meaning fails to resolve the parties’
`
`dispute. Id. at 1361. But, a finding of “plain and ordinary meaning” is sufficient where the court
`
`rejects the opposing party’s claim construction. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing
`
`Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`The Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2,
`
`definiteness is evaluated from the perspective of a person of skill, Nautilus, Inc. v.
`Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128, 189 L. Ed. 2d 37 (2014); requires
`a determination of whether such a skilled person would understand the scope of
`the claim when it is read in light of the specification, Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
`Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986); and is evaluated in
`light of knowledge extant in the art at the time the patent application is filed, W.L.
`Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
`
`Dow Chem. Co. v. NOVA Chems. Corp. (Can.), 809 F.3d 1223, 1225 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2015);
`
`see also AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007) (confirming that “specify[ing] the proficiency of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
`
`in the art . . . is essential to administering the definiteness test”).
`
`
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`5
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`IV. AGREED TERMS AND PHRASES
`Uniloc and Defendants Avaya, Cisco, Huawei and ShoreTel have agreed to the following
`
`claim constructions in the ’948 and ’000 patents:
`
`Terms and Phrases
`“network [access / accessible] device”
`
`’948 patent claims 1, 23, 51
`’000 patent claims 1, 23
`
`“address”
`
`’948 patent claims 17, 18, 47, 63
`’000 patent claims 18-20
`
`Agreed Construction
`“any device capable of communicating
`over a network to one or more other
`Network Access Devices using a
`common protocol.”
`
`Such NADs can include but are not
`limited to computers, servers,
`workstations, Internet appliances,
`terminals, hosts, personal digital
`assistants (hereafter ‘PDAs’), and
`digital cellular telephones
`“the identifier for where a participant
`to a conference call may be contacted,
`and may be, but is not limited to, a
`PSTN or cellular phone number, such
`as an ANI, or a unique identifier
`associated with a voice over Internet
`protocol communications path”
`“the direct phone number of a call
`participant, and is typically the number
`at which a person may be directly
`dialed”
`
`“automatic number identified”
`Also known as “ANI”
`
`’948 patent claim 19
`’000 patent claim 19
`
`V.
`
`
`DISPUTED TERMS AND PHRASES
`The parties dispute the following terms and phrases.
`
`A.
`
`“voice over internet protocol” / “VOIP”
`(’948 patent claims 6, 24; ’000 patent claims 6, 20)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`“the use of the Internet Protocol (IP)
`for transmitting voice
`communications”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary.
`
`
`There is no real dispute that the meaning of “voice over internet protocol,” or “VOIP,” is
`
`the use of Internet Protocol (IP) to transmit voice communications. See Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at 6:6
`
`
`
`6
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`(“VOIP—Voice over Internet Protocol”); see, e.g., id. at 6:14-17 (“The conference call server
`
`may have one or more ports for connecting participants, such as by a VOIP path, or through a
`
`telephonic network. Connection of two or more paths allows the formation of a conference
`
`bridge.”); 8:13-17 (“If it is determined that, for each target, that direct dial calls are enabled, the
`
`conference bridge provider can dial 334 the direct dial number for the targets, connect to VOIP
`
`paths if VOIP connections are to be used, or may implement a combination of direct dialed and
`
`VOIP connections.”); 9:44-47 (“[T]he telephonic capability may be implemented into the NAD,
`
`such as through a digital cell phone, or VOIP connection through a desktop or laptop computer
`
`connected to the network.”). Defendants only dispute whether this term needs to be explicitly
`
`construed. Uniloc believes that it does, insofar as it clarifies a term of art that might not be
`
`known to the lay juror. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`B.
`
`“publicly switched telephone network” / “PSTN”
`(’948 patent claims 5, 25; ’000 patent claim 5)
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`“voice networks and related services” No construction necessary.
`
`
`As with VOIP, supra, the specification defines “publicly switched telephone network,” or
`
`“PSTN.” In particular, it is the voice networks and their related services. Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at
`
`6:4-5 (“PSTN—The voice networks are referred to as a publicly switched telephone network
`
`(PSTN) and its related services.”); Figs. 1, 4. Uniloc simply proposes to apply the explicit
`
`definition set in the Detailed Description. Defendants offer no alternative construction, other
`
`than to suggest no construction is required, even for a term that the inventor expressly defined.
`
`Leaving this technical term without construction risks undermines the central purpose of claim
`
`construction. Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1347.
`
`
`
`7
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`C.
`
`“conference call server”
`(’948 patent claims 1, 23, 51; ’000 patent claims 1, 23; ’194 Patent claim 1)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`“computer or program that facilitates
`the establishment of the conference
`call”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“a central server that communicates
`parameters for the conference call and
`directly or indirectly initiates the
`conference call itself”
`
`
`The fundamental dispute concerning this term is whether the “conference call server” is a
`
`component “that facilitates the establishment of the conference call,” as Uniloc proposes; or
`
`whether it must be the “conference call server” itself that “initiates” a conference call, as
`
`Defendants would have it. The intrinsic evidence supports Uniloc’s position, and also confirms
`
`that Defendants’ construction is inconsistent with surrounding claim language and with other
`
`claim language encompassing preferred embodiments that Defendants seek to exclude.
`
`Defendants’ construction also and improperly imports various limitations from different claims
`
`while excluding others.
`
`The specification discloses various preferred embodiments including, inter alia, one
`
`where the conference call server itself initiates a conference bridge between the conference call
`
`requester and the conference call targets: “The conference call server may then initiate 114 or
`
`request initiation of a conference bridge between the conference call requester and the
`
`conference call targets.” Ex. 1 (’948 Patent) at 6:57-60.2 Crucially, however, the specification
`
`also includes other examples where the conference call server requests that initiation of a
`
`conference bridge be handled elsewhere, such as by third party conference call providers: “The
`
`conference call server may further utilize third party conference call providers for the actual
`
`initiation of a conference call based on parameters generated by the conference call server or the
`
`
`2 Notably, even this example uses the permissive “may” rather than the mandatory “must.”
`
`
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`8
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`conference call requester.” Id. at 8:25-28 (emphasis added); see also id. at 11:34-40 (“The
`
`[conference call requester] may select potential targets from the display, or manually add
`
`potential targets to a potential target list, to be included in a conference call request to be
`
`generated 1510 on and transmitted 1512 by the NAD to the conference call server, which may
`
`then initiate the conference call either directly or through a third party conference call service
`
`provider.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, the specification makes clear that there are alternatives to
`
`the conference call server itself initiating calls when it states: “Where the conference call server
`
`initiates the conference call itself . . . .” Id. at 8:52-53. After all, the implication of the statement
`
`“[w]here the conference call server initiates the conference call itself” is that there are also
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`instances where the conference server does not, itself, initiate the conference call. See, e.g.,
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`Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584-85 (noting that a construction that reads out a preferred embodiment is
`
`rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support).
`
`Further proof is found in the claims themselves. For example, independent claim 1 of the
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`’948 patent includes the limitation “said conference call connection initiated by said conference
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`call server,” which illustrates an instance when the conference call server itself must initiate the
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`call. Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at 12:14-15 (emphasis added). But, independent claim 23 of the ’948
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`patent instead recites “automatically initiating a conference call;” and claim 41, which depends
`
`upon claim 23, further requires “the step of initiating a conference call comprises communicating
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`information from said conference call server to a third party conference call service, said third
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`party conference call service establishing a conference bridge . . . .” Ex. 1 (’948 Patent) at
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`13:51-54, 14:55-60 (emphasis added). Thus, at least independent claim 23 must encompass
`
`within its scope instances where the conference call server “facilitates the establishment of the
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`conference call” (per Uniloc’s construction) and does not “itself” establish the conference call.
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`9
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 14 of 30 PageID #: 2166
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`Defendants’ attempt to write out this embodiment is improper. See, e.g., Luv N’ Care, LTD. v.
`
`Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., No. 2:11-CV-512, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95198, *38, 2013 WL
`
`3471269 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2013) (rejecting a construction that was “superfluous with
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`surrounding claim language [i.e., as in claim 1], is inconsistent with surrounding claim language
`
`[as confirmed by, e.g., claims 23 and 41], and improperly imports various limitations from
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`different claims [e.g., imports from Claim 1 into Claim 23].”).
`
`Finally, the extrinsic evidence also supports Uniloc’s construction. For example, a
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`relevant and well-known technical dictionary defined “server,” in part, as a “computer or
`
`program that responds to commands from a client,” which is consistent with how the intrinsic
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`evidence (including the claims) uses that term. See Ex. 5 (Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth
`
`Edition (2002)) at 474. As “server” is a technical term, a jury would benefit from clarification
`
`by the Court as to what the term means. See, e.g., Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 6:10-cv-561
`
`LED-JDL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89764, at *59 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2012). Only Uniloc has
`
`offered a construction that is consistent with and supported by the intrinsic evidence and the one
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`and only item of extrinsic evidence before the Court for this term.
`
`D.
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`“application sharing capability”
`(’948 patent claims 9, 10, 52, 53; ’000 patent claims 9-10)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed Construction
`“the ability to grant two or more
`devices access to a single application”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`“ability to allow two or more network
`access devices to access a single
`application on a network access
`device”
`
`
`The dispute regarding this construction boils down to the question of where the shared
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`application(s) must reside. Uniloc’s construction clarifies the technical scope in a manner
`
`consistent with definitions found in the intrinsic evidence , i.e., “the ability to grant two or more
`
`devices access to a single application.” Uniloc’s definition thus includes the ability of two or
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`
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`10
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 144 Filed 12/02/16 Page 15 of 30 PageID #: 2167
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`more NADs to share an application that might be run from a server or other cloud-based device,
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`as well as an application that could reside on one of those NADs. Defendants’ construction
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`improperly limits the application to being installed on one of the NADs used by a participant.
`
`The specification generally describes “application sharing capability” in the context of a
`
`“shared application session”:
`
`Shared application sessions comprise the ability of multiple viewers to view the
`interface with a particular software application operating on a particular set of
`data, and may include the ability of each viewer to simultaneously operate the
`shared application. Such shared applications are discussed further in applicant’s
`U.S. Patent Publication No. 20030018725, a.k.a., U.S. Patent Application Ser. No.
`10/015,077 (“the ’725 publication”), filed Oct. 26, 2001, the contents of which are
`herein incorporated in their entirety by reference thereto.
`
`Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at 9:30-38. Nothing in this passage suggests that the application must be
`
`installed on one of the viewers’ NADs. Indeed, just the opposite is true, as established by the
`
`incorporated reference: “A Shared Application Session is defined as a Hosted Application
`
`Session that is being concurrently accessed by more than one network access device.” Ex. 4
`
`(’725 publication) at 3 (emphasis added).3 “A Hosted Application Session is a session of use of
`
`a Hosted Application.” Id. Finally, “[a] Hosted Application is an application being executed on
`
`a host and accessed by a remote Network Access Device.” Id. In other words, a “shared
`
`application session” involves NADs accessing an application that may be hosted elsewhere.
`
`Uniloc’s proposed construction is consistent with these explicit definitions.
`
`Uniloc’s construction finds further support in the specification and figures of the Asserted
`
`Patents. For example, the specification explains that “IM [may be] used to provide a channel for
`
`communications outside the shared application session,” and that in such instances “the
`
`
`3 The capitalized terms defined by the ’725 publication are italicized in the original. This
`italicization is not included herein to avoid confusion.
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`conference call server . . . could be common with the shared application session server . . . .” Ex.
`
`1 (’948 patent) at 7:1-5. This “shared application session server” is also shown in the figures as
`
`something separate from the NADs, but sharing information with them via the network:
`
`
`Ex. 1 (’948 patent) at Fig. 4. The shared application session server could, presumably, host the
`
`application, and to read out this embodiment per Defendants’ construction would be improper.
`
`Uniloc’s construction also finds support in the claims. For example, clai