Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 175 Filed 11/22/16 Page 1 of 45 PageID #: 3600
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG,
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLE, INC., et al.
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-cv-1095
`§ (LEAD CASE)
`§
`§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
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`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 175 Filed 11/22/16 Page 2 of 45 PageID #: 3601
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`This Court Should Adopt Papst’s Proposed Construction of the “Connecting
`
`The “Connecting Device” Terms Are Presumptively Not Means-Plus-
`
`The “Connecting Device” Terms Have Sufficient Structure Such That
`
`C.
`
`If the Court Determines that § 112 ¶6 Does Apply, It Should Adopt Papst’s
`
`Papst’s Proposed Structure of the “First Connecting Device” Is
`
`Papst’s Proposed Structure of the “Second Connecting Device” Is
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ................................................................ 3
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4
`I.
`TERM DISPUTE 2: THE “CONNECTING DEVICE” TERMS....................................... 4
`A.
`Device” Terms. ....................................................................................................... 5
`B.
`The “Connecting Device” Terms Are Not Subject to § 112 ¶6. ............................. 7
`1.
`Function Terms. .......................................................................................... 7
`2.
`§112 ¶6 Does Not Apply. ........................................................................... 8
`Alternative Construction. ...................................................................................... 11
`1.
`Limited to Only What Is Necessary to Perform the Function. ................. 12
`2.
`Limited to Only What Is Necessary to Perform the Function. ................. 13
`TERM DISPUTE 3: THE “COMMAND INTERPRETER” TERMS ............................. 15
`A.
`Interpreter” Terms. ................................................................................................ 15
`B.
`Subject to § 112, ¶6. .............................................................................................. 17
`1.
`Function Terms. ........................................................................................ 17
`2.
`Papst’s Alternative Construction. ............................................................. 17
`TERM DISPUTE 1: THE “MULTI-PURPOSE INTERFACE” TERM .......................... 18
`........................................................................................................................................... 20
`
`TERM DISPUTE 9: “SPECIFIC DRIVER FOR THE MULTI-PURPOSE INTERFACE”
`
`This Court Should Adopt Papst’s Proposed Construction of the “Command
`
`“First Command Interpreter” and “Second Command Interpreter” Are Not
`
`The “Command Interpreter” Terms Are Presumptively Not Means-Plus-
`
`If the Court Determines that §112, ¶6 Does Apply, It Should Adopt
`
`II.
`
`III.
`IV.
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`TERM DISPUTE 4: THE “SEND A PARAMETER/SIGNAL” TERMS ....................... 20
`V.
`TERM DISPUTE 5: THE “CUSTOMARY” TERMS ..................................................... 23
`VI.
`VII. TERM DISPUTE 6: THE “AUTOMATIC” TERMS ...................................................... 25
`A.
`The automatic terms (except “automatic recognition process”) ........................... 27
`B.
`“automatic recognition process” ........................................................................... 28
`VIII. TERM DISPUTE 7: “DATA TRANSMIT/RECEIVE DEVICE” ................................... 30
`TERM DISPUTE 8: “SIMULATING A VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM TO THE HOST” . 31
`IX.
`TERM DISPUTE 10: THE “USER-LOADED” TERMS ................................................ 32
`X.
`XI.
`TERM DISPUTE 11: “INPUT/OUTPUT [I/O] PORT” .................................................. 35
`XII. TERM DISPUTE 12: THE “ANALOG ACQUISITION” TERMS................................. 36
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc.,
`253 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................... 13, 14
`
`Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
`616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010)......................................................................................... 25
`
`Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comput., Inc.,
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`448 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006)......................................................................................... 11
`
`B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................... 11
`
`Bell Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys.,
`132 F.3d 701 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................. 3
`
`Bonutti v. Lantz Med., Inc.,
`No. 1:14-cv-00909-SEB-MJD, 2016 WL 247752 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2016) ..................... 9
`
`CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc.,
`418 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 27, 30
`
`Finjan, Inc., v. Proofpoint, Inc.,
`No. 13-CV-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 7770208 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) ............................. 9
`
`Good Technology Corp. v. Little Red Wagon Technologies, Inc.,
`2013 WL 4052408 (N.D.Tex. Aug., 11 2013) ............................................................ 19, 27
`
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,
`91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................. 9
`
`In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig.,
` 778 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2015).......................................................................................... 2
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................... 3, 31
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen’l Ins.,
`No. 6:15-cv-59, 2016 WL 125594 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) ............................................ 9
`
`Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp.,
`175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999)............................................................................................. 6
`
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`JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................... 12
`
`Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
`968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992)........................................................................................... 3
`
`M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless Am. Inc.,
`No. 12-30-RGA, 2015 WL 5826816 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015) .............................................. 8
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)............................................................................................... 3
`
`Masco Corp. v. United States,
`303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Mass Engineered Design, Inc. v. Spaceco Bus. Solutions, Inc.,
`No. 6:14-CV-411, 2016 WL 826048 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2016) ....................................... 11
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................... 11, 12
`
`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
` 133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).......................................................................................... 3
`
`Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
`325 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)........................................................................................... 7
`
`NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.,
` 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).......................................................................................... 3
`
`OPTIS Wireless Technology LLC, et al. v. ZTE Corporation, et al.,
`No. 2:15-cv-300-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 1599478 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2016)....................... 9
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
` 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................. passim
`
`Renishaw PLC v. MarpossSocieta’ Per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998)................................................................................... 22, 35
`
`Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1999)......................................................................................... 12
`
`Source Vagabond Sys. Ltd. v. Hydrapak, Inc.,
`753 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................... 20, 23
`
`Syncpoint Imaging, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
` No. 2:15-cv-00247-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 55118 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) ...................... 11
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`Thorner v. Sony Computer Enternatinment America LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................... 5, 27
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................. 7, 8, 17
`
`Z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation,
`507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................... 30
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Statutes
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`Pursuant to the Court’s Second Amended Docket Control Order (Doc. No. 154), Plaintiff
`
`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. (“Papst” or “Plaintiff”) hereby files this Opening Claim
`
`Construction Brief.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringe one or more claims of U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`6,470,399 (“the ’399 patent”) (Ex. 1), 6,895,449 (“the ’449 patent”) (Ex. 2), 8,504,746 (“the ’746
`
`patent”) (Ex. 3), 8,966,144 (“the ’144 patent”) (Ex. 4), and 9,189,437 (“the ’437 patent”) (Ex. 5)
`
`(collectively, the “Patents”)1 through their implementation of cellular camera phones. The
`
`Patents generally relate to a unique method for achieving high data transfer rates for data
`
`acquisition systems (e.g., still pictures, videos, voice recordings) to a general-purpose computer,
`
`without requiring an end user to purchase, install, and/or run specialized software for each
`
`system. (Ex. 1, 4:23-27).
`
`At the time of the invention, there were an increasing number and variety of data
`
`acquisition systems with the ability to capture high volumes of information, and an increasing
`
`demand to transfer that information to commercially-available, general purpose computers. (Ex.
`
`1, 1:20-54.) But at that time, performing that data transfer operation required either loading
`
`specialized, sophisticated software onto a general purpose computer, or specifically matching
`
`interface devices for a data acquisition system (e.g., a digital camera or camera phone) to a host
`
`system which may maximize data transfer rates, but lacks the flexibility to operate with different
`
`devices. (Ex. 1, 1:15-2:14.) The resulting invention allows a data acquisition system to identify
`
`itself as a type of common device so as to leverage the inherent capabilities of general-purpose,
`
`commercially-available computers. (Ex. 1, 5:6-20.) Accordingly, by using the patented
`
`1 The specifications of the Patents are similar. Throughout this brief, Plaintiff may cite to a particular single
`specification for brevity, but incorporates similar corresponding passages in the specifications of the other Patents.
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`invention, users could avoid loading specific software; improve data transfer efficiency; save
`
`time, processing power, and memory space; and avoid the waste associated with purchasing
`
`specialized computers or loading specific software for each device. (Ex. 1, 3:25-28, 4:23-36,
`
`8:23-59, 9:23-28, 10:10-14, 12:23-40.)
`
`Four of the Patents (the ’399, ’449, ’746 and ’144 patents) are the subject of multi-district
`
`litigation pending in Washington D.C. In Re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG Patent
`
`Litigation, MDL NO. 1880, Misc. Action 07-493 (RDM) (“MDL”). On November 29, 2009, the
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`MDL court issued a (modified) claims construction order construing a number of terms in the
`
`’399 and ’449 patents. (See Exs. 6 and 7.)2 The claims construction order from the MDL court
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`was appealed, and the Federal Circuit vacated the claim construction of the following terms:
`
`“interface device,” “data transmit/receive device,” “second connecting device,” “virtual files”
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`and “simulating a virtual file system.” In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 778
`
`F.3d 1255, 1261-70 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (the “Opinion”). The Federal Circuit’s Opinion is critical to
`
`this Court’s claim construction for not only the terms that were directly addressed by the Federal
`
`Circuit, but also for other terms this Court will consider. The Federal Circuit made it clear that
`
`the Patents are not limited to a stand-alone interface device. See Opinion at 1262 (“We hold that
`
`the term ‘interface device’ is not limited to a ‘stand-alone device’ in the district court’s sense”).
`
`On November 15-17, 2016, a second claims construction hearing began in the MDL; that
`
`hearing has not concluded (the parties did not finish argument for all of the terms), and an order
`
`has not yet been issued. Nevertheless, Judge Moss’s observations regarding the Federal Circuit
`
`Opinion are instructive:
`
`And related to that – and this may be something that I find I'm particularly concerned
`about, is that if there was one principal take away from the Court of Appeals’
`
`2 Exhibit 6 is Doc. No. 337 (Judge Collyer’s Modified Order Regarding Claims Construction); Exhibit 7 is a
`summary of the constructions in Judge Collyer’s Modified Order Regarding Claims Construction.
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`decision, it was that Judge Collyer erred in concluding that the invention had to be a
`standalone device. And if the answer in the Court of Appeals and the whole decision
`is really premised – and virtually all of the constructions and the reversals in that
`decision were premised on the issue no, no, no, this doesn't have to be a standalone
`device, this can be something that is actually part of the other devices, I presume of
`the host or probably more likely of the data device.
`
`Nov. 16, 2016, Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, In Re Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG
`
`Patent Litigation, MDL NO. 1880, Misc. Action 07-493 (RDM) (J. Moss) (Ex. 10). Defendants
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`invite error by construing some terms to require a stand-alone device.
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The Court is well versed in the principles of claim construction. Claim construction is the
`
`first step in any infringement or validity analysis.3 A district court should construe the claims in
`
`light of their explicit language as informed by their preambles, as well as the patent’s
`
`specification, figures, and prosecution history.4
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`The specification is the “best source for understanding a technical term,” to be
`
`supplemented, “as needed, by the prosecution history.”5 The prosecution history represents key
`
`evidence of how the examiner and the inventor construed the patent.6 Claims should generally be
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`interpreted in a manner consistent with other claims, as well as with the prosecution history.7
`
`Moreover, claim terms in patents sharing a common specification and application should usually
`
`be given the same interpretation.8 It is improper to confine a claim to a particular embodiment;
`
`the claim language itself is paramount.9 Extrinsic evidence may also be relevant to claim
`
`3 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`4 See id. at 980.
`5 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam,
`Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
`6 See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`7 See Bell Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`8 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rehearing en banc denied.
`9 See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008); accord Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1325.
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`construction.” Such evidence consists of all evidence extrinsic to the patent and its prosecution
`
`history, including “expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”ll While
`
`authorizing examination of extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit has warned that, while it “can
`
`shed useful
`
`light on the relevant art,” it is “less significant
`
`than the intrinsic record in
`
`determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.”12
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`Term Dispute 2: The “connecting device” terms
`
`Terms to be Construed
`
`Plaintiff’s Construction
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`
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`“a first connecting device for
`interfacing the host device with the
`interface device via the multi-
`purpose interface of the host device”
`[Ex. 1, claims 1, 11: Ex. 2, claims 1.
`17]
`
`“interfacing of the host device with a
`first connecting device of the
`interface device via the multi-
`
`purpose interface of the host device”
`[Ex 1. claims 14]
`
`“a second connecting device for
`interfacing the interface device with
`the data transmit/receive device”
`[Ex. 1. claims 1. 11; Ex. 2, claims 1.
`17]
`
`“interfacing of the data
`transmit/receive device with a
`
`second connecting device of the
`interface device”
`
`[’399 patent. claim 14]
`
`“a component or group of
`components for interfacing the
`interface device with the host
`device”
`
`IfM+F. alternatively:
`Function: Agreed
`Structure: Fig. 1 and associated
`text (’399 and Ex. 25)
`
`Samsung, Lenovo. Motorola. and LG:
`Subject to §112(6)
`Function: [Agreed] interfacing the
`host device with the interface device
`via the multi—purpose interface of the
`host dCViCC-
`Structure: 12xx structures as
`described at ’399, col. 9:30-48 and
`Fig. 2-
`
`“a component or group of
`components for interfacing the
`interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
`
`Samsung. Lenovo. Motorola. and LG:
`Subject to §112(6)
`Function: [Agreed] interfacing the
`interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device.
`Structure: 15xx structures as
`IfM+F~ alternatively;
`described at ’399, col. 9:49-64 and
`Function: Agreed
`Structure: Fig. 1 and associated Fir. 2.
`text (’399 and ‘449 patents)
`
`1° See Phillips. 415 F.3d at 1317.
`
`11 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
`‘2 Id.
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`A.
`
`
`This Court Should Adopt Papst’s Proposed Construction of the “Connecting
`Device” Terms.
`Papst’s proposed construction follows the Opinion and is based on the plain and ordinary
`
`meaning of “connecting device” and its usage in the claims. Apple, Huawei, and ZTE defendants
`
`do not dispute Papst’s construction.
`
`The Federal Circuit emphasized that construction of “second connecting device” cannot
`
`limit the scope of the claim to the embodiment:
`
`The principal basis for the district court's inclusion of those requirements was the basis
`we have already rejected [in the discussion of “interface device”]—the view that other
`claim language and the written description require the interface device (of which the
`second connecting device is a part, according to the claims) to be stand-alone. For
`“second connecting device,” the district court added that a preferred embodiment from
`the written description includes pin connectors and other socket-like structures . . . . But
`we see nothing to take that embodiment outside the reach of the usual rule that claims
`are generally not limited to features found in what the written description presents as
`mere embodiments, where the claim language is plainly broader.
`
`Opinion at 1265 (emphasis added). Following this guidance, Papst proposes a construction based
`
`on the plain and ordinary meaning of “connecting device” and its usage in the claims.13
`
`The plain and ordinary meaning of “device” in this context is “a circuit or logical group
`
`of circuits resident on one or more boards capable of interacting with other such devices through
`
`the bus.”14 One of skill in the art would understand that a connecting device is thus a “component
`
`or group of components” that provide an electrical interface between two devices. (Decl. of Dr.
`
`Kenneth Fernald (Ex. 8), ¶ 35.) The words of the claims themselves explain the location of the
`
`first and second connecting device: (1) the first connecting device “interfac[es] the host device
`
`13 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim are generally given their
`ordinary and customary meaning.”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also Thorner v. Sony Computer
`Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect
`to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee explicitly redefines the term or
`disavows its full scope.”).
`14 Ex. 9 at 279.
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`with the interface device,” (Ex. 1, 12:51-54; see also id., 13:58-59, 14:37-38; Ex. 2, 11:54-55,
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`13:21-22, 14:13-14); and the second connecting device “interfac[es] the interface device with the
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`data/transmit receive device,” (Ex. 1, 12:54-55; see also id., 13:61-62, 14:40-41; Ex. 2, 11:57-58,
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`13:24-25, 14:17-18).
`
`The specification further supports Papst’s proposal. The varied usage of a term in the
`
`specification is evidence that it should be interpreted broadly.15 For example, the specification
`
`provides an example embodiment using BNC connectors (see Ex. 1, 9:49-64) but explains that
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`the second connecting device can be implemented with any hardware. (Ex. 1, 8:33-37 (“any
`
`modification of the specific hardware symbolized by the second connecting device 15 can be
`
`implemented essentially without changing the operation of the interface device.”).) Moreover,
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`the specification explains that different kinds of data transmit/receive devices can be connected
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`to the second connecting device. (E.g., Ex. 1, 6:19-20 (“Regardless of which data
`
`transmit/receive device...is connected to the second connecting device...”); id. at 8:30-31
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`(describing how “a plurality of dissimilar device types [can] be operated in parallel in identical
`
`manner”).) Finally, the specification contemplates using the invention in the “entire electrical
`
`engineering spectrum,” from multimeters to medical diagnostic equipment. (Ex. 1, 1:34-46.)
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`Figures 1 of the ’399 and ’499 patents provide further support, identifying the location of
`
`the first connecting device (“1st CD” (in yellow)) and second connecting device (“2nd CD” (in
`
`orange)) consistent with the claim language:
`
`15 Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Varied use of a disputed
`term in the written description demonstrates the breadth of the term rather than providing a limited definition.”).
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`Ex. 1, Fig. 1. Thus, the plain meaning is a component or group of components that form an
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`interface between (i) the interface device and the host device (“first connecting device”) or (ii)
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`the interface device and the data/transmit receive device (“second connecting device”). Papst’s
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`proposal does not artificially restrict the invention to a particular type of connection and should
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`therefore be adopted.
`
`B.
`
`The “Connecting Device” Terms Are Not Subject to § 112 ¶6.
`The “Connecting Device” Terms Are Presumptively Not Means-Plus-
`1.
`Function Terms.
`The Patent Act permits applicants to draft claims in functional language by referring to a
`
`“means” or “step for” performing a function without reciting the structure, material, or acts in
`
`support thereof, i.e., in “means-plus-function” form.16 This allows an applicant to express a claim
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`limitation through a functional description using the word “means,” but confines the structure of
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`that “means” to the structure in the specification that corresponds to the claimed function and
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`equivalents thereof.17 To determine whether an applicant has elected to make use of § 112, ¶6,
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`the Court first must examine the words of the claim itself.18 A claim that does not include the
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`16 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) (formerly 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6); see Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d
`1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`17 See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`18 Id. at 1348.
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`word “means” is presumed not to be subject to § 112, ¶6.19 The presumption can be overcome
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`only by the movant demonstrating that “the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite
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`structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that
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`function.’”20 If the claim term, when read in context with the rest of the claim and the
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`specification, connotes sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function, then it
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`is not a means-plus-function term.21
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`Neither the “first” nor “second connecting device” terms is a means-plus-function
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`limitation. The word “means” is not used in the claims, raising a presumption that § 112, ¶6 does
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`not apply.22 To overcome that presumption, Defendants must demonstrate that “the claim term
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`fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient
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`structure for performing that function.”23 Defendants cannot overcome that presumption.
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`2.
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`The “Connecting Device” Terms Have Sufficient Structure Such That
`§112 ¶6 Does Not Apply.
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`The terms provide more than sufficient description for one of ordinary skill to understand
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`the claimed structure. “Connecting device” alone connotes structure. (Ex. 8 ¶¶ 35, 37-39.) A
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`“connecting device” is a single component, or a group of components, such as circuitry that
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`provides an interface between two separate devices or subsystems. (Ex. 8 ¶¶ 35; Ex. 9 at 279.)
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`19 Id.
`20 Id.
`21 Id. at 1349; Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`22 See Williamson, 792 F. 3d at 1348-49.
`23 Id. at 1349 (citation and internal quotations omitted); accord Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comput., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364,
`1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Williamson did not change that long-standing presumption; rather the opinion clarified and
`overruled certain language in a string of Federal Circuit opinions that characterized the presumption as “strong.”
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. See M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless Am. Inc., No. 12-30-RGA, 2015 WL
`5826816, at *3 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015) (“Accordingly, if a limitation recites ... [a] generic term with a sufficient
`description of its operation, the presumption against means-plus-function claiming remains intact”) (internal
`citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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`Far from being a mere placeholder, “connecting device” plainly describes the function it
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`performs in clear, unambiguous language, similar to terms like screwdriver, clamp, filter, etc.24
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`Further, the claims provide context and describe how the “first” and “second connecting
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`device” interact with other components, which connotes sufficiently definite structure to one of
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`skill in the art.25 The asserted claims explain that the “first connecting device” “interfac[es] the
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`host device with the interface device via the multi-purpose interface of the host device.” (Ex. 1
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`at 12:51-53; see also id., Claims 11 (13:58-60) and 14 (14:38-40); Ex. 2, Claims 1 (11:54-56), 17
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`(13:21-23), and 18 (14:13-15).) One of skill in the art would understand that the “first connecting
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`device” was intended to broadly claim any component or set of components that formed an
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`appropriate interface. (Ex. 8 ¶¶ 35-38.)
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`The claims also explain that the “second connecting device” is required to “interfac[e] the
`interface device with the data transmit/receive device.” (Ex. 1, 12:54-55; see also id., 13:61-62,
`14:40-41; Ex. 2, 11:57-58, 13:24-25, 14:17-18). In relevant part, Ex. 1, claims 1, 11 state: “a
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`second connecting device for interfacing the interface device with the data transmit/receive
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`device, the second connecting device including a sampling circuit for sampling the analog data
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`provided by the data transmit/receive device and an analog-to-digital converter for converting
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`24 Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he fact that a particular
`mechanism . . . is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into
`a ‘means for performing a specified function’ within the meaning of section 112(6).”); see also Bonutti v. Lantz
`Med., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00909-SEB-MJD, 2016 WL 247752, at *21 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2016) (holding that
`“lockout element” was not a means-plus-function term because “[w]e do not view the term ‘lockout element’ as
`being significantly different from the term ‘lock’ and find that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`invention would have understood the former, like the latter, to be a name for a class of structures”); OPTIS
`Wireless Technology LLC, et al. v. ZTE Corporation, et al., No. 2:15-cv-300-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 1599478, at
`*25 (holding that “determination unit” connoted structure sufficient to avoid 112, ¶6).
`25 See Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen’l Ins., No. 6:15-cv-59, 2016 WL 125594, at *5-10 (E.D. Tex. Jan.
`11, 2016) (holding that “distributed information access point” was not a means-plus-function term because the
`claims provided context and described how the “access point” interacted with other components via recitations of
`inputs, outputs, and operations of the access point); OPTIS, 2016 WL 1599478, at *25-26 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19,
`2016); Finjan, Inc., v. Proofpoint, Inc., No. 13-CV-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 7770208, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3,
`2015) (“[H]ere, the intrinsic evidence establishes the structural character of ‘content processor’ through its
`interaction with the system's other components.”).
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`data sampled by the sampling circuit into digital data.” (Ex. 1, 12:54-60.) The interface between
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`the interface device and data transmit/receive device is intended to