U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`
`BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`STRAGENT, LLC
`Patent Owner.
`__________
`
`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
`__________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: September 10, 2018
`__________
`
`Before LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, PATRICK M. BOUCHER, CHRISTA P.
`ZADO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`__________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________
`
`BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`STRAGENT, LLC
`Patent Owner.
`__________
`
`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
`__________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: September 10, 2018
`__________
`
`Before LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, PATRICK M. BOUCHER, CHRISTA P.
`ZADO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`On behalf of Petitioner
`
`
`LIONEL M. LAVENUE, ESQ
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`Two Freedom Square
`11955 Freedom Drive
`Reston, VA 20190
`(571) 203-2700
`lionel.lavenue@finnegan.com
`
`of:
`
`
`
`of:
`
`SEAN D. DAMON, ESQ
`Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
`901 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`(202) 408-4397
`sean.damon@finnegan.com
`
`
`On behalf of Patent Owner
`
`GEORGE PAZUNIAK, ESQ
`of:
`O'Kelly, Ernst & Joyce, LLC
`901 N. Market Street
`Suite 1000
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 778-4230
`gp@del-iplaw.com
`
`
`
`of:
`
`THOMAS H. KRAMER, Pharm.D.
`O'Kelly, Ernst & Joyce, LLC
`901 N. Market Street
`Suite 1000
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 778-4000
`tkramer@del-iplaw.com
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Monday,
`September 10, 2018, commencing at 1:00 p.m. at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
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`
`
`P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
`
`1:00 p.m.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: This is a consolidated hearing for four
`cases, IPR2017-01519, 01520, 01521, and 01522, BMW of North America
`v. Stragent. Judge Boucher is joining us by video from our Denver office,
`and Judge Zado is joining us by video from our Silicon Valley office.
`Please speak into the microphone, to ensure that they can hear your
`argument.
`Also, because they won't have the benefit of visual cues in the room,
`please identify your slide numbers as you move through your
`demonstratives. We also remind the parties that demonstratives are not
`evidence but, instead, are aids to assist the Panel in understanding your
`arguments here today.
`Each side has 90 minutes to argue and, as set forth in our hearing
`order, Petitioner will begin by presenting its case regarding the challenged
`claims. Patent Owner then will respond to Petitioner's argument. Finally,
`Petitioner may use any time it has reserved for rebuttal to respond to Patent
`Owner's argument. Depending on how much time each side uses, we may
`have a break at an appropriate time, either after Petitioner's opening
`argument or after Patent Owner's argument. Counsel, when you begin your
`argument, please identify yourself and the party you represent for the record.
`Counsel for Petitioner, please indicate how much time you would like to
`reserve for rebuttal when you're ready.
`MR. LAVENUE: Forty-five minutes, Your Honor.
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`JUDGE PETTIGREW: I'm sorry?
`MR. LAVENUE: Forty-five minutes.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: Petitioner, you may begin.
`MR. LAVENUE: Thank you, Your Honors. Lionel Lavenue from
`Finnegan for BMW North America. Frankly, I will just be standing up for a
`few moments to make an introduction of my colleague, Mr. Damon, who
`will be presenting the argument this morning. Just for a little background
`before I turn it over to Mr. Damon, as you know, there were two sets of IPR
`proceedings, one set of IPR proceedings were the IPR2017-676 and 677.
`The arguments in that proceeding were very similar to the arguments
`in this proceeding. We had a demonstrative in those two proceedings,
`which are over. There's been a final written decision in those two prior
`proceedings, and those are now on appeal to the federal circuit. We had
`demonstratives in that proceeding, where we went through each of the
`challenged claims and compared those and mapped those to the prior art. In
`the previous proceeding, we had done that with Judge Pettigrew and Judge
`Boucher. Judge Zado, you're new to this, so you did not see us go through
`that mapping in the prior two proceedings, but what we have done is we
`have prepared a very similar mapping in our demonstratives for these four
`IPR proceedings for the different claims in this second set of claims that are
`at issue. Those are the ones that have been submitted. Judge Pettigrew, I
`have a paper copy, if you'd like a paper copy.
`JUDGE PETTIGREW: I would, please.
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`MR. LAVENUE: Mr. Damon will bring that to you. What we've
`done in our demonstratives is we've done a similar thing that we did in the
`676/677, where we've gone through each of the challenged claims and we
`have mapped the challenged claim to the prior art, so that whether or not you
`utilize it today or during the preparation of the final written decision, you
`have what we believe is a guide map to the proof that we have put forward,
`both in our papers and in the declarations, to support the position that we
`have presented a full and accurate case showing that these claims are
`non-patentable. We use that as a reference.
`However, Mr. Damon will be doing something a little different.
`He'll be going through what we believe are the five main points for
`consideration in today's oral argument, so it's a little bit different from what
`we did at our last oral argument. With that, I'll turn it over to Mr. Damon.
`Thank you.
`MR. DAMON: Thank you, Your Honors. As Mr. Lavenue just
`said, I've distilled the 100 and almost 60 slides down to five key points.
`Those five main points are Stragent presents the same failed arguments they
`previously presented. The second main point is sharing still does not
`require storage. The third main point is Dr. Miller's declaration should be
`given little to no weight. The fourth main point is that Dr. Miller's
`deposition testimony contradicts Stragent's arguments and supports BMW's.
`The fifth main argument is that Stragent argues -- -- excuse me -- --
`arguments either contradict or ignore the teachings of its own specification
`and the teachings of the prior art. Your Honors, for Slide 10 of the
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`demonstrative, BMW's demonstrative, as Mr. Lavenue stated, the previous
`IPRs were 00676 and 00677, and the same arguments that was presented in
`those IPRs, which have now been -- final written decisions have been issued,
`are the same arguments that are being presented in these four IPRs. So if
`we move down --
`JUDGE BOUCHER: I have a question about that. Are you
`familiar with the federal circuit's MaxLinear v. CRESPE decision?
`MR. DAMON: Not entirely, Your Honor. I've seen --
`JUDGE BOUCHER: I didn't see it cited in your reply brief, but I
`was curious whether or not you had an opinion on whether or not that
`decision would apply here. It's not clear to me that it does, but it's not clear
`to me that it doesn't.
`MR. DAMON: I recognize that there were two prior Board
`decisions, which are not precedent, which talked about the estoppel
`provision. There, they thought that it had to be a final on appeal, but I'll
`point you to the rule, that 37 CFR 42.2 states in the definition, that a
`judgment is a final written decision, not an appeal. Therefore, in our
`opinion, 37 CFR 47.3 estops Stragent from arguing anything that's not
`patently distinct.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Okay, so you are making that collateral
`estoppel argument, then?
`MR. DAMON: That's correct, Your Honor.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Okay, thank you.
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`MR. DAMON: Just to address one more point with respect to that, I
`think it's our position that's just one more vehicle that this Board can find the
`claims unpatentable. We're not suggesting that the Patent Owner shouldn't
`have an opportunity to argue the claims. We just believe that there's no new
`arguments, no new evidence, that would result in a decision that would be
`inconsistent with the two that have already issued.
`If no more questions on that point, looking at Slide 11, on BMW
`Slides 11 through 14, it's just illustrating exactly the point that I'm making,
`that Stragent arguments from the prior IPRs are nearly identical to the
`arguments being made before you today in IPRs 1519 through 1522. We
`just pulled four of the main argument examples from all of the IPRs. On
`Slide 12, again, this is IPR 1521, related to Claim 7. On the left-hand side,
`that's the prior IPR argument. As you can see, the arguments are nearly
`identical. For example, that sharing requires storage. Multiplexing is not a
`form of sharing, and we'll address each one of those. As I stated, these are
`illustrated in Slides 11 through 14 of BMW's demonstrative. So, Your
`Honors, if we can turn quickly to Slide 148 of BMW's demonstratives -- I
`know we're going to jump around a little bit, but rather than go through all
`160 slides, I just figure it's better to give you the key points right up front.
`Not only are the arguments the same as illustrated in Slides 11 to 14,
`but the claims are, in fact, the same. So if we look at Slide 148 of BMW's
`demonstratives, the green box represents the claims that are at issue in
`today's proceeding. The claims with a dotted red line through them
`represent claims that have already been held unpatentable. So Claim 1, 47
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`through 50, are both in this proceeding, but then also have been held
`unpatentable.
`That's because those claims were held unpatentable in the parallel
`proceeding against Mercedes. So the question today is whether or not
`BMW's prior art also renders those claims unpatentable. In our view, that
`answer is simply yes. Because if we take a look at Claim 51, which was
`held unpatentable in the prior IPRs, it's nearly identical to Claim 1. The
`only difference is the type of claim it is, whether it's a method, system, or
`computer apparatus, but the actual substance of the claims are nearly
`identical. That's illustrated, if we take a look on Slide 149. We've mapped
`the unpatentable claim, 51, its elements, to those elements that was instituted
`and found to be representative of Claim 1. If we're looking at those
`elements, each of these elements that are in 51, which were already found
`unpatentable, are also in Claim 1. You may remember, in the prior IPR
`proceeding, there were only three limitations at issue, or two, really, and
`today, those same two. If we focus in on Limitation 51.8 -- and I've now
`turned to Slide 150 -- this is the heart of Stragent's argument is whether or
`not the sharing in real time between two networks is disclosed in the prior
`art reference.
`This is a decision the Board has already found that both the primary
`reference Staiger, as well as the primary reference OSEK, both disclose. As
`you can see on the right-hand side, the only difference between 51.8 in
`Claim 1 is just the type of limitation or type of claim that it is. If we turn to
`Slide 153, Your Honors, that same thing is true for the 705 patent, where we
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`show, in the green box, the claims that are before you today that were
`instituted, and the claims that have already been canceled.
`Just like 51 and 1 paralleled each other, independent Claim 1 and
`Claim 7 here parallel each other. If we take a look at those limitations just
`briefly -- and I'm moving down to Slide 154 -- you'll see, in red, Claim 7,
`and in black, Claim 1. I think this further illustrates just how similar the
`claims are because the only thing that's really changing is the type of claim
`that it is, a method versus a computer readable median claim. Excuse me
`one second. For the remote judges, I'm holding up a copy of Stragent's
`slides. Of the 72 slides that Stragent will present to you, 65 of them are
`these same old arguments that you've already heard. They have three slides
`that raise new issues, and I'll save my objections until the end of my
`presentation, and then there are four slides that are actually at issue here
`today. That's related to dependent Claim 9 and 18 of the 705 patent.
`All the claims of the 843 patent have already been discussed,
`decided, argued, and presented. That turns me to my second main point of
`five, Your Honor, is that sharing still does not require storing the
`information. I'm going to transition to Slide 36. On Slide 36, Stragent is
`essentially asking this Board to do for it what it chose not to do for itself,
`and that's amend its claims.
`It would like for you to, at Limitation 1.7, which we've identified in
`the square bracket, add a caret between the, after sharing the, and
`information, and put in the word stored because there's just simply no link
`between the limitation that is storing the information and this limitation,
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`which is sharing the information. So, Your Honors, I'm going to switch to
`Slide 159 -- actually, excuse me, before I switch to Slide 159, in the prior
`proceeding, Stragent argued that sharing required storage. At least Judge
`Pettigrew and Judge Boucher, you recall asking my colleague, Mr. Lavenue,
`whether or not if you guys found that storage was required as part of sharing,
`did the reference teach that? We addressed that then, and I want to address
`it now because that was a key point. If we move to Slide 49 --
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Actually, before you do that, the claims here,
`although you've highlighted the similarities between the claims, and
`recognize that there are different statutory classes, my concern is that -- is it
`necessarily the case that sharing needs to be construed exactly the same way
`in the method claim as in the computer readable medium claim?
`Because the storage of the information in the method claim was part
`of a conditional limitation, which doesn't necessarily need to be met. In the
`computer readable medium claim, it's also part of the conditional limitation,
`but the code has to be there anyways. So doesn't the patent owner have a
`stronger argument that, at least in the context of this claim, that sharing
`should include storage?
`MR. DAMON: That's a great question. I think they do not have a
`stronger argument. While I'll certainly go into detail later, let me just
`answer your question directly. One, to do that, they would have to import a
`specific embodiment from the specification into the claim. That's Point 1.
`Point 2, there's an alternative embodiment in that same specification which
`talks about sharing the information without utilizing a storage. Just to make
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`this point a little clearer, I'm going to change to Slide 125, if that's okay, just
`to show the particular portion of the specification that I'm referring to. On
`Slide 125, I have here where it talks about sharing information with devices
`that are connected on the same physical multiplexing system. This method
`of information sharing is called horizontal information sharing. To come to
`Stragent's conclusion that sharing would require storage, regardless of the
`claim type, you would have to ignore this particular embodiment, import the
`one specific environment that they're referring to, and then also ignore the
`text that's highlighted in blue, which talks of storage and sharing being two
`distinct concepts.
`It states in the context of the present description, such information
`may include data, a signal, or anything else that's capable of being stored
`and shared. So the specification talks about these as being two distinct
`options, as well as the claims, themselves. On Slide 36 -- again, my
`apologies for jumping and back forth, but just want to make the points clear
`and give you visuals. On Slide 36, the limitation says sharing the
`information.
`The information, we look for the antecedent basis. That goes back
`to Limitation 1.4. It's not a matter of whether or not the other conditional
`limitations had to be met in the method claim. That certainly was an issue
`that we discussed. The problem is the specification teaches away from
`sharing the stored information, as well as the claims. The claims do not
`refer to sharing the stored information. If Stragent wanted the claims to
`recite sharing the stored information, it's now had six opportunities in
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`BMW's proceedings, and five in Mercedes, to amend their claims to call out
`sharing the stored information. Because a person of ordinary skill in the art
`of reading this claim, for example Claim 1, there's just no connection
`between the information that is being stored and shared. So a person
`reading this would read this as yes, I store the information if the condition is
`met, but then I also share the information. It does not say sharing the stored
`information. I hope that addresses your question.
`JUDGE ZADO: I have a question, then. I'm looking at what we've
`called Element 1.5, which is the code for in the event storage resource is
`available causing storage of the information using the storage resource. The
`way I'm reading this claim is that the information we're talking about in
`Element 1.5 that the code has to be able to store is the same information
`that's shared. That's where this requirement's coming from. It's all still
`pointing, through antecedent basis, to the same information, right?
`MR. DAMON: I think the information is pointing to the same
`information. I 100 percent agree with that. The question is whether or not
`the following subsequent limitation, 1.7, that says sharing that information,
`which is the same information that was stored, somehow now is being
`required to share the information from the storage device.
`JUDGE ZADO: So you're saying the information is the same in
`terms of -- so you're saying the information is the same, but it's not being
`taken from the storage.
`MR. DAMON: That's the way the claims are written. It's not
`required to be taken from the storage.
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`JUDGE ZADO: But is that what you're saying the prior art is
`showing?
`MR. DAMON: I'm saying the prior art shows that, but then also, if
`we look at Slide 49, Your Honors -- I'll give everyone a moment to get there.
`On Slide 49, not only does the prior art show sharing the information, it
`shows sharing the information via storage. What I have highlighted in the
`green box of Figure 2, on Slide 49, is the tag registry, and 246, which are the
`additional memory pages, essentially. This is where the information is
`stored.
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`Staiger teaches -- and this goes in the bottom box on Slide 49 -- that
`the system includes Switchboard 201, through which Buses 202 to
`205 -- that's the buses highlighted in red, and those are the CAN buses. As
`Staiger discloses, these can be CAN-B or CAN-C buses -- Buses 210 and
`211, these are highlighted in purple in the bottom right. These can be
`FireWire or MOST. They communicate with Control Engine 224 and
`Registries 238 and 246. To close that out, on Slide 50, it talks about the tag
`registry, the dynamic process execution unit, storing the data needed for the
`computation of the received messages. These are the messages received
`through the buses on one network, which are then transmitted to a second
`network, where the protocols are different. Regardless of the construction, I
`was just pointing out that their construction's improper, based off the
`teaching of the specification and how the claims are written, but the prior art
`references teach storing -- teach sharing the information, regardless of
`whether storage is required or not.
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`JUDGE BOUCHER: When you're making your argument, it
`sounds to me like you're arguing the method, but the claim actually requires
`code for -- you agree that the claim requires code for storing the information;
`it requires code for sharing the information; and that's the same information?
`MR. DAMON: Yes, I agree with that.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: I agree it would be unusual to have a different
`construction, just depending on the statutory class, but I don't think I've got
`my mind fully wrapped around the consequences of the fact that we
`have -- in the claims before us now, we're looking at code for storing the
`information and code for sharing the information, and that the proper
`construction would be one in which the information is not -- the shared
`information is not necessarily stored.
`MR. DAMON: To answer that, I think the way that we wrap our
`heads around it is that one, the prior art discloses code for sharing the
`information from storage. Even if we have a different construction -- which
`I think the construction that the Board used previously would work here
`because we're not really talking about the construction of sharing, which we
`use the Microsoft Press tech dictionary -- what we're doing is construing the
`claim limitations to determine whether or not, somehow, Limitation 1.7,
`which does not recite sharing -- essentially, what it should recite, based on
`Stragent's argument, is sharing from the storage or sharing the storage
`information.
`You can easily envision a system where you store a copy of the
`Word document that you want, and then you also email it. That's sharing
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`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
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`the information. That's the same file. It doesn't mean that I had to take the
`Word document from the backup storage location in which I stored it. It
`just simply means I had to have a code to store that information, and I also
`had code that shared that information, in my example, in an email.
`JUDGE BOUCHER: Right. So your argument, essentially, is that
`even though I have code for storing the information, that code does not
`necessarily need to be executed, and I have code for sharing the information,
`and that code could be executed without ever executing the code for storing
`the information.
`MR. DAMON: That's correct, Your Honor. I'm going to turn now
`to my third main point out of five. If we could turn to Slide 15. I'll give
`everyone a minute to get to Slide 15. Dr. Miller's declaration in these four
`IPRs are riddled with the same mistakes as the previous two IPR
`declarations. There, we moved to exclude portions of his declaration.
`However, here, rather than exclude his opinions, Your Honor, we decided to
`simply give -- we simply ask that you give little weight to no weight to Dr.
`Miller's opinions.
`First, because he does not understand or apply broadest reasonable
`interpretation. This is a conclusion that Your Honors came to in the final
`written decision in the previous two IPRs. Second, he imports limitations
`from the specification. Third, he does not understand what defines an
`invention. Lastly, he cannot identify an antecedent basis, despite relying
`heavily on it for his opinions. Turning to Slide 16 --
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`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
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`JUDGE BOUCHER: But weren't some of those deficiencies in his
`declaration cured in this proceeding? Some of the statements that we
`focused on that seem to be missing from his testimony before are included
`now. So one presumes that there was some consultation between the
`attorneys and the witness, and the witness now has a better understanding of
`those issues and may have had an understanding of them previously, but that
`was not evident from what he said.
`MR. DAMON: I think you've either already read my slides and
`know where I'm going with this, or you're just following the same logic that
`I'm following. It was my first deposition first chair. I thought the same
`way as you. I presumed the things that he did wrong previously he would
`then -- those things would be cured. Counsel would have prepared him to
`be able to answer the questions better. However, if we take a look at Slide
`16, and I show you, in the red text, is Stragent's Counsel's question on
`redirect, so he goes after I go during the deposition.
`So he asked Dr. Miller does your declaration set forth what it is you
`relied on, in every case, informing your claim constructions? Dr. Miller's
`response to his own Counsel was, not specifically, but I did have a paragraph
`on what sources I used. He didn't even understand how to answer his own
`Counsel's questions. Earlier, when I asked has his understanding of
`broadest reasonable construction changed since the previous two IPRs, in
`these four IPR proceedings?
`His response was, so my understanding of broadest reasonable
`construction has not changed. While we would presume he would have a
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`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
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`better understanding, he does not. So Stragent's Counsel -- I'm going to
`switch to their slides. You can pull it up, if you like. It's Slide No. 5 in
`their deck -- sorry, excuse me, Slide No. 4 in that deck. I apologize.
`Again, I apologize, Slide No. 3. Yes, three. This is a paragraph taken from
`his declaration, and this is Paragraph 26. In it, it now includes the statement
`broadest reasonable construction, but merely writing broadest reasonable
`construction in the declaration does not suggest or convey that he understood
`it. In his own words, his understanding has not changed since when you
`found that he did not understand broadest reasonable construction. I would
`argue --
`JUDGE BOUCHER: I'm not sure that's entirely fair. I don't recall
`exactly what we said, but I think the point was that it was not evident from
`his testimony that he had actually applied the correct construction for
`broadest reasonable interpretation. I don't conclude from that, that his
`statement, that his understanding has not changed, cannot be understood to
`mean that he did understand it, but his declaration just didn't convey that
`understanding adequately in the previous cases.
`MR. DAMON: I understand how you get to that conclusion, but it's
`our position that his declaration are not even his own opinions; they're
`Counsel's. Because routinely, throughout the deposition, he's going to
`contradict those opinions and give testimony that are just not at all in line
`with the testimony he gives in the declaration. In our view, he essentially
`was presented with a declaration and signed his name to it. I will walk
`through several examples demonstrating just that.
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`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
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`JUDGE ZADO: Actually, before we walk through those examples,
`my question really is this. If we're being asked to accord less weight to Dr.
`Miller's testimony, I really want to get into the issues of this case that we're
`talking about because there are a few big issues that I think the parties are
`focusing on. What I really want to focus on is specific things he said that
`you believe -- or that Petitioner believes if we give it less weight, it
`somehow impacts the outcome of how we decide these issues. What,
`exactly, is specific testimony he gave that if we didn't give it weight, it
`would somehow change our outcome or impact our outcome on these
`issues?
`MR. DAMON: Certainly. I want to turn to Slide 15, but I'm going
`to address your question specifically first. One of the issues that Dr. Miller
`testified in the prior proceeding was that CAN has the same format. One of
`the claims requires that the message formats be different. In our primary
`reference related to OSEK, Your Honors said without additional evidence or
`testimony, we took what Dr. Miller said -- because he was unequivocal in
`that CAN frames are all the same message type.
`During his deposition, he contradicts that. We presented you
`evidence. We cited to documents which show different types of CAN
`frames. On Slide -- I want to pull up the exact slide I have showing his
`testimony. Excuse me for one second, Your Honors, so I can just pull up
`that particular slide. Here we are. I apologize. I'm looking at Slide 87.
`On Slide 87, we asked Dr. Miller, CAN-B and CAN-C have different
`formats, correct? His response: CAN-B and CAN-C are different
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`Case IPR2017-01519
`Case IPR2017-01520
`Patent 8,566,843 B2
`Case IPR2017-01521
`Case IPR2017-01522
`Patent 8,209,705 B2
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`protocols. It's not trivial to convert between CAN-B and CAN-C, correct?
`That is correct. Do you have to convert the message format -- because we
`wanted to make sure it was explicit what we were referring to -- of CAN-B
`to CAN-C if there was a system that allowed you to communicate between
`CAN-B and CAN-C? His response: Yes.
`We think that's one issue where he should be given little weight with
`respect to his argument that they're all the same because his deposition
`testimony contradicts that. Another example, Your Honors, is if I turn to
`Slide 20 -- actually, let's do -- yes, we can start with Slide 20. In Slide 20,
`Dr. Miller admits that the construction for sharing the information was
`provided to him for one of the declarations, and that it was not his own
`construction. We just think this is a routine thing.
`So if we look at Slide 21, the Patent Owner argues, as well as in Dr.
`Miller's declaration, that the patent does not suggest that multiplexing is a
`form of sharing. In the Staiger reference, it talks about using a multiplexing
`bus or multiplexing system. But during cross, I asked Dr. Miller if you
`transmit data, which is the word you used for multiplexing in your answer,
`transmitted to someone else, did you not share the data with someone else?
`His response was I would say if you transmit data from one device to
`another device, that data has been shared with the second device. I
`followed up. You can do that on a multiplexing bus or system? His
`response was yes, you can use multiplexing for doing that.
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