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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`PFIZER, INC., and
`SAMSUNG BIOEPIS CO., LTD.,1
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`GENENTECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01489
`Patent 6,407,213
`____________
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNER’S
`MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO PAPER NO. 572
`
`
`
`
`1 Samsung Bioepis Co. Ltd.’s IPR2017-02140 has been joined with this
`
`proceeding. (IPR2017-02140, Paper 40.)
`
`2 All emphases within are added.
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 1
`II.
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`PO’s Objections To The Foote And Wilson Deposition
`Testimony, And Accompanying Foote 1989 Reference, Have
`Been Waived ......................................................................................... 4
`B. Much Of The Evidence And Argument PO Seeks To Strike
`Was Raised In The Petition And Supporting Foote Declaration .......... 6
`The Evidence And Argument PO Seeks To Strike
`Appropriately Replies To PO’s Own Evidence And Arguments
`In Its Response ...................................................................................... 7
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`C.
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu,
`889 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................... 8, 10
`Apple, Inc. v. Smartflash LLC,
`CBM2014-00106, Paper 52 (Sept. 25, 2015) ....................................................... 5
`Cox Comms., Inc. v. AT&T Intellectual Prop. iI, L.P.,
`IPR2015-01187, Paper 59 (Nov. 15, 2016) ........................................................ 10
`eBay Inc. v. Global Equity Mgmt.,
`IPR2016-01829, Paper 63 (April 18, 2018) ......................................................... 7
`Emerson Elec. Co. v. Sipco, LLC,
`IPR2016-00984, Paper 43 (Oct. 25, 2017) ......................................................... 10
`Generico, LLC, v. Dr. Falk Pharma Gmbh,
`IPR2016-00297, Paper 55 (May 19, 2017) ........................................................... 5
`Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc.,
`825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................... 8, 10
`Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. UCB Pharma GmbH,
`IPR2016-00517, Paper 37 (Jul. 19, 2017) .......................................................... 10
`Volkswagen Group v. Emerechem Holdings, LLC,
`IPR2014-01555, Paper 50 (Jan. 22, 2016) ............................................................ 6
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) ........................................................................................... 1, 4, 5
`37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c) ................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`PO asserts that Petitioners have changed the bases for their position that the
`
`prior art disclosed use of a “consensus” sequence. That is incorrect. Petitioners did
`
`not “pivot” to relying “for the first time in their Reply” on Foote 1989, Reichmann
`
`1988, and Kurrle for this limitation. Much of the evidence PO seeks to exclude—
`
`including evidence that Riechmann’s CAMPATH antibody was made using the
`
`“consensus” approach, and that Kurrle teaches use of a “consensus” sequence in its
`
`humanization method—was squarely raised in the Petition and/or supporting
`
`declaration of Dr. Foote. In fact, PO deposed Dr. Foote about it before filing its POR.
`
`The evidence and argument PO seeks to exclude also is legitimate reply, as it
`
`responds directly to the inaccurate description of the state of the art, and flawed
`
`secondary considerations arguments, PO and its expert presented in the Response.
`
`PO also waived its objection to the Foote and Wilson deposition testimony, and the
`
`Foote 1989 reference discussed therein. PO’s counsel did not raise timely objections
`
`during the depositions as 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) requires.
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`Challenged claims 4, 33, 62, 64 and 69 of the ’213 patent recite a “consensus”
`
`sequence element. Pet. at 13, 15. The Petition cited either Queen 1990, or Queen
`
`1989 in view of Kabat 1987, as disclosing or rendering obvious the “consensus”
`
`sequence element in the recited invalidity grounds. Pet. at 31-38, 55-56, 60. The
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Petition and supporting expert declaration also showed use of “consensus”
`
`sequences in humanizing antibodies was otherwise known. For example, the Petition
`
`cited Dr. Foote’s testimony that the prior art CAMPATH antibody Riechmann 1988
`
`described was made using “a ‘consensus’ sequence.” Ex. 1503, ¶ 103 (cited Pet. at
`
`8) (describing use of a consensus sequence “in which relatively uncommon residues
`
`in certain positions were substituted with more commonly found ones,” where
`
`“[j]udgment of whether a residue type was common or uncommon at a particular
`
`position was based on the Kabat database, 1983 edition”). Dr. Foote also explained
`
`that, in Kurrle’s method, when humanizing an antibody with a given human
`
`framework, one should “consider changing the chosen human framework residue
`
`with the consensus human residue at that position.” Id., ¶ 123.
`
`During Dr. Foote’s deposition before PO submitted its Response, PO’s
`
`counsel questioned him extensively about both of these issues. Ex. 2039 at 77:18–
`
`88:23; 293:16–304:25. Dr. Foote explained without objection that Riechmann’s
`
`CAMPATH “consensus” sequence was derived from his own “anti-lysozyme”
`
`construct described in Foote 1989. Id. at 79:12–80:7, 83:17–16. That reference was
`
`subsequently submitted as an exhibit and discussed on redirect, again without
`
`objection. Id. at 327-332. Indeed, PO’s counsel questioned Dr. Foote on Foote 1989
`
`during re-cross. Id. at 349:22–350:20. PO’s counsel also questioned Dr. Foote
`
`regarding Kurrle’s choice of a framework, and Dr. Foote testified (again without
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`objection) to Kurrle’s use of a “consensus” sequence, with the result being that
`
`“Kurrle is an example where both methods [consensus and best fit] arrive at the same
`
`result.” Id. at 320:4–11; see also id. at 293:16–304:25, 313:7–320:3.
`
`In its subsequent Response and supporting expert declaration, PO and its
`
`expert Dr. Wilson simply ignored this evidence. They asserted that the ’213 patent’s
`
`description of a “consensus” human framework was a “new approach to humanizing
`
`antibodies” and a “novel strategy.” POR at 8, 23-24. And in arguing unexpected
`
`results using the “consensus” approach, PO and Dr. Wilson suggested the
`
`CAMPATH antibody was made using the “best fit” approach, and compared the
`
`claimed invention to it, notwithstanding the CAMPATH antibody actually was made
`
`using the same “consensus” approach. POR at 66.
`
`The Reply and Dr. Foote responded to these incorrect contentions. Dr. Foote
`
`corrected Dr. Wilson’s description of the state of the art, reiterating that the
`
`CAMPATH antibody was actually made using the “consensus” sequence Foote
`
`himself generated for his anti-lysozyme construct described in Foote 1989. Ex. 1702,
`
`¶¶12, 40-43. Thus, PO’s comparison of the claimed invention with CAMPATH for
`
`unexpected results purposes made no sense, since both used the so-called
`
`“consensus” approach that allegedly led to the unexpected results. Id., ¶¶185-189;
`
`Reply at 24-27. The Reply and Dr. Foote also responded to PO’s argument that the
`
`“consensus” and “best fit” approaches are somehow fundamentally different by
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`pointing out, as Dr. Foote did during his deposition, that both can lead to the same
`
`antibody, exemplified by Kurrle’s combined best-fit/consensus approach. Id.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`PO’s Objections To The Foote And Wilson Deposition Testimony,
`And Accompanying Foote 1989 Reference, Have Been Waived
`PO seeks to exclude deposition testimony from the parties’ experts, and the
`
`Foote 1989 reference submitted and discussed therein. But “[a]n objection to the
`
`admissibility of deposition evidence must be made during the deposition.” 37 CFR
`
`§ 42.64(a). And, any motion to exclude evidence “must identify the objections in the
`
`record in order and must explain the objections.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). PO’s motion
`
`fails on both counts.
`
`With respect to use of Dr. Foote’s “consensus” sequence described in Foote
`
`1989 in development of the prior art anti-lysozyme and CAMPATH antibodies, PO
`
`seeks to strike four pages of Dr. Foote’s deposition testimony (Ex. 2039 at 327:12–
`
`331:11), two pages of Dr. Wilson’s testimony (Ex. 1697 at 176:25–178:23), and
`
`Foote 1989 itself (Ex. 1693). And with respect to Kurrle’s use of a “consensus”
`
`sequence, PO seeks to strike seven pages of Dr. Foote’s testimony (Ex. 2039 at
`
`313:77–320:11) and eleven pages of Dr. Wilson’s testimony (Ex. 1697 at 258:3–
`
`263:21, 264:9–267:18, 267:24–268:12). Yet, PO’s motion does not identify a single
`
`objection its counsel “made during the deposition(s)” on these bases.
`
`Indeed, during the entirety of Dr. Foote’s testimony PO seeks to strike, PO’s
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`counsel objected to the “form” of some of the questions (Ex. 2039 at 315:8, 19,
`
`317:7, 15, 318:10, 319:2, 15, 320:6) and once as calling for a “legal conclusion” (id.
`
`at 319:2-3), but never as being outside the scope of the Petition as PO’s motion to
`
`strike alleges. PO’s objection to Dr. Foote’s testimony on that basis is thus waived.
`
`See Apple, Inc. v. Smartflash LLC, CBM2014-00106, Paper 52 at 40 (Sept. 25, 2015)
`
`(“Moreover, as Petitioner correctly points out, many of the questions and answers
`
`that Patent Owner now seeks to exclude were not objected to during the deposition,
`
`even giving the transcript the ‘fair reading’ that Patent Owner suggests. ‘An
`
`objection to the admissibility of deposition evidence must be made during the
`
`deposition.’”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a)). Further, Foote 1989 was submitted as
`
`an exhibit and addressed during Dr. Foote’s deposition without objection. Ex. 2039
`
`at 327:12–331:11. PO’s counsel had the opportunity to, and indeed did, question on
`
`Foote 1989. Id. at 350:15-20; 361:9-362:7. PO’s objection to Foote 1989 thus also
`
`is waived. See Generico, LLC, v. Dr. Falk Pharma Gmbh, IPR2016-00297, Paper
`
`55 at 51 (May 19, 2017) (denying motion to exclude exhibit because it was marked
`
`at expert’s deposition without objection, and party seeking exclusion should have
`
`been aware of it because it was cited during prosecution)3; Volkswagen Group v.
`
`
`3 Sure enough, during prosecution of the ’213 patent, PO cited Foote 1989. PO
`
`represented that it had “learnt that the humanized light chain gene of the
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Emerechem Holdings, LLC, IPR2014-01555, Paper 50 at 73-75 (Jan. 22, 2016)
`
`(denying motion to exclude exhibit filed with reply, where no objection was made
`
`to its admissibility during deposition, and PO addressed it on redirect).
`
`Finally, although PO’s counsel did object to Foote 1989 during Dr. Wilson’s
`
`deposition (Ex. 1697 at 177:4–6), that objection already had been waived during Dr.
`
`Foote’s deposition. And with respect to Kurrle, PO’s counsel stated only a
`
`“foundation” objection that “I don’t believe anyone’s pointed to Kurrle using a
`
`consensus sequence in this case” (id. at 257:9–258:1), which is different from the
`
`objection PO presents here, and in any event was incorrect, as Kurrle’s use of a
`
`“consensus” sequence was discussed in Dr. Foote’s declaration and at his deposition.
`
`Thus, Dr. Wilson’s testimony should not be stricken either.
`
`B. Much Of The Evidence And Argument PO Seeks To Strike Was
`Raised In The Petition And/Or Supporting Foote Declaration
`PO’s motion seeks to strike evidence and argument that were clearly presented
`
`with the Petition. For example, PO seeks to strike part of Reply page 27 and ¶¶ 12,
`
`
`CAMPATH-1 antibody in Riechmann et al. was converted from an anti-
`
`lysozyme construct” and that “Foote’s anti-lysozyme construct was prepared by
`
`combining CDR sequences from the kappa light chain of the anti-lysozyme
`
`antibody with consensus human kappa frameworks.” Ex. 1502_5:2500 (citing
`
`Foote 1989).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`41–43, 61, 79, 82, 119, 162, and 187 of Dr. Foote’s reply declaration regarding use
`
`of a “consensus” sequence in the humanization of Riechmann’s CAMPATH
`
`antibody. Mot. at 1. But Dr. Foote discussed the use of “consensus” approach in
`
`CAMPATH in his first declaration, and this discussion was cited in the Petition. Ex.
`
`1503, ¶103; Pet. at 11. Similarly, PO seeks to part of Reply page 18, and ¶¶ 7, 44,
`
`104-106, and 160-162 of Dr. Foote’s reply declaration regarding use of a
`
`“consensus” sequence in Kurrle’s humanization method. Mot. at 1. Yet, again, Dr.
`
`Foote described Kurrle’s instruction to use a human “consensus” sequence in his
`
`first declaration. Ex. 1503 at ¶123. PO’s motion should be denied for this additional
`
`reason. See eBay Inc. v. Global Equity Mgmt., IPR2016-01829, Paper 63 at 2-4
`
`(April 18, 2018) (motion to strike reply evidence denied where petitioner “point[ed]
`
`out where it had first raised the issue in the Petition”).
`
`C. The Evidence And Argument PO Seeks To Strike Appropriately
`Replies To PO’s Own Evidence And Arguments In Its Response
`PO’s motion also should be denied because the evidence and argument it seeks
`
`to strike appropriately responds to arguments PO raised in the Response. “The
`
`development of evidence in the course of the trial is in keeping with the oppositional
`
`nature of an [IPR] proceeding.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship. v.
`
`Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, “the Board
`
`may consider a prior art reference to show the state of the art at the time of the
`
`invention, regardless of whether that reference was cited in the Board’s institution
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`decision.” Id. at 1369; Anacor Pharms., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2018) (“the petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding may introduce new
`
`evidence after the petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence
`
`introduced by the patent owner, or if it is used ‘to document the knowledge that
`
`skilled artisans would bring to bear in reading the prior art identified as producing
`
`obviousness.’”). The evidence and argument at issue here meets these standards.
`
`For example, PO’s Response made an “unexpected results” argument
`
`contrasting the ’213 patent antibodies against CAMPATH and implying that use of
`
`the “best-fit” approach (rather than the “consensus” approach) was responsible for
`
`its allegedly inferior immunogenicity. POR at 66; Ex. 2041, ¶267. Petitioners’
`
`evidence and argument regarding use of the “consensus” sequence from Foote 1989
`
`to generate CAMPATH responds directly to this.
`
`The evidence and argument regarding Kurrle’s use of a “consensus” sequence
`
`similarly responds to PO’s assertion that the ’213 patent’s “consensus” approach is
`
`somehow superior to other approaches, e.g., “best-fit.” POR at 64–67; Ex. 2041,
`
`¶¶ 264–68. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is no relevant difference between
`
`antibodies generated using the “best-fit” and “consensus” approaches, which can
`
`lead to the same result, as Kurrle exemplifies. Reply at 16–19.
`
`Furthermore, all of this evidence is also relevant to PO’s contentions as to the
`
`state of the art and the “knowledge that skilled artisans would bring to bear” in
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`reviewing the prior art. Specifically, in describing the state of the art, PO and its
`
`expert allege that the ’213 patent inventors’ use of a “consensus” sequence was
`
`“novel” in contrast to humanization efforts in the prior art, which they contend only
`
`used an individual human antibody for the framework, such as one identified as the
`
`“best-fit” by homology matching to the donor mouse antibody. POR at 6-7, 9-10;
`
`Ex. 2041, ¶¶ 55–72. The evidence sought to be stricken corrects the record regarding
`
`the state of the art, and thus provides appropriate context for the prior art’s teaching
`
`to use a “consensus sequence” as the starting point for the framework of a humanized
`
`antibody, in response to PO’s contentions. See, e.g., Reply at 16-17, 26-27; Ex. 1702,
`
`¶¶ 12, 41–43 (“It is here that Dr. Wilson’s description of the state of the art diverges
`
`from a current summary of the history of antibody generation.”), 79, 82, 104–106,
`
`119. The evidence and argument at issue in PO’s motion thus should not be stricken
`
`for this additional reason. See Anacor, 889 F.3d at 1380–81; Genzyme, 825 F.3d at
`
`1369; Emerson Elec. Co. v. Sipco, LLC, IPR2016-00984, Paper 43 at 46–50 (Oct.
`
`25, 2017) (considering evidence regarding state of the art in reply to patent owner
`
`arguments does not violate APA).4
`
`
`4 PO’s cited cases are inapposite. Cox Comms., Inc. v. AT&T Intellectual Prop. II,
`
`L.P., IPR2015-01187, Paper 59 at 16-17 (Nov. 15, 2016) (petitioner sought to
`
`“replace” prior art reference in instituted ground for the first time at oral hearing);
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`PO’s motion should be denied.
`
`
`
` Date: July 6, 2018
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Amanda Hollis/
`Attorney For Petitioner Pfizer, Inc.
`
`
`Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. UCB Pharma GmbH, IPR2016-00517, Paper 37 (Jul. 19,
`
`2017) (petitioner sought to “shift” argument from footnote in the Petition to
`
`support prima facie case on a different claim element).
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2017-01489: Petitioners’ Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Opposition
`
`Motion to Strike was served on July 6, 2018, via electronic service on lead and back-
`
`up counsel:
`
`For Genentech:
`david.cavanaugh@wilmerhale.com
`lauren.blakely@wilmerhale.com
`robert.gunther@wilmerhale.com
`abrausa@durietangri.com
`ddurie@durietangri.com
`andrew.danford@wilmerhale.com
`kevin.prussia@wilmerhale.com
`lisa.pirozzolo@wilmerhale.com
`
`For Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd.:
`ddrivas@whitecase.com
`sweingaertner@whitecase.com
`eric.majchrzak@whitecase.com
`athakore@whitecase.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
` /Amanda Hollis/
`Amanda Hollis
`
`

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