throbber
IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Adam R. Brausa (Reg No. 60,287)
`Daralyn J. Durie (Pro Hac Vice)
`DURIE TANGRI LLP
`217 Leidesdorff Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
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`Filed on behalf of Patent Owner Genentech, Inc. by:
`
`David L. Cavanaugh (Reg. No. 36,476)
`Lauren V. Blakely (Reg. No. 70,247)
`Robert J. Gunther, Jr. (Pro Hac Vice)
`Lisa J. Pirozzolo (Pro Hac Vice)
`
`Kevin S. Prussia (Pro Hac Vice)
`
`Andrew J. Danford (Pro Hac Vice)
`
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
`
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
`
`Washington, DC 20006
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________________________________________
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________________________________________
`PFIZER, INC. AND
`SAMSUNG BIOEPIS CO., LTD.;
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`GENENTECH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________________________________________
`Case IPR2017-014891
`U.S. Patent No. 6,407,213
`____________________________________________
`PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`PURSUANT TO PAPER NO. 57
`
`
`1 Case IPR2017-02140 has been joined with this proceeding.
`
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`
`2.
`
`C.
`
`Page
`PETITIONERS’ EVOLVING INVALIDITY THEORY ............................... 1
`PETITIONERS’ NEW ARGUMENTS ARE FORECLOSED BY
`FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, STATUTE, AND THE
`BOARD’S REGULATIONS ........................................................................... 3
`A. Applicable Law ..................................................................................... 3
`B.
`Petitioners’ Reliance on Foote 1989 is Improper .................................. 4
`1.
`Petitioners’ arguments and testimony regarding Foote 1989
`present a new theory of unpatentability ...................................... 4
`The prejudice to Patent Owner outweighs any marginal
`relevance of Foote 1989 to unexpected results ........................... 6
`Petitioners’ Arguments as to the Kurrle Reference Are
`Improper ................................................................................................ 9
`III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 10
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`i
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
`
`
`CASES
`Apple Inc. v. e-Watch Inc.,
`IPR2015-00412, Paper 50 (PTAB May 6, 2016) ............................................ 3
`Coherus Biosciences Inc. v. AbbVie Biotech. Ltd.,
`IPR2016-00188, Paper 54 (PTAB Jun. 9, 2017) ............................................. 5
`Cox Comms., Inc. v. AT&T Intellectual Prop. II, L.P,
`IPR2015-01187, Paper 59 (PTAB Nov. 15, 2016) .......................................... 6
`
`In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule
`Patent Litigation,
`676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ....................................................................... 7
`Dexcom, Inc. v. Waveform Techs, Inc.,
`IPR2016-01679, Paper 53 (PTAB Feb. 28, 2018) .......................................... 3
`Intelligent-BioSystems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................... 4, 8
`Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. UCB Pharma GmbH,
`IPR2016-00517, Paper 37 (PTAB Jul. 19, 2017) ............................................ 9
`Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc.,
`853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ......................................................... 3, 5, 8, 10
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a) ..................................................................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. § 325(d) ..................................................................................................... 9
`REGULATIONS
`37 C.F.R. § 42.23 (b) ................................................................................................. 3
`Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,620 (Aug. 14,
`2012) ................................................................................................................ 3
`
`ii
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`

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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Pursuant to Paper No. 57, Patent Owner files this motion to strike new
`
`evidence and argument presented in Petitioners’ Reply (Paper 53) pertaining to the
`
`alleged disclosure of a “consensus” sequence in the prior art. First, Petitioners
`
`argue that a new exhibit, Foote 1989 (Ex. 1693), teaches that a “consensus”
`
`sequence was used by Petitioners’ expert to generate the humanized antibody in
`
`Riechmann 1988 (Ex. 1569). Neither Foote 1989 nor Riechmann 1988 were cited
`
`or discussed in the Petition. Second, Petitioners present a new argument that
`
`Kurrle (Ex. 1571) discloses a humanized antibody with a “consensus” sequence.
`
`For the reasons below, the Board should strike the following:
`
` Exhibit 1693 submitted with Petitioners’ Reply and the associated arguments
`
`and testimony that rely on this exhibit, including the last paragraph
`
`beginning on page 27 of the Reply; Ex. 1702, ¶¶ 12, 41-43, 61, 79, 82, 119,
`
`162, and 187; Ex. 1697, 176:25-178:23; Ex. 2039, 327:12-331:11.
`
` The first full paragraph of page 18 of the Reply and the testimony relying on
`
`Petitioners’ new theory including: Ex. 1702, ¶¶7, 44, 104-106, 160-162; Ex.
`
`1697, 258:3-263:21, 264:9-267:18, 267:24-268:12; Ex. 2039, 313:7-320:11.
`
`I.
`
`PETITIONERS’ EVOLVING INVALIDITY THEORY
`Claims 4, 33, 62, 64, and 69 require the use of a “consensus” sequence. The
`
`’213 patent provides a specific definition of the claimed human “consensus”
`
`sequence, “which comprises the most frequently occurring amino acid residues at
`
`1
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`

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`
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`each location in all human immunoglobulins of any particular subclass or subunit
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`
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`
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`structure.” (Ex 1001, 11:32-38; Paper 27 at 9-10.) The Petition argued that the
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`“consensus” limitation was met by either by Queen 1990 (Ex. 1550)’s disclosure of
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`“us[ing] a consensus framework from many human antibodies,” or by Queen 1989
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`(Ex. 1534)’s teaching “moving towards a consensus framework region” in
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`combination with Kabat 1987 (Ex. 1552) and/or the PDB database. (See Paper 1 at
`
`40-45, 55-56.) Petitioners did not argue in the Petition that Foote 1989,
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`Riechmann 1988, or Kurrle anticipate, render obvious, or otherwise disclose a
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`“consensus” sequence as claimed in the ’213 patent.
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`Consistent with the arguments in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response
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`focused on showing that neither Queen 1990 nor Queen 1989 disclosed—or would
`
`lead to—the “consensus” sequence limitation of claims 4, 33, 62, 64, and 69.
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`(Paper 42 at 51-55; id. at 55-56 (arguing Kabat 1987 cannot cure Queen 1989’s
`
`deficiencies).) For the first time in their Reply, Petitioners pivot from relying on
`
`Queen 1990 and Queen 1989 with respect to the “consensus” sequence limitations,
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`and now invite the Board to find those limitations in a new reference, Foote 1989,
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`as well as in Kurrle.
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`2
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`II.
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
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`PETITIONERS’ NEW ARGUMENTS ARE FORECLOSED BY
`FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, STATUTE, AND THE BOARD’S
`REGULATIONS.
`A. Applicable Law
`Evidence introduced in a reply “must be responsive and not merely new
`
`evidence that could have been presented earlier” to support the petition. Patent
`
`Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,620 (Aug. 14, 2012); see also 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.23 (b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the … patent
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`owner response.”). But “‘[r]espond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does
`
`not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the
`
`position originally taken in the Petition.” Apple Inc. v. e-Watch Inc., IPR2015-
`
`00412, Paper 50 at 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016).
`
`When a reply strays from “explaining how [the] original petition was
`
`correct” and begins arguing new theories of unpatentability or relying on
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`references not disclosed in the petition, this amounts to a shifting of arguments that
`
`is “foreclosed by statute, our precedent, and Board Guidelines.” Wasica Fin.
`
`GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also
`
`Dexcom, Inc. v. Waveform Techs, Inc., IPR2016-01679, Paper 53 at 50 (PTAB
`
`Feb. 28, 2018) (evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case of
`
`unpatentability may not be introduced for the first time in the reply brief); 35
`
`U.S.C. § 312(a) (petition must identify “with particularity” the evidence supporting
`
`3
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`

`

`
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`the grounds). Thus, “[i]t is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`
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`
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`proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify with
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`particularity the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim
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`….” Intelligent-BioSystems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359,
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`1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2016); id. at 1370 (“[T]he expedited nature of IPRs bring with it
`
`an obligation for petitioners to make their case in their petition to institute.”).
`
`B.
`
`Petitioners’ Reliance on Foote 1989 is Improper.
`1.
`Petitioners’ arguments and testimony regarding Foote 1989
`present a new theory of unpatentability.
`Petitioners invite the Board to find the “consensus” sequence in a reference
`
`outside the instituted grounds—in the form of Exhibit 1693, a publication titled
`
`“Humanized Antibodies” and authored by Petitioners’ expert, Jefferson Foote.
`
`Petitioners argue that Foote 1989 supports the conclusion that the work described
`
`in Riechmann 1988 was performed using a consensus sequence. (Reply at 26-27.)
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`However, neither of these references was disclosed or discussed in the Petition.
`
`Although Petitioners’ discussion of Foote 1989 in the Reply is in a section
`
`addressing secondary considerations, Petitioners’ reliance on Foote 1989 is not
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`limited to rebuttal on secondary considerations. Dr. Foote’s Reply Declaration
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`cites to Foote 1989 throughout his analysis, including when addressing Petitioners’
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`affirmative evidence of obviousness. (Ex. 1702, ¶¶ 12, 41, 61, 79, 82, 119, 162,
`
`4
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`

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`187.) For example, in addressing the “consensus” limitations of the challenged
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
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`
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`claims, Dr. Foote cites to Ex. 1193 to argue “[t]he skilled artisan would know that
`
`a consensus sequence had been used previously.” (Ex. 1702, ¶162; see also id.,
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`¶12 (arguing he “used a consensus sequence derived from Kabat (1983) to
`
`humanize” the light chain of an anti-lysozyme antibody starting in 1986” and Dr.
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`Riechmann used that light chain to generate a humanized antibody); ¶79
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`(“[S]killed artisans, including myself, had used the same ‘consensus sequence
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`approach’ in humanizing antibodies before the ’213 patent.”), ¶119 (identifying a
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`consensus sequence).)
`
`Petitioners’ reliance on Foote 1989 goes far beyond “explaining how [the]
`
`original petition was correct” and instead encourages the Board to rely on evidence
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`outside the instituted grounds to find the challenged claims unpatentable. See
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`Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1286-87; see also Coherus Biosciences Inc. v. AbbVie Biotech.
`
`Ltd., IPR2016-00188, Paper 54 at 22-23, (PTAB Jun. 9, 2017) (a shift in argument
`
`from “half-life alone” as a motivation to combine, to reliance on “half-life as a
`
`factor” improper under Wasica). The only attempted connection to the Petition is
`
`a citation by Dr. Foote in his Reply Declaration back to ¶103 of his initial
`
`declaration where he discussed the work of Dr. Riechmann as part of the
`
`“background” of the patent. (Ex. 1702, ¶42; Ex. 1503, ¶103.) But a single
`
`paragraph in Dr. Foote’s original declaration cited in the Petition only as part of a
`
`5
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`string citation (Paper 1 at 8), is insufficient to put Patent Owner on notice that
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
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`
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`
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`Petitioners would rely on additional publications to argue that substantive elements
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`of the claims were known in the prior art.2
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`Even if Petitioners were correct that Foote 1989 shows the use of a
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`“consensus sequence”, that does not speak to whether it would have been obvious
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`for a skilled artisan to derive the claimed invention by combining, e.g., Queen
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`1990 and the PDB database (Grounds 1-2) or by combining Queen 1989 with the
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`PDB Database and Kabat 1987 (Ground 5) or with Hudziak (Ground 7). See Cox
`
`Comms., Inc. v. AT&T Intellectual Prop. II, L.P, Case No. IPR2015-01187, Paper
`
`59 at 16-17 (PTAB Nov. 15, 2016) (declining to consider obviousness combination
`
`where a “background reference” would be substituted for part of instituted
`
`reference, finding the assertion comprised a “new argument of unpatentability,”
`
`and “trial was not instituted on this ground”).
`
`2.
`
`The prejudice to Patent Owner outweighs any marginal
`relevance of Foote 1989 to unexpected results.
`Petitioners’ citation to Foote 1989 under the heading of “[n]o unexpected
`
`results” does not nullify Petitioners use of new evidence to argue that core claim
`
`
`2 Dr. Foote’s original declaration spans 354 paragraphs over 194 pages and
`
`includes pages of discussion pertaining to grounds not raised in the Petition.
`
`6
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`elements were disclosed in the prior art. Using Foote 1989 to rebut unexpected
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
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`results makes little practical sense. If Petitioners are correct that Queen 1990 and
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`Queen 1989 disclose using a consensus sequence (they do not), then the addition of
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`another reference showing that the prior art disclosed the same thing adds nothing
`
`to Petitioners’ response to “unexpected results;” Petitioners could simply rely on
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`Queen 1990 or Queen 1989. And, in any event, Petitioners raised unexpected
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`results in its Petition (see, e.g., Paper 1 at 61-63) and did not argue that any prior
`
`art antibodies embody the consensus sequence limitation.
`
`The substantial prejudice caused by Petitioners’ reliance on a new piece of
`
`evidence to teach missing claim elements—even if in context of secondary
`
`considerations—greatly outweighs any marginal relevance of Foote 1989 to the
`
`secondary considerations debate. The Federal Circuit has required that all
`
`evidence—including objective indicia of non-obviousness—must be considered
`
`together before finding a patent invalid as obviousness. In re Cyclobenzaprine
`
`Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation, 676 F3d 1063, 1079-
`
`80 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, it is clear that Petitioners are attempting to use Foote
`
`1989 to fill the gaps in Petitioners’ prima facie case. (See supra pp. 4-7.)
`
`Moreover, Petitioners should have been aware of Foote 1989 before filing
`
`the Petition at least because, as Petitioners note in Reply, Foote 1989 is
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`7
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`substantively discussed in the prosecution history. (See, e.g., Reply at 26-27.)3
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`
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`
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`More fundamentally, Foote 1989 was authored by and describes the work of
`
`Petitioners’ own expert, Dr. Jefferson Foote. If Petitioners’ are correct that it
`
`teaches a key component of the claims—the use of a consensus sequence—Dr.
`
`Foote should have included this information when he was drafting his initial
`
`declaration, and Petitioners should have included that information in its grounds
`
`for institution.
`
`Lastly, the prejudice to Patent Owner is not mitigated by the introduction of
`
`Foote 1989 during the redirect testimony (elicited by Petitioners) of Dr. Foote
`
`during his first deposition prior to the submission of Patent Owner’s Response.
`
`The Federal Circuit has been clear, where a party relies on a reference to disclose a
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`substantive element of the claims, the reference and accompanying argument must
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`have been made in the Petition. See, e.g., Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1286-87; Intelligent-
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`BioSystems, 821 F.3d at 1369-70. Moreover, had Foote 1989 been raised in the
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`Petition, Patent Owner would have responded to the Petition differently, including,
`
`for example, by presenting argument that the Petition should have been denied
`
`
`3 Whether Patent Owner was on notice of the existence of Foote 1989 is a separate
`
`question from whether Patent Owner was on notice of Petitioners’ reliance on
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`Foote 1989 to teach the “consensus” sequence limitations of the ’213 patent.
`
`8
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`

`

`
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the challenged claims were allowed over Foote
`
`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`
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`
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`1989. (See, e.g., Ex. 1002 at 2500 (discussing Foote 1989); id. at 4462-71 (Notice
`
`of Allowability); Ex. 1001 at 4 (listing Foote 1989).)
`
`Accordingly, the Board should strike Ex. 1693 and the testimony that relies
`
`on it, including the portions of Dr. Foote’s Reply Declaration and deposition
`
`testimony that discuss Ex. 1693, and the portions of Dr. Wilson’s testimony that
`
`were elicited from questioning related to Ex. 1693.
`
`C.
` Petitioners’ Arguments as to the Kurrle Reference Are Improper
`In Reply, Petitioners argue for the first time that Kurrle describes an
`
`antibody with a consensus human variable domain. (Reply at 18.) Petitioners
`
`argue that Kurrle discloses a method of humanizing an antibody using a “best fit”
`
`approach as a first step, followed by comparing the results to a consensus sequence
`
`to identify any differences, such that the remaining framework residues are all
`
`“consensus” human residues. (Id.; see also Ex. 1702, ¶105.) But Kurrle is only
`
`cited in the Petition as support for the unremarkable proposition that many research
`
`institutions “were very active in the field of humanization as of June 1991.” (Paper
`
`1 at 32.) Petitioners did not include Kurrle in any of the proposed grounds in this
`
`Petition. A single citation to a reference absent any argument applying that
`
`reference to the challenged claims does not permit Petitioners to morph that
`
`discussion into a reason why that reference discloses a “consensus” sequence
`
`9
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`

`

`
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`limitation. See e.g., Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. UCB Pharma GmbH, IPR2016-00517,
`
`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`
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`
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`Paper 37 at 23-24 (PTAB Jul. 19, 2017) (change in argument presented in footnote
`
`of Petition improper). Petitioners’ attempt to rely on Kurrle’s purported disclosure
`
`of a humanized antibody with a “consensus” sequence is exactly the type of
`
`shifting argument that is “foreclosed by statute, [Federal Circuit] precedent, and
`
`Board guidelines.” Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1286.
`
`Accordingly, the Board should strike Petitioners’ new argument with respect
`
`to Kurrle, including the portions of Dr. Foote’s Reply Declaration and deposition
`
`testimony that discuss it, and the portions of Dr. Wilson’s testimony that were
`
`elicited from questioning pertaining to this new argument.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`The Board should strike (1) Exhibit 1693 and the associated arguments and
`
`testimony that rely on this exhibit, including the last paragraph beginning on page
`
`27; Ex. 1702, ¶¶ 12, 41-43, 61, 79, 82, 119, 162, and 187; Ex. 1697, 176:25-
`
`178:23; Ex. 2039, 327:12-331:11; and (2) the first full paragraph of page 18 of the
`
`Reply and the testimony relying on Petitioners’ new theory including: Ex. 1702,
`
`¶¶7, 44, 104-106, 160-162; Ex. 1697, 258:3-263:21, 264:9-267:18, 267:24-268:12;
`
`Ex. 2039, 313:7-320:11.
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`
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`10
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`

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`
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`Date: June 22, 2018
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`
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/David L. Cavanaugh/
`By:
`David L. Cavanaugh
`Reg. No. 36,476
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`202-663-6025
`
`
`
`
`
`11
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that, on June 22, 2018, I caused a true and correct
`copy of the following materials:
`
` Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`to be served via electronic mail on the following attorneys of record:
`
`Amanda Hollis
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`amanda.hollis@kirkland.com
`300 North LaSalle, Chicago, IL 60654
`
`Stefan M. Miller, Ph.D.
`stefan.miller@kirkland.com
`601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022
`
`Karen Younkins
`karen.younkins@kirkland.com
`333 South Hope Street, Los Angeles, CA 90071
`
`Benjamin A. Lasky
`benjamin.lasky@kirkland.com
`601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022
`
`Sarah K. Tsou
`sarah.tsou@kirkland.com
`601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022
`
`Mark C. McLennan
`mark.mclennan@kirkland.com
`601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022
`
`Christopher J. Citro
`christopher.citro@kirkland.com
`601 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022
`
`
`12
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`IPR2017-01489
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike
`
`Pfizer_Genentech_IPRs@kirkland.com
`
`Dimitrios T. Drivas
`White & Case LLP
`ddrivas@whitecase.com
`1221 Avenues of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
`
`Scott T. Weingaertner
`White & Case LLP
`scott.weingaertner@whitecase.com
`1221 Avenues of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
`
`Amit H. Thakore
`White & Case LLP
`athakore@whitecase.com
`1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
`
`Eric Majchrzak
`White & Case LLP
`eric.majchrzak@whitecase.com
`1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
`
`/Lauren V. Blakely/
`Lauren V. Blakely
`Reg. No. 70,247
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
`950 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`(650) 600-5039
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`13
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`

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