Paper 41
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`MICRO LABS LIMITED AND MICRO LABS USA INC.
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`SANTEN PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND ASAHI GLASS CO., LTD.
`Patent Owners.
`_____________
`
`Inter Partes Review No. IPR2017-01434
`U.S. Patent No. 5,886,035
`
`_____________
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNERS’
`MOTION TO EXCLUDE
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` Case IPR2017-01434
`Patent 5,886,035
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
`II.  Petitioners’ reliance on expert declaration testimony evidence in their Reply
`does not incorporate arguments by reference. ...................................................... 1 
`A.  ¶¶ 10–70, 75–88, 91–98 of Ex. 1031 and ¶¶ 23–28, 31–33, 36–41, 48–53,
`55–62, 67–73 of Ex. 1032. .............................................................................. 2 
`1.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 10–16, 75; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 48–53 .............................................. 4 
`2.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 30–45; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 26–27, 31–33, 36–41 ............................ 5 
`3.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 46–70 and 76 ......................................................................... 6 
`4.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 77–88, 92; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 67–73 .............................................. 7 
`5.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 17–39 and ¶¶ 47–57 ............................................................... 8 
`6.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 91–93; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 55–62 .................................................... 9 
`7.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 92–98; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 23–28 .................................................... 9 
`B.  Petitioners’ evidence is relevant and admissible. .......................................... 10 
`1.  Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 6–8, 71, and 89–90 .............................................................. 10 
`2.  Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 20–22, 29–30, and 63–66 .................................................... 11 
`3.  Exhibits 1033–1035; 1037; 1038; 1040–1043; 1045–1060 ..................... 12 
`III. Patent Owners’ improper and meritless objection to Petitioners’ compliance
`with the word count limit has been waived and is not a proper basis for a
`motion to exclude. ............................................................................................... 14 
`A.  Patent Owners’ “motion to exclude” is improper because it is not based on
`the Federal Rules of Evidence. ...................................................................... 14 
`B.  Patent Owners failed to timely object to Petitioners’ alleged non-compliance
`with the word count ....................................................................................... 15 
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`I.
`
`Introduction
`Patent Owners’ purported “motion to exclude” is an improper and belated
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`attempt to make a procedural objection to Petitioners’ alleged non-compliance with
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`the word count limit, based on the erroneous premise that Petitioners somehow
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`incorporated “arguments” by reference. Patent Owners did not identify a single
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`argument that is allegedly incorporated by reference as there are none. Further,
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`any objection that a paper does not comply with the word limit must be promptly
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`raised with the Board; such an objection is not the proper basis for a motion to
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`exclude evidence. Patent Owners’ motion should be denied.
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`II.
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`Petitioners’ reliance on expert declaration testimony evidence in their
`Reply does not incorporate arguments by reference.
`Patent Owners’ purported “motion to exclude” is wrong on the merits and
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`should be denied. Petitioners relied on their expert declarations as evidence in
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`support of the arguments made in Petitioners’ Reply. Such reliance on expert
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`declaration testimony is proper because “[d]eclaration testimony generally is
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`regarded as evidence, not argument. . . . There is no meaningful occasion to
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`consider whether a declaration has been ‘effectively incorporated by reference.’
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`Impermissible incorporation by reference . . . applies to non-evidentiary papers.”
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`Research in Motion Corp. v. Multimedia Ideas LLC, IPR2013-00036, Paper 15 at 7
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`(PTAB Mar. 18, 2013).
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`Further, Patent Owners failed to comply with Rule 42.64(b)(1), which
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`requires the grounds for their objection be stated “with sufficient particularity to
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`allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 (b)(1).
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`Patent Owners did not point out, in their objections (Paper 27) or their motion
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`(Paper 32), a single argument that is allegedly incorporated by reference in the
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`Reply. Instead, Patent Owners generally assert that there are arguments in
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`Petitioners’ declarations that are not in their Reply. (See, e.g., Paper 32, at 5.)
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`Such vague and conclusory assertions are insufficient for Patent Owners to meet
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`their burden. See Research in Motion Corp., Paper 15 at 8 (rejecting “the patent
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`owner conten[tion] that . . . the declaration testimony contains numerous
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`arguments in addition to factual support for arguments made in the petition. . . .
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`[when] patent owner has not identified separately the factual portions of the
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`declaration apart from the argument portions and thus has not established that the
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`argument portion exceeds [the page limit]”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (“The moving
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`party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.”)
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`A.
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`¶¶ 10–70, 75–88, 91–98 of Ex. 1031 and ¶¶ 23–28, 31–33, 36–41,
`48–53, 55–62, 67–73 of Ex. 1032.
`Contrary to Patent Owners’ assertion, Petitioners made their arguments
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`explicitly in the text of their Reply and cited to specific supporting expert
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`testimony for their arguments. Petitioners’ use of terms like “as explained in his
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`declaration,” does not mean that arguments are incorporated by reference. Nor do
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`Petitioners’ citations to several paragraphs of supporting expert testimony amount
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`to impermissible incorporation by reference. See Chervon v. Milwaukee, IPR2015-
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`00597, Paper 79 at 18–19 (PTAB July 28, 2016) (refusing to find petitioner’s
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`citations to expert declarations to support arguments made in its reply improper
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`incorporation by reference when petitioner cites 10–15 paragraphs of expert
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`declarations).
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`Patent Owners’ reliance on two Board decisions, Cisco and Conopco, is
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`mistaken. In Cisco Sys. Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, the petitioner, in an effort to
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`compact five asserted grounds for unpatentability into only seven pages, the
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`petitioner used five footnotes to cite large portions of expert declarations, including
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`pages of claim charts, to support either topical section headings or broad legal
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`conclusions, without any explanation of those cited portions. IPR2014-00454
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`Paper 12 at 7–8 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative). But here, Petitioners made
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`every one of their arguments explicitly in their Reply, and every argument cites to
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`the specific expert declaration testimony that supports the argument. Nowhere
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`does Petitioners’ Reply in this proceeding cite to declaration testimony in
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`connection with broad legal conclusions or topical headings. Patent Owners’
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`reliance on Cisco is therefore misplaced.
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`Conopco, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., IPR2013-00510, Paper 9 at 8
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`(PTAB Feb. 12, 2014) is also inapposite. The issue in that case was whether the
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`claimed “charge density” limitation was inherently disclosed by “Reid,” an
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`allegedly anticipatory reference. Although the Conopco Petition contained a
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`general assertion that Reid discloses the claimed charge density limitation, the
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`Conopco Petition did not argue inherency. Instead, the inherency argument was
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`only contained in a supporting declaration. Accordingly, the Board declined to
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`consider the inherency argument. In contrast, Petitioners in the present proceeding
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`are not relying on any argument that are not made in the Reply and thus only found
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`in the declarations since all of Petitioners’ arguments are made in their Reply.1
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`Accordingly, ¶¶ 10–70, 75–88, 91–98 of Ex. 1031 and ¶¶ 23–28, 31–33, 36–
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`41, 48–53, 55–62, 67–73 of Ex. 1032 should not be excluded.
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`1.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 10–16, 75; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 48–53
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that Klimko’s data
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`would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) to select Compound C as
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`a lead compound because Klimko teaches a longer duration of action for
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`Compound C, which advantageously allows for once-per-day dosing, combined
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`with increased IOP-lowering efficacy as compared to commercially-available
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`1 Even if the Board finds that some portions of Petitioners’ expert declarations
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`“contain[] numerous argument not found in the Reply,” (Paper 32, at 6), exclusion
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`is unnecessary because the Board can simply choose to not consider such
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`arguments. Research in Motion Corp., Paper 15 at 8.
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`latanoprost. (Paper 24, at 2–3.) Petitioners properly rely on expert declaration
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`testimony establishing, for example, that a POSA would interpret the data in
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`Klimko according to “the entirety of the graph,” particularly the IOP measurement
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`at the longest time after a dose, “the fourth dose (i.e.,16/4),” and further according
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`to the length of time for peak IOP reduction (which is 6 hours for Compound C),
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`and would “find compound C attractive as a lead compound for further
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`development because of its later peak time for IOP-reduction (6 hours or longer).
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`This is in addition to the longer-lasting efficacy advantage that a POSA would
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`expect for compound C as compared to other compounds.” (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 10–16,
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`75 and Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 48–53.)
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`2.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 30–45; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 26–27, 31–33, 36–41
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that Dr. Macdonald’s
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`and Dr. Fechtner’s opinion that Klimko somehow shows that Compound C causes
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`an initial increase in IOP are wrong because they do not understand the definition
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`of “initial increase in IOP.” (Paper 24, at 8–11.) Petitioners properly rely on
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`expert testimony establishing, for example, that an “initial increase in IOP” refers
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`to an increase in IOP that is “observed when the IOP of the experimental eye [is]
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`higher compared to the simultaneously-measured IOP of the contralateral control
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`(vehicle-solution treated) eye,” or when “the IOP of the treated eye is higher than
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`the baseline of the treated eye.” (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 29–39; Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 36–40.)
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`Petitioners also generally argued, for example, that any initial increase in
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`IOP would not deter a POSA from selecting a compound for further modification,
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`because it was known that an initial increase in IOP could be lessened or
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`eliminated through dose-reduction and chemical modification. (Paper 24, at 12–
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`13.) Petitioners therefore properly rely on expert declaration testimony to
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`establish, for example, that the prior art discloses examples of reducing and/or
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`eliminating initial increase in IOP through dose-reduction, which is likely due to a
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`phenomenon known as the “therapeutic ceiling,” and removal of the C-15
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`hydroxyl. (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 40–45; Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 26–27, 31–33, and 41.)
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`Petitioners’ reliance on supporting expert testimony is appropriate and not
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`an incorporation by reference of arguments. Accordingly, none of Ex. 1031, at ¶¶
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`30–45 and Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 26–27, 31–33, 36–41 should be excluded.
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`3.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 46–702 and 76
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that a POSA would
`
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`2 Patent Owners list Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 48–61 in a separate heading (II.A.4) and Ex.
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`1031, ¶¶ 50, 56–59, 62–67 in another separate heading (II.A.5), even though the
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`challenged testimony is included in section II.A.3 of their motion. Their
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`challenges raised in sections II.A.4 and II.A.5 suffer the same deficiencies as the
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`be motivated to modify the C-15 hydroxyl group of Compound C with two
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`fluorines, which would mimic the tetrahedral geometry of the C-15 hydroxyl, to
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`improve its therapeutic profile with a reasonable expectation of success. (Paper
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`24, at 14–16.) Petitioners therefore properly rely on expert testimony establishing,
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`for example, that a POSA would understand: Kishi teaches that the C-15 hydroxyl
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`contributes to the side effects of prostaglandins, the tetrahedral geometry at the C-
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`15 carbon should be preserved, and would be preserved via difluoro substitution,
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`and Ueno discloses difluoro substitution of the hydroxyl. (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 46–70
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`and 76.)
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`4.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 77–88, 92; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 67–73
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that sales and market
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`share for tafluprost do not support commercial success and thus are not evidence of
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`non-obviousness. (Paper 24, at 19–20.) Petitioners properly rely on expert
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`declaration testimony establishing, for example, that global sales for tafluprost-
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`containing products is “very small,” because it is only $150 million, but global
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`sales for glaucoma drugs is $2.6 billion. (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 77–85.)
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`Petitioners also generally argued, for example, that there is no nexus
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`rest of their motion, including for the reasons stated in section II.A.3 of this
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`Opposition.
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`between the alleged merits of tafluprost and the alleged commercial success of
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`tafluprost. (Paper 24, at 20.) Petitioners properly rely on expert declaration
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`testimony establishing, for example, that “sales of a drug depend on a variety of
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`factors, including the pharmaceutical company’s efforts to market the drug to
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`patients directly . . . . Pharmaceutical companies may also provide discount or
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`rebate coupons to patients to incentivize them to buy the drug, and once a patient is
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`on a particular drug the patient tends to remain on the same drug.” (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶
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`86–88; Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 67–73.)
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`5.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 17–39 and ¶¶ 47–57
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that tafluprost
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`exhibits no unexpected results because the prior art taught that modifying the C-15
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`hydroxyl with a suitable surrogate, such as fluorine, would be expected to reduce
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`side effects, including for example hyperemia and/or any initial increase in IOP.
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`(Paper 24, at 20–21.) Petitioners properly rely on expert declaration testimony
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`establishing, for example, that “difluorination is a known and well-defined
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`medicinal chemistry substitution for the POSA based on the common knowledge in
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`the field,” that it would be expected to preserve the tetrahedral geometry of the C-
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`15 carbon, which was “commonly known by medicinal chemists” to be one of the
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`“most important features” of the C-15 hydroxyl, and that it would advantageously
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`serve as a hydrogen-bond donor but not a hydrogen-bond acceptor thus
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`“minimiz[ing] chemical and biological lability (i.e., chemical/biological
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`breakdown).” (Ex. 1031 at ¶¶ 17–39, ¶¶ 47–57.)
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`6.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 91–93; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 55–62
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argue, for example, that there was no
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`long-felt need or failure of others because latanoprost, marketed in June 1996 as
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`Xalatan®, was known to be safe and effective for treating glaucoma and elevated
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`IOP, and successful in the market. (Paper 24, at 21–22.) Petitioners properly rely
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`on expert declaration testimony establishing, for example, that latanoprost was
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`considered safe and effective for patients and still accounts for about 65% of PG-
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`analog prescriptions, and that the clinical efficacy and side effects of tafluprost are
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`no better than latanoprost, and researchers successfully improved the therapeutic
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`profile of prostaglandins via modification with ester groups and bulky aromatic
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`groups. (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 91–93, Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 55–62.)
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`7.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 92–98; Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 23–283
`In their Reply Petitioners generally argued, for example, that any alleged
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`3 In section II.A.10 of their purported “motion to exclude” Patent Owners
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`challenge Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 94–98 and Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 23–28, even though that testimony
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`is included within section II.A.9. The challenges in section II.A.9 suffer from the
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`same deficiencies as the rest, including section II.A.10.
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`evidence of secondary considerations for tafluprost, to the extent it exists, does not
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`support nonobviousness because it is not commensurate in scope with the claims.
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`(Paper 24, at 22–23.) Petitioners properly rely on expert declaration testimony
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`establishing, for example, that the claims cover numerous compounds including
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`compounds in carboxylic acid forms, which would have an inferior therapeutic
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`profile compared to tafluprost, and compounds with esters of various sizes
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`different from tafluprost, which would be expected to affect the therapeutic profile
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`of the compounds. (Ex. 1031, at ¶¶ 92–98; Ex. 1032, at ¶¶ 23–28.)
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`B.
`Petitioners’ evidence is relevant and admissible.
`Patent Owners’ argument that “[m]aterials not discussed in a substantive
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`paper are irrelevant and their consideration would be unfairly prejudicial” is not
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`sufficient basis to exclude any of the Exhibits and portions of Drs. deLong and
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`Rose’s supplemental declarations. “There is no requirement that a supporting
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`declaration only cite to evidence which has already been directly cited in the
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`petition.” Research in Motion Corp., Paper 15, at 9. Moreover, as demonstrated
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`below, every piece of evidence challenged in section II.B of Patent Owners’
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`purported “motion to exclude” is highly probative and non-prejudicial.
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`1.
`Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 6–8, 71, and 89–90
`In Ex. 1031 at ¶¶ 6–8, Dr. deLong responds to the declaration testimony
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`submitted by Patent Owners’ expert, Dr. Macdonald, regarding the level of the
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`POSA in this proceeding, which Dr. deLong opined on in his opening declaration
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`(Ex. 1027, at ¶¶ 26–28) and which was discussed in the Petition. (Paper 1, at 23–
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`25.)
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`In Ex. 1031, at ¶ 71, Dr. deLong rebuts generally Patent Owners’ erroneous
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`assertion that a previous Canadian Court decision (Ex. 2027) purportedly
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`contradicts his testimony in this proceeding. Dr. deLong then explains in detail
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`why such assertion is incorrect in the following paragraphs (¶¶ 72–76), all of
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`which are cited or discussed in Petitioners’ Reply. (Paper 24, at 7.)
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`In Ex. 1031 at ¶¶ 89–90, Dr. deLong rebuts Dr. Macdonald’s opinion that
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`tafluprost exhibits alleged “unexpected results,” and internally cites to previous
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`paragraphs ¶¶ 17–41 and 47–70 in his supplemental declaration. Although
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`Petitioners did not cite to ¶¶ 89–90 directly, Petitioners cited to these internally
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`cited paragraphs ¶¶ 17–41 and 47–70 in the Reply to support the argument that
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`there are no unexpected results. (Paper 24, at 9–10, 14, 20–21.) Therefore, all of
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`these portions of Dr. deLong’s testimony is evidence directly relevant to this
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`proceeding and thus admissible. To the extent some of them are not cited directly
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`in the substantive papers, that argument goes to the weight and not the
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`admissibility of the evidence.
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`2.
`Ex. 1032, ¶¶ 20–22, 29–30, and 63–66
`In Ex. 1032 at ¶ 20, Dr. Rose explains his understanding of the law
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`regarding “copying” and its relationship to obtaining FDA approval for a generic
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`drug, which provides the basis for his opinion regarding the same subject matter in
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`¶¶ 71–73, which are cited in the Reply. (Paper 24, at 19.) It is relevant and non-
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`prejudicial because Patent Owners and their experts rely on alleged copying as a
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`basis for commercial success. (Paper 22, at 65; Ex. 2028, at ¶ 13.)
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`In Ex. 1032 at ¶¶ 21–22, Dr. Rose provides general and introductory subject
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`matter related to his view of Dr. Fechtner’s opinions on the state of the relevant art
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`at the time. It is relevant and non-prejudicial because it is essential to an
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`obviousness inquiry and it responds directly to Patent Owners’ expert Dr. Fechtner.
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`In Ex. 1032 at ¶¶ 29–30, Dr. Rose provides a high-level summary of Dr.
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`Macdonald’s and Dr. Fechtner’s opinions on whether the prior art teaches away
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`from Compound C as a lead compound. It is relevant and non-prejudicial because
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`it directly responds to Patent Owners’ experts.
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`In Ex. 1032 at ¶¶ 63–66, Dr. Rose describes his understanding that Dr.
`
`deLong was asked to opine on failure of others and unexpected results, which is
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`relevant and harmless.
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`3.
`Exhibits 1033–1035; 1037; 1038; 1040–1043; 1045–1060
`Patent Owners’ theory that exhibits not cited in Petitioners’ Reply must be
`
`excluded belies the Board’s practice and common sense. See, e.g., Limelight
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`Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., IPR2016-01631, Paper 34, at 17 (denying
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`motion to exclude exhibits cited in expert declaration but not the Petition, agreeing
`
`with Petitioner that the exhibits were “not arguments improperly incorporated into
`
`the Petition”) (PTAB Oct. 25, 2017); Daicel Corp. v. Celanese Int’l Corp.,
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`IPR2015-00170, Paper 29 at 4–6 (PTAB Sept. 1, 2015) (rejecting Patent Owner’s
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`argument that two exhibits, cited in expert declaration but not in the Petition, were
`
`improperly incorporated by reference). Exhibits 1033–1035, 1037,4 1038, 1040–
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`1043, and 1045–10605 were all discussed or cited by Petitioners’ experts to support
`
`opinions and analysis that respond directly to issues raised by Patent Owners and
`
`their experts, and those are the issues discussed in the Reply. These exhibits are
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`relevant, non-prejudicial, and should not be excluded. Expert testimony about
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`these exhibits,6 challenged in section II.C of Patent Owners’ motion, is also
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`relevant and non-prejudicial.
`
`
`4 Any alleged evidentiary deficiency for the July 1996 interview with Dr. Alan
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`Robin about latanoprost, (Ex. 1037), was cured by Petitioners’ service of Ex. 1064.
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`5 Any alleged evidentiary deficiency for Dr. deLong’s lecture notes on calculating
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`lipophilicity (Ex. 1051) was cured by Petitioners’ service of Ex. 1063.
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`6 Ex. 1031, ¶¶ 16, 39, 43, 49, 50, 55, 57, 59, 69, 81, 82, 83, 85, and 86; Ex. 1032,
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`¶¶ 24, 26, 27, 41, 44, 47, 49, 56, 57, 59, and 60.
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`III. Patent Owners’ improper and meritless objection to Petitioners’
`compliance with the word count limit has been waived and is not a
`proper basis for a motion to exclude.
`Patent Owners’ objection to Petitioners’ alleged non-compliance with the
`
`word count limit, based on a theory of incorporation by reference, suffers from at
`
`least two fatal procedural defects: A) it not an evidentiary objection; and B) it is
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`late. It is not a motion to exclude evidence, and labeling it as such does not cure
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`these defects.
`
`A.
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`Patent Owners’ “motion to exclude” is improper because it is not
`based on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
`The Board’s Scheduling Order only authorizes each side to file a motion to
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`exclude evidence. (Paper 12 at 8.) Admissibility of evidence is governed by the
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`Federal Rules of Evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62; Google, Inc. v. Visual Real Estate,
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`Inc., IPR2014-01339, Paper 39 at 36 (PTAB Jan. 25, 2016) (“the party moving to
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`exclude evidence bears the burden of proving . . . that the material . . . is
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`inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence”) (emphasis added). But on its
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`face Patent Owners’ motion is based on the theory that Petitioners’ Reply
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`somehow exceeds the word count limit.7 Such a contention “does not belong in a
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`Motion to Exclude.” Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Robert Bosch LLC, IPR2016-
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`7 Patent Owners’ reliance on 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) misses the mark because
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`that provision governs the content of a Petition, not a Reply.
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`00038, Paper 68, at 11 (PTAB Mar. 30, 2017). The Board should reject Patent
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`Owners’ attempted end-run around the Board’s Scheduling Order and the
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`applicable federal rules.
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`B.
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`Patent Owners failed to timely object to Petitioners’ alleged non-
`compliance with the word count
`Once a trial has been instituted, a party must file its objections to evidence
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`within five days of service. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1). But Patent Owners’
`
`objections, (Paper 27), did not mention Petitioners’ alleged non-compliance with
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`the word count limit, nor did they cite to the rule governing the word count limit.
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.24(c)(1). Instead, Patent Owners waited nearly two months to
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`improperly raise this objection in a motion to exclude. Such delay tactics should
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`not be allowed. Research in Motion Corp., IPR2013-00036, Paper 15, at 8 (“if a
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`party has an objection about the other party’s exceeding a certain page limit, the
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`matter should be raised as soon as possible with the Board to preserve remedial
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`measures which can still be taken by the Board without prejudice to all parties.
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`We disapprove of patent owner’s taking three months to make the procedural
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`objection.”). The Board should reject Patent Owners’ untimely and improper
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`objection and deny the motion to exclude.
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`15
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`Dated: August 9, 2018
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` Case IPR2017-01434
`Patent 5,886,035
`
`By: /Cedric C.Y. Tan/
` Cedric C.Y. Tan (Reg. No. 56,082)
`H. Keeto Sabharwal
`(admitted pro hac vice)
`Yun Wei (Reg. No. 70,744)
`Alton L. Hare (Reg. No. 68,638)
`PILLSBURY WINTHROP
`SHAW PITTMAN LLP
`1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`Tel.: (202) 663-8000
`Fax.: (202) 663-8007
`Email: cedric.tan@pillsburylaw.com
`Email:keeto.sabharwal@pillsburylaw.com
`Email: sophie.wei@pillsburylaw.com
`Email: alton.hare@pillsburylaw.com
`
` Sean M. Weinman (Reg. No. 69,515)
`PILLSBURY WINTHROP
`SHAW PITTMAN LLP
`1650 Tysons Boulevard, 14th Floor
`McLean, VA 22102
`Tel.: (703) 770-7511
`Fax.: (703) 770-4856
`Email: sean.weinman@pillsburylaw.com
`
`Counsel for Petitioners Micro Labs
`Limited and Micro Labs USA Inc.
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`16
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`Case IPR2017-01434
`Patent 5,886,035
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies that a copy of the
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`foregoing PETITIONERS’ OPPOSITION TO PATENT OWNERS’ MOTION TO
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`EXCLUDE was served on August 9, 2018, by filing this document through the
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`Patent Trial and Appeal Board End to End System as well as delivering a copy via
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`electronic mail upon the following attorneys of record for the Patent Owners:
`
`Arlene L. Chow (Reg. No. 47,489)
`arlene.chow@hoganlovells.com
`Eric J. Lobenfeld (pro hac vice)
`eric.lobenfeld@hoganlovells.com
`Ernest Yakob, Ph.D. (Reg. No. 45,893)
`ernest.yakob@hoganlovells.com
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`875 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`Tel: (212) 918-3000
`Fax: (212) 918-3100
`
`
`
` /Cedric C.Y. Tan/
` Cedric C.Y. Tan (Reg. No. 56,082)
`PILLSBURY WINTHROP
`SHAW PITTMAN LLP
`1200 Seventeenth Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`Tel.: (202) 663-8000
`Fax.: (202) 663-8007
`Email: cedric.tan@pillsburylaw.com
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