`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FACEBOOK, INC., WHATSAPP INC., LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`and HUAWEI DEVICE COMPANY, LTD.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNILOC 2017 LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held August 30, 2018
`____________
`
`
`
`BEFORE: JENNIFER S. BISK, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and
`CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER LG ELECTRONICS, INC.:
` ANAND K. SHARMA, ESQUIRE
` CORY BELL, ESQUIRE
` JOSHUA GOLDBERG, ESQUIRE
` FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
` GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
` 901 New York Avenue, NW
` Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER FACEBOOK, INC. and WHATSAPP,
`INC.:
`
` HEIDI KEEFE, ESQUIRE
` LOWELL MEAD, ESQUIRE
` ANDREW MASE, ESQUIRE
` COOLEY, LLP
` 3175 Hanover Street
` Palo Alto, California 94304-1130
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER HUAWEI DEVICE COMPANY,
`LTD.:
`
` DAVID GARR, ESQUIRE
` COVINGTON AND BURLING
` One CityCenter
` 850 Tenth Street, NW
` Washington, DC 20001-4956
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER APPLE, INC.:
`
` JASON D. EISENBERG, ESQUIRE
` TRENT W. MERRELL, ESQUIRE
` STERNE KESSLER GOLDSTEIN & FOX, PLLC
` 1100 New York Ave, NW
` Suite 600
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` Washington DC 20005
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
` BRETT MANGRUM, ESQUIRE
` RYAN LOVELESS, ESQUIRE
` MANGRUM LAW FIRM
` 2001 Ross Avenue
` Dallas, Texas 75201
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on August 30, 2018,
`commencing at 12:00 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Texas
`Regional Office, 207 South Houston Street, #159, Dallas, Texas, 75202.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`
`
`P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
` (Proceedings begin at 12:00 p.m.)
` THE COURT: Let's begin our second session of the
`day. This session is for IPR2017-1428, 2017-1667, and
`2017-1668.
` The IPR 2017-1428 deals with patent number 8,995,433,
`while the 1667 and 1668 cases deal with the '622 patent.
`Sorry. Let me give you that full number. Patent
`Number 8,724,622.
` With me, again, or joining me again, are Judges
` Charles Boudreau in the San Jose, California office, and
` Judge Jennifer Bisk joining us from the Alexandria campus at
` the USPTO headquarters.
` Here we have quite a few parties, so let me get
` everyone straight before we start.
` So we should have here Facebook, Inc., WhatsApp
` Inc., LG Electronics, Inc. and Huawei Device Company, Ltd.
` Are we missing anybody else from the description?
` MS. KEEFE: No, Your Honor, except for the joinder.
` JUDGE QUINN: And the joined party Apple, Inc. Thank
`you for that.
` And for patent owner we have again Uniloc USA and
` Uniloc Luxembourg, but as we understand, notices have been
` filed of updating the patent owner corporation.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` MR. MANGRUM: That's correct in these matters, as
`well, Your Honor.
` JUDGE QUINN: Thank you. All right.
` Let's start with appearances for Facebook and
`WhatsApp.
` MS. KEEFE: Good morning on the West Coast. Good
`afternoon everywhere else. My name is Heidi Keefe, and I'm
`lead counsel on behalf of Facebook, Inc. and WhatsApp Inc.,
`petitioners.
` During the oral argument today, Mr. Andrew Mase will
`be presenting in the 2017-1428 case, and Mr. Lowell Mead will
`be presenting in the 1667 and 1668 cases.
` Thank you, Your Honor.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. So who do we have next?
` MR. GARR: So for the petitioner Huawei Device
`Company, Ltd., I'm David Garr with Covington and Burling.
`Good morning, good afternoon.
` JUDGE QUINN: Thank you.
` MR. BELL: Good morning and good afternoon. Cory
`Bell from Finnegan on behalf of LG.
` JUDGE QUINN: Thank you.
` Do we have anybody else? Oh, yes.
` Apple, Inc., you can make your appearances for the
`record again, please.
` MR. EISENBERG: Good morning, good afternoon, Your
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`Honors. This is Jason Eisenberg and Trent Merrell for Apple.
` JUDGE QUINN: Thank you.
` Okay. We've got everybody. Okay.
` For patent owner, who do we have presenting today?
` MR. MANGRUM: Welcome back, all. This is Brett
`Mangrum. With me is Ryan Loveless, and I will be exclusively
`presenting today on behalf of patent owner.
` I'm also listed as the lead counsel in these matters,
`all of them.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. All right. For this session, we
`have a total of 45 minutes per side. And as I understand then
`Facebook, Inc., WhatsApp Inc., yes, they will be presenting
`for or on behalf of everybody, from the petitioners.
` You may reserve rebuttal time, and you can let me
`know what that time would be as you step up. Same for patent
`owner, you may reserve rebuttal time. If you want to reserve
`that, it's your choice.
` Same instructions from the last session. No speaking
`objections. If you have anything that you want to raise our
`attention to in regards to objections, you may state those
`during your argument time.
` In these cases, as well, I want to make that
`statement now rather than at the end, that pursuant to 35
`U.S.C. § 315(d), we, the panel, is considering consolidating the
`1427 and 1428 cases that deal with the '433 patent, and also
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`consolidating the 1667 and 1668 cases together because those
`deal with the '622 patent.
` And this is exclusively for purposes of us rendering
`a final written decision. And the parties are given a week --
`calendar week to respond or otherwise object if you have any
`issues with our proceeding in that manner. You may send an
`email to the trial inbox and let us know whether we need to
`have a conference call on that.
` Do you have any questions on that instruction or
`notice?
` MS. KEEFE: No, Your Honor.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay.
` MR. MANGRUM: None from patent owner, Your Honor.
` JUDGE QUINN: Perfect.
` MS. KEEFE: Just one quick housekeeping question,
`Your Honor.
` JUDGE QUINN: Sure.
` MS. KEEFE: I know that there is a total amount of
`time for the oral argument on all three petitions. Would Your
`Honor prefer that we do all of the issues regarding the '433
`through? In other words, petitioner talks on the 1428 case,
`response, finish, and then move on to the 1667 and 1668, or do
`you prefer that Mr. Mase present on the issues of the '433
`patent, followed immediately by Mr. Mead on the '622, and then
`addressed by patent owner?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` JUDGE QUINN: I think, because there are so many
`overlapping issues, it probably makes sense to just go
`straight through, and you tell us which patent you want to
`take up at any time. And then likewise, patent owner can
`address all of the issues during their 45 minutes. I think
`that's the most efficient thing.
` MS. KEEFE: Sounds --
` JUDGE QUINN: Because otherwise we're going to get confused as
`to which patent we're referring to at what time.
` MS. KEEFE: Sounds logical, Your Honor. Without
`further ado, I'll give you Mr. Mase.
` MR. MASE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Andrew Mase,
`again, for petitioner Facebook. And I'm going to -- I'm going
`to talk about the 1428 proceeding on the '433 patent.
` JUDGE QUINN: So how much time do you want for
`rebuttal?
` MR. MASE: So we'll collectively take 25 minutes to
`opening, and reserve 20 for rebuttal.
` JUDGE QUINN: So you -- you want to speak for 20
`minutes?
` MR. MASE: Mr. Mead and myself will collectively
`speak for 25 minutes.
` JUDGE QUINN: 25.
` MR. MASE: I'm planning to speak for about 10
`minutes.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. So I'm going to put the timer
`for 25, and you stop when you need to stop. Okay.
` MR. MASE: Okay. Excellent.
` So I'm going to focus my presentation on the instant
`voice message term. That's because, even though the Board's
`Institution Decision rejected all of the patent owner's
`arguments, patent owner's response offers nearly nothing new.
`The main difference is that the patent owner has offered an
`express instruction of that term "instant voice message".
` The bottom line is that patent owner has not provided
`any reason for the Board to depart from its reasoning --
` JUDGE QUINN: Well, why don't you start with that,
`because we are concerned about the claim scope of that term.
`It permeates throughout all of the related patents, and we
`have some suggestions that we want to explore today.
` The main question I have for you is that I notice in
`your briefs, you take the position that the construction is
`plain and ordinary meaning, and I want to understand why you
`say that.
` MR. MASE: Sure. Sure. So two things, Your Honor.
`The first thing is that I think it's in column 2 of the '433
`patent, it acknowledges that voice messaging and instant voice
`messages are already known. And I think as ordinary users of
`the web and the internet, we all know what an instant text
`message is, we all know what voice messages are.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` And so an instant voice message is like an instant
`text message except that it's voice. And particularly in view
`of Zydney's clear teachings about its system and how it uses
`voice containers to enable near realtime communication -- so
`I'm citing Zydney at page 16 lines 14 to 15 -- it talks about
`exchanging these voice containers to create an instant voice
`messaging session. That's Zydney page --
` JUDGE QUINN: Why are we talking about Zydney? Okay.
`I want to address claim construction first without really
`referring to what the prior art has.
` We understand that the patent has in the background,
`the '433 patent addresses instant text messaging and it
`says -- and addresses voice mail, and it says, "We now have
`instant voice messaging." So it's neither instant text
`messaging nor is it voice mail.
` The question is what is it? And what I'm hearing
`from you is that everybody knows what that is. And I think
`our problem is that this is a technical term at this point.
`So what is the definition of that, so we know at a minimum
`what are we looking for?
` MR. MASE: Okay, Your Honor. Our position that,
`again, known construction is necessary for that term exactly
`because the '433 patent acknowledges that voice messaging is
`known, voice mail is known, and instant text messaging is
`known.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` So an instant voice message is simply an instant text
`message, except that it's voice instead.
` If Your Honor would like a claim construction
`proposal from us, I'd ask that I can confer with my colleagues
`and address it in rebuttal.
` JUDGE QUINN: Well, that's what I don't understand,
`because we made it very clear that this is a claim
`construction issue, and it was on our decisions on Institution
`that we said you needed to brief that.
` So what I -- what came back from you is, "Patent
`owner's not correct. Leave it -- leave it plain and ordinary
`meaning," and that's just not very helpful because, you know,
`you know it when you see it is not a claim construction.
` I do have a proposal for you, if you can approach.
`And we have hadthis actually copied for all of your colleagues
`and everybody else in the courtroom, including one for the
`court reporter.
` I'm handing down to everyone involved a copy of a
`definition that appears in the Microsoft Computer Dictionary,
`copyrighted 2002, approximately, published at that time, and
`it is for the term "instant messaging".
` And this is not -- this is not an exhibit of record,
`so it is provided to you as information that the panel has
`considered and is looking at for purposes of starting a
`conversation about what this term really means.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` (Pause in the proceedings)
` MR. MASE: Thank you for providing this reference.
` So this entry is describing instant messaging, and
`it's talking about a service that alerts users when their
`friends or colleagues are online and enable them to
`communicate with each other in real time through private online
`chat areas.
` So in view of this dictionary entry and the
`disclosures of the '433 patent, I think we'd be comfortable
`saying that an instant voice message, as used in the '433
`patent, is the near real-time communication of a voice. As
`I've been saying before, it's like an instant text message
`except it's voice.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. So your construction, you would
`say, is "Near real-time communication of voice," or at least as
`a minimum that, as opposed to instant text messaging.
` MR. MASE: Correct.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay.
` JUDGE BOUDREAU: This is Judge Boudreau. What form would
`that take? Would it be a file, or would it be a data
`structure, or what -- what would that be?
` MR. MASE: I think it would take the form of a data
`structure, Your Honor. I think using a file is too narrow.
`For example, the '433 patent.
` It does have an embodiment of using an audio file
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`and -- as a voice -- voice instant text, but it also talks
`about an intercom mode where the instant voice message is
`simply the use of transmission of audio using -- using message
`buffers. So it's not limited to a file.
` I think also I'd like to point out --
` JUDGE BOUDREAU: Would you agree then there would be
`a -- a data structure including a representation of an
`audible message?
` MR. MASE: Yes, Your Honor. I think that's -- I
`think that's accurate. And that's -- addresses the narrowness
`that would be present if a file were used in the definition.
` JUDGE QUINN: I think my only concern with that -- I
`want your comments on this -- is that the patents refer to
`instant voice messages before even they're created, such as,
`you know, the system alerts the user when it is ready to
`record the instant voice message.
` At that point, there is no message, tangible -- you
`know -- yeah -- where it's in a tangible medium. At that point
`there's no data, there's no structure. It will become that,
`supposedly, eventually, but it's more like the communication
`is about to begin, or the speech is about to come forth, and
`that will become the medium by which you deliver that message,
`but it's not necessarily data at that point.
` MR. MASE: Right. I think that's talking about sort
`of the process of generating an instant voice message. So I
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`think Your Honor is right that at that point, one doesn't
`exist yet. As part of that process, the '433 patent talks
`about a user being able to press a start button, and speak
`into it, and then press a stop button, and then as a result of
`that, the instant voice message is generated to be sent to its
`recipient.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. And for the claims that say you
`have a potential recipient where, again, the instant voice
`message hasn't been generated yet.
` MR. MASE: I'm not sure that "potential recipient" is
`recited in the claims that I'm addressing, but I think it was
`covered in LG's presentation about what a potential recipient
`is. I don't think it requires that an instant voice message
`already exists before you select users who could be potential
`recipients of that message.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Does it have to be -- I mean,
`the patent discloses audio in general, even though it says
`"voice messaging". But should it be broader than voice if the
`disclosure is just audio files and audio being transmitted, or
`should it be just what it says, just voice?
` MR. MASE: I think it should be limited to the voice,
`Your Honor, as part of the -- as part of the claim term.
` JUDGE QUINN: Any other things you want to say about
`the term vis-à-vis the definition that we have provided to
`you -- which, by the way, we are going to enter this into the
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`record as probably Exhibit 3001, if we don't have one already
`taking that number.
` MR. MASE: Just two points, Your Honor. We already
`talked about the issue of whether it should be limited to a
`file; it should not. The '433 patent, as I already mentioned,
`discusses two embodiments, one of which just uses buffers
`and -- to create the instant voice message for transmission.
` The other issue is whether the instant voice message
`should be limited to only including voice data so it couldn't
`include any metadata such as the destination or (inaudible)
`any identifier.
` And I think it is broader than just being limited
`purely to raw voice data. And the reason for that is, if you
`look at claims at the '622 patent, at least Claims 6 and 8, it
`talks about an instant voice message that includes fields,
`like an identifier, and a destination field.
` JUDGE QUINN: So you would say the instant voice
`message would include data?
` MR. MASE: I'm saying that it could. It should not
`be limited to only those of raw audio data that's provided by
`some speaker.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Now, if we -- if we agree with
`you that it is a near realtime communication of voice
`comprising some data structure, or that represents voice, how
`does that -- how does that match with the embodiments in which
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`the instant voice message gets delivered to a recipient over a
`telephone, and at that point, it's not data?
` MR. MASE: I think, Your Honor, the embodiment that
`you're talking about is media via a server; so a user calls
`up, and they generate their instant voice message in that
`manner.
` And so what happens is you do generate an instant
`voice message that includes a data structure that has no voice
`data, it may include other information, as well, and that
`instant voice message gets transmitted for the recipient to
`ultimately listen to or receive.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay.
` MR. MASE: And I think I'll turn it over to Mr. Mead
`for the '622.
` MR. MEAD: Thank you, Your Honors.
` So with respect to the '622 patent, I have three
`quick points to make, but, of course, would be most happy to
`hear if there are particular issues regarding the patent that
`the Board would desire to raise. But unless there are any
`particular questions at the outset, I'll go ahead and address
`the points I plan to raise.
` First, with respect to Claim 3, the dispute over the
` object field in Claim 3 of the '622 patent, we have a
` demonstrative slide, which will be 2, which we can pull up
` here.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` Judge Quinn, if you have the demonstrative slides
` handy, there may be an issue here, but it's the --
` So the claim language of the object field
` limitation -- so the issue -- the first issue to address here
` is the claim construction, or lack thereof, the breadth of
` the object field.
` So the '622 patent recites at 3, "Wherein the instant
` voice message includes an object field, including a digitized
` audio file."
` And Slide 42 shows the claim language. The patent
` itself broadly describes the object field as simply a block
` of data carried by message object, and that's actually in
` co-pending litigation that the patent owner's claim
` construction was simply a block of data carried by the
` message object. And that's consistent with kind of broad,
` plain, ordinary meanings reflected in technical dictionaries.
` So the Microsoft Dictionary, which is Exhibit 1012
` and 1112 at page 210, "field" is defined as simply a location
` in a record in which a particular type of data is stored.
` So the '622 patent itself, column 14, lines 37
` through 40, define a block of data, or extrinsic evidence
` confirms the field is broadly simply a location. And so
` under that broad understanding, the object field and the
` Zydney voice container is simply the voice data that's
` carried within the voice container.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`17
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` So if we look at Zydney itself, numerous instances --
` such as page 12, lines 6 through 8; page 12, lines 21 through
` 23; page 23, lines 1 through 11 -- where Zydney explicitly
` describes the voice data contained within the voice
` container, and as we know from Figure 3 of Zydney and other
` disclosures, the voice container can contain other data, such
` as identity fields. And so the disclosures that the block of
` data that's the voice data content, as opposed to other
` content, that's -- that discloses the object field.
` In addition, there's -- what we believe is a
` substantially unrebutted showing of obviousness. So in
` addition to the disclosure, the MIME formatting of the
` message described by Zydney -- so as Your Honors noted in the
` Institution Decision, Zydney, page 19, line 30 -- or 13
` through page 20, line 9, explicitly describes that the voice
` container can be formatted according to MIME. And we
` submitted the incorporated by reference standard of RFC 1521,
` which is Exhibit 1006, and pages 2 through 4 of that
` supported by extensive discussion by Dr. Lavian, that's at
` paragraphs 141 through 144 of his expert declaration.
` It would be obvious that in Zydney, when you have
` the -- the user at the client recording into an audio file,
` which is described at Zydney, page 16, lines 1 through 4, for
` example, page 21, lines 14 through 16, "When formatted
` according to MIME, as explicitly described by Zydney, the
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`18
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` message body of the MIME formatted message discloses that
` object field and would contain that digitized audio file."
` And patent owner's expert declaration submitted
` before the Institution Decision didn't rebut or actually even
` address that showing of obviousness.
` Very quickly on the message database point.
` Substantially, the same claim language that I would just
` refer the Court to -- or the Board to the store message ID.
` So you have exactly the same thing. It's on demonstrative
` Slide 58, as well, and this is what we heard in the prior
` case.
` So there's a disclosure here, as we have the message
` store -- Message Database 23, we have the store message ID,
` which is a unique identifier representing the message, and
` the message data content is within the table, which writ
` large, the plain meaning of the record of this substantially
` similar claim language is satisfied by the Clark disclosure.
` And finally, on Claim 24, so this the connection
` objects. I just wanted to point out -- so this is one of the
` disputes that doesn't actually turn on instant voice message,
` or the claim language doesn't specifically address it, so we
` have -- on Slide 79, we've got the claim language of
` Claim 24.
` What we're talking about here is the messaging
` system, a server side system receiving connection object
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`19
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` messages from the client systems.
` And what Zydney describes is clear disclosure on
` page 14, lines 2 through 9, that the client systems will log
` in and transmit their statuses to the central server, online,
` offline, and other statuses.
` So we have the disclosure of the messages being
` transmitted, but not -- Zydney doesn't get to the next level
` of detail what's the messaging protocol. And we've shown --
` I think it's -- I believe the disclosure is unrebutted, it's
` only a matter of motivation to combine that the -- when to
` use with http as top -- the Hethmon (phonetic) reference, in
` combination with Zydney, which also motivates the use of
` http, those status messages would be transmitted using http,
` which indisputably discloses the connection object messages.
` So unless there are further questions on the '622
` patent, we would reserve time for rebuttal.
` JUDGE QUINN: Any questions from my colleagues?
` JUDGE BISK: Nothing from me.
` JUDGE BOUDREAU: Not right now. Thank you.
` MR. MANGRUM: Good afternoon, Your Honors. I also
`would like to reserve the same amount of time. So --
` JUDGE QUINN: Which is what?
` MR. MANGRUM: Go for --
` JUDGE QUINN: They went for -- they asked for 25
`minutes upfront, 20 minutes on the back end.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`20
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` MR. MANGRUM: Let's do the same.
` JUDGE QUINN: Okay. Thank you.
` MR. MANGRUM: I'd like to start with the question of
`construction of instant voice message.
` Now, in the briefing, Uniloc did offer a construction
`for instant voice message. And the -- without countering
`Uniloc's construction with a counterproposal while all that
`was done in the briefing and reply was attacking that
`construction. I want to talk about specific intrinsic
`evidence that informs the construction of instant voice
`message, and also respond to the attack on the construction we
`supplied, and perhaps, in view of that attack, modify the
`construction, and in view of the discussion today, in a manner
`that we still --
` MS. BISK: May I just --
` MR. MANGRUM: Go ahead.
` MS. BISK: I'm sorry. I'm not clear what your
`construction is.
` MR. MANGRUM: Oh. It was in -- at least in the 14 --
` MS. BISK: I look -- yeah. I'm looking at the
`response, and in some places you say "an audio file recording
`voice data", and some places "an audio file that records voice
`data".
` And first of all, I don't understand what that means.
`I don't know -- I don't know of any files that can record
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`21
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
`things, so that confuses me.
` And then later you say it's "an audio file having
`recorded voice data".
` MR. MANGRUM: That -- that might be -- in view of
`your question, that might be a better articulation of what we
`were conveying. It is a --
` MS. BISK: So the -- "the audio file having recorded
`voice data"?
` MR. MANGRUM: Right. And I think that actually
`perhaps better even reflects what's in the specification.
` The specification used the words "recorded" and
`"recording", and so we were trying to incorporate that
`particular word inside the construction.
` But "recording" is not -- is not going to -- more
`than what it is, not how it was formed, and so to the extent
`that there could be some confusion in our original
`construction, then we would -- we would propose to say "it
`has".
` But I want to clarify a few things with respect to
` our construction and the attack on the construction in the
` papers.
` So I want to first draw Your Honors' attention to
` Slide 18. And in Slide 18, there is a series of quotations,
` these are all from Uniloc's briefing, but there are -- I just
` want to draw your attention to the fact -- and the citations
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`22
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2017-01428 (Patent 8,995,433 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01668 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`Case IPR2017-01667 (Patent 8,724,622 B2)
`
` are provided in the brief and I won't waste time repeating
` them here -- but there are a number of instances where
` "instant voice message" is referred to with the word --
` letters "i.e.", and it's in parenthesis coupled to another
` statement.
` And so while it is correct there are two
` embodiments -- two fundamental embodiments disclosed that are
` distinguished as the record embodiment and the intercom
` mode -- they're described as modes, actually. And here what
` we've shown is a number of descriptions of what the instant
` voice message is in the record mode.
` And so consistently, and I think it's over 12 times,
` the specification refers to the digitized audio file as b