throbber
Filed on behalf of Cellular Communications Equipment LLC
`By: Terry A. Saad (tsaad@bcpc-law.com)
`
`Jeffrey R. Bragalone (jbragalone@bcpc-law.com)
`Daniel F. Olejko (dolejko@bcpc-law.com)
`Nicholas C. Kliewer (nkliewer@bcpc-law.com)
`Bragalone Conroy PC
`2200 Ross Ave.
`Suite 4500 – West
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Tel: 214.785.6670
`Fax: 214.786.6680
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`HTC CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA, Inc.,
`ZTE CORPORATION, and ZTE (USA), Inc.,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`Case IPR2017-01081
`U.S. Patent No. 8,457,676
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR JOINDER
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
` I.
`
` II.
`
`III.
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 4
`
` Status of Related Litigation ............................................................................. 4
`
` Status of Related IPRs ....................................................................................... 5
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................. 6
`
` The Motion for Joinder Should Be Denied Because the Motion
`
`Was Never Authorized by the Board. ......................................................... 6
`
` HTC and ZTE Do Not Meet the Statutory Requirement For
`
`Joinder to the Apple IPR. ................................................................................ 7
`
` HTC and ZTE Should Not Be Permitted to Circumvent the Statute
`
`that Time-Bars The Petition. ........................................................................ 11
`
`
`
`If the Board Exercises Its Discretion to Grant the Motion for
`
`Joinder, This Case Should Be Terminated and Other Procedural
`
`Protections Should Be Imposed. ................................................................. 12
`
` V.
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................13
`
`ii
`
`
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`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITY
`
`City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al.,
`
` 133 S. Ct. at 1870 (2013) ............................................................................... 10, 11
`
`Hyundai Motor Co. v. American Vehicular Sciences LLC,
`
` Case IPR2014-01543, Paper 11 at 4-6 ..................................................................13
`
`Sony Corp. of America v. Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc.,
`
` Case IPR2013-00495, Paper 13 at 10-11 ..............................................................13
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. §311(a) ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(b) ........................................................................... 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(c) ..................................................................................................2, 9
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(d) ....................................................................................................12
`
`35 U.S.C. §316(a)(8) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`35 U.S.C. 315(c) ........................................................................................................ 9
`
`Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.1(b) ...................................................................................................12
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.107 ...................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.120 ...................................................................................................... 2
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.122(b) ...............................................................................................10
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.20(a) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`37 C.F.R. §42.20(b) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`Treatises
`
`Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 157 at 48762 ....................................................... 6
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`Description
`
`2001
`
`Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for Patent Infringement, Cellular
`
`2002
`
`2003
`
`Communications Equipment LLC v. AT&T, Inc., et al., No. 2:15-
`
`cv-00576 (E.D. Texas 2015) (Dkt. No. 1)
`
`Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to Move, Answer, or
`
`Otherwise Respond to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Cellular
`
`Communications Equipment LLC v. AT&T, Inc., et al., No.
`
`2:15-cv-00576 (E.D. Texas 2015) (Dkt. No. 29)
`
`Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice as to Defendants
`
`ZTE Corporation and ZTE Solutions, Inc., Cellular
`
`Communications Equipment LLC v. AT&T, Inc., et al., No.
`
`2:15-cv-00576 (E.D. Texas 2015) (Dkt. No. 21)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Cellular Communications Equipment LLC (“CCE” or “Patent
`
`Owner”) hereby files this Opposition (“Opposition”) to Petitioners’ Motion for
`
`Joinder to Related Instituted Inter Partes Review (Paper 3) (the “Motion for
`
`Joinder”) regarding Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,457,676 (Ex. 1001)
`
`(the “’676 Patent”) in IPR2017-01081 filed by HTC Corporation, HTC America,
`
`Inc. (collectively, “HTC”), ZTE Corporation, and ZTE (USA), Inc. (collectively,
`
`“ZTE”) (HTC and ZTE collectively, “Petitioners”). This Opposition is made
`
`pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §42.23.
`
`This Opposition responds to Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder only. It does not
`
`attempt to respond to the arguments or issues raised in the Petition (Paper 1). Patent
`
`Owner reserves its right to separately file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response.
`
`Patent Owner’s decision at this time to defer or forgo contesting or rebutting any
`
`contention or argument raised in the Petition is not an indication of Patent Owner’s
`
`agreement with the contention or argument, nor should it be deemed an admission
`
`by Patent Owner as to the truth or accuracy of such contention or argument. Patent
`
`Owner reserves all rights to provide both a preliminary response to the Petition in a
`
`Patent Owner Preliminary Response and a full response to the Petition in a Patent
`
`Owner Response, in accordance with the applicable federal statutes and rules of the
`
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See 35 U.S.C. §316(a)(8) and 37 C.F.R. §42.107,
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`and 37 C.F.R. §42.120.
`
`II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder should be denied. Petitioners’ motion has not
`
`been authorized by the Board, as required by 37 C.F.R. §42.20(b). Petitioners do not
`
`meet the statutory requirements for joinder, and have no standing to request joinder,
`
`because Petitioners did not file a proper IPR petition. See 35 U.S.C. §315(c)
`
`(authorizing joinder only for “any person who properly files a petitioner under
`
`section 311 …”). Petitioners do not dispute that they filed the Petition more than
`
`one year after they were served with a complaint for infringement of the ’676 patent.
`
`See Motion, Paper 3 at 2-3. For this reason, the Petition is not proper, and the Board
`
`may not institute a trial in this case. See 35 U.S.C. §315(b) (“An inter partes review
`
`may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1
`
`year after the date on which the petitioner … is served with a complaint alleging
`
`infringement of the patent.”) and 35 U.S.C. §311(a) (stating that all petitions are
`
`“[s]ubject to the provisions of this chapter,” thus including the timeliness
`
`requirement of §315(b)).
`
`Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder does not meet Petitioners’ burden to show that
`
`joinder is warranted under the particular facts of this case, as discussed below.
`
`Further, HTC previously filed an Inter Partes Review petition against the ’676
`
`patent, which was denied institution on the grounds that relied on the same primary
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`reference as the current Petition. See IPR2016-01501 (the “HTC IPR”), Paper 7.
`
`Patent Owner does not dispute that the current Petition is duplicative of the
`
`grounds, evidence, and arguments presented by petitioner Apple Inc. in IPR2016-
`
`01493 (the “Apple IPR”), which has been instituted for trial. Patent Owner is aware
`
`of previous Board decisions permitting institution of copy-cat petitions that would
`
`otherwise be time-barred when a request for joinder to an instituted trial is filed with
`
`the copy-cat petition. Patent Owner respectfully contends that such an outcome is
`
`contrary to the statutory mandate of §315(b), and that in doing so the Board exceeds
`
`a limitation that Congress placed on the Board’s statutory authority and that is
`
`plainly expressed in the statute. Despite the prior panel decisions to the contrary,
`
`Patent Owner urges this panel to follow the plain commands of the statute; and
`
`Patent Owner presents its arguments here to preserve the issue for appeal, if
`
`necessary.
`
`If the Board decides to grant Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder, the Board should
`
`impose restrictions and conditions on Petitioners’ participation in the Apple IPR that
`
`will ensure Patent Owner is not prejudiced by the joinder, minimize disruptions in
`
`the schedule for the Apple IPR, and otherwise provide efficiency for the parties and
`
`3
`
`the Board.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`III. BACKGROUND
`
` Status of Related Litigation
`
`The ’676 patent is currently subject to the following district court litigations:
`
` Cellular Communications Equipment LLC v. AT&T Inc., et al., 2:15-
`
`cv-00576 (E.D. Tex.);
`
` Cellular Commc’ns Equipment LLC v. Sprint Corp. et al., 2:15-cv-
`
`00579 (E.D. Tex.);
`
` Cellular Commc’ns Equipment LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al., 2:15-
`
`cv-00580 (E.D. Tex.);
`
` Cellular Commc’ns Equipment LLC v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. et al.,
`
`2:15-cv-00581 (E.D. Tex.);
`
` Cellular Commc’ns Equipment LLC v. HTC Corporation, et al., 2:17-
`
`cv-00078 (E.D. Tex.), filed January 25, 2017; and
`
` Cellular Commc’ns Equipment LLC v. ZTE Corporation, et al., 2:17-
`
`cv-00079 (E.D. Tex.), filed January 25, 2017.
`
`CCE filed its first complaint alleging infringement of the ’676 patent against
`
`both HTC and ZTE, among other parties, on April 30, 2015. Cellular Commc’ns
`
`Equipment LLC v. AT&T Inc., et al., 2:15-cv-00576, Dkt. No. 1 (E.D. Tex. April 30,
`
`2015). See Ex. 2001. HTC entered an appearance and waived formal service of the
`
`amended complaint on August 17, 2015. See Ex. 2002. ZTE (USA) Inc. was served
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`with the amended complaint on July 28, 2015 and also entered an appearance in the
`
`litigation on August 11, 2015. See Ex. 2003.
`
` Status of Related IPRs
`
`The ’676 patent is currently the subject of two other pending IPR proceedings:
`
`(1) the Apple IPR to which Petitioners seek joinder and (2) the HTC IPR. On
`
`February 13, 2017, a decision instituting inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 19, and
`
`21 was entered in the Apple IPR (Paper 7, IPR2016-01493) based on obviousness
`
`grounds involving U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0223455 to Fong
`
`(“Fong”), R2-052744, “Filtering For UE Power Headroom Measurement,” 3GPP
`
`RAN WG2 #49 Meeting, Seoul, Korea, November 2, 2005 (“Ericsson”), and U.S.
`
`Patent No. 6,445,917 to Bark (“Bark”). Also on February 13, 2017, a decision
`
`instituting inter partes review of claims 1, 19, and 33 (but denying institution on
`
`claims 3, 21, or 34) was entered in the HTC IPR (Paper 7, IPR2016-01501) based
`
`on one ground of obviousness involving U.S. Patent Application Publication No.
`
`2006/0140154 to Kwak (“Kwak”). Of note, the two grounds of unpatentability in the
`
`HTC IPR that relied upon Fong (the same primary reference relied on in the Apple
`
`IPR and the current Petition) were denied by the Board. See Institution Decision,
`
`5
`
`Paper 7, IPR2016-01501.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`IV. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
`
` The Motion for Joinder Should Be Denied Because the Motion Was
`Never Authorized by the Board.
`
`Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder should be denied because Petitioners have
`
`never requested authorization to file the motion. Under the applicable PTAB
`
`regulations, all requests for relief (other than a request for institution of trial) must
`
`be made by motion, and all motions must be authorized by the Board. See 37 C.F.R.
`
`§42.20(a) and (b). The rule states that the authorization “may be provided in an order
`
`of general applicability or during the proceeding.” See id. at §42.20(b).
`
`The PTAB’s Trial Practice Guide states that certain motions for which it may
`
`be impractical to obtain prior Board authorization may be filed without the Board’s
`
`prior authorization. See Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 157 at 48762 (“Generally,
`
`a motion will not be entered without prior Board authorization. … Exceptions
`
`include motions where it is impractical for a party to seek prior Board
`
`authorization…”) But the Trial Practice Guide does not suspend the authorization
`
`requirement of §42.20(b) altogether. Instead, the Trial Practice Guide recognizes a
`
`limited exception to obtaining prior Board authorization in cases where it is
`
`impractical to do so. This is not one of those cases.
`
`The Trial Practice Guide does not mention a motion for joinder as an example
`
`of motions that do not require prior authorization. And nothing about the
`
`circumstances surrounding the Petitioners’ filing of the Petition and the Motion for
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`Joinder made it impractical to seek authorization. But even assuming that a motion
`
`for joinder filed with a petition falls within this exception, Petitioners were still
`
`required to seek the Board’s authorization after the motion was filed. See 37 C.F.R.
`
`§42.20(b) (“A motion will not be entered without Board authorization.”). Petitioners
`
`have never done so. And so the Motion for Joinder should not have been entered.
`
`Petitioners could have requested such authorization at any time since they filed the
`
`Petition, but they did not. Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder should therefore be denied
`
`because it lacks the required authorization.
`
` HTC and ZTE Do Not Meet the Statutory Requirement For
`Joinder to the Apple IPR.
`
`Following institution of an IPR trial, §315(c) permits joinder only for “any
`
`person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . .
`
`determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.” 35
`
`U.S.C. §315(b). Petitioners do not meet this statutory requirement because they did
`
`not timely file the present petition. The Petition is improperly filed and does not
`
`warrant institution.
`
`Congress set forth the one-year statutory time-bar for IPR petitions as follows
`
`in §315(b):
`
`An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting
`
`the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the
`
`petition, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set
`
`forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder
`
`under subsection (c).
`
`HTC entered an appearance and waived formal service of the amended
`
`complaint on August 17, 2015. See Ex. 2002. ZTE (USA) Inc. was served with the
`
`amended complaint on July 28, 2015 and also entered an appearance in the litigation
`
`on August 11, 2015. See Ex. 2003. Petitioners filed this Petition on March 13,
`
`2017—more than eighteen months after both HTC and ZTE were served with CCE’s
`
`complaints for infringement of the ’676 patent. See Petition, Paper 1.
`
`Petitioners do not contest that their IPR petition was filed after the one-year
`
`statutory deadline. Instead, HTC and ZTE contend that the §315(b) time-bar does
`
`not apply because Petitioners also filed a Motion for Joinder request to be joined as
`
`parties to the Apple IPR, which has been instituted for trial. See Motion, Paper 3 at
`
`5 (“The one-year time bar does not apply to a request for joinder.”).
`
`But Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder does not exempt their Petition from the
`
`time-bar of §315(b). This is apparent from the plain language of the statute. The
`
`second sentence of §315(b) does not state that the filing of a request for joinder
`
`makes the time-bar itself (from the first sentence) inapplicable to a particular
`
`petition. Instead, by its plain language, the statute merely states that the one-year
`
`limitations period “shall not apply to a request for joinder . . . .” 35 U.S.C. §315(b)
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`(emphasis added). In other words, a petitioner who has timely filed an IPR petition
`
`may request joinder to another proceeding after the one-year deadline for filing a
`
`petition, and such a request for joinder would not be precluded by the §315(b) one-
`
`year deadline. The plain language of the statute simply does not state that a request
`
`for joinder suspends the time-bar for the filing of a petition.
`
`Patent Owner’s reading of §315(b) is reinforced by the language of §315(c),
`
`in at least two ways. First, §315(c) grants the Director the authority and discretion
`
`to join parties to an instituted IPR case, but only for “any person who properly files
`
`a petition under section 311.” See 35 U.S.C. 315(c) (emphasis added). Section 311(a)
`
`states that IPR petitions are “[s]ubject to the provisions of this chapter . . .”, and thus
`
`incorporates by reference all of the statutory requirements for a proper IPR petition,
`
`including the timeliness requirement of §315(b). In other words, a party who did not
`
`timely file its own IPR petition did not “properly file” its petition, and therefore is
`
`not eligible for joinder at all under §315(c).
`
`Second, §315(c) states that the Director may join a party to an instituted case
`
`only after the Director has first determined that the petition filed by the party seeking
`
`joinder should itself be instituted for a full IPR trial. See 35 U.S.C. §315(c)
`
`(precluding the Director from deciding the joinder issue until after a preliminary
`
`response has been filed to the petition filed by the party seeking joinder, and
`
`permitting joinder only if the Director first “determines [that the petition] warrants
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`the institution of an inter partes review under section 314”). Prior to joinder, the
`
`Director would have no authority or discretion to institute a petition that was filed
`
`more than one year after the petitioner had been served with a complaint alleging
`
`infringement of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. §315(b). The second sentence of §315(b)
`
`makes the time-bar inapplicable to the request for joinder; but the statutory language
`
`does nothing to alter or affect the institution decision which, according to §315(c),
`
`must be made as a prerequisite before joinder can even be considered. In making the
`
`institution decision, §315(b) very plainly states that a time-barred petition “may not
`
`be instituted . . . .” 35 U.S.C. §315(b).1
`
`
`1 Patent Owner is aware that the Board’s regulations governing IPR practice may be
`
`read as contrary to Patent Owner’s interpretation of the §315(b) time-bar. See 37
`
`C.F.R. §42.122(b) (“The time period set forth in §42.101(b) shall not apply when
`
`the petition is accompanied by a request for joinder”). Patent Owner respectfully
`
`contends that the §42.122(b) is not a valid regulation because it is contrary to the
`
`statutory mandate of §315(b), for the reasons previously discussed. Accordingly,
`
`Patent Owner respectfully contends that §42.122(b) is not a valid exercise of the
`
`USPTO’s statutory rulemaking authority. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.Ct.
`
`1863, 1869 (2013) (“[F]or agencies charged with administering congressional
`
`statutes . . . [b]oth their power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively
`
`prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when they
`
`act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires”). Patent Owner is unaware
`
`of any judicial decision that has endorsed or affirmed the time-bar waiver in
`
`§42.122(b) as a valid exercise of the USPTO’s administrative rulemaking authority,
`
`10
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`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`The USPTO and the Board are required to comply with all applicable statutory
`
`mandates, and no discretion is afforded to the USPTO’s interpretation of statutes
`
`that are plain and unambiguous. See City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal
`
`Communications Commission et al., 133 S. Ct. at 1870-71 (2013) (“[T]he question
`
`in every case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion
`
`of authority, or not”). Patent Owner respectfully urges the Board to apply the plain
`
`language of §315(b) in this case, as it is required to do.
`
` HTC and ZTE Should Not Be Permitted to Circumvent the Statute
`that Time-Bars The Petition.
`
`This Petition is HTC’s second attempt at an IPR petition against the ’676
`
`patent using the same primary reference (Fong) as the denied grounds from its earlier
`
`Petition. See Institution Decision, Paper 7, IPR2016-01501. And ZTE, instead, took
`
`a “wait and see” approach to the IPR process, and sat on its own right to file an IPR
`
`petition for more than eighteen months after being served with a complaint for patent
`
`infringement of the ’676 patent. Because Petitioners did not “properly file a
`
`petition,” joinder to the Apple IPR case should be denied. 35 U.S.C. §315(b).
`
`
`or that has found the final sentence of §42.122(b) to be consistent with the language
`
`of §315(b). Nor is Patent Owner aware of any judicial decision that has expressly
`
`affirmed the Board’s waiver of the §315(b) time bar when an otherwise time-barred
`
`petitioner files a motion for joinder with the petition.
`
`11
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`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`
`
`If the Board Exercises Its Discretion to Grant the Motion for
`Joinder, This Case Should Be Terminated and Other Procedural
`Protections Should Be Imposed.
`
`If the Board, in its discretion, grants Petitioners’ Motion for Joinder and adds
`
`HTC and ZTE as parties to the Apple IPR, this case must be terminated. The Board
`
`may not institute this case for a trial because the petition was not timely filed. See
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(b). Moreover, the Director has discretion to terminate this case after
`
`HTC and ZTE are joined to the Apple IPR. See 35 U.S.C. §315(d). Institution for
`
`trial in this IPR and also in the Apple IPR would be inefficient for the parties and
`
`wasteful of the Board’s resources, and thus would not “secure the just, speedy, and
`
`inexpensive resolution” of the proceeding as required by 37 C.F.R. §42.1(b).
`
`If HTC and ZTE are added as parties to the Apple IPR, CCE requests that the
`
`Board impose procedural safeguards to ensure Patent Owner is not prejudiced by the
`
`joinder, to minimize disruptions in the schedule for the Apple IPR, and otherwise to
`
`promote efficiency for the parties and the Board. CCE requests at least the following:
`
` HTC and ZTE should be required to formally adopt all previous filings,
`
`arguments, evidence, positions, representations, and statements made
`
`by Apple Inc. in the Apple IPR.
`
` HTC and ZTE should be required to adopt the previous deposition
`
`testimony of Dr. Haas, and should be required to produce Dr. Haas for
`
`additional cross-examination on issues that are unique to HTC and
`
`12
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`

`

`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
`
`ZTE.
`
` HTC and ZTE should be required to submit to the control of Apple Inc.
`
`with respect to all future filings in the Apple IPR, and Apple Inc. should
`
`continue to control all decisions related to the management and strategy
`
`for the case for so long as Apple is a party to the proceeding.
`
` HTC and ZTE should not be permitted to make any independent filings
`
`on any issue without prior authorization from the Board.
`
` HTC and ZTE should not be permitted to make their own arguments,
`
`jointly or individually, at the oral argument if Apple is a party at the
`
`time without prior authorization from the Board.
`
`See, e.g. Hyundai Motor Co. v. American Vehicular Sciences LLC, Case
`
`IPR2014-01543, Paper 11 at 4-6; Sony Corp. of America v. Network-1 Security
`
`Solutions, Inc., Case IPR2013-00495, Paper 13 at 10-11.
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the Board should deny Petitioners’ Motion for
`
`13
`
`Joinder.
`
`
`
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`Case IPR2017-01081
`Patent 8,457,676
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`Dated: April 13, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`________________________
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`Terry A. Saad (Reg. No. 62,492)
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`Bragalone Conroy PC
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`2200 Ross Ave.
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`Suite 4500 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that this document has been served via
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`electronic mail on April 13, 2017, to Petitioner at following email addresses pursuant
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`to its consent in its Petition at pp. 3-4: steve.moore@pillsburylaw.com,
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`brian.nash@pillsburylaw.com, and rene.mai@pillsburylaw.com, with a courtesy
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`copy to docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com.
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`________________________
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`Terry A. Saad (Reg. No. 62,492)
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`Attorney for Patent Owner
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`Bragalone Conroy PC
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`2200 Ross Ave.
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`Suite 4500 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`14
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