United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`IN RE PAPST LICENSING DIGITAL CAMERA
`PATENT LITIGATION
`______________________________________________________
`
`PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG,
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`v.
`
`FUJIFILM CORPORATION, FUJIFILM NORTH
`AMERICA CORPORATION (formerly known as
`Fujifilm USA, Inc.), HEWLETT-PACKARD
`COMPANY, JVC COMPANY OF AMERICA, NIKON
`CORPORATION, NIKON, INC., OLYMPUS CORP.,
`OLYMPUS IMAGING AMERICA INC., PANASONIC
`CORPORATION (formerly known as Matsushita
`Electric Industrial Co., LTD.), PANASONIC
`CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA , SAMSUNG
`OPTO-ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., SAMSUNG
`TECHWIN CO., AND VICTOR COMPANY OF JAPAN,
`LTD.,
`Defendants-Appellees.
`______________________
`
`2014-1110
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`District of Columbia in No. 1:07-mc-00493-RMC, Judge
`Rosemary M. Collyer.
`______________________
`
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 1
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 1
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`Decided: February 2, 2015
`______________________
`
`JOHN T. BATTAGLIA, Fisch Hoffman Sigler LLP, of
`Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him
`on the brief were ALAN M. FISCH and ROY WILLIAM
`SIGLER.
`
`RACHEL M. CAPOCCIA, Alston & Bird LLP, of Los An-
`geles, California, argued for defendants-appellees. With
`her on the brief for Panasonic Corporation, et al., was
`THOMAS W. DAVISON. On the brief for Fujifilm Corpora-
`tion, et al., were STEVEN J. ROUTH, STEN A. JENSEN, JOHN
`R. INGE and T. VANN PEARCE, JR, Orrick, Herrington &
`Sutcliffe LLP, of Washington, DC. On the brief for Nikon
`Corporation, et al., were DAVID L. WITCOFF and MARC S.
`BLACKMAN, Jones Day, of Chicago, Illinois. Of counsel was
`MARRON ANN MAHONEY. On the brief for Olympus Corpo-
`ration, et al., were RICHARD DE BODO and ANDREW V.
`DEVKAR, Bingham McCutchen LLP, of Santa Monica,
`California. Of counsel was SUSAN BAKER MANNING, Mor-
`gan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, of Washington, DC. On the
`brief for Samsung Techwin, Co., et al., was PATRICK J.
`KELLEHER, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, of Chicago,
`Illinois.
`
`
`CHARLENE M. MORROW, Fenwick & West LLP, of
`Mountain View, California, argued for defendant-appellee
`Hewlett-Packard Company. With her on the brief were
`DAVID D. SCHUMANN and BRYAN A. KOHM, of San Francis-
`co, CA.
`
`______________________
`
`Before TARANTO, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
`TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG owns U.S. Patent
`Nos. 6,470,399 and 6,895,449. The written descriptions
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 2
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 2
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`are largely the same, the ’449 patent having issued on a
`divisional application carved out of the application that
`became the ’399 patent. The focus of both patents is an
`interface device for transferring data between an in-
`put/output data device and a host computer. The current
`appeal involves whether certain digital-camera manufac-
`turers infringe Papst’s patents. The district court, apply-
`ing and elaborating on its constructions of various claim
`terms, entered summary judgment of non-infringement,
`concluding that none of the manufacturers’ accused
`products at issue here come within any of the asserted
`claims. Papst appeals five claim constructions. We agree
`with Papst that the district court erred in the identified
`respects. We therefore vacate the summary judgment of
`non-infringement.
`
`BACKGROUND
`The ’399 and ’449 patents, both entitled “Flexible In-
`terface for Communication Between a Host and an Analog
`I/O Device Connected to the Interface Regardless the
`Type of the I/O Device,” disclose a device designed to
`facilitate the transfer of data between a host computer
`and another device on which data can be placed or from
`which data can be acquired. ’399 patent, Title and Ab-
`stract.1 The written description states that, while inter-
`face devices were known at the time of the invention, the
`existing devices had limitations, including that they
`tended to require disadvantageous sacrifices of data-
`transfer speed or of flexibility as to what host computers
`and data devices they would work with. ’399 patent, col.
`1, line 15, to col. 2, line 13. Thus, “standard interfaces”—
`those “which, with specific driver software, can be used
`
`1 Because the ’399 and ’449 patents have very simi-
`lar written descriptions, we cite the ’399 patent, and refer
`to a “written description” in the singular, except when
`there are important differences between the two.
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 3
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 3
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`with a variety of host systems”—“generally require very
`sophisticated drivers” to be downloaded onto the host
`computer, but such drivers “are prone to malfunction
`and . . . limit data transfer rates.” Id. at col. 1, lines 22–
`28. On the other hand, with interface devices that “specif-
`ically match the interface very closely to individual host
`systems or computer systems,” “high data transfer rates
`are possible,” but such interface devices “generally cannot
`be used with other host systems or their use is very
`ineffective.” Id. at col. 1, line 67, to col. 2, line 7. The fast,
`host-tailored interface also “must be installed inside the
`computer casing to achieve maximum data transfer
`rates,” which is a problem for laptops and other space-
`constrained host systems. Id. at col. 2, lines 8–13.
`The patents describe an interface device intended to
`overcome those limitations. It is common ground between
`the parties that, when a host computer detects that a new
`device has been connected to it, a normal course of action
`is this: the host asks the new device what type of device it
`is; the connected device responds; the host determines
`whether it already possesses drivers for (instructions for
`communicating with) the identified type of device; and if
`it does not, the host must obtain device-specific drivers
`(from somewhere) before it can engage in the full intended
`communication with the new device. In the patents at
`issue, when the interface device of the invention is con-
`nected to a host, it responds to the host’s request for
`identification by stating that it is a type of device, such as
`a hard drive, for which the host system already has a
`working driver. By answering in that manner, the inter-
`face device induces the host to treat it—and, indirectly,
`data devices on the other side of the interface device, no
`matter what type of devices they are—like the device that
`is already familiar to the host. Thereafter, when the host
`communicates with the interface device to request data
`from or control the operation of the data device, the host
`uses its native device driver, and the interface device
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 4
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 4
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`translates the communications into a form understanda-
`ble by the connected data device. See id. at col. 3, line 25,
`to col. 5, line 32.
`The interface device of the invention thus does not re-
`quire that a “specially designed driver” for the interface
`device be loaded into a host computer—neither a “stand-
`ard” one to be used for a variety of hosts nor one custom-
`ized for a particular host. Id. at col. 5, line 15. Instead, it
`uses a host’s own familiar driver, which (as for a hard
`drive) often will have been designed (by the computer
`system’s manufacturer) to work fast and reliably. The
`result, says the written description, is to allow data
`transfer at high speed without needing a new set of
`instructions for every host—“to provide an interface
`device for communication between a host device and a
`data transmit/receive device whose use is host device-
`independent and which delivers a high data transfer
`rate.” Id. col. 3, lines 25–28.
`Claim 1 of the ’399 patent sets forth the specifics of
`the claimed interface device:
`1. An interface device for communication be-
`tween a host device, which comprises drivers for
`input/output devices customary in a host device
`and a multi-purpose
`interface, and a data
`transmit/receive device,
`the data
`trans-
`mit/receive device being arranged for providing
`analog data, comprising:
`a processor;
`a memory;
`a first connecting device for interfacing the host
`device with the interface device via the multi-
`purpose interface of the host device; and
`a second connecting device for interfacing the
`interface device with the data transmit/receive
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 5
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 5
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`device, the second connecting device including a
`sampling circuit for sampling the analog data
`provided by the data transmit/receive device and
`an analog-to-digital converter for converting data
`sampled by the sampling circuit into digital data,
`wherein the interface device is configured by the
`processor and the memory to include a first com-
`mand interpreter and a second command inter-
`preter,
`wherein the first command interpreter is config-
`ured in such a way that the command interpreter,
`when receiving an inquiry from the host device as
`to a type of a device attached to the multi-purpose
`interface of the host device, sends a signal, re-
`gardless of the type of the data trans-
`mit/receive device attached to the second
`connecting device of the interface device, to the
`host device which signals to the host device that it
`is an input/output device customary in a host
`device, whereupon the host device communicates
`with the interface device by means of the driver
`for the input/output device customary in a host
`device, and
`wherein the second command interpreter is con-
`figured to interpret a data request command from
`the host device to the type of input/output device
`signaled by the first command interpreter as a da-
`ta transfer command for initiating a transfer of
`the digital data to the host device.
`Id. col. 12, line 42, to col. 13, line 13 (emphases added to
`highlight language of particular significance to the issues
`on appeal). Claim 1 of the ’449 patent is similar, but it
`does not require the data device to be an analog device,
`and it requires the interface device to respond to the host
`that it is a storage device. ’449 patent, col. 11, line 46, to
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 6
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 6
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`col. 12, line 6. A few other differences between the claims
`are discussed infra.
`Beginning in 2006, Papst sent letters to major digital-
`camera manufacturers, accusing them of infringing its
`patents and requesting that they enter into negotiations
`to license its inventions. One of the manufacturers sued
`Papst in the United States District Court for the District
`of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment of non-
`infringement. In 2008, Papst filed infringement suits
`against the camera manufacturers in multiple district
`courts across the country. A multi-district litigation panel
`then consolidated all cases and transferred them to the
`D.C. district court.
`In preparation for claim construction, the district
`court received a “tutorial” from the parties’ experts, whom
`the court asked to be “neutral” and who addressed the
`background of the technology, how the claimed inventions
`work, and other technical understandings, but not wheth-
`er any particular term in the patent or the prior art has a
`particular meaning in the relevant field. J.A. 1596–97;
`see In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litig., No. 07-
`mc-00493 (D.D.C. June 6, 2008) (order specifying scope of
`tutorial). The court then heard extensive argument from
`counsel, but it declined to admit expert testimony or to
`rely on an expert declaration from Papst, stating that “the
`intrinsic evidence—the claims, the specification, and the
`prosecution history—provide the full record necessary for
`claims construction.” J.A. 1597.
`The court issued its initial claim-construction order in
`2009. It issued a modified claim-construction order after
`additional briefing. The district court then ruled on eight
`summary-judgment motions filed by the camera manufac-
`turers, treating the manufacturers as two distinct
`groups—one group consisting of Hewlett-Packard Co.
`(“HP”), the other of all other accused manufacturers
`(“Camera Manufacturers”). As detailed in our discussion
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 7
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 7
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`infra, the court’s rulings on summary judgment clarified
`what it understood some of its claim constructions to
`mean. With respect to the accused products now at issue,
`the combined effect of the court’s summary-judgment
`rulings was a determination of non-infringement by the
`Camera Manufacturers and HP. The court ultimately
`entered a final judgment of non-infringement under
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for both HP and the
`Camera Manufacturers, In re Papst Licensing GmbH &
`Co. KG Litig., 987 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2013),
`having severed certain other claims, In re Papst Licensing
`GmbH & Co. KG Litig., 967 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 n.2, 71
`(D.D.C. 2013).
`Papst appeals, arguing that the court’s summary-
`judgment orders should be reversed because they rely on
`incorrect constructions of five different terms from
`the ’399 and ’449 patents. We have jurisdiction under 28
`U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
`
`DISCUSSION
`We review the grant of summary judgment of non-
`infringement de novo, applying the same standard used
`by the district court. See Bender v. Dudas, 490 F.3d 1361,
`1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The infringement inquiry, which
`asks if an accused device contains every claim limitation
`or its equivalent, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
`Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997), depends on the proper
`construction of the claims. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
`Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In
`this case, we review the district court’s claim construc-
`tions de novo, because intrinsic evidence fully determines
`the proper constructions. See Teva Pharm. U.S.A. Inc. v.
`Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840–42 (2015). As we have
`noted, the district court relied only on the intrinsic record,
`not on any testimony about skilled artisans’ understand-
`ings of claim terms in the relevant field, and neither party
`challenges that approach.
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 8
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 8
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`Two clarifications simplify our analysis so that it is
`enough for us to address the correctness of the district
`court’s constructions. First, the parties have not present-
`ed developed arguments other than arguments about the
`choice, on each issue, between the district court’s con-
`struction and the alternative construction by Papst that
`the district court rejected. Specifically, for none of the
`issues have the parties identified a third possibility and
`both elaborated an argument for such a possibility and
`explained the importance to the case of considering it.
`Second, it is undisputed that if we reject all five of the
`challenged constructions, the summary-judgment orders
`must be vacated.2
`We reject the five constructions at issue. We do so fol-
`lowing our familiar approach to claim construction. “We
`generally give words of a claim their ordinary meaning in
`the context of the claim and the whole patent document;
`the specification particularly, but also the prosecution
`history, informs the determination of claim meaning in
`context, including by resolving ambiguities; and even if
`the meaning is plain on the face of the claim language,
`the patentee can, by acting with sufficient clarity, dis-
`claim such a plain meaning or prescribe a special defini-
`tion.” World Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., 769 F.3d
`1120, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorn-
`er v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
`1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We apply, in particular, the princi-
`ple that “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim
`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
`description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct
`construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per
`
`If some aspects of the summary-judgment orders
`2
`are unaffected by our claim-construction rulings, they
`may, to that extent, be reinstated on remand.
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 9
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 9
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998), adopted by
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
`On remand, this case will proceed in light of our
`claim-construction reversals. For that reason, it is worth
`reiterating that a district court may (and sometimes
`must) revisit, alter, or supplement its claim constructions
`(subject to controlling appellate mandates) to the extent
`necessary to ensure that final constructions serve their
`purpose of genuinely clarifying the scope of claims for the
`finder of fact. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innova-
`tion Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
`Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364,
`1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That determination is to be made
`as the case moves forward.
`
`A
`Papst first challenges the district court’s “memory
`card” summary judgment as relying on an improper
`construction of the term “interface device” found in the
`preamble of claims in both patents. The district court
`construed the term as limiting the claims’ coverage to
`“stand-alone device[s].” In re Papst Licensing GmbH &
`Co. KG Litig., 670 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31–35 (D.D.C. 2009)
`(“Claim Constr. Op.”). In particular, the court held that
`“the data transmit/receive device must be a separate
`device from the” claimed “interface device.” Id. at 33.
`Subsequently, in granting summary judgment, the court
`explained that what it meant by this requirement is that
`the interface device may not be “a permanent part of
`either the data transmit/receive device or the host de-
`vice/computer,” by which it meant that it may not be
`located permanently inside the housing of either of those
`two devices. In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litig.,
`932 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2013).
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 10
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 10
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`1
`As a threshold matter, the Camera Manufacturers ar-
`gue that we should not reach this issue because the
`district court’s summary-judgment rulings do not depend
`on the construction of “interface device.” They invoke
`principles stated in SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Technology
`Co., 695 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]here, as
`here, a party’s claim construction arguments do not affect
`the final judgment entered by the court, they are not
`reviewable.”), and Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 525
`F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“we review judgments,
`not opinions”). We conclude, however, that the premise
`for invoking the cited principles is missing here.
`The district court’s summary-judgment order regard-
`ing memory-card devices shows that its final judgment
`did turn on the construction of “interface device.” The
`primary reason the court gave for rejecting Papst’s in-
`fringement contentions was that “[t]he Court made clear
`in its claims construction opinion that the interface device
`is separate and distinct from the data transmit/receive
`device.” Papst, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 21. The court cited
`repeatedly to the portion of its claim-construction opinion
`addressing “interface device.” E.g., id. at 18 (citing Claim
`Constr. Op. at 32–35); id. at 21 (citing Claim Constr. Op.
`at 34–35); id. at 23 (citing Claim Constr. Op. at 31–35).
`And in its opening paragraphs, the court summarized the
`Camera Manufacturers’ position on summary judgment
`as relying on that same construction. Id. at 16 (“Because
`the invented ‘interface device’ is a stand-alone device that
`is separate and apart from any data transmit/receive
`device, the Camera Manufacturers contend that a
`memory card cannot be both part of the interface device
`and a data transmit/receive device . . . .”). In these cir-
`cumstances, we will consider whether the district court’s
`construction is correct.
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 11
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 11
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`2
`We hold that the term “interface device” is not limited
`to a “stand-alone device” in the district court’s sense
`relied on for summary judgment: a device that is physical-
`ly separate and apart from, and not permanently attached
`to, a data device (or a host computer). Representative
`claim 1 of the ’449 patent begins, “[a]n interface device . . .
`comprising the following features,” and then recites the
`necessary components of the claimed interface device. See
`supra pp. 5–6. Neither the claim language nor the rest of
`the intrinsic record supports the district court’s exclusion
`of a device that performs the required interface functions
`and is installed permanently inside the housing of a
`particular data device.
` The district court did not suggest that the term “in-
`terface device” by itself implied its construction. Rather,
`it heavily relied for its construction on the specific claim
`requirement that (to paraphrase) a part of the interface,
`upon receiving an identification query from the host
`computer, send a signal identifying itself as a host-
`familiar device “regardless of the type of the data trans-
`mit/receive device attached to the second connecting
`device of the interface device.” ’449 Patent, col. 11, lines
`63–65. The court concluded that the “regardless” phras-
`ing in the claim “strongly indicates that various kinds of
`data transmit/receive devices could be attached” to the
`interface device. Claim Constr. Op. at 32–33.
`But the court’s construction does not follow from its
`understanding of the “regardless” phrase. Nothing about
`that phrase forbids any single instance of the claimed
`interface device to be permanently attached to a particu-
`lar data device. It readily allows permanent attachment
`of each copy of the interface device to a particular data
`device, prescribing only that the same host-responsive
`identification signal be sent regardless of what type of
`data device the interface device is attached to. That is,
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 12
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 12
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`there can be multiple copies of the same interface device,
`with each permanently attached to one of a variety of
`different data devices. The claim language, in short, does
`not limit “interface device” to a device not permanently
`attached to (readily detachable from) a data device.
`The written description does not do so either. Criti-
`cally, the district court’s construction, like the Camera
`Manufacturers’ arguments supporting it, fundamentally
`mistakes what the description makes clear is the stated
`advance over the prior art. As explained supra, the
`described advance over the prior art was the elimination
`of the need for special drivers to be placed on the host
`computer by instead having the host computer use a
`single, already-present, fast, reliable driver to communi-
`cate with the interface and, through it, with the data
`device, which need not be of a particular type. Nothing
`about that advance suggests exclusion of a permanent
`attachment of such an interface to the data device—a
`construction that is “unmoored from, rather than aligned
`with” what is described as the invention’s advance. World
`Class Tech., 769 F.3d at 1124.
`No passage in the written description says otherwise.
`The Camera Manufacturers cite passages that describe
`the invention as “sufficiently flexible to permit attach-
`ment of very different electrical or electronic systems to a
`host device.” ’399 patent, col. 1, lines 56–59; id., col. 7,
`lines 45–49 (touting the “present invention” as allowing
`“an interface between a host device and almost any data
`transmit/receive device”). But that language does not
`speak to the connection between the interface and data
`devices. Rather, it addresses the connection between the
`host computer and data devices, a connection facilitated
`by the interface device. Even as to that, the passage may
`be read merely to assert the capability of one-to-one host-
`to-data-device connections, with the data device chosen
`from a wide variety of possible data devices. But even if it
`is read to assert a capability of one-to-many host-to-data-
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 13
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 13
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`device connections, it says nothing to assert that a given
`copy of the interface device must be attachable to differ-
`ent data devices either simultaneously or seriatim.
`The Camera Manufacturers also point to the written
`description’s statement that “[i]n the interface device
`according to the present invention an enormous ad-
`vantage is to be gained . . . in separating the actual hard-
`ware required to attach the interface device to the data
`transmit/receive
`device
`from
`the
`communication
`unit,” ’399 patent, col. 8, lines 23–28 (figure numbers
`removed)—which they say means that permitting multi-
`ple data devices to attach to a single interface device is an
`integral part of the invention. But that passage does not
`support the district court’s limiting construction, and not
`only because it is part of the description of several pre-
`ferred embodiments, rather than a clear declaration of
`what constitutes an essential part of the invention.
`The full passage makes clear that the “hardware sep-
`aration” is not between the interface and data device, but
`within the interface device itself—between the second
`connecting device, on one hand, and “the digital signal
`processor, the memory means[,] and the first connecting
`device,” on the other. Id., col. 8, lines 28–29 (figure num-
`bers removed). When the passage states that this separa-
`tion “allows a plurality of dissimilar device types to be
`operated in parallel in identical manner,” it immediately
`adds: “Accordingly, many interface devices can be connect-
`ed to a host device which then sees many different ‘virtu-
`al’ hard disks.” Id. col. 8, lines 30–33 (emphasis added).
`The suggestion is that distinct interface devices are used
`for distinct data devices, each interface device incorporat-
`ing a “second connecting device” that works for its partic-
`ular data device. This suggestion works against, rather
`than supports, the Camera Manufacturers’ view of multi-
`ple data devices attached to a single (separate) interface
`device, whether at once or in sequence, for it readily
`accommodates a one-to-one permanent attachment of an
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 14
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 14
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`interface device to a data device. And the parallel opera-
`tion of dissimilar device types is possible because the
`invention causes the host computer to use its native
`software to transfer data at high speed and because the
`invention creates a uniform interface from the host’s
`perspective for controlling the data device. See, e.g., ’399
`patent, col. 7, lines 45–49.
`Finally, nothing in the prosecution history supports
`the district court’s narrow construction. The Camera
`Manufacturers point to an amendment that changed the
`claim language from “the type of a device attached” to “a
`type of device attached” in what became claim 1 of the
`’399 patent. J.A. 391. But there was no accompanying
`explanation of the change, which, on its face, does nothing
`more than the “regardless” language of claim 1 does, and
`that language, as we have explained, does not forbid
`permanent attachment. The Camera Manufacturers also
`note that the applicant stated that “it is clear that the
`data transmit/receive device to be connected to the second
`connecting device of the subject interface provides analog
`data.” J.A. 389 (emphasis added). Nothing in that state-
`ment precludes the connection from being permanent once
`made.
`
`B
`Papst also appeals the district court’s construction of
`the phrase “second connecting device,” which appears in
`both patents.3 The district court construed the term as “a
`physical plug or socket for permitting a user readily to
`
`3 The ’399 and ’449 patent claims use slightly dif-
`ferent language, but neither party suggests that the
`difference affects the proper construction of “second
`connecting device.” Nor does either party argue that the
`claim language is means-plus-function language under
`what is now codified as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 15
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 15
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`attach and detach the interface device with a plurality of
`dissimilar data transmit/receive devices.” Claim Constr.
`Op. at 43. The parties’ arguments over the proper con-
`struction of “second connecting device” largely mirror the
`arguments over whether the interface device must be
`readily detachable from the data device. See Camera
`Manufacturers’ Br. 68 (“As explained above, the claim
`language requires the interface device to be connectable
`to many different types of [data devices].”); HP’s Br. 3
`(“Core to the invention is the ability to attach the inter-
`face device to different or multiple data transmit/receive
`devices.”). The district court likewise tied its construction
`of “second connecting device” to its understanding that
`the interface device must be a stand-alone one readily
`attachable to and detachable from multiple data devices.
`See Claim Constr. Op. at 42, 44.
`We conclude that the district court’s construction of
`“second connecting device” is incorrect largely for reasons
`we have given for rejecting the “interface device” con-
`struction. The district court did not conclude, and the
`Camera Manufacturers and HP have not meaningfully
`argued, that the ordinary meaning of “second connecting
`device” (or “connecting device”) requires a physical plug,
`socket, or other structure that permits a user to readily
`attach and detach something else. The principal basis for
`the district court’s inclusion of those requirements was
`the basis we have already rejected—the view that other
`claim language and the written description require the
`interface device (of which the second connecting device is
`a part, according to the claims) to be stand-alone. For
`“second connecting device,” the district court added that a
`preferred embodiment from the written description in-
`cludes pin connectors and other socket-like structures.
`See Claim Constr. Op. at 42–44. But we see nothing to
`take that embodiment outside the reach of the usual rule
`that claims are generally not limited to features found in
`what the written description presents as mere embodi-
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1011, p. 16
`
`LG Exhibit 1011, Page 16
`LG Electronics, Inc. v. Papst Licensing
`
`

`

`ments, where the claim language is plainly broader.
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
`
`C
`The district court’s construction of the phrase “data
`transmit/receive device” is challenged here as well. The
`district court construed the phrase to mean “a device that
`is capable of either (a) transmitting data to or (b) trans-
`mitting data to and receiving data from the host device
`when connected to the host device by the interface device.”
`Claim Constr. Op. at 39 (emphasis added). The parties’
`dispute focuses on the “when connected” portion of the
`court’s construction, which the district court understood
`to require that the data device be capable of transmitting
`data while connected to the host, that is, able to begin
`transmitting after the interface device is connected to the
`host device. In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litig.,
`967 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2013). We reject that
`portion of the court’s construction.
`1
`The Camera Manufacturers initially argue that Papst
`may not challenge the district court’s construction be-
`cause “the district court adopted word-for-word the con-
`struction of [data transmit/receive device] that Papst
`proposed.” Camera M