Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`Simulation Training To Meet
`Advances in Shipboard Automation
`
`Brian D. Long, STAR Center Director
`
`We all know that the maritime industry does not
`adapt quickly to new technologies. Gradually, however,
`the shipboard environment has advanced to include
`such technologies as Automatic Radar Plotting Aids
`(ARPA), Electronic Chart Display Information System
`(ECDIS), Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS), Voyage
`Management Systems (VMS), joystick controllers,
`automated Engine and Cargo control rooms. These
`advancements have been developed in an attempt to
`increase safety, reduce the workload on the watch
`officer, and increase the quality of watchkeeping,
`however, it is important to note that if training is not
`provided for the operators of this equipment the
`opposite may result; decreased safety, increased
`workload, and decreased quality of watchkeeping.
`One important phase of this training can be
`provided at a maritime simulation facility. These
`facilities provide a controlled environment where
`students can gradually learn, through a structured
`curriculum, the capabilities, limitations and operation of
`specific automation equipment without the obvious risk
`to the crew, vessel, environment, and passengers, if
`applicable. The simulators also provide an excellent
`“test bed” for designers and users to determine how to
`best utilize a particular piece of equipment or to
`evaluate between different manufacturers of the same
`type of equipment.
`Recently, the Conference on Maritime Simulation
`(MARSIM) met in Copenhagen, Denmark, and
`discussions were held regarding the present status of
`simulation training and research. This international
`conference, which is held every three years, attracted
`over 200 participants from 25 countries. From this
`conference and subsequent visits to several European
`simulation facilities, it is evident to me that excellent
`simulation training and research capabilities exist
`world-wide and that the current state of simulation
`technology (hardware, software, courseware) can
`provide operators and designers of automated
`shipboard equipment with tremendous benefits. These
`facilities are constantly adapting their simulators and
`programs to incorporate new shipboard technologies
`and to meet new training regulations.
`
`TRAINING METHOD
`
`Obviously, when introducing a new piece of
`automated equipment into an existing training program,
`a training objective must first be clearly defined and
`then the training program built from that objective. You
`can not, for example, simply throw an ECDIS on the
`bridge simulator and continue the training courses as
`usual. By the way, this principle also applies to the
`ship itself; a shipping company should not expect to
`add new automation technology to the vessel without a
`clear objective of how and when this automation
`should be utilized.
`When addressing training for operation of
`automated systems, it should kept in mind that the
`training requirements for the operators actually
`increase when automation is introduced. This is due to
`the fact that the individual needs to be trained in the
`use of the automation and also needs to be proficient in
`manual and backup procedures.
`We all know the problems which can arise from
`relying solely on automation. A cruise ship grounding
`last year involved a failure of the position fixing input
`to an Integrated Bridge System, which went undetected
`for numerous hours. Although still under
`investigation, one can speculate that there may have
`been a sense of complacency on the bridge since the
`system had worked flawlessly in the past. This may
`have led to a relaxing of cross checking procedures
`with other navigation information.
`As we all know from the Prevention Through
`People (PTP) program the vast majority of maritime
`casualties are the result of human error. It is important
`to realize, however, that the human who is responsible
`for the error is not necessarily the human operating the
`equipment. In some cases the error can be traced back
`to the people who designed the equipment or the
`overall system which incorporates the equipment. The
`error can even be traced back to the company in some
`cases for not providing an adequate level of training or
`not providing guidelines for when and how to use the
`equipment.
`
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`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`AVIATION COMPARISON
`
`In the area of maritime training we are constantly
`looking to the aviation industry for comparisons since
`it has been quicker to adapt new technologies. In
`referencing Cockpit Resource Management, which is a
`compilation of papers on aviation training, some good
`lessons can be found. For example, in aviation it is
`interesting to note that initially when automation
`systems were added to training and check ride
`sessions, it resulted in an increase in the student
`failure rate. This was attributed to the fact that the
`students were not adequately trained on the
`automated systems before the sessions. This resulted
`in a revised training evolution which included:
`· Generic automation training
`· Simulator sessions without automation
`· Extensive training on specific automation
`· Simulator sessions with the use of automation at
`the pilots discretion
`
`Several airline companies have adopted an
`automation philosophy which spells out what the
`company’s stance is on the use of automation. A
`company may decide to leave it up the operator to
`
`determine in which situations the automation will be best
`suited and during which time it is better to use a more
`traditional method.
`JOYSTICK EXAMPLE
`
`As far as the training goes, we need to determine
`which training device should be used during which
`stage of the program. If we use the example above, it is
`best to train an individual on a piece of equipment in a
`stand alone mode prior to incorporating that system in a
`much larger system and complex training exercise on a
`full mission simulator.
`As mentioned earlier, maritime simulators can be
`used to train on specific automated shipboard systems.
`Since equipment varies significantly from one ship to the
`other, unlike aviation, this usually involves hardware
`and software integration to the existing simulator. One
`example of customized integration to meet customer
`requirements is the installation of a joystick controller
`for a cruise company’s training program at STAR Center.
`This controller combines the separate controls of the
`engines, rudders, and thrusters in a single control
`device.
`
`Continued
`
`STAR Center’s 360° Bridge Simulator equipped with Joystick Controller (inset)
`
`Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council — July-September 1996
`
`Page 63
`
`FLIR-1015.201
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`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`To try and imagine how the officers might feel when a new piece of automation is added onboard their vessel, an analogy that almost
`everyone can identify with follows: Suppose you rent a car and instead of a steering wheel, accelerator, and break pedal, the car is
`fitted with a joystick which incorporates all of those separate controls. You are told that this makes driving the car much easier and
`safer. I think you would agree that without training, this device would definitely decrease the safety of the operation. An what could be
`said about your confidence level in using this device; I think it is safe to say that it would not be very high. If given the choice, I am
`sure that you would opt to abort the joystick if possible and use the traditional and familiar controls.
`
`The cruise company saw the tremendous benefit
`to training their senior officers on this device in a
`controlled environment; the simulator. To meet this
`goal, an authentic joystick identical to that which is on
`board the vessel was integrated into the existing
`simulator. In conjunction with this, a maneuvering
`model based on the actual ship maneuvering data was
`prepared. This allowed a recreation of the entire
`shipboard environment for the officers participating in
`the training.
`Once the joystick was installed, the validation of
`the system was conducted. First the ship model was
`validated separately by one of the captains to insure
`
`that the modeled vessel behaved as the actual ship.
`Then the joystick was validated by someone with
`experience with the device as well as the technical
`representative for the equipment. Also visual and
`environmental models utilized in the training were
`validated in a similar manner.
`To incorporate this device into our training
`curriculum, first, lecture modules were presented on the
`theory and operation of the joystick. Then simple
`“experiments” were conducted where the students were
`placed offshore on the simulated vessel to get a feel for
`how the joystick behaved under various conditions.
`The exercises were developed so they would
`
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`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`incrementally build to eventually include complex
`maneuvers in authentic and generic ports under
`adverse environmental conditions. The training
`evolution would then culminate in an exercise involving
`a failure of the system and a review of abort and
`backup procedures. Throughout the course, extensive
`maneuvers utilizing traditional controls were also
`conducted.
`From our observations of the training it was
`obvious that the officers’ proficiency on the joystick
`increased dramatically as the week progressed and from
`their comments, the students’ confidence in using the
`system had increased significantly. I believe, as do the
`students who have attended these courses, that this is
`an ideal use of simulation technology. To realize the
`benefit of the joystick training example one needs only
`to consider the alternative; onboard experimentation in
`a real port with a ship full of passengers. I think
`everyone would agree that this is not the time to try a
`radically different maneuvering device.
`
`SUMMARY
`
`The joystick is just one example of the right way
`to introduce a new piece of shipboard automation but
`this philosophy can translate to other equipment such
`
`as ECDIS, IBS, portable Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS),
`etc. Any of this equipment can be integrated into a
`simulator so that it may be evaluated or used for
`training in a controlled environment. Other centers
`world wide have also integrated joysticks, ECDIS units,
`voyage management systems (VMS), as well as other
`specific equipment to conduct research or to meet
`specific customer requirements with similar results.
`Shipping companies must keep in mind that if the
`people are not trained properly on these automated
`systems, the majority of them will simply not use the
`equipment, or even worse, misuse it. This could lead to
`“automation assisted” casualties as was seen with the
`introduction of RADAR and ARPA. With adequate
`structured training programs, however, these
`automated systems can achieve the desired results of
`increased safety, reduced workload, and an improved
`quality of watchkeeping.
`Brian D. Long is the Director of RTM STAR
`Center, a Simulation Training and Research
`organization with locations in Dania, Florida and
`Toledo, Ohio. Mr. Long has worked in the simulation
`field in various capacities since 1984. Mr. Long is a
`graduate of SUNY Maritime College and holds an
`engineering degree and an unlimited mates license.
`—————————— ——————————
`
`Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council — July-September 1996
`
`Page 65
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`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`MARINER’S SEABAG
`
`PC-Based Radar Simulators in
`Coast Guard Approved Courses
`
`Innovative technology has provided a variety
`of useful tools for the mariner; thereby, making the
`task of safe navigation much less burdensome.
`Radio, Radar, and D-GPS are potentially tremendous
`assets in any pilothouse or ship’s bridge.
`Unfortunately, simple installation of such
`equipment does not make vessels any safer to
`operate. Numerous reviews of marine accident
`reports suggest that mere installation of equipment is
`just not enough. However, timely application of
`knowledge and skills in the proper use of these
`navigational aids is essential. This was certainly a
`key factor in the most deadly marine incident on U.S.
`waters in recent memory.
`Well past midnight, on September 22, 1993, a
`radar-equipped towboat pushing several barges was
`not where its operator believed it was. The
`MAUVILLA was lost in the blanketing fog of Big
`Bayou Canot and headed for the tragic consequences
`of a chain of events beginning with the allision of a
`railroad bridge. This incident became the driving
`force in changes to regulations designed to prevent a
`repeat of circumstances surrounding the fatal
`disaster.
`More than a decade ago, technology—in the
`form of marine-radar simulators—was identified as
`essential to improve marine safety through training,
`testing, and certifying mariners’ competency in radar
`observation and plotting. Back then the emphasis
`was on collision avoidance, and the training
`requirements were directed primarily at masters and
`mates on vessels of at least 200 gross tons. Radar
`Schools offered courses based on the MARAD
`model, as this was the standard adopted by the
`USCG. Computers running simulation programs
`provided inputs to actual radar units and displays.
`Since the implementation of revised regulations as
`noted above, the scope of Coast Guard approved
`radar training courses has broadened to also
`emphasize position determination. Advisory
`Committee members, public comments, and marine
`educators provided information useful in the
`
`development of NVIC 9-94, the current guidelines for
`USCG approved radar-observer training courses.
`To have radar courses approved today, or to
`have them remain approved, radar schools must
`show their curricula complies with the new
`standards. In addition to dealing with multiple
`targets (vessels) in collision avoidance, this means
`incorporating learning objectives on position
`determination, and using radar simulators with land-
`masses, coastline, or riverbanks that the students
`may observe and/or measure. Schools without the
`requisite simulator capability began searching for
`upgrades and alternatives. In an effort to keep their
`costs down, several schools have chosen desk-top,
`PC-based radar simulation to conduct the required
`practice and demonstrations of skills. While earlier
`attempts to offer radar training on desktop devices
`were unsatisfactory or marginal, this option is now
`viable due to the significant leaps in power and
`capability of hardware, as well as the development of
`software generating the visual elements needed to
`accomplish the training and testing. Factors leading
`to the Coast Guard’s acceptance of PC-based radar
`simulators include:
`1. A survey of currently available marine-radar
`units. Reflection plotters appear to have been
`largely phased-out. They are certainly obsolete for
`units with ARPA capabilities, or redundant where
`electronic marking features are used. Consequently,
`mandating exercises or demonstrations of
`proficiency in this type of “scope” plotting would
`be, at best, questionable;
`2. The ability of today’s PC hardware and
`software to effectively emulate key marine-radar
`functions and performance; and,
`3. The need to emphasize the focus on
`developing and demonstrating watchkeeping skills
`which will positively reduce the likelihood of
`mishaps, and thereby improve safety.
`In addition, the typical deck-license candidate
`seeking a radar-observer endorsement must have at
`
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`FLIR-1015.204
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`

`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`least two years of underway experience. In that time,
`he or she should have gained some familiarity with
`the radar units installed on their vessels. Further,
`many of today’s license applicants may in fact have
`experience with PCs on the job and/or in education
`and training environments. The Coast Guard expects
`mariners will find that PC-based radar-simulators
`used in approved courses will improve their ability to
`use the particular radar-units installed on their
`vessels in determining risk of collision, avoiding
`collisions and allisions, and monitoring own-ship’s
`position.
`Future training in ARPA, GMDSS, and the use
`of other navigational safety devices may be
`delivered using PC-based simulators. While
`
`validation of simulator-based training has largely
`relied on manufacturers, schools, and/or Coast Guard
`personnel, in order to conform with the 1995
`amendments to the STCW Convention, it is expected
`standard-setting organizations will be involved in
`establishing a more structured process for validating
`simulators used in future approved courses to come.
`A key element in all simulator-based courses
`must be the danger of over-reliance on radar, ARPA,
`and the other tools technology delivers; for the
`importance of non-technical and “low-tech”
`watchkeeping skills remain as important as ever, and
`must be understood and practiced.
`—————————— ——————————
`
`Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council — July-September 1996
`
`Page 67
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`FLIR-1015.205
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`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`NAUTICAL QUERIES
`
`DECK
`
`1. Fusible-link fire dampers are operated by
`___________________.
`A. a mechanical arm outside the vent duct
`B. electrical controls on the bridge
`C. the heat of a fire melting the link
`D. a break-glass and pull-cable system
`
`2. A sextant having an index error that is “off the arc”
`has a ____________.
`A. positive correction
`B. dip error
`C. negative correction
`D. semidiameter error
`
`3. What is the effect of heated intake air on a diesel
`engine?
`A. Increases efficiency
`B. Increases engine horsepower
`C. Increases engine life
`D. Reduces engine horsepower
`
`4. The great circle on the celestial sphere that passes
`through the zenith and the north and south poles is
`the __________________.
`A. hour circle
`B. prime vertical
`C. principal vertical
`D. ecliptic
`
`5. How should you signal the crane operator to stop?
`A. Place both fists in front of your body with the
`thumbs pointing outward.
`B. Extend both arms out with the palms down and
`move arms back and forth.
`C. Extend arm with the palm down and hold this
`position rigidly.
`D. Clasp hands in front of your body.
`
`B. Because of its inherent vice, coal should not be
`loaded wet.
`C. Dunnage should be placed against ship’s sides
`and around stanchions.
`D. Through ventilation, as well as surface ventilation,
`should be provided whenever possible.
`
`7. The dividing meridian between zone descriptions - 4
`and -5 is ______.
`A. 60°00' E
`B. 67°30' E
`C. 75°00' E
`D. 60°00' W
`
`8. When towing another vessel astern, the length of the
`towline should be ________.
`A. as long as possible
`B. such that one vessel will be on crest while the
`other is in a trough
`C. such that the vessel will be “in step”
`D. not over two wave lengths in seas up to 10 feet
`
`9. While providing assistance to a victim of an epileptic
`seizure, it is most important to ________.
`A. give artificial respiration
`B. prevent patient from hurting himself
`C. keep the patient awake and make him/her walk if
`necessary to keep him/his awake
`D. remove any soiled clothing and put the patient in
`a clean bed
`
`10.Considering manning requirements for US flag
`vessels, your 2 watch cargo vessel has a deck crew
`of 20 people, exclusive of officers. How many of
`these people do the manning regulations require to
`be able seamen?
`A. 13
`B. 10
`C. 7
`D. 5
`
`6. Which statement is correct concerning the carriage
`of coal in bulk?
`A. Coal should be vented with surface ventilation only.
`
`DECK ANSWERS
`1-C, 2-A, 3-D, 4-C, 5-C, 6-A, 7-B, 8-C, 9-B, 10-B If you
`have any questions concerning this quiz, please contact
`the National Maritime Center at (703) 235-1368.
`
`Page 68
`
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`
`FLIR-1015.206
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`

`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`ENGINEERING
`
`1. The auxiliary exhaust system is typically supplied by
`steam directly from ______________.
`A. the main engine
`B. turbine and reciproacting pumps
`C.Spring bearings
`D. all of the above
`
`7. Boiler efficiency and its ability to absorb heat is
`limited by the need to ________.
`A. maintain an excess of CO during transient firing
`rates
`B. prevent excess air density at low load conditions
`C. protect the safety valves from excessive tempera-
`ture
`D. maintain uptake gas temperature above the dew
`point
`
`2. When completing the ballasting operation of a
`contaminated tank, which of the following problems
`must be guarded against?
`A. Back flow of contaminated water
`B. Loss of pump suction
`C. Excessive tank pressure due to closed vents
`D. Motor overload due to high discharge head
`
`8. The cooling water flow from an air ejector
`intercondenser and aftercondenser is discharged
`directly into the ________________.
`A. main condenser hotwell
`B. auxiliary condenser hotwell
`C. condensate and feed system
`D. atmospheric drain tank
`
`3. If an oil fire occurs in the double casing of a steming
`boiler, you should________________.
`A. increase the forced draft fan speed
`B. secure the feedwater supply to the boiler
`C. secure the fuel oil supply to the burners
`D. apply water with a smooth bore nozzle
`
`4. Excessive exhaust temperatures in a two-stroke/cycle
`diesel engine can be caused by a/an _________.
`A. high injection pressure
`B. high firing pressure
`C. overheated air starting line
`D. carbon build up in the exhaust ports
`
`5. Which statement is true concerning a split-phase
`induction motor?
`A. Motor rotation can be reversed without changing
`the windings or leads.
`B. Motor speed can be readily adjusted from zero to
`full speed.
`C. The motor will run as a generator with the proper
`wiring.
`D. Motor rotation can be reversed by reversing the
`leads on the starting winding.
`
`6. Which of the listed fire extinguishers would be most
`effective to use on a fire in a small electric motor?
`A. Soda acid
`B. Foam
`C. C02
`D. Light water
`
`9. When hydrogen sulfide has been encountered on a
`MODU, or is anticipated, monitoring devices must
`sound an alarm (differing from the lower concentra-
`tion alarm) or otherwise warn employees when the
`concentration of the gas reaches or exceeds how
`many parts per million?
`A. 20
`B. 50
`C. 100
`D. 200
`
`10.Mechanical foam used for firefighting, is produced
`by ___________________.
`A mechanically mixing and agitating foam chemical,
`water, and air
`B. a chemical reaction of foam components and air
`C. gas bubbles liberated when the foam chemical
`contacts fire
`D. chemical reaction of foam components and water
`
`ENGINEERING ANSWERS
`
` 1-B, 2-A, 3-C, 4-D, 5-D, 6-C, 7-D, 8-C, 9-B, 10-A If
`you have any questions concerning this quiz, please
`contact the National Maritime Center at (703) 235-
`1368.
`
`Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council — July-September 1996
`
`Page 69
`
`FLIR-1015.207
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`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
` INVESTIGATOR’S CORNER.
`
`SAVING SECONDS
`
`by Tim Farley
`
`It’s a clear, calm sunny day, not a cloud in the sky.
`You’ve just cleaned the pool, the water’s clean and clear
`and it’s time to grab a cool one. Life is oh ... so good. As
`you meander back from the fridge you gasp as you catch a
`glimpse of what looks like your two year old face down
`and floating in the pool. Your heart drops to the deck, you
`become flush and fired up all at once, tunnel vision sets in
`focusing on the only thing that matters; getting to your
`baby. You drop your drink, heave your body into action
`blind to the fact you just stepped barefoot on your
`shattered glass, hurdle the lawn chairs and launch
`yourself into the water convinced that this is not really
`happening.
`The Chief mate aboard the foreign chemical tanker
`M/V CHEMBULK SINGAPORE might have felt similarly
`one beautiful September day in Texas City, Texas. The
`Mate was on deck overseeing the routine bulk loading
`operations of Polybutene cargo, a water white
`combustible/flammable liquid. This cargo was described
`as benign in appearance, producing no fumes or foul
`odors. Because of this cargo’s volatility and sensitivity to
`water contamination, the ship’s cargo tank receiving it had
`been thoroughly purged of oxygen with nitrogen, a
`colorless, odorless inert gas. The oxygen content of the
`cargo tank was tested prior to loading and found to be
`two percent.
`As the loading operations progressed the Chief
`Mate suddenly signaled the dock for an emergency
`shutdown of the transfer procedures and disappeared
`from sight. Once operations were secured a cargo
`inspector boarded the vessel to investigate the
`unexpected stoppage and found the cargo deck
`completely abandoned. Finally, after rustling out a
`member of the crew the inspector was informed that two
`crewmembers were missing, one of which was the Chief
`Mate. A search of the ship was initiated and the two
`missing crewmembers were found floating face down in
`the Polybutene cargo tank.
`The investigation into the events that led up to this
`tragedy revealed that, apparently, a crewman had been
`stationed near the open cargo tank top in order to monitor
`the progress of the 1oadinq operations. As the loading
`
`progressed the nitrogen atmosphere in the tank was
`displaced, somehow overcoming the crewman who
`subsequently fell into the tank through the open tank top.
`The Chief Mate, having either noticed the crewman
`missing or having actually seen him fall into the cargo
`tank, immediately ordered an emergency shutdown of the
`cargo operations and rushed to the scene. Whether the
`Chief Mate entered the tank directly or placed his head
`into the cargo tank trunk to got a better view of the
`crewman, we can only speculate. However, the Mate was
`also overcome by the nitrogen gas and fell into the cargo
`tank with tragic results.
`Many questions are called to mind when looking
`at this incident. Was the crewman attending the tank
`fully aware of the hazards involved with loading this
`cargo? Did he understand that the tank was devoid of
`oxygen, and the cargo tank had been thoroughly
`purged with nitrogen, a colorless, odorless gas? Did he
`understand that, as the tank was filled with product, the
`atmosphere in the tank would pour out of the tank top?
`Why was the crewman overcome? Why was he
`even near the cargo tank top. Did he put his head in the
`tank to get a good gauge of the cargo ullage? What was
`he actually instructed to do? What were his duties? Why
`wasn’t the automatic tank gauging system used?
`Sufficient precautions were taken to place a barrier
`between the cargo and any water vapor or ignition source
`that might be found. Tragically, no consideration was
`given to the personnel hazards.
`Code of Federal Regulation 46, at Section 35.30-10
`allows cargo tank ‘hatches (tank tops), ullage holes, or
`Butterworth plates to be open without flame screens fitted
`as long as the operation is under the supervision of the
`senior members of the crew or if the opened tank is gas
`free. Clearly, the open tank top in this case was permitted
`under the current rules. However, were personnel
`protected from falling into the tank as is the intent of 46
`CFR Section 32.02-15 - Guards at Dangerous Places? This
`section requires all exposed and dangerous places be
`properly protected with covers, guards, or rails in order
`that the danger of accidents may be minimized. If a person
`can fall into a cargo tank shouldn’t the area around the
`tank top have been secured?
`How often do we see cases where someone,
`rushing to the aid of another, also becomes a victim thus
`exacerbating the situation. Why does this happen? How
`could the Chief Mate not be fully aware of the hazards of
`entering this cargo tank? He would have been intimately
`
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`

`Attachment 3g: Publication citing Document 3
`
`familiar with the hazardous atmosphere within the tank as
`he would have overseen the nitrogen gas purge and the
`removal of all the oxygen in the tank. Most certainly the
`Chief Mate experienced an overwhelming need to help, to
`actively do something for his fallen crewman. Amplify
`this by a scene described by the investigator’s on scene
`as almost surreal, tranquil, and very benign. There were
`no apparent indications of danger; no fumes or foul odors.
`The water-like cargo itself shimmered with a transparent,
`almost Caribbean blue hue given off by the cargo tank
`coating. Overcome by events, one can easily understand
`why the Chief Mate, the Officer on board most
`responsible for the deck crew and who is accustomed to
`“getting things done”, may have momentarily overlooked
`the grave nature of the situation and peeked his head into
`the tank. Unfortunately, this brief lapse of attention may
`have caused his death.
`Certainly, the Chief Mate was one of the best suited
`crewmembers to understand the hazardous nature of the
`situation he was in. The question begs, how do we
`prevent this from happening again? Should tank top’s
`always be fully secured and the atmosphere only released
`through the vent system? Although preferred, this
`solution is not always practical. However, had this been
`the case the final outcome may have been quite different.
`Someone may still have been overcome by the nitrogen
`gas (or lack of oxygen) but the chance they would have
`fallen into the cargo tank itself would have been
`eliminated. Further, had some type of rail or other physical
`barrier existed to keep personnel away from the edge of
`the tank top, it would be quite unlikely this accident would
`have happened as it did.
`A conspicuous sign or signal in close proximity to
`the hazardous area also might have allowed the Chief
`Mate just a brief reminder that the cargo tank contained a
`dangerous, oxygen deficient atmosphere. This might have
`helped him to take a brief moment to reassess the situation
`and could have minimized the tragic results of this
`accident. When the Mate saw one of his crew in distress
`he acted instinctively to help–went on ‘autopilot’ so to
`say. One of his crew, his shipmate, his ward was in
`trouble and he most likely immediately reacted to the
`situation without any thought for his safety. Added to
`the sense of urgency was the fact that the scene was
`tranquil and had a benign appearance. Had a clear
`indication of the danger been present, the Chief Mate’s
`memory may have been jogged. This might have him a
`brief moment to get control of his reactions and respond
`more appropriately.
`The Coast Guard investigating officer who
`responded to this accident also relayed the following
`regarding the shoreside rescue team that responded to the
`incident. Apparently, the rescue team appeared to be ill
`prepared, not very well trained to handle this type of
`
`situation, and were in poor physical condition. They had
`no apparent awareness of the hazards they were dealing
`with. They mounted a rescue effort when there was
`absolutely no hope for rescue. The crewmembers were
`floating face down in Polybutene in an atmosphere of less
`than 2% oxygen. The response to this accident was
`mounted well after any reasonable rescue could be
`expected. The concentration of the effort should have
`been the retrieval of the bodies. This would have
`considerably reduced the unnecessary risk to each of the
`rescuers.
`As it was, the rescuer’s hastily responded with ill
`fitting equipment. The bodies were eventually retrieved
`but two squad members subsequently collapsed–one on
`deck, another on the gangway while exiting the vessel.
`One rescuer actually went for a dip in the product without
`actually knowing the hazards associated with it.
`Exactly twelve days after this accident a similar
`tragedy occurred near Philadelphia, PA on board the
`foreign flag bulk carrier, M/V SAGA WAVE. During
`discharge operations of cut timber, an alarm was raised
`that a body had been found lying-in the after access trunk
`of the #8 cargo hold. As the crew mustered to mount a
`rescue attempt, the Chief Mate arrived obscene and
`immediately attempted a rescue on his own. By the time
`the rescue party arrived two bodies were observed in the
`space. A longshoreman and the Chief Mate were later
`removed from the space, transported to the hospital, and
`pronounced dead due to hypoxia caused by exposure to
`an oxygen deficient atmosphere.
`Air samples of the cargo spaces and access trunks
`revealed that the atmosphere in the opened #8 cargo hold
`was normal but the after access trunk where the victim’s
`were found contained 14% oxygen as well as an elevated
`level of carbon monoxide. Similarly, the after access trunk
`to the #10 cargo hold contained 10% oxygen and a high
`concentration of carbon monoxide. The cargo contained
`in holds #8 and #10 was the same and both cargo holds
`had been loaded and sealed five weeks earlier in
`Vancover, British C