`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________________
`
`
`ARGENTUM PHARMACEUTICALS LLC
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`CIPLA LIMITED
`
`Patent Owner
`
`_____________________
`
`Case No. IPR2017-00807
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,168,620
`_____________________
`
`CIPLA LIMITED’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`
`Introduction ......................................................................................................... 2
`
`II. Legal Standard .................................................................................................... 3
`
`III. Argument ............................................................................................................. 4
`
`A. The Board misapprehended or overlooked the importance of the proper
`claim constructions of “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal
`administration.” ............................................................................................... 4
`B. The Board misapprehended or overlooked that Argentum’s prior art
`references do not teach a “nasal spray” that is “suitable for nasal
`administration.” ............................................................................................... 6
`1. The Board overlooked that Segal is even more deficient than the
`closer prior art (Cramer) which Cipla overcame. ........................................ 7
`2. The Board misapprehended or overlooked that Ground 2 is deficient
`because Argentum’s alleged art is missing key claim limitations:
`“nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration.” ................................ 8
`3. Ground 3 also fails because it relies upon deficient Ground 2. .................10
`IV. Once the Board’s claim construction oversight/misapprehension is
`cured, it is appropriate to grant rehearing and deny institution on
`Grounds 2 and 3. ...............................................................................................12
`
`V. Conclusion......................................................................................................... 14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- 1 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Patent Owner Cipla Limited requests rehearing under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
`
`of the Board’s Decision on Institution (“Decision,” Paper 11). The Board correctly
`
`denied institution of Ground 1, finding the challenged claims novel over Segal. But
`
`the Board wrongly instituted trial on the obviousness grounds (Grounds 2 and 3).
`
`At least two statements in the Decision evince that, in doing so, the Board
`
`misapprehended or overlooked key evidence and arguments in Cipla’s Preliminary
`
`Response that warranted denial of trial on Grounds 2 and 3. These statements are:
`
`(1) the Board’s conclusion that “no claim terms require express interpretation for
`
`purposes of this Decision;” and (2) the Board’s conclusion that “Patent Owner
`
`does not identify any particular claim limitation as not disclosed in the prior art.”
`
`(Paper 11, 7, 16.)
`
`The first statement shows that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the
`
`importance of construing the terms “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal
`
`administration.” As Cipla explained in its preliminary response, even under the
`
`“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard, the terms “nasal spray” and “suitable
`
`for nasal administration” must be construed to mean “pharmaceutical formulations
`
`that are tolerable to patients, homogeneous, and can be suitably deposited onto the
`
`nasal mucosa.” (See Paper 7, 9.)
`
`This construction is important because the preliminary response then
`
`- 2 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`demonstrates that none of the combinations of cited art teach a person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art how to make the claimed fixed-dose combination “nasal spray” or
`
`formulation “suitable for nasal administration” with a reasonable expectation of
`
`success. This is because the Petition fails to show how Segal (even in combination
`
`with Hettche, Phillipps, and/or the Flonase® Label) teaches the composition that
`
`would provide for the claimed fixed-dose combination “nasal spray” formulation
`
`that is “suitable for nasal administration.” (Paper 7, 12-16, 24-25, 41-42.) None of
`
`Hettche, Phillipps, nor the Flonase® Label describe formulations with two active
`
`ingredients, and Segal does not teach how to successfully make a combination
`
`formulation suitable for nasal administration.
`
`Because the Board misapprehended or overlooked the relevance of Cipla’s
`
`proposed claim construction to demonstrating this threshold failure in Argentum’s
`
`Petition, the Board should grant Cipla’s motion for rehearing and reverse its
`
`decision to institute trial on Grounds 2 and 3.
`
`II. Legal Standard
`“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing,
`
`without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The “burden of
`
`showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the
`
`decision,” and the request “must specifically identify all matters the party believes
`
`the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was
`
`- 3 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a
`
`decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for abuse of discretion. 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.71(c).
`
`Cipla’s request satisfies 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) and demonstrates that the
`
`Board abused its discretion by overlooking Cipla’s proposed claim construction
`
`and evidence in Cipla’s preliminary response that demonstrates how the Petition
`
`failed to show that the cited art taught critical claim elements—“nasal spray” and
`
`“suitable for nasal administration.”
`
`III. Argument
`A. The Board misapprehended or overlooked the importance of the
`proper claim constructions of “nasal spray” and “suitable for
`nasal administration.”
`
`In its Decision, the Board determined that “no claim term requires express
`
`interpretation for purposes of this Decision.” (Paper 11, 7.) In doing so, the Board
`
`misapprehended or overlooked that a key dispute between the parties is whether
`
`the combination of cited references in Grounds 2 and 3 disclose a “nasal spray”
`
`that is “suitable for nasal administration.” This is important because these elements
`
`appear in every challenged claim, yet they are not found in the art.
`
`As Cipla explained in its preliminary response, the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation of “nasal spray” or a formulation “suitable for nasal administration”
`
`is “pharmaceutical formulations that are tolerable to patients, that are
`
`- 4 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`homogeneous, and that can be suitably deposited onto the nasal mucosa.” (Paper 7,
`
`9.) This interpretation arises from the ’620 patent specification (EX1001, 1:37-53
`
`3:36-39) and amendments and arguments made during prosecution of the ’620
`
`patent. (Paper 7, 10-11.) For example, during prosecution, the ’620 patent’s
`
`application was rejected over Example III in Cramer. In response to that rejection,
`
`Cipla scientists prepared and tested a formulation by following the teaching of
`
`Cramer Example III. The testing revealed that Cramer’s disclosed formulation had:
`
`“(1) unacceptable osmolality, which would irritate patients; (2) unacceptable spray
`
`quality, which would not have suitably deposited onto the nasal mucosa; and (3)
`
`unacceptable settling, which would have adversely effected homogeneity of the
`
`formulation.” (Id. (citing EX1002, 286-87, 220-21).) Cipla consequently
`
`distinguished its claimed inventions from Cramer by (1) amending several claims
`
`to recite “said pharmaceutical formulation is in a dosage form suitable for nasal
`
`administration,” and (2) emphasizing the limitation “nasal spray,” as it appeared in
`
`all other claims. (Id.) That is, the prosecution history shows that the inventors did
`
`not claim just any formulation—they claimed only “pharmaceutical formulations
`
`that are tolerable to patients, that are homogeneous, and that can be suitably
`
`deposited onto the nasal mucosa.” (Paper 7, 9-11.)
`
`These amendments and arguments made during prosecution and their effect
`
`on claim construction of the ’620 patent claims should not be overlooked here.
`
`- 5 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`Indeed, the Federal Circuit has mandated that the Board “should [] consult the
`
`patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought
`
`back to the agency for a second review” to see if a given construction would be
`
`“legally incorrect.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015); D’Agostino, 844 F.3d at 948. (Paper 11, 10.)
`
`Had the Board adopted the proper claim construction, which Cipla proffered,
`
`the Board would not have instituted trial. Rather, the Board would have found that
`
`none of Argentum’s prior art references or arguments disclose a “nasal spray”
`
`formulation that is “suitable for nasal administration,” as discussed in detail in
`
`III.B., below.
`
`B.
`
`The Board misapprehended or overlooked that Argentum’s prior
`art references do not teach a “nasal spray” that is “suitable for
`nasal administration.”
`
`The Board’s conclusion that “no claim terms require express interpretation,”
`
`(Paper 11, 7), suggests that the Board misapprehended or overlooked Cipla’s
`
`arguments that the art fails to give any reason to a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`to modify the cited art to arrive at the claimed “nasal spray” and formulation
`
`“suitable for nasal administration” with a reasonable expectation of success. (Paper
`
`7, 41-42.) This is underscored by the Board’s assertion that “Patent Owner does
`
`not identify any particular claim limitation as not disclosed in the prior art.” (Paper
`
`11, 16.) To the contrary, Cipla showed in its preliminary response that the claim
`
`- 6 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`elements “nasal spray” and formulation “suitable for nasal administration,” as
`
`properly construed, are not taught in the art.
`
`1.
`
`The Board overlooked that Segal is even more deficient than
`the closer prior art (Cramer) which Cipla overcame.
`In finding that Cipla did not identify any particular claim limitation that was
`
`not disclosed in the prior art, the Board overlooked Cipla’s evidence that Cramer
`
`and Segal share the same teachings relevant to these proceedings, (Paper 7, 12-16),
`
`and that Segal is even more deficient, as confirmed by the testimony of
`
`Argentum’s experts, Dr. Schleimer and Dr. Donovan.
`
`Attempting to avoid the irreparable deficiencies in Cramer’s disclosure
`
`established during prosecution and confirmed in district court litigation, Argentum
`
`instead relies on the more general teachings from the Segal reference to anchor its
`
`obviousness Grounds 2 and 3. But not only does Segal fail to cure Cramer’s
`
`shortcomings, it exacerbates them. There can be no dispute that Segal’s disclosure
`
`is a “less specific” version of Cramer’s teachings. That is how Argentum’s expert,
`
`Dr. Schleimer, described the two references during his testimony in district court.
`
`(Paper 7, 12 (quoting CIP2019, 65:17-20).) That description is accurate: Segal
`
`discloses more than 800 million hypothetical drug combinations, as the Board
`
`found, (Paper 11, 13.), and contains no formulation examples or other description
`
`of ingredients or concentrations. (See CIP2007, ¶29; see generally EX1012.)
`
`In contrast to Segal, Cramer—which Cipla overcame during prosecution by
`
`- 7 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`clarifying or inserting the “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration”
`
`claim elements—does provide specific example formulations and other
`
`descriptions of ingredients and concentrations. Dr. Govindarajan, upon whose
`
`testing Argentum’s expert Dr. Donovan relied in the district court, attempted to
`
`recreate Cramer Example III. But his attempted formulations exhibited the same
`
`shortcomings that Cipla had shown during prosecution. (Paper 7, 42 (citing
`
`CIP2007, ¶¶42-47; CIP2030, 31, 39.)
`
`If Cramer’s specific disclosure does not teach a POSA how to make a “nasal
`
`spray” that is “suitable for nasal administration,” then Segal surely cannot. (Paper
`
`7, 12-16, 40, 41-42.) Indeed, Argentum’s Petition shows no basis to assume it
`
`could.
`
`2.
`
`The Board misapprehended or overlooked that Ground 2 is
`deficient because Argentum’s alleged art is missing key claim
`limitations: “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal
`administration.”
`As the Board correctly recognized, Segal does not anticipate the ’620 patent
`
`claims. (Paper 11, 10-14.) Consequently, a person of ordinary skill in the art must
`
`modify Segal in order to stand any chance of arriving at the claimed formulations.
`
`But Cipla’s preliminary response highlights how a person of ordinary skill in the
`
`art would have had no reasonable expectation that the POSA could successfully
`
`modify Segal to arrive at a “nasal spray” formulation “suitable for nasal
`
`administration.” In fact, as Cipla explained in its Preliminary Response, testing by
`
`- 8 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`Dr. Govindarajan that Dr. Donovan relied on in the district court showed that even
`
`modifications of Cramer (and thus, Segal) that might be considered routine in the
`
`art, still did not yield the claim elements. Both Dr. Govindarajan’s efforts and
`
`additional testing conducted by Cipla (including varying the viscosities of the
`
`HPMC thickening agent, varying the micronization of triamcinolone, applying
`
`heat, and applying high-speed mixing steps) all showed that various so-called
`
`“routine” modifications failed to cure the deficiencies that Cipla exposed during
`
`prosecution. (Paper 7, 42 (citing CIP2007, ¶¶48-50, CIP2030, 27; CIP2105, 4-6;
`
`CIP2110, 4-7, CIP2040, 4; CIP2029, 3; EX1002, 285-86; CIP2030, 30-31, 33, 36,
`
`37).) These failed results underscore that parameters necessary for a “nasal spray”
`
`that is “suitable for nasal administration” within the meaning of the claims are
`
`interrelated, such that modifying the formulation to address one problem will have
`
`adverse consequences for other parameters. And the scant formulation guidance in
`
`Segal would not have taught a person of ordinary skill in the art how to modify a
`
`combination of azelastine and fluticasone to make it suitable for nasal
`
`administration with any reasonable expectation of success. (Paper 7, 38-42).
`
`The Board concluded that Cipla’s preliminary response creates “disputed
`
`issues of fact” as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a
`
`reasonable expectation of success. (Paper 11, 20.) There is no such dispute: in
`
`district court, both Argentum’s and Cipla’s experts provided testing of numerous
`
`- 9 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`changes to Cramer’s formulation and the process for making the same (each of
`
`which would fall within the scope of Segal’s unspecific teachings). (Paper 7, 42.)
`
`The results of these formulation tests cannot be disputed, and each test was
`
`unsuccessful. The repeated failures do not give rise to any expectation of success,
`
`reasonable or otherwise. (Id., 41-42.) For Argentum’s expert to testify otherwise
`
`does not create a dispute of fact where the testing she previously relied upon
`
`proves that there is no dispute. See Brand Management, Inc. v. Menard, Inc., 135
`
`F.3d 776, *9 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting a later declaration that contradicted a
`
`witness’s earlier deposition testimony).
`
`Ground 3 also fails because it relies upon deficient Ground 2.
`3.
`The Board’s decision to institute Ground 3 also overlooks the importance of
`
`the correct construction of the limitations, “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal
`
`administration.” As with Ground 2, there can be no dispute that the same
`
`limitations above are missing from Ground 3. But Cipla highlighted additional
`
`shortcomings in Ground 3 that the Board would have found persuasive had it not
`
`overlooked the correct claim construction.
`
`Specifically, the Board found that “Patent Owner’s contention that the
`
`Petition fails to articulate a motivation to combine Hettche, Phillipps and Segal
`
`with the Flonase® Label is an issue for trial,” and that “Patent Owner’s arguments
`
`and evidence” regarding teaching away and the additional excipients “raise a
`
`- 10 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`disputed issue of fact that is best resolved on a complete record.” (Paper 11, 21-
`
`22.)
`
`First, Cipla explained that the use of either CMC or MCC was inconsistent
`
`with the homogeneity requirement of the correctly construed claims. CMC and
`
`MCC—both thickening agents intended to keep the fluticasone suspended—were
`
`expected to precipitate out of solution in the presence of cationic drugs. (Paper 7,
`
`44-45.) Azelastine hydrochloride is cationic. (Id., 45.) Thus, by using CMC or
`
`MCC in a formulation with azelastine, a POSA would not expect fluticasone to
`
`stay properly suspended, which in turn yields a non-homogeneous formulation.
`
`(Id.) The Board’s finding that this is a disputed issue is an abuse of discretion: the
`
`pre-invention art unambiguously established this expectation, and post-invention
`
`testing by Meda Pharmaceuticals confirmed the expectation. (Id., 45-46.)
`
`Second, Cipla explained that Segal itself teaches that Argentum’s proposed
`
`combination is inconsistent with the tolerability requirement of the correctly
`
`construed claims. Segal teaches that “[p]reservative-free compositions are
`
`preferred due to reduced sensitivity and increased patient acceptance.” (Paper 7, 47
`
`(quoting EX1012, 6:15-19).) There can be no dispute that this is what Segal
`
`teaches. And the parties also do not dispute that a POSA would have known that
`
`Astelin® is the commercial embodiment of Hettche. (Compare Paper 7, 47, with
`
`Paper 2, 12 (“[Hettche], issued in 1982, is the patent that covers Astelin®.”).) Both
`
`- 11 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`drugs—Astelin® and Flonase®—contain two preservatives: BKC and EDTA in
`
`Astelin® and BKC and phenyl ethyl alcohol in Flonase®. (Paper 7, 47 (citing
`
`EX1008, 2; EX1010, 1).) Putting them together, as Argentum proposes in Ground
`
`3, yields three preservatives and increased concentration in the formulation. (Paper
`
`7, 47.) But Segal teaches away from that very result, particularly in a situation
`
`where, as here, the formulation must be tolerable to patients. In finding that Cipla’s
`
`arguments “raise a disputed issue of fact,” the Board overlooked that there is no
`
`dispute of fact: Segal teaches not to increase preservative content, but that is
`
`precisely what Argentum’s purported combination achieves. (See Paper 2, 44-45
`
`(listing EDTA, BKC, and phenylethyl alcohol as preservatives).)
`
`In short, the Board’s misapprehension of the correct construction of terms
`
`“nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” compounded its
`
`misapprehension of the arguments presented in Ground 3. The undisputed facts are
`
`sufficient to show that Ground 3 should not have been instituted.
`
`IV. Once the Board’s claim construction oversight/misapprehension is
`cured, it is appropriate to grant rehearing and deny institution on
`Grounds 2 and 3.
`
`The Board’s precedent establishes that rehearing is particularly appropriate
`
`in situations where it either arrived at an incorrect claim construction and the
`
`correct construction would change the outcome of its original decision. See, e.g.,
`
`WesternGeco LLC v. PGS Geophysical AS, IPR2015-00313, Paper 45 (Feb. 3,
`
`- 12 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`2017) (granting rehearing and reversing original opinion when corrected claim
`
`construction changed the import of prior art); AVX Corp. v. Greatbatch, Ltd.,
`
`IPR2015-00710, Paper 13 (Jan. 13, 2016) (same).
`
`Cipla showed that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim terms
`
`“nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” is “pharmaceutical
`
`formulations that are tolerable to patients, that are homogeneous, and that can be
`
`suitably deposited onto the nasal mucosa.” (Paper 7, 9-11.) Cipla also established
`
`that these claim elements are absent from Argentum’s cited prior art. (See supra.)
`
`Accordingly, the Board should grant Cipla’s request for rehearing, construe these
`
`claim terms, and reverse its decision to institute because Argentum’s Petition failed
`
`to show that either element was known in the prior art.
`
`
`
`
`
`- 13 -
`
`
`
`
`
`Cipla Limited’s Motion for Rehearing
`
`
`
`V. Conclusion
`The Board misapprehended or overlooked various critical (and indisputable)
`
`facts raised in Cipla’s Preliminary Response that warrant denial of institution of
`
`Argentum’s Grounds 2 and 3. Argentum’s arguments alleging that Segal taught a
`
`“nasal spray” formulation that is “suitable for nasal administration,” within the
`
`proper meaning of these terms, is at odds with its own experts’ prior testimony.
`
`Cipla, therefore, respectfully requests that the Board grant rehearing and deny
`
`institution on Grounds 2 and 3.
`
` Respectfully Submitted,
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`__________________________
`
` Dennies Varughese
` Lead Attorney for Patent Owner
` Registration No. 61,868
`
`
`
`Date: September 5, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`1100 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`(202) 772-8501
`
`- 14 -
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e))
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the above-captioned “Cipla Limited’s
`
`Motion for Rehearing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)” was served in its entirety
`
`on September 5, 2017, upon the following parties via email:
`
`Michael R. Houston: mhouston@foley.com
`Joseph P. Meara: jmeara@foley.com
`James P. McParland: jmcparland@foley.com
`ARG-dymista@foley.com
`
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`321 North Clark Street
`Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60654
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`
`
`
`
`
`__________________________
`Dennies Varughese
`
`
`Date: September 5, 2017
`Lead Attorney for Patent Owner
`1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Registration No. 61,868
`Washington, D.C. 20005-3934
`(202) 371-2600
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`