throbber
Docket No.: 0100157-00270US2
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`____________________________________________
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`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
`
`____________________________________________
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`EMC Corporation
`Petitioner
`
`Lenovo (United States) Inc.
`Petitioner
`
`NetApp, Inc.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`Intellectual Ventures I, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`Case No. IPR2017-00439
`Patent No. 8,275,827
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`
`PETITIONERS’ REPLY
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`

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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
`Carter Discloses Claims 1 and 13 .................................................................... 2 
`A. 
`Carter Discloses the “Assess[ing]” Limitation ..................................... 2 
`B. 
`Carter Discloses the “Allocat[ing]” Limitation..................................... 6 
`C. 
`Carter Discloses the “Representing” Limitation ................................... 8 
`1. 
`IV Attempts To Artificially Narrow The Claims ....................... 8 
`2. 
`Carter Teaches The “Representing” Limitation Even
`Under IV’s Narrow Reading ..................................................... 14 
`IV’s Argument That Carter Presents Only A Single Large
`Device Is Not True .................................................................... 18 
`III.  Carter Teaches The Centralized Server Limitation (claims 4 and 16) .......... 20 
`A. 
`IV Premises Its Argument On An Artificially Narrow Reading
`Of The Claims ..................................................................................... 21 
`Carter Discloses The “Centralized Server” Limitation Even
`Under This Narrow Reading ............................................................... 23 
`Carter Does Not Teach Away From Centralization ............................ 24 
`C. 
`IV.  Carter Teaches The Storage Priority Control Limitations (claims 9 and
`21) .................................................................................................................. 25 
`Level of Skill ................................................................................................. 28 
`
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`I. 
`II. 
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`V. 
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`3. 
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`B. 
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`i
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Patent Owner’s Response (“POR”) confirms that the challenged ’827 claims
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`are invalid. As the Petition explained, the ’827 patent claims old and obvious
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`distributed storage systems, in which distributed devices are configured to mimic
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`NAS devices by making their otherwise unused or under-utilized storage available
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`for use by other network-connected entities. The challenged claims stood rejected
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`for over ten years until they were narrowed to require so-called “location
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`information.” Petition (“Pet.”), 9. The Petition demonstrated there was nothing
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`new or non-obvious about the claims or their recitation of location information,
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`which Carter satisfied in multiple ways.
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`In its POR, Patent Owner Intellectual Ventures (“IV”) does not (and cannot)
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`dispute that “location information” was well known. Instead, it attempts to re-
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`write the claims to demand that each distributed device represents itself as a
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`separate NAS device. POR, 8-11. The Board properly rejected the same artificial
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`narrowing of the claim in its Decision to Institute (“DI”), and should do so again
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`here. See DI, 25.
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`IV’s other attempts to distinguish Carter rely on old, obvious, basic features
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`that are not even discussed in the ’827 patent. IV’s attempts to narrow the claims
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`based on features not even discussed in the specification also should be rejected.
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`1
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
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`II. CARTER DISCLOSES CLAIMS 1 AND 13
`IV disputes the same three limitations it challenged in its Patent Owner
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`Preliminary Response (“POPR”): “assessing,” “allocating,” and “representing.”
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`POR, 19, 24, 30; compare with POPR, 12, 18, 21. The Board properly rejected
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`these arguments in its DI, and should do so again.
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`A. Carter Discloses the “Assess[ing]” Limitation
`As the Petition explained and the Board preliminarily agreed, Carter
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`discloses “assess[ing] unused or under-utilized storage resources.” Pet., 38-39; Ex.
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`1102, ¶¶117-118; DI, 22. For example, Carter teaches “determin[ing] the
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`availability of resources such as … hard-disk, available RAM and other
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`resources,” plainly conveying that Carter is assessing whether hard disk resources
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`are available, i.e., unused or under-utilized. DI, 22 (quoting Ex. 1140 (“Carter”),
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`36:27-29).1 Carter also discloses “suitable heuristics” to distribute resources that
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`are assessed. DI, 22 (quoting Carter, 36:29-37:2).
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`IV repeats its POPR arguments (much of them nearly verbatim), which the
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`Board should reject again. POR, 19-30; compare with POPR, 12-17.
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` 1
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` All emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
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`2
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`First, the POR largely sidesteps, and therefore presents no rebuttal to,
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`Carter’s disclosure relied upon by the Board – “determin[ing] the availability of
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`resources such as ... hard-disk, available RAM and other resources.” Carter,
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`36:27-29; DI, 22; see POR, 19-29.
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`Instead, IV focuses its criticism on Carter’s related disclosure of
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`“dynamically distribut[ing] the available resources,” and argues “Carter does not
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`disclose what ‘heuristics’ are used.” POR 25-27, 29. This complaint demands
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`more disclosure in Carter than is provided in the ’827 specification and is
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`misplaced. The claims merely require “assessing” and do not require any
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`particular “heuristics;” nor does the specification provide any detail on how to
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`“assess unused or under-utilized storage resources.” Ex. 1144 (“Shenoy Dep.”),
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`81:9-11, 82:12-14. Indeed, during prosecution, applicants admitted that the ’827
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`patent lacked any description of “assessing,” yet argued this was entirely
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`appropriate because “client agent programs must be capable of assessing what
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`capabilities are spare and/or unused.” Pet., 8 (citing Ex. 1115, 8) (emphasis
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`omitted). Ex. 1145, ¶¶8-11.
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`Second, IV’s argument ignores not only the plain disclosure which the
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`Board relied upon for “assessing,” but also Carter’s multitude of other disclosures,
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`clearly showing the “assessing” of unused or under-utilized storage. Ex. 1145,
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`¶12.
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`3
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`For example, Dr. Shenoy admitted Carter discloses “determin[ing] the free
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`volume space available for allocation,” making clear Carter assesses (i.e.,
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`determines) unused or under-utilized (i.e., free volume) space for the specific
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`purpose of allocation. Shenoy Dep., 142:19-20 (referencing Carter, 19:14-17). He
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`further admitted that Carter discloses “request[ing] the total available space
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`information and us[ing] this information to quickly determine whether to proceed
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`with the allocation processing.” Id., 142:14-17, 143:16-17. Ex. 1145, ¶13.
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`Third, IV’s argument concerning Carter’s “private memory” is similarly
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`flawed. The Petition showed an additional way Carter discloses the “assessing”
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`limitation—by distinguishing between private memory reserved for a node’s own
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`use and non-private memory available for other nodes to use. Pet., 38; Ex. 1102,
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`¶117. IV argues Carter does not describe this functionality in sufficient detail.
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`POR, 14, 20-23. This argument is not only factually wrong, but misses the point
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`entirely. Carter reserves specific memory for local use, and assesses and makes
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`available other specific memory (non-private) for other network-connected users.
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`E.g., Carter, 28:19-29:20 (contrasting “private memory” that provides “local
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`storage that can be kept inaccessible to the other nodes” and “virtual shared
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`memory” that “map[s] to devices that provide physical storage”). This approach
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`parallels the ’827 patent’s assessment and allocation of sub-system components.
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`Ex. 1101 (“’827 patent”), 12:26-31 (“The capability allocation may also be a
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`4
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`system-wide (i.e., course) allocation . . . The capabilities allocation may also be
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`sub-system specific (i.e., fine) allocation, such as allocation of particular
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`subsystem capabilities to particular affiliations.”). Ex. 1145, ¶14.
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`Finally, IV also makes multiple attempts to improperly impose a
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`“necessarily present” inherency standard. POR, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29.2 This is
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`irrelevant where, as here, Carter expressly discloses the relevant limitation in at
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`least as much detail as the patent. Ex. 1145, ¶15. Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti Inc.,
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`878 F.3d 1052, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[A] reference can anticipate a claim even if
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`it does not expressly spell out all the limitations arranged or combined as in the
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`claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’
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`the claimed arrangement or combination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In
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`re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“[I]n considering the disclosure of a
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`reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the
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`reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
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`expected to draw therefrom.”).
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` 2
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` IV makes similar inherency arguments for other limitations. These arguments
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`should be rejected for the same reason.
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`5
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`B. Carter Discloses the “Allocat[ing]” Limitation
`As the Petition showed and the Board preliminarily agreed, Carter also
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`discloses the “allocating” limitation—namely, it allocates the storage it has
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`assessed as unused or under-utilized and thus available for other devices on the
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`network to use. E.g., Pet., 19-21, 37-43, 54; DI, 27. For example, Carter teaches
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`“dynamically distribut[ing] available resources.” DI, 27 (citing Pet., 39 (citing
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`Carter, 36:29-37:2), 54); see also, e.g., Pet., 20 (quoting Carter, 9:18-21).
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`IV’s attempts to distinguish Carter are, once again, inconsistent both with
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`the ’827 patent and with IV’s own expert.
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`First, IV again demands more disclosure from Carter than is present in the
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`’827 specification, this time complaining “Carter does not explicitly disclose
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`reserving or ‘locking down’ resources as part of its policy controller’s distribution
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`of resources to make the[m] ‘exclusively available’ to Carter’s shared memory
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`subsystem.” POR, 38. However, nothing in the challenged claims requires
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`locking down resources. Shenoy Dep., 83:7-8 (“The claim just talks about allocate
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`respective amounts, and that's all it says”). Nor does the ’827 specification
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`disclose it. In fact, Dr. Shenoy was unable to identify any description of
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`“allocating” in the ’827 specification, let alone any locking resources. Id., 83:10-
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`18. Ex. 1145, ¶18.
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`6
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`Moreover, IV is wrong to state Carter does not lock down, or reserve,
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`storage resources. Dr. Shenoy admitted Carter discloses “reserving something
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`much larger than requested memory space for a file.” Shenoy Dep., 133:20-134:2
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`(referencing Carter, 19:14-17). Ex. 1145, ¶19.
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`Second, like the situation with “assess,” cross-examination corroborated that
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`Carter discloses “allocating” a multitude of times, undermining IV’s denials. For
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`example, Dr. Shenoy admitted that Carter discloses “allocating the first available
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`free space on that page.” Shenoy Dep., 127:7-8 (referencing Carter, 16:21-23).
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`And that Carter discloses “data streams are mapped onto allocated pages.” Id.,
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`128:6-7 (referencing Carter, 17:17-20). Dr. Shenoy further admitted that Carter
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`teaches when a file is deleted, “all shared memory space allocated to the files in
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`the fileset is discarded.” Id., 135:5-17 (referencing Carter, 15:9-11). Moreover, he
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`confirmed that “allocate” has the same meaning when used in Carter as it has in the
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`’827 patent. Id., 124:3-6. Ex. 1145, ¶20.
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`Finally, Dr. Kubiatowicz also confirms that both assessing and allocating
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`are old, well-known and basic functions and would not require significant
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`description, a fact consistent with the ’827 patent specification’s utter lack of
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`description for either function. Ex. 1145, ¶21. See Microsoft, 878 F.3d at 1068
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`(Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Preda, 401 F.2d at 826 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
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`7
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`C. Carter Discloses the “Representing” Limitation
`Carter’s software causes nodes (e.g., commercially available PCs) to
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`represent, or mimic, dedicated NAS devices. Pet., 26-27; Ex. 1102, ¶¶47-48, 88-
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`90. The parties agree that the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) of “NAS
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`device,” as used in the ʼ827 specification, would at least include “a device that
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`makes data storage resources available to network-connected user devices.” Pet., 9-
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`10; POR, 6-7; see also ’827 patent, 2:31-34. The PC nodes in Carter represent, or
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`mimic, NAS devices by making their storage available to other nodes using
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`software modules called shared memory subsystems that run on each PC node.
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`Pet., 37-43; Ex. 1102, ¶¶114-125.
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`IV premises its argument that Carter does not teach this limitation on an
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`artificially narrow reading of the claims the Board should reject. Moreover, even if
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`IV’s reading of the claim were correct, Carter still teaches the limitation because
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`each of the PC nodes in Carter mimics a dedicated NAS devices by making
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`storage available to other nodes.
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`1.
`IV Attempts To Artificially Narrow The Claims
` IV recycles the same argument previously rejected by the Board in the form
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`of a claim construction. The POPR argued that Carter did not disclose the
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`“representing” limitation because “the NAS component must represent that each
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`distributed device includes its own NAS device.” POPR, 19. Likewise, the POR
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`8
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`argues this limitation should be construed to mean “using the corresponding
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`software-based NAS components of the selected distributed devices to cause each
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`selected distributed device to separately appear to network-connected user devices
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`as a dedicated NAS device.” POR, 7. The Board should reject this construction
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`for at least three reasons.3
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`First, the broadest reasonable interpretation should at least cover the
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`disclosed embodiments—in which distributed devices are configured to mimic
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`NAS devices that cooperate together in a NAS fabric—rather than be constrained
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`to only those embodiments in which NAS devices “stand alone.” See EPOS Techs.
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`Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting
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`construction “because it reads out preferred embodiments”); Anchor Wall Sys., Inc.
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`v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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` 3
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` For efficiency, Petitioners have included this substantively identical claim
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`construction argument in its Replies in IPR2017-00374 and IPR2017-00439.
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`9
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`

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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`For example, in connection with Figure 21,4 the ʼ827 specification states
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`“[t]he implementation can be accomplished in a variety of ways. A relatively
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`simple implementation is to have the devices simply mimic the functionality of
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`stand-alone NAS devices, while a more complex implementation is to provide a
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`storage fabric across the Intranet or Internet where hundreds or thousands of
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`devices work cooperatively as NAS devices in conjunction with server systems that
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`assist in controlling and managing the storage function of the NAS fabric.” ʼ827
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`patent, 42:65-43:5. The specification then describes the “simple implementation”
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`as the first, or “stand-alone only NAS device implementation.” Id., 43:44-47; Ex.
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`2003, ¶23. It describes the “more complex” implementations as the second, or
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`“NAS device fabric implementation” (ʼ827 patent, 43:59-63, 44:9-12; Ex. 2003,
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`¶24), and the third, or “server assisted implementation” (ʼ827 patent, 44:24-27; Ex.
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`2003, ¶25).
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`The claims should be read to include all of the relevant embodiments,
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`including at least the “NAS device fabric” implementation. Indeed, that is the only
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`
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` 4
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` IV does not contest that the ʼ827 claims focus on the subject matter added on
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`April 13, 2001, when applicant added Figure 21 and its description at col. 42:29-
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`46:10. See Pet., 5-9; POR, 1-4.
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`10
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`embodiment in which IV’s expert, Dr. Shenoy, could identify disclosure of the
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`recited “location information” that was required to secure allowance of the claims.
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`Shenoy Dep., 43:16-44:16. IV’s construction is plainly flawed to the extent it
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`excludes this cooperative architecture or otherwise limits the claims to “stand-
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`alone” embodiments where “each” distributed device acts as a “separate” NAS
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`device that in no way cooperates with other mimicked NAS devices.5
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`Second, IV distorts the claims’ use of “respectively” to contradict the
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`specification. The complete claim phrase—“the selected distributed devices
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`respectively comprise NAS devices”—relates one plurality (i.e., the distributed
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`devices) to another (i.e., the NAS devices), confirming a many-to-many
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`correspondence rather than excluding it. By contrast, IV’s construction requires a
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`one-to-one correspondence in which “each” distributed device must correspond to
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`a “separate” NAS device, two words that do not appear anywhere in the limitation,
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` 5
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` The specification confirms that when each device appears as its own NAS device,
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`location libraries are “not required,” and “each of these … NAS devices…knows
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`nothing of other …NAS devices.” ʼ827 patent, 43:56-58; Shenoy Dep. 54:3-8
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`(confirming that stand-alone embodiment does not need to use location
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`information because “clients connect to the stand-alone NAS devices directly”).
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`11
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`and as described above, contradict the specification. Accent Packaging, Inc. v.
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`Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (term “‘one’ appearing
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`directly after the phrase ‘a respective’” should not be “viewed as limiting” where
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`that construction would exclude disclosed embodiment). In the context of the
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`claim language and the specification, the term “respectively” simply connotes
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`“consequently” (a recognized synonym of “respectively”), making clear that the
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`mimicked NAS devices are a consequence of the previously recited “software-
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`based NAS component.” Ex. 1145, ¶28.
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`Third, IV’s construction is also inconsistent with the dependent claims.
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`Claim 2 recites “enabling at least one of the selected distributed devices to
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`function as a stand-alone dedicated NAS device through the use of the respective
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`client agents for the particular distributed device.” Claim 1, being broader, must
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`encompass configurations in which none of the distributed devices function as a
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`stand-alone NAS device, i.e., because they all are in a NAS fabric. Thus, claim 2
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`confirms that claim 1 must encompass the fabric architecture, and contradicts IV’s
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`12
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`construction to the extent it implies claim 1 is limited to stand-alone
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`configurations. Anchor Wall, 340 F.3d at 1308.6
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`Fourth, judging from its POR, IV’s construction is purportedly based on a
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`single embodiment described in just the first part of a single sentence. See POR,
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`10. Dr. Shenoy, however, identified “three different NAS architectures” as being
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`described in the ʼ827 patent. Ex. 2003, ¶¶23-25. Despite describing these
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`embodiments in his declaration—even after having read the patent “at least a
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`dozen times”—Dr. Shenoy could not say whether any of these are covered by
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`
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` 6
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` IV also argues that the agreed interpretation of “NAS device” somehow compels
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`its construction of the “representing” limitation. POR, 8-9. But substituting the
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`agreed interpretation for “NAS device” merely requires that “the selected
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`distributed devices [plural] respectively comprise devices [plural] that make data
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`storage resources available to network-connected devices.”
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`13
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`claim 1, or whether any of these embodiments meet the “representing” limitation.
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`Shenoy Dep., 70:12-72:14; 74:1-77:6, 38:17:39:1, 40:3-9.7
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`For at least these reasons, IV’s construction is inconsistent with the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation of the claims.
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`2.
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`Carter Teaches The “Representing” Limitation Even Under
`IV’s Narrow Reading
`Even if IV’s reading of the claims were correct, which it is not, Carter would
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`still teach the “representing” limitation. IV’s argument that Carter does not
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`disclose representing that its PC nodes comprise “respective (i.e., separate), NAS
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`devices” (POR, 30-31) fails for at least the following reasons.
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`First¸ IV’s argument is wrong because each separate PC node in Carter’s
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`system is made to mimic a dedicated “NAS device” by making data storage
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`resources available to network-connected user devices. As the Petition explained,
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`
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` 7
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` As shown herein, both the POR and Dr. Shenoy’s declaration only repeat
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`arguments that IV had made previously in its POPR. Dr. Shenoy, however, did not
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`begin his work on this case until well after the POPR was filed (Shenoy Dep.,
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`14:1-6), meaning his opinions are nothing more than repeated attorney argument
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`that have already been considered and rejected by the Board. Compare, e.g., Ex.
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`2003, ¶45 with POPR, 6.
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`14
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`Carter’s Figure 11 shows multiple commercially available PC nodes (406a and
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`406b) each mimicking NAS devices by making storage available:
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`
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`Pet., 26; Ex. 1102, ¶86; Carter, 25:14-16, 41:25-29; Shenoy Dep., 177:14-20. The
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`Petition further explained that “virtual page 5 is stored on node 406a, which, in this
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`instance, represents itself as a ‘NAS device’ that ‘makes data storage resources
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`available to network-connected user devices.’” Pet., 27; Ex. 1102, ¶¶47-48, 88-90;
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`Carter, 41:25-29. Similarly, node 406b acts as a NAS device by making storage
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`resources available, such as virtual page 2. IV’s own expert Dr. Shenoy does not
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`dispute this. Shenoy Dep., 155:15-19. Moreover, both parties agree that the BRI
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`of “NAS device” includes “a device that makes data storage resources available to
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`15
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`network-connected user devices.” POR, 6-7. Thus, each separate node in Carter’s
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`system is made to mimic a dedicated “NAS device.” Ex. 1145, ¶33.
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`As the Petition also explained, Carter’s “shared memory subsystem” is the
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`software-based NAS component on each node that cooperates with “shared
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`memory subsystems” on other nodes to make physical storage available. Pet., 22-
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`23, 31-32; Ex. 1102, ¶¶79-80, 98-100. Thus, contrary to IV’s assertion, Carter
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`does not merely disclose a “‘shared memory subsystem’ … [that] appears as a
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`single shared resource across all of Carter’s nodes.” POR, 30. Instead, it discloses
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`a shared memory subsystem on each node that allows the node to mimic a
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`dedicated NAS device by making its storage available to other nodes. Pet., 37-40;
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`Ex. 1102, ¶¶114-122. Ex. 1145, ¶34.
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`For example, Carter discloses with reference to Fig. 1 (below) that “[e]ach
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`of the nodes 12a-12d can access the addressable shared memory space 20 through
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`the shared memory subsystems 34a-34d.” Carter, 10:30-11:2, Fig. 1; Pet., 22, 31;
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`Ex. 1102, ¶¶79, 100.
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`16
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`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
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`
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`IV admits that “nodes 12a-12d … each hav[e] a respective shared memory
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`subsystem 34a-34d.” POR, 18. Thus, Carter plainly discloses each separate node
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`(e.g., 12a-d) having its own shared memory subsystem (e.g., 34a-d) to represent, or
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`mimic, a dedicated NAS device. Ex. 1145, ¶35.
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`Second, the cooperation between the “shared memory subsystems” on
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`Carter’s nodes is a point of similarity with the ’827 patent, not a distinction. This
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`cooperation corresponds, for example, to the ’827 patent’s second architecture,
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`referred to as a storage fabric. ’827 patent, 43:1-5. In this arrangement, each
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`distributed device acts as a NAS device. However, rather than act as a “stand-
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`alone” device (i.e., as taught in the first architecture), each distributed device
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`works “cooperatively” with other “NAS devices” (by means of the recited location
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`information, absent in the first architecture). Indeed, the ’827 patent was explicit
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`that a “a more complex implementation is to provide a storage fabric across the
`
`Intranet or Internet where hundreds or thousands of devices work cooperatively as
`
`NAS devices.” ’827 patent, 42:66-43:3. Ex. 1145, ¶36.
`
`3.
`
`IV’s Argument That Carter Presents Only A Single Large
`Device Is Not True
`Finally, IV suggests that Petitioner and Dr. Kubiatowicz agreed with its
`
`stretched interpretation of Carter as having only a single NAS device. POR, 32-34.
`
`Once again, IV is wrong.
`
`First, contrary to IV’s assertions, the Petition makes clear from the first page
`
`that Carter discloses multiple NAS devices: “Carter had a set of widely distributed
`
`devices, which made their excess storage capacity available for use by other
`
`devices, through Carter software, allowing that excess storage capacity to be used
`
`by other devices connected to the network.” Pet., 1-2. The Petition again explains
`
`in the overview of Carter: “The unused storage space attached to each computer in
`
`the system is pooled and managed by the software taught by Carter so that it may
`
`be available for use and access by any node.” Pet., 21; Ex. 1102, ¶75.
`
`As explained above, Carter discloses each computer mimicking a NAS
`
`device by making its storage available, plainly satisfying all proposed
`
`constructions of the “representing” limitation, and plainly disclosing multiple NAS
`
`devices. Supra, §II.C.2. The Petition and Dr. Kubiatowicz also explain how the
`
`“filesets” in Carter’s Fig. 2 disclose multiple NAS devices because they appear to
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`users as separate drives, such as “F:” and “N:” drives. Pet., 29-30; Ex. 1102, ¶¶94-
`
`97.)
`
`Second, IV mischaracterizes the Petition. IV points to certain statements in
`
`the Petition referring to a “single large device,” even adding “[NAS]” in brackets
`
`in one place where the Petition refers to “a device.” POR, 32. But if anything,
`
`IV’s selective quoting of the Petition illustrates the immense overlap in teachings
`
`between Carter and the ’827 patent’s NAS fabric, just like the cooperation between
`
`the “shared memory subsystems” discussed in the previously section. Supra,
`
`§II.C.2. Ex. 1145, ¶41.
`
`Third, IV similarly misrepresents Dr. Kubiatowicz’s deposition testimony.
`
`POR, 33-34. IV cites Dr. Kubiatowicz’s testimony that “in the aggregate, one
`
`Carter instance is a single NAS device” out of context and implies this was an
`
`admission that Carter discloses only a single NAS device. POR, 33 (quoting Ex.
`
`2002 (“Kubiatowicz Dep.”), 79:16-19). However, the quote is clearly referring to
`
`“one Carter instance” not all instances. And once again, this one Carter instance
`
`illustrates the extreme overlap with the ’827 patent. ’827 patent, 42:63-65 (“[A]
`
`large number of desktop PCs in the enterprise (Intranet) or on the Internet can each
`
`act as a NAS device by running a client agent program and NAS component that
`
`brings its resources to the network with the appears of a dedicated NAS device or
`
`as part of an integrated system that appears as a single or dedicated NAS device.”)
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`IV ignores Dr. Kubiatowicz’s other testimony where he explained that each
`
`individual node mimics a NAS device which can be combined and cooperate with
`
`other NAS devices as part of an aggregate: “What I point out here in my analysis is
`
`that each device mimics a NAS device and can be combined together in an
`
`aggregate.” Kubiatowicz Dep., 77:18-23. Additionally, Dr. Kubiatowicz made
`
`clear that Carter discloses there can be multiple aggregate Carter instances.
`
`Kubiatowicz Dep., 78:8-79:3; 80:25-81:5. Ex. 1145, ¶42.
`
`Thus, there can be no fair dispute that Carter discloses multiple NAS
`
`devices.
`
`III. CARTER TEACHES THE CENTRALIZED SERVER LIMITATION
`(CLAIMS 4 AND 16)
`As the Petition showed and the Board preliminarily agreed, Carter discloses
`
`a “centralized server” that stores its root directory page 342 and a “centralized
`
`server” that stores its root entry point 64. Pet., 49-51; Ex. 1102, ¶139-144; DI, 29-
`
`30.
`
`Once again, IV premises its argument that Carter does not teach this
`
`limitation on an artificially narrow reading of the claims the Board should reject.
`
`Moreover, even if IV’s reading of the claim were correct, Carter teaches the
`
`limitation even under IV’s construction.
`
`20
`
`

`

`A.
`
`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`IV Premises Its Argument On An Artificially Narrow Reading Of
`The Claims
`Although IV has never formally identified “centralized server” for
`
`construction, IV argues that the claimed centralized server must “form[] a known,
`
`physical ‘center’ from the perspective of the distributed devices,” POR, 41, and
`
`that it “must be physically separate from the client devices (claimed ‘distributed
`
`devices’) that it serves.” POR, 42. IV’s proposal is not BRI. Instead, IV is
`
`improperly reading limitations into the claims, and doing so inconsistently and
`
`selectively—a fact made abundantly evident by its proposing two different
`
`constructions, one here, and one in related IPR, IPR2017-00374, where IV argues
`
`the term the “centralized server” must be “a single server or a single group of
`
`servers that are commonly controlled and managed.” IPR2017-00374 POR, 29-
`
`30.8
`
`
`
` 8
`
` IV does not dispute that Carter discloses the “centralized server” under its
`
`proposed construction in IPR2017-00374. For example, Carter discloses the
`
`computers (including the computer storing the root directory page) could be
`
`located on a local area network, which a POSITA would have understood
`
`encompasses an office network with commonly owned computers. Carter,
`
`Abstract; Shenoy Dep., 179:22-180:21 (agreeing).
`
`21
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`There is no basis in the specification for any of these requirements IV
`
`attempts to read into the claims. IV argues the claims require a “physically
`
`separate” centralized server, but neither the claims nor the specification contain
`
`such a requirement. The claims simply recite a “centralized server.” The claims
`
`do not require that it is “physically separate,” nor do they connote anything
`
`physical at all. Instead, the claims and specification both use the term in
`
`connection with functionality. For example, claim 4 refers to managing the NAS
`
`service for at least one distributed device at least in part using a centralized server.
`
`The specification in turn refers to central functions such as “receiv[ing] storage and
`
`access requests from user devices and would at least in part direct the user devices
`
`to the distributed devices storing the requested data.” ’827 patent, 44:38-41. Ex.
`
`1145, ¶47.
`
`IV also appears to equate the claimed “centralized server” with the ’827
`
`patent’s NAS server systems 104. POR, 43. But notably, the patent’s description
`
`of such systems simply refers to a “typical” case: “NAS server systems 104 … are
`
`typically a single server machine or a relatively small group of server machines
`
`that are commonly controlled and managed, for example, as to physical location
`
`and authorized user.” ’827 patent, 44:47-54. Thus, the specification expressly
`
`acknowledges that NAS server systems 104 are not limited to physically separate
`
`devices. Ex. 1145, ¶48.
`
`22
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00439
`U.S. Patent No. 8,275,827
`B. Carter Discloses The “Centralized Server” Limitation Even
`Under This Narrow Reading
`Moreover, even if IV’s artificially narrow reading were adopted, which it
`
`should not be,

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