throbber
SECURE ACCESS TO MEDICAL INFORMATION BY SMART CARDS
`
`R. BEUSCART (MD, PHD) (*), C. GRAVE (MD) (**), P. GEORGE(*)
`
`(*) RD2P (Recherche et Developpement Dossier Portable)
`Hopital CALMETTE - 59037 Lille Cooex
`
`**DIM - Rez-de-jardin - Hopital CALMETIE - Bd du Pr. LECLERCQ
`CHRU de Lille - 59037 Lille Cedex
`
`Summarv:
`
`The recent development of Medical Information
`Systems is due to the connection of medical data bases through
`networks.But this development emphasizes the problems of
`security and confidentiality of medical data
`This security requires the implementation of three
`complementary functions : identification-authentication,
`signature, encryption. The smart card is a possible tool for this
`security because of its micro-computer and RAM Memory. The
`most frequently used algorithm is TELEPASS. Recently,
`standard algorithms (RSA and DES) were implemented in
`enlarged memory cards. The Professional Access Card (CPS in
`France) and specific "Key Cards" are vectors for the
`generalization of security statements in the medical domain.
`
`Key words : Smart card , Security , Tele - Medicine ,
`Communication systems
`
`Introduction :
`
`The management of medical information is more and
`more realized through computer systems. Hospitals are
`dev~loping Hospital Infonnation Systems for the archieving of
`mechcal records and for the communication between medical
`units, labs, X-Ray departments, administrative boards. The
`development of telematics and public networks (LAN or WAN)
`makes possible the transmission of medical information and the
`synchronous as well as asynchronous exchanges between
`physicians.
`But these new technologies arise general problems
`concerning the confidentiality and the security of the transfer of
`medical data.
`
`I. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS.
`
`The rules concerning the security of the transmission
`of medical data between medical units and physicians are widely
`different from one country to another. In France, the
`Commission Nationale Infonnatique et Libertes (CNIL) pointed
`out at the following points :
`1) It is recommended to use and to send a record number and not
`the patient's name. If necessary identity items must be
`encrypted.
`
`2) For sensitive applications in the medical domain (Psychiatry,
`AIDS, Blood-diseases) it is recommended to use identifications
`and authentication by smart card (micro-processeur card).
`3) If the.results of blood analysis are send through the network ,
`automatic correction of errors must be possible.
`
`These recommendations are necessary both to protect
`~he medical information of the patient and to guarantee the
`mdepedance of the physician towards health care institutes and
`insurance companies.
`The electronic signature is also possible by means of
`smart card but legal constraints are limiting this use. In fact,
`only the manual signature is recognized as legally valid.
`In summary. there are 3 constraints for a wide use of
`telematic networks in the health care domain :
`- Identification, authentication,
`- Security of the transfer of data..
`- To avoid the fraudulent use of medical information ..
`
`II. PROFESSIONAL ACCESS CARD.
`
`II. I Micro-processor cards.
`
`A smart card (or micro-processor card) is made of:
`- A micro-processor;
`- Three memories.
`. RAM memory for temporary storages of information
`.
`durmg the calculations and the operations of the micro(cid:173)
`processor.
`. PROM memory for fixed programs written when the
`card is manufactured.
`. A programm~ble memory [EPROM or EEPROM].
`~mpty "":'hen the card 1s manufactured, containing the new
`mfonnauon necessary for the users of the card. The capacity of
`this memory is variable from 1024 bytes to 64 kbytes. This
`part of the memory is divided in a number of zones the access of
`which may be :
`- Free.
`- Confidential (they~ protected by a secret code),
`• Secret (only the micro-processor of the card can have
`access to this information).
`
`0-7803-1377-1193 $3.00 ©1993 IEEE
`
`1049
`
`IPR2017-00430
`UNIFIED EX1022
`
`

`

`The chip is fixed under a metallic patch and the link is
`effective by means of six contact points for asynchronous
`exchanges.
`
`11.3 The professsional Access Card.
`
`In the first experiences of Patient Data Cards in
`Europe, the access to sensitive infonnation was protected by the
`use of a "key" card, distributed to the professionals who would
`take the patient in charge : physician, nurse, chemist,
`physiotherapist. .. But the rights for reading/writing were
`different according to the profession of the owner. A physician
`could read and write all the areas of the patient data card whereas
`the nurse could only read emergency and historic infonnation.
`The French Ministry of Health has decided to generalize
`the use of the smart card as a professional access card for :
`- The identification and authentication of the owner,
`- Securtity of data,
`- Coherence of the cards systems.
`
`Ill. SECURITY FUNCTIONS
`
`The security functions are assured by the micro(cid:173)
`processor smart card using specific algorithm
`for
`indentifications of the owner but also to secure data transfers
`between medical units.
`
`III. I. The TELEPASS example.
`
`One of the most common algorithm is TELEP ASS
`which has the following fwictionalities :
`- The algorithm corresponds to a program or a function
`F, stored in the micro-processor with secrete data S written in
`the card and confidential data In wriuen by the responsible of the
`specific application. We can take 2 examples of the use of the
`"TELEPASS" smart card:
`
`1) Authentication
`If n persons are authorized to access to the application
`"X", each person has a card with :
`- Program F and a personal code
`- A secret number S
`- The identity In of the bearer.
`When the card is introduced in a reader, then the system
`reads the identity In of the bearer and sends to the card a random
`number R. Then the micro-processor of the card computes :
`
`The decryption function of C is :
`P= dK(C)
`So a smart card is, with a simple algorithm, a very
`secure method for identification, authentication, encryption or
`decryption of confidential data as medical information.
`
`III.2. RSA and DES.
`
`Recently, smart cards with higher RAM memory size,
`permitted the implementation of higher level algorithms.
`
`. The RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) algorithm uses
`the following function : When X wants to send the m message
`to the user A, them it computes : (mP mod n) and sends this
`result to A. Only the user A may rebuild m using the secret
`exposant s to calculate :
`m = ( mP modn)S mod n
`
`This RSA algorithm exists on specific smart card as
`MIMOSA (Gemplus)
`
`. The DES algorithm was obtained by arrangement of
`several encryption functions. DES is the "Data Encryption
`Standard" published as a Federal Information Processing
`Standard n°46 in 1977. In the DES algorithm, encryption and
`decryption use an algorithm on data blocks of 64 bits, under the
`control of a 56 bits key. A block is submitted to an initial
`permutation, then to a complex calculation (depending on the
`key) an then to an inverse permutation.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`Smart cards, because they are equiped with three types
`of memory and a true micro-computer, are effective and secure
`ways to ensure the confidentiality of medical data. The principal
`possible functions are :
`- Identification
`- Authentication of the bearer by means of a secret code
`- Electronic signature
`- Encryption and decryption of electronic mails.
`
`The recent availability of classical algorithms as DES
`or RSA on the smart card reinforces the potential of smart cards
`as a key acces to medical information.
`
`A= F (S, In, R)
`
`REFERENCES :
`
`and sends this result to the system which has the list of
`the n authorized clients. Then the system computes
`A'=F(S, In, R) and verifies the equality : A=A'. The key 'R' is
`secure as the random number R is generated every time ; if K
`and R are 64 bits long, then the risk of rutilizing the same key
`is 10-9.
`
`2) Encryption.
`The system sends C and the random number R. At
`reception, the calculation is the following one :
`K = F(S, In, R).
`
`R. BEUSCART and P.C. PARADINAS
`Smart cards for Health Care
`In "Telematics in Medicine" J. Duisterhout ed.
`p. 357-367. - North-Holland, 1991.
`
`J.M. LAMERE, Y. LEROUX, J. TOURLY
`La securite des reseaux - p. 294-300
`Dunod ed. Paris (1987)
`
`1050
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket