Paper 10
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822 Entered: June 6, 2017
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VALENCELL, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before BRIAN J. McNAMARA, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
`SHEILA F. McSHANE, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes
`
`review of claims 1–13 of U.S. Patent No. 8,923,941 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’941
`patent”) under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Valencell, Inc.
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless
`. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
`For the reasons set forth below, we institute inter partes review of
`
`claims 1, 2, and 6–13 of the ’941 patent.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`
`According to the parties, the ’941 patent is involved in the following
`civil actions: Valencell, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 5-16-cv-00010
`(E.D.N.C. 2016); Valencell, Inc. v. Bragi Store, LLC et al., Case No. 5-16-
`cv-00895 (E.D.N.C. 2016); and Valencell, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., Case No. 5-16-
`cv-00002 (E.D.N.C. 2016). Pet. 70; Paper 5, 1. Further, the ’941 patent is
`involved in a related petition for inter partes review, Case IPR2017-00321,
`filed by Petitioner on the same day as the instant Petition.1
`
`
`1 Neither party identified the related petition in its Mandatory Notices or in
`an updated Mandatory Notice. We caution each party to comply with its
`obligation to update its Mandatory Notices, as required. 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.8(a)(3); Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48759–60
`(Aug. 12, 2012); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a)(1).
`
`2
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`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
`
`
`B. The ’941 Patent
`
`The ’941 patent is entitled “Methods and Apparatus for Generating
`Data Output Containing Physiological and Motion-Related Information,”
`filed February 19, 2014, and issued December 30, 2014. Ex. 1001 at [22],
`[45], [54]. The ’941 patent is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application
`No. 12/691,388, filed January 21, 2010, now issued as U.S. Patent
`No. 8,700,111 B2 (id. at [63]), and claims priority to four provisional patent
`applications: U.S. Provisional Patent Application Nos. 61/208,567, filed
`February 25, 2009; 61/208,574, filed February 25, 2009; 61/212,444, filed
`April 13, 2009; and 61/274,191, filed August 14, 2009 (id. at [60]).
`The ’941 patent discloses methods related generally to “physiological
`monitoring” and, in particular, methods for generating a serial data string
`containing both physical or motion-based activity information and
`physiological information. Id., Abstract, 1:20–23. The ’941 patent
`describes using a motion sensor to capture physical or motion-based activity
`information and a photoplethysmography (PPG) sensor to capture
`physiological information. Id. The PPG sensor uses an optical emitter to
`emit light into a subject, for example, via a light-guiding cover made from
`“light transmissive material.” Id. at 2:3–17. An optical detector then detects
`scattered light produced upon the emitted light penetrating the subject. See
`id. at 13:4–14; 14:40–49.
`The ’941 patent discloses determining multiple physical activity and
`physiological parameters based on information obtained from the respective
`sensors. Id., Abstract. Specifically, “[a] plurality of subject physiological
`parameters can be extracted from the physiological information, and a
`plurality of subject physical activity parameters can be extracted from the
`
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`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
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`motion-related information.” Id. The physiological and motion-related
`information may be processed into a serial string. Id. at 26:4–7. The serial
`string then may be parsed, such that an application-specific interface (API)
`may use both sets of data to generate statistical relationships between the
`physiological parameters and the physical activity parameters. Id. at
`26:15–19; Fig. 18.
`In the methods described in the ’941 patent, PPG signals may be pre-
`conditioned to reduce motion artifacts and signal noise. Id. at 30:44–48; see
`id. at 32:1–15, 3:47–55. In particular, the physiological information may be
`filtered to remove signal noise by using various, known signal processing
`techniques. See id. at 3:56–67. Thus, the ’941 patent discloses methods for
`removing motion-related noise artifacts, such as subject footstep noise. See
`id. at 3:65–4:5; 31:18–19.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`
`Claim 1 is the challenged independent claim of the ’941 patent. Each
`of claims 2–13 depends directly or indirectly from claim 1. Claim 1 is
`illustrative and is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized.
`1.
`A method of generating data output containing
`physiological and motion-related information, the method
`comprising:
`sensing physical activity and physiological
`information from a subject via a single monitoring device
`attached to the subject, wherein the monitoring device
`comprises at least one motion sensor for sensing the
`physical activity and at least one photoplethysmography
`(PPG) sensor for sensing the physiological information;
`and
`
`processing signals from the at least one motion
`sensor and signals from at least one PPG sensor via a
`processor of the monitoring device into a serial data output
`
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`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
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`
`and motion-related
`information
`of physiological
`information, wherein the serial data output is configured
`such that a plurality of subject physiological parameters
`comprising subject heart rate and subject respiration rate
`can be extracted from the physiological information and
`such that a plurality of subject physical activity parameters
`can be extracted from the motion-related information.
`Id. at 30:35–54 (emphases added).
`
`D. Applied References and Declaration
`
`Petitioner relies on the following references and declaration in support
`of its asserted grounds of unpatentability.
`
`Exhibit
`1003
`1004
`1009
`
`1010
`
`1016
`
`1025
`
`1031
`
`References and Declaration
`Declaration of Dr. Majid Sarrafzadeh
`Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Majid Sarrafzadeh
`Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2005/040261 A
`to Numaga et al., published February 17, 2005
`Certified English-language translation of Numaga2
`(“Numaga”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2009/0105556 A1 to
`Fricke et al., filed September 29, 2008, published
`April 23, 2009 (“Fricke”)
`Hyonyoung Han et al., Development of a wearable health
`monitoring device with motion artifact reduced algorithm,
`International Conference on Control, Automation and
`Systems, IEEE (2007) (“Han”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0059870 A1 to
`Aceti, published March 17, 2005 
`
`
`
`
`
`2 Citations to Numaga are to this English-language translation.
`
`5
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`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
`
`
`Exhibit
`1032
`
`References and Declaration
`G. Comtois & Y. Mendelson, A Comparative Evaluation of
`Adaptive Noise Cancellation Algorithms for Minimizing
`Motion Artifacts in a Forehead-Mounted Wearable Pulse
`Oximeter, IEEE (2007) (“Comtois”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2007/0197881 A1 to
`Wolf et al., published August 23, 2007 (“Wolf”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0200774 A1 to
`Luo, filed February 16, 2007; published August 21, 2008
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0133699 A1 to
`Craw et al., filed October 4, 2007, published June 5, 2008
`(“Craw”)
`U.S. Patent No. 6,513,532 B2 to Mault et al., issued February
`4, 2003 (“Mault”)
`U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0181798 A1 to
`Al-Ali, published September 25, 2003 (“Al-Ali”)
`International Patent Application Publication No. WO
`2006/009830 to Behar et al., published January 26, 2006
`(“Behar”)
`U.S. Patent No. 6,996,427 to Ali et al., issued
`February 7, 2006 (“Ali”)
`
`1042
`
`1055
`
`1056
`
`1057
`
`1058
`
`1061
`
`1064
`
`
`Pet. vii–x.
`As noted above, the ’941 patent issued claiming benefit from U.S.
`provisional patent applications having filing dates as early as February 25,
`2009. Ex. 1001 at [60]. Each of the applied references has an effective date
`prior to February 25, 2009. See Pet. 9–10.
`
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability:
`References
`Basis
`Challenged Claim(s)
`Luo and Craw
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 1–3, 9, and 11–13
`Luo, Craw, and Wolf
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 4 and 5
`Luo, Craw, and Fricke
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 6 and 8
`
`6
`
`

`

`Basis
`
`Challenged Claim(s)
`
`IPR2017-00319
`Patent 8,923,941 B2
`
`
`References
`Luo, Craw, Fricke, and
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 7
`Comtois
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 10
`Luo, Craw, and Aceti
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 1, 2, 9, 11, and 12
`Mault and Al-Ali
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 3
`Mault, Al-Ali, and Lee
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 4 and 5
`Mault, Al-Ali, and Behar
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 6–8
`Mault, Al-Ali, and Han
`Mault, Al-Ali, and Numaga 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 10
`Mault, Al-Ali, and Ali
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 13
`Pet. 8–9.
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. Claim Interpretation
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and
`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim
`term must be set forth with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.
`See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`1. “physiological information” (Claims 1–13)
`
`Petitioner argues that the Specification of the ’941 patent provides an
`express definition of the term “physiological.” Pet. 13–14. In particular, the
`Specification states that:
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`
`The term “physiological” refers to matter or energy of or from
`the body of a creature (e.g., humans, animals, etc.). In
`embodiments of the present invention, the term “physiological”
`is intended to be used broadly, covering both physical and
`psychological matter and energy of or from the body of a
`creature. However, in some cases, the term “psychological” is
`called-out separately to emphasize aspects of physiology that are
`more closely tied to conscious or subconscious brain activity
`rather than the activity of other organs, tissues, or cells.
`Ex. 1001, 10:9–18 (emphasis added). Therefore, Petitioner argues that the
`broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “physiological information” is
`“information about physical and/or psychological matter and energy of or
`from the body of a creature.” Pet. 14; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 61.
` Patent Owner contends that this construction is improper under the
`broadest reasonable interpretation standard, but Patent Owner does not state
`why or propose an alternative construction. Prelim. Resp. 13. Instead,
`Patent Owner chooses not to “address the merits of Petitioner’s claim
`constructions at this time, but expressly reserves the right to do so should the
`present Petition be instituted.” Id.
` On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we are persuaded
`that Petitioner’s proposed construction of the term “physiological
`information” as “information about physical and/or psychological matter and
`energy of or from the body of a creature” is the broadest reasonable
`interpretation of that term.
`
`2. “application-specific interface (API)” (Claim 3)
`
`Petitioner argues that the recitation in claim 3 of an “application-
`
`specific interface (API)” contains a typographical error. Pet. 14. Further,
`Petitioner argues that this typographical error also appears in the
`
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`Patent 8,923,941 B2
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`Specification of the ’941 patent, which describes an “application-specific
`interface (API).” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 26:15–19). In particular, Petitioner
`argues that “API was a well-known term in common usage at the time of the
`alleged invention. By contrast, ‘application-specific interface’ did not have
`a common meaning in the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). Thus, because
`API was a well-known abbreviation, Petitioner concludes that “application-
`specific interface” in the claim and the Specification should have been
`“application programming interface,” so that the recitations would have
`been consistent with the known abbreviation. Id.
`
`Patent Owner also contends that this construction is improper under
`the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, but, as with the previous
`term, Patent Owner does not state why or propose an alternative
`construction. Prelim. Resp. 13.
`
`We are unable to accept Petitioner’s proposed construction of this
`term as the broadest reasonable interpretation for at least three reasons.
`First, because the term appears in the identical form, namely, “application-
`specific interface (API),” in both claim 3 and in the Specification, Petitioner
`has not provided any evidence to support its argument that this term contains
`a typographical error. The similarity of the abbreviation “API” selected by
`the patentee to a well-known abbreviation may be nothing more than a
`coincidence. Further, even assuming that Petitioner is correct and that this
`term contains a typographical error, on this record, we cannot be certain
`whether the error is in the words of the term (i.e., “application programming
`
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`interface,” rather than “application-specific interface”) or the letters of the
`abbreviation (i.e., “ASI,” rather than “API”).3
`
`Second, when construing a claim term under the broadest reasonable
`interpretation standard, we begin with the words of the term as it appears in
`the claims and, if the ordinary and customary meaning is not plain, we look
`to the specification to glean the meaning of the term. In re Morris, 127 F.3d
`1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he specification is always highly
`relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the
`single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”). We also may look to
`the prosecution history to try to discern a claim term’s meaning. “At the
`same time, because prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
`between the PTO and the inventor, ‘it often lacks the clarity of the
`specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.’”
`Trading Technologies Intern., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Netcraft Corp. v. eBay, Inc., 549 F.3d 1394, (Fed.
`Cir. 2008)). When we are unable to construe the claim term from such
`intrinsic evidence, we may turn to extrinsic evidence to aid in construing the
`claim term. See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S.
`___, 135 S.Ct. 831, 840 (2015) (“In some cases, however, the district court
`will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult
`extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
`
`
`3 We note that the prosecution history consistently uses the term
`“application-specific interface (API).” Ex. 1002, 47–48, 55, 95, 132, 157.
`Thus, we find no evidence of a typographical error in the prosecution
`history.
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`science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time
`period.”).
`
`Petitioner, however, would have us assume a particular typographical
`error in the term “application-specific interface (API)” and then turn directly
`to extrinsic evidence to construe the term as rewritten by Petitioner. We
`decline to deviate from our claim construction standards based on
`Petitioner’s presumed error in the claim language and to rely on extrinsic
`evidence (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62, 63) over intrinsic evidence as to the claim
`term’s meaning.
`
`Third, we reject Petitioner’s proposed construction for the term
`“application-specific interface (API)” because we find that construction is
`inconsistent with the explanation of the meaning of the term in the
`Specification of the ’941 patent. In particular, Petitioner argues that “APIs
`are thus characterized by their broad applicability to different applications—
`and not “application specific” as such.” Pet. 14 (emphasis added, citing Ex.
`1003 ¶ 62). Therefore, Petitioner argues that “‘application-specific interface
`(API)’ should be [construed] broadly to include at least an application
`interface that specifies how some software components should interact with
`each other.” Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63).
`
`Nevertheless, the Specification of the ’941 patent states that:
` The multiplexed data outputs 604 may be a serial data
`string of activity and physiological information 700 (FIG. 18)
`parsed out specifically such that an application-specific interface
`(API) can utilize the data as required for a particular application.
`The applications may use this data to generate high-level
`assessments, such as overall fitness or overall health.
`Furthermore, the individual data elements of the data string can
`be used to facilitate better assessments of other individual data
`elements of the data string.
`
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`Ex. 1001, 26:15–23 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s
`arguments, the Specification explains that the “application-specific interface
`(API)” is directed to a “particular application,” rather than broadly to
`different applications. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
`(noting that the specification is the single best guide to a disputed term’s
`meaning).
`
`Consequently, we decline to accept Petitioner’s overly broad
`construction of the term “application-specific interface (API).” Because
`Petitioner’s assertions challenging claim 3 are based on its construction of
`this term, we do not consider further Petitioner’s challenges to claim 3 as
`rendered obvious over Luo and Craw (Pet. 27) or over Mault, Al-Ali, and
`Lee (id. at. 55–59); and we deny institution of inter partes review of claim 3
`on either asserted ground.
`
`3. “the application” (claims 4 and 5)
`
`Petitioner also argues that the term “the application” in claim 4
`
`contains a typographical error. Pet. 15. In particular, Petitioner argues that,
`because claim 4 depends from claim 1 and because “an application” does
`not appear in claim 1, the term “the application” in claim 4 lacks antecedent
`basis. Id. Petitioner alleges that, in view of this lack of antecedent basis,
`one of two possible errors exists in claim 4. First, Petitioner suggests that
`the dependency of claim 4 is incorrect and that, because claim 3 recites “an
`application,” “claim 4 should have depended on claim 3.” Id. Second,
`Petitioner argues that, alternatively and for purposes of this Petition only, the
`term “the application” should be read as “an application.” Id. Patent Owner
`does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response.
`
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`Although we agree that the recitation of the term “the application” in
`
`claim 4 lacks antecedent basis in claim 1, we decline to speculate as to the
`intended meaning of the term. Further, the lack of antecedent basis is an
`issue arising under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and Section 112 is not proper subject
`matter for an inter partes review.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). If the scope and
`meaning of the claims cannot be determined without speculation, the
`differences between the challenged claims and the prior art cannot be
`ascertained. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case
`IPR2013-00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing In
`re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior
`art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based
`on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). In other words,
`“[w]ithout ascertaining the proper claim scope, we cannot conduct a
`necessary factual inquiry for determining obviousness—ascertaining
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art.” Id. at 20
`(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). Because
`Petitioner’s assertions challenging claim 4 and claim 5, which depends from
`
`
`4 Although the prosecution history of the ’941 patent indicates that Patent
`Owner filed a request for a Certificate of Correction (see Ex. 1001,
`Certificate of Correction), Patent Owner did not seek to correct errors in
`claim 3 or 4. Patent Owner is in the best position to explain any possible
`typographical errors in claim 3 or 4, but has chosen not to do so here (see
`Prelim. Resp. 13), as is its privilege. Since the filing of the Petition, the
`Board has had exclusive jurisdiction over the patent before the Office. 37
`C.F.R. §§ 42.2 (defining “Proceeding”), 42.3(a). Therefore, we remind
`Patent Owner that it may not now file a further request for a Certificate of
`Correction in the ’941 patent without the Board’s express authorization.
`See, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, L.L.C. v. Meyer Products, LLC, Case
`IPR2015-01839 (PTAB Mar. 1, 2017) (Paper 51).
`
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`claim 4, are based on its construction of this term, we do not consider further
`Petitioner’s challenges to claims 4 and 5 as rendered obvious over Luo,
`Craw, and Wolf (id. at 29–32) or over Mault, Al-Ali, and Behar (id. at. 59–
`61); and we deny institution of inter partes review of claim 4 and 5 on either
`asserted ground.
`4. Other Claim Terms
`Neither party offers specific constructions of other terms in the
`challenged claims. See Pet. 15 (“All other claim terms should be given their
`plain and ordinary meaning under the broadest reasonable construction.”).
`Only terms which are in controversy in this proceeding need to be construed,
`and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See
`Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
`(explaining that “claim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary
`to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g,
`Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Except as provided below, for
`purposes of this Decision, no other claim terms require express construction.
`
`B. Obviousness over Luo and Craw, Alone or in Combination with Other
`References
`
`1. Overview
`
`Petitioner argues that claim 1, 2, and 6–13 are unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Luo and Craw, alone or in combination
`with other references. See supra Section I.E. To support its argument,
`Petitioner provides a detailed mapping of limitations of claims 1, 2, and
`6–13 to structures taught or suggested by Luo and Craw or by Luo and Craw
`and one or more additional references. Pet. 15–44. Petitioner also cites Dr.
`
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`Sarrafzadeh’s Declaration for support. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–91, 94–98,
`105–129.
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of skill in the art;5 and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
`Nevertheless, the Court cautions us against “the temptation to read into the
`prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 36.
`We begin our analysis of these grounds of unpatentability with a
`review of the applied art.
`
`2. Luo (Ex. 1055)
`
`Luo teaches noninvasive monitoring system for continuous, painless,
`and bloodless health state monitoring of a subject. Ex. 1055, Abstract.
`Specifically, a wearable device, such as that depicted in Luo’s Figure 1,
`monitors health conditions, analyzes the subject’s health information, and
`
`
`5 Petitioner proposes an assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.
`Pet. 12; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Sarrafzadeh, exceeds
`this assessed level. Ex. 1004. At this time, Patent Owner does not propose
`an alternative assessment. For purposes of this Decision, and to the extent
`necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.
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`outputs that information. Id. ¶¶ 9–13. Luo’s Figure 1 is reproduced below
`with our annotations.
`
`
`
`Luo’s Figure 1 depicts a system configured for positioning around the
`subject’s ear for detection of activity and physiological information. Id.
`¶ 10. The depicted system includes physiological sign sensors (S1) for
`detecting the subject’s physiological information (such as heart rate, oxygen
`saturation (SpO2), and respiration rate (i.e., sleep apnea)); activity sensors
`(S2) for detecting the subject’s physical activity; a central processing
`module (CPM) including a central processing unit (CPU); and a shell to
`contain the system components. Id. ¶ 27; see id. Figs. 3 and 4; see also id.
`¶ 46 (“blood oxygen level, heart rate or pulse, blood flow information, body
`temperature, sleep apnea, glucose, exercise amount, unexpected fall or any
`type of health sign or activity that may be detected by the monitoring device”
`(Emphasis added.)), claim 37 (“respiratory rate”). Physiological sensors
`(S1) include red (660 nm) and infrared (910 nm) light sources for emitting
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`light through the subject’s body, for example, the earlobe, and optoelectronic
`sensors for detecting the intensity of light reflected back through the earlobe
`from a reflection plate. Id. ¶ 28. The CPM extracts physiological
`parameters from the plethysmographic signals obtained by the
`optoelectronic sensors. Id. Signals from Luo’s sensors are processed in
`real-time to output physiological and activity information. Id. ¶¶ 28, 46,
`claim 37, Fig. 4.
`Activity sensors S2 continuously detect a subject’s physical activity in
`three dimensions. Id. ¶ 29. The CPM processes signals from 3-axis
`acceleration sensors to extract activity information, such as activity state,
`activity strength, and activity duration. Id.; see id., Fig. 5. Activity
`information may be correlated with physiological information to more
`intelligently differentiate normal and dangerous health conditions. Id. ¶ 31.
`For example, a heart rate of 60–100 beats per minute (bpm) may be
`considered normal for a subject at rest, but a heart rate of 120 bpm may be
`considered within a normal range if the subject is running. Id.
`
`3. Craw (Ex. 1056)
`
`Craw teaches methods for communicating medical information
`between network devices. Ex. 1056 ¶ 2; see id. ¶ 13, Fig. 9A (displaying
`physiological information based definitions derived from data dictionaries).
`The health care computing environment includes a variety of medical
`monitoring and analysis devices that process physiological data, including
`heart rate and respiration rate, and communicate that physiological data via a
`network. Id. ¶ 4. For example, Craw teaches “a system for interoperability
`of medical devices on a network and particularly measurements of non-
`invasive blood pressure (‘NIBP’), but it is understood that this example is
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`merely illustrative and other uses and fields of use are contemplated.” Id.
`¶ 51.
`Craw teaches serializing data for transmission using a classification
`scheme to enable extraction of physiological parameters by a recipient
`device, such as for displaying information. See id. ¶¶ 200–216.
`“Serialization may be thought of as a process for taking an instance of
`software structure or class and turning the attributes/members of the class
`into transferable data encoding.” Id. ¶ 235. Craw further teaches the use of
`string tables to provide an interface that may be used by software to manage
`and access strings of data. Id. ¶ 255. The data dictionary may be used with
`a string table as an interface for managing, extracting, and displaying
`information from binary information streams. Id. ¶ 256, Fig. 7G. Thus,
`Craw’s system may include a protocol for the serializing and deserializing
`byte streams of information. Id. ¶ 15. Accordingly, physiological
`information may be communicated via known serial communications
`channels. Id. ¶¶ 68–70.
`
`4. Analysis
`a. Claim 1
`
`As noted above, independent claim 1 recites a method of generating
`data output containing physiological and motion-related information.
`Ex. 1001, 30:35–36. Petitioner provides a detailed mapping of the
`limitations of claim on the teachings of Luo. Pet. 22–24. In particular,
`Petitioner argues that Luo teaches a method of generating health information
`derived from physiological information and physical activity information.
`Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1055 ¶ 11); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 79. Referring to Luo’s
`Figure 1, Petitioner further argues that Luo teaches sensing physical activity
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`and physiological information by means of a single monitoring device, such
`as Luo’s ear mounted system, which is attached to the subject. Pet. 22
`(citing Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 10, 27–29, 45, Figs. 1, 4, and 5); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 80.
`With respect to the sensors recited in claim 1, Petitioner argues that
`both types of recited sensors are taught by Luo. First, Petitioner argues that
`Luo’s activity sensors (S2) teach the “at least one motion sensor” of the
`recited monitoring device. Pet. 22 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1055 ¶ 39,
`Fig. 5); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Second, Petitioner argues that Luo’s
`physiological sensors (S1) teach the “at least one photoplethysmography
`(PPG) sensor for sensing the physiological information,” as recited in claim
`1. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 27, 28); see Ex. 1003 ¶ 82. Although Luo
`does not describe sensor (S1) as a photoplethysmography (PPG) sensor,
`Petitioner argues that Luo’s sensor (S1) optically obtains a plethysmographic
`signal and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood
`Luo’s sensor (S1) to be a PPG sensor. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–33, 82. Moreover,
`Luo teaches that its sensor (S1) may retrieve physiological information,
`including heart and respiratory rate, as recited in claim 1. See Ex. 1055 ¶ 46.
`Petitioner also argues that Luo’s system teaches the processing of
`signals from the at least one motion sensor and the at least one PPG sensor
`“via a processor of the monitoring device into a serial data output of
`physiological information and motion-related information.” Pet. 23–24
`(citing Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 28–30, 33–35, 40–42, Figs. 4 and 5); see Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 83–85. In particular, referring to Luo’s Figure 4, Luo teaches that the
`monitoring device of Luo’s Figure 3 includes standard input/output
`interfaces, such as a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port, for outputting health
`information. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 11, 43). Thus, Petitioner argues
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`that, in view of Luo’s teaching regarding the use of a USB port, a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would understand that Luo produces serial data for
`output. I