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`
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`Filed on behalf of Valencell, Inc.
`By: Daniel F. Olejko (dolejko@bosfirm.com)
`
`Jeffrey R. Bragalone (jbragalone@bosfirm.com)
`
`Bragalone Olejko Saad PC
`
`2200 Ross Ave.
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`Suite 4600 – West
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`Dallas, TX 75201
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`Tel: 214.785.6670
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`Fax: 214.786.6680
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`FITBIT, INC.,1
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`VALENCELL, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`Case IPR2017-003192
`U.S. Patent No. 8,923,941
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR REVIEW
`
`
`Mail Stop PATENT BOARD
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
`
`
`1 Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Apple”) is no longer a party in this proceeding.
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`2 Case IPR2017-01555 has been joined with this proceeding.
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`Case IPR2017-00319
`U.S. Pat. No. 8,923,941
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................1
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...........................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`III. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .............................................................8
`
`A.
`
`Overview of the Challenged Claims .....................................................2
`
`Summary of the Proceedings ................................................................3
`
`The Board Misapprehended or Overlooked the Fact That Fitbit’s
`Arguments on Remand Were Not Made in the Petition. .......................8
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`
`B.
`
`The Board Misapprehended or Overlooked the Fact That Fitbit’s New
`Arguments Concerning Craw Contradict the Arguments in the Petition
`and Petitioner’s Own Expert’s Testimony. .......................................... 11
`
`The Board Overlooked or Misapprehended the Teachings of Craw. ..12
`
`
`
`
`C.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................15
`
`
`
`i
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`Case IPR2017-00319
`U.S. Pat. No. 8,923,941
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`adidas AG v. Nike, Inc.,
` IPR2016-00922, 2018 WL 4056113 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2018) .............................8
`
`Apple Inc. v. INVT SPE LLC,
` IPR2018-01472, 2020 WL 865280 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2020) ..............................12
`
`Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,
` 5 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 11
`
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC,
` IPR2017-01719, 2019 WL 328734 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2019) .................................8
`
`Fitbit, Inc. v. Valencell, Inc.,
` 964 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 4, 11
`
`InfoBionic, Inc. v. Braemar Mfg., LLC,
` IPR2017-00796, 2018 WL 3618694 (P.T.A.B. July 27, 2018) ............................12
`
`SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
` 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ...........................................................................................8
`
`United States v. Arthrex, Inc.,
` 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021) ...........................................................................................1
`
`Valencell, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
` No. 21-2041 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2021) ..................................................................1
`
`Rules
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) ............................................................................................8
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) ..................................................................................................1
`
`
`ii
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`Case IPR2017-00319
`U.S. Pat. No. 8,923,941
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s Order granting limited remand in light of
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`United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021),3 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d),
`
`Patent Owner Valencell, Inc. (“Valencell”) submits this Request for Director Review
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`of the Board’s Final Written Decision on Remand, which found that claims 3–5 (the
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`“challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,923,941 (the “’941 patent”) are
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`unpatentable as obvious over Luo and Craw, alone or in combination with Wolf. See
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`Paper 73 at 18–34, 46–47. Review by the Director is warranted because the Board’s
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`Final Written Decision on Remand is premised on new arguments about the prior art
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`that were not made in the Petition and that conflict with the arguments actually made
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`in the Petition and the testimony of Petitioner’s own expert witness. Further, the
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`Board’s findings also rest on fundamental misunderstandings of the disclosures in
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`the prior art. Because Drew Hirshfeld has not been appointed by the President and
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`confirmed by the Senate as the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
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`3 Following Valencell’s Notice of Appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
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`Arthrex. Valencell thereafter filed a motion for stay and limited remand with the
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`Federal Circuit, which the Court granted on November 10, 2021. See Valencell, Inc.
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`v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 21-2041 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2021), Doc. No. 26. This request is
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`timely as it comes within 30 days of the Federal Circuit’s order. See id. at 2.
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`1
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`as required by Arthrex, Valencell respectfully requests that the PTO defer
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`consideration of this Request until a new Director is confirmed.
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`A. Overview of the Challenged Claims
`The ’941 patent, entitled “Methods and Apparatus for Generating Data Output
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`Containing Physiological and Motion-related Information,” discloses wearable
`
`monitors used to measure multiple types of physiological and motion-related
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`information about a person. Ex. 1001, Abstract. One type of sensor used by the
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`monitors is a photoplethysmography (“PPG”) sensor, which can be used to measure
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`a person’s heart rate. Id. at 4:3–5. Another type of sensor used by the monitors is a
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`motion sensor for sensing physical activity. Id. at 30:41.
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`Of particular relevance, the ’941 patent discloses generating a “serial data
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`output” that “is parsed out such that an application-specific interface can utilize the
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`physiological information and motion-related information for an application” to
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`assess the person’s fitness or health. Id., Abstract (emphasis added). Figure 17
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`illustrates the generation of such a serial data string 604 from sensor input, and the
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`serial data string 700 is also illustrated in Figure 18, where the different types of
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`information are parsed out for use by a particular application. Id. at 25:65–26:33. In
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`discussing Figures 17 and 18, the patent further explains that:
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`The multiplexed data outputs 604 may be a serial data string of activity
`and physiological information 700 (FIG. 18) parsed out specifically
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`2
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`such that an application-specific interface (API) can utilize the data as
`required for a particular application. The applications may use this
`data to generate high-level assessments, such as overall fitness or
`overall health.
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`Id. at 26:15–21 (emphasis added). The challenged claims require that “the serial data
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`output is parsed out such that an application-specific interface (API) can utilize the
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`physiological information and motion-related information for an application.” Id.
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`at 30:62–65 (emphasis added).
`
`B. Summary of the Proceedings
`The grounds of unpatentability in the Petition were premised on Petitioner’s
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`proposed construction of a key term in the challenged claims: “application-specific
`
`interface (API)” in claim 3. Petitioner argued that the word “specific” in
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`“application-specific interface (API)” was a typographical error and that the patentee
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`actually meant to claim the use of “application programming interface” or “APIs,”
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`which “are [] characterized by their broad applicability to different applications—
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`and not ‘application specific’ as such.” Paper 2 at 14 (emphasis added). Petitioner
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`asserted that “Craw teaches that a data dictionary used with data classes acts as an
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`API for managing, extracting, and displaying information from information
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`streams.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1056 ¶ 256, Ex. 1003 ¶ 92) (emphasis added). As
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`Petitioner’s expert explained, Craw’s “dictionary provides interfaces to access all
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`types of definitions abstractly and anonymously, to provide the developer with a
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`3
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`generic mechanism to handle definitions that might come from connected devices.”
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`Ex. 1003 ¶ 75 (emphasis added). Further, “Craw teaches that string tables provide a
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`generic interface that are used by any software project to manage and access strings
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`based on symbolic links.” Id. ¶ 76 (emphasis added). Craw’s “data dictionary used
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`with DMOIB [Dynamic Medical Object Information Base] and string table classes
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`may act as interfaces for managing, extracting, and displaying information from
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`binary information streams.” Id. ¶ 92. Thus, Petitioner’s expert concluded that “a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the data dictionary acts
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`as an API.” Id. (emphasis added).
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`In its initial Final Written Decision, the Board rejected Petitioner’s proposed
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`constructions of “application-specific interface” in claim 3 and concluded that,
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`“[b]ecause Petitioner’s assertions challenging claim 3 are based on the rejected
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`construction of [application-specific interface], and the evidentiary support relied
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`upon is predicated on the same,” Petitioner had failed to meet its burden of proof.
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`Paper 43 at 17–18. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s construction
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`of “application-specific interface,” agreeing that “an ‘application specific interface
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`(API)’ is directed to a ‘particular application,’ rather than broadly to different
`
`applications.” Fitbit, Inc. v. Valencell, Inc., 964 F.3d 1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
`
`(emphasis in original). Notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit noted in dicta that “[t]he
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`Board’s narrowing construction may have no significance, where, as here, the
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`4
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`claimed ‘application-specific interface’ performs the same function as an application
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`programming interface, i.e., ‘enabl[ing] a particular application to utilize data
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`obtained from hardware.’” Id. Further, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he Board
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`erred in holding that since it did not adopt Fitbit’s claim construction, that decided
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`the question of patentability.” Id. at 1118. It vacated the Board’s decision with respect
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`to claims 3–5 and “remanded for determination of the merits of patentability on the
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`grounds presented in the petition.” Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
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`On remand, the Board ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing.
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`Paper 57 at 10–11. In its brief on remand, Fitbit argued for the first time that “Craw’s
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`‘interfaces’ each qualify as an ‘application specific interface (API)’ under the
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`Board’s narrowing construction,” that the claimed “application-specific interface”
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`performs the same function as an API, and that “Craw’s interfaces are also used by
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`specific applications.” Paper 60 at 6. As an example, Fitbit asserted that “Craw
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`teaches that a health-monitoring application, such as the blood pressure application
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`of Figure 9A, uses the disclosed interfaces in order to display extracted health data.”
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`Id. (citing Ex. 1056 ¶¶ 203, 208). In addition, Fitbit made a new argument that “Craw
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`discloses
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`tailoring
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`the ‘application-specific
`
`interface (API)’
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`to a specific
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`application.” Id. at 7. “For example, Craw discloses using ‘a decipherable dictionary
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`and an interpreter’ in order to ‘extract information and act on it,’ and further teaches
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`that ‘[a]cting on the received information may depend on the goal of the
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`application.” Id. (citing Ex. 1056 ¶ 48) (emphasis in original). Thus, Fitbit asserted
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`that “Craw … recognizes that ‘medical devices may include one or more types of
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`software, and the medical devices and software may be configured to operate upon
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`a particular subset of physiological data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1056 ¶ 4) (emphasis in
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`original). Fitbit concluded that “not only are Craw’s ‘interfaces’ used by ‘a particular
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`application,’ they can be specifically tailored to each ‘particular application.’” Id.
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`Following an oral hearing, the Board issued its Final Written Decision on
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`Remand. See Paper 73. The Board found “that Craw’s ‘interfaces,’ like the recited
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`‘application-specific interface,’ enable a particular application to utilize data
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`obtained from hardware.” Id. at 23. It based this finding on the background section
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`of Craw, which stated that “[t]he following description describes use of a system
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`from
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`interoperability of medical devices on a network and particularly
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`measurements of non-invasive blood pressure (‘NIBP’), but it is understood that this
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`example is merely illustrative and other uses and fields of use are contemplated” and
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`that the “MOIB [Medical Object Information Base] may include a dictionary and
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`classification mechanism used to model information sets that represent human
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`physiology or other information models.” Id. (citing Ex. 1056 ¶¶ 51–52) (emphasis
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`in original). However, the Petition did not rely on this portion of Craw to establish
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`the disclosure of the claimed “application-specific interface.” See Paper 2 at 27.
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`The Board highlighted Fitbit’s new arguments that “Craw’s teach[es] that its
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`dictionary-based interfaces ‘[a]ct[] on the received information’ in a way that
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`‘depend[s] on the goal of the application’” and that “Craw thus expressly teaches
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`interfaces directed to a ‘particular application,’ regardless of whether those
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`interfaces are also ‘interoperable’ with other applications.” Paper 73 at 24
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`(emphasis in original). It further cited Craw’s disclosure that “the data dictionary is
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`derived from a device data sheet, and … the data dictionary comprises one or more
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`data definitions specific to the network device and a global unique identifier for the
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`network devices,” that it “extract[s] information from the data according to the data
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`dictionary,” and that the “dictionaries may include information specific to the data.”
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`Id. (citing Ex. 1056 ¶¶ 13, 18) (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding the fact that
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`the Petition did not rely on paragraphs 13 or 18 of Craw as disclosing the claimed
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`“application-specific interface,” the Board concluded that “Craw makes clear that
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`the data dictionary interfaces are tailored to be specific to the device or the device
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`and the measured data.” Id.
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`Despite Petitioner’s expert testimony that Craw’s data dictionary and data
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`classes are generic and provide a generic interface used in any software project, the
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`Board found that “Craw teaches that a health-monitoring application, such as the
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`blood pressure application, uses the disclosed interfaces, i.e., data dictionaries, in
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`order to display extracted health data,” that “Craw’s interfaces ‘enabl[e] a particular
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`application to utilize data obtained from hardware,’ the same function achieved by
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`the received ‘application-specific interfaces,’” and “that is all that is required under
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`[the Board’s] construction of ‘application-specific interface (API)’ and the Federal
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`Circuit’s guidance.” Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1056 ¶¶ 51–52, 203, 208, Fig. 9A). But
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`the Petition did not rely on paragraphs 51–52, 208, or Fig. 9A as disclosing the
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`claimed “application-specific interface.” See Paper 2 at 27.
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`III. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
`A. The Board Misapprehended or Overlooked the Fact That Fitbit’s
`Arguments on Remand Were Not Made in the Petition.
`A remand “does not change [the Board’s] focus on the Petition as Petitioner’s
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`case-in-chief ….” adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., IPR2016-00922, 2018 WL 4056113, at *3
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`(P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2018) (emphasis added). The “petitioner’s contentions [in the
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`petition] … define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to
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`conclusion.” SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018). The Petition must
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`identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” and “specify where each
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`element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied
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`upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).
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`A petitioner cannot use later briefing as “an opportunity to start anew, to fill
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`in gaps or to remedy omissions in a petition.” Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Oyster Optics, LLC,
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`IPR2017-01719, 2019 WL 328734, at *10 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2019). Yet that is
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`exactly what Fitbit attempted to do. Faced with the reality that the Petition did not
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`demonstrate that claims 3–5 are obvious (as the Board had already found), Fitbit
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`sought to fill in the gaps and remedy omissions in the Petition by relying on new
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`disclosures from Craw and making new arguments that contradict the arguments
`
`made in the Petition and Petitioner’s expert testimony. In the Petition, Petitioner
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`argued only that “Craw teaches that a data dictionary used with data classes acts as
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`an API for managing, extracting, and displaying information from information
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`streams.” Paper 2 at 27. Other than the data dictionary from paragraph 256 of Craw,
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`the Petitioner did not identify any other disclosure in Craw that allegedly teaches or
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`discloses the claimed “application-specific interface,” much less the claimed
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`“application-specific interface” as construed by the Board.
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`Indeed, when Petitioner sought rehearing of the Board’s denial of institution
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`on claims 3–5, it attempted to argue, as Fitbit did on remand, that Craw discloses the
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`claimed application-specific interface even under the Board’s construction of the
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`term. See Paper 13 at 2–3. But the Board rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding that
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`“the record lacks sufficient evidence to show that there is a reasonable likelihood
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`that a challenged claim could be found unpatentable by applying the teachings of
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`those references to a different construction of the term.” Paper 15 at 6. Importantly,
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`the Board recognized that it “evaluate[s] the arguments and evidence as presented
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`by the Petitioner in its Petition, including arguments presented for alternative
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`constructions, if any.” Id. (emphasis modified). Further, the Board found that
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`“Petitioner did not argue for an alternative construction of the disputed term or for
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`the application of the teachings of Lou and Craw to such an alternative
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`construction.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Board concluded that it could not
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`“have overlooked or misapprehended an argument that the Petitioner did not
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`make.” Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added). The Board also rejected Petitioner’s argument
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`that “claim 3 only requires that the ‘application-specific interface (API)’ ‘can utilize
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`a particular application’” because it relied on a misinterpretation of the specification,
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`and because Petitioner did not rely on that language in support of its claim
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`construction arguments. Id. at 7 n.6.
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`Fitbit’s argument on remand was nothing more than a recycled version of
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`Petitioner’s petition for rehearing and should have been rejected by the Board for the
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`same reasons. Compare Paper 13 at 2–3 (arguing that Craw discloses “[a]cting on
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`the received information may depend on the goal of the application,” that, “when
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`implemented, the data dictionary is directed to a particular application,” and that “the
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`data dictionary’s use is tailored to the specific application that it is intended to
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`complement”), with Paper 60 at 6–7 (arguing that “Craw’s interfaces are also used
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`by specific applications,” that “[a]cting on the received information may depend on
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`the goal of the application,” and that Craw’s interfaces “can be specifically tailored
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`to each ‘particular application.’”) (emphasis modified). While the Federal Circuit
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`stated that the Board’s narrowing construction “may have no significance, where, as
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`here, the claimed ‘application-specific interface’ performs the same function as an
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`application programming interface, i.e., ‘enabl[ing] a particular application to utilize
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`data obtained from hardware,’” Fitbit, 964 F.3d at 1117 (emphasis added), Petitioner
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`never made that argument in the Petition either. The Federal Circuit’s observation is,
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`at best, dicta, and cannot be construed as a finding of fact. See Atl. Thermoplastics
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`Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Fact-finding by the
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`appellate court is simply not permitted.”). Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s statement
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`that “[o]n remand the Board may consider this aspect” did not grant Fitbit an
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`unfettered license to expand the scope of the Petition. See id.
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`B. The Board Misapprehended or Overlooked the Fact That Fitbit’s
`New Arguments Concerning Craw Contradict the Arguments in
`the Petition and Petitioner’s Own Expert’s Testimony.
`Not only did Petitioner not make the arguments made by Fitbit on remand in
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`the Petition, Fitbit’s argument on remand actually conflicts with the arguments
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`presented in the Petition as well as Petitioner’s expert testimony.
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`Petitioner asserted that Craw’s “data dictionary used with data classes acts as
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`an API.” Paper 2 at 27. Petitioner further contended that “APIs are thus
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`characterized by their broad applicability to different applications—and not
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`‘application specific’ as such.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s expert
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`explained that Craw’s “dictionary provides interfaces to access all types of
`
`definitions abstractly and anonymously, to provide the developer with a generic
`
`mechanism to handle definitions that might come from connected devices.”
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`Ex. 1003 ¶ 75 (emphasis added). Further, Petitioner’s expert asserted that “Craw
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`teaches that string tables provide a generic interface that are used by any software
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`project to manage and access strings based on symbolic links.” Id. ¶ 76 (emphasis
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`added). This is the exact opposite of the claimed “application-specific interface.”
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`Indeed, the Board recognized that Lee’s API, a Bluetooth® wireless connection, was
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`not an application-specific interface because it was “designed for general
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`applicability across applications.” Paper 73 at 44 (emphasis in original).
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`Fitbit’s new argument on remand that Craw’s interfaces “can be specifically
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`tailored to each ‘particular application’” depending on the “goal of the application”
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`(Paper 60 at 7) contradicts the arguments made in the Petition and its own expert
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`testimony. Accordingly, it should have been rejected by the Board. See Apple Inc. v.
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`INVT SPE LLC, IPR2018-01472, 2020 WL 865280, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2020)
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`(rejecting a party’s argument that contradicted its own expert’s testimony);
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`InfoBionic, Inc. v. Braemar Mfg., LLC, IPR2017-00796, 2018 WL 3618694, at *13
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`(P.T.A.B. July 27, 2018) (same).
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`C. The Board Overlooked or Misapprehended the Teachings of Craw.
`In finding that Craw discloses the claimed “application-specific interface,” the
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`Board relied on Craw’s disclosure that its system is used “for interoperability of
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`medical devices on a network and particularly measurements of non-invasive blood
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`pressure.” Paper 73 at 23 (emphasis omitted). But the measurement of non-invasive
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`blood pressure is not a “particular application” within the meaning of the
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`’941 patent. Instead, it is an example of an assessment performed by an application.
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`Ex. 1001 at 26:15–33 (“The applications may use this data to generate high-level
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`assessments, such as overall fitness or overall health. Furthermore, the individual
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`data elements of the data string can be used to facilitate better assessments of other
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`individual data elements of the data string…. In another example, the filtered PPG
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`signal may be run through an integration circuit to estimate blood volume over each
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`blood pulse. This information may then be used to assess blood pressure and blood
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`oxygen levels more accurately than a direct measurement of blood pressure or blood
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`oxygen levels.”). Indeed, Craw makes clear that blood pressure measurement is an
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`example of a “use[]” or “field[] of use” of the system — not an “application.”
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`Ex. 1056 ¶ 51 (emphasis added).
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`The Board also relied on Craw’s disclosure that “[a]cting on the received
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`information may depend on the goal of the application.” Paper 73 at 23–24. But that
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`disclosure does not concern Craw’s data dictionary or data classes (i.e., the alleged
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`“application-specific
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`interface”). It references
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`the functionality of Craw’s
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`“interpreter,” which Petitioner did not rely upon for the disclosure of the claimed
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`“application-specific interface” in the Petition. Compare Paper 2 at 27 (arguing that
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`Craw’s data dictionary and data classes disclose an API), with Ex. 1056 ¶ 48 (“The
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`interpreter may use the dictionary to extract information and act on it. Acting on the
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`received information may depend on the goal of the information.”) (emphasis
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`added); see also Paper 71 at 20:7–15 (“[T]hey misstated when they said that the
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`dictionary actually extracts this information. Instead, it’s the interpreter that is
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`referred to as doing that. The Petitioner cannot identify only the data dictionary as
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`being the generic application programming interface, and then come back for the
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`first time on remand, and say, ‘Oh, it’s the interpreter,’ …. The interpreter is not the
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`data dictionary.”).
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`In addition, the Board relied on Craw’s disclosure that “the data dictionary is
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`derived from a device data sheet” and “comprises one or more data definitions
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`specific to the network device and a global unique identifier for the network device”
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`and that the system “extract[s] information from the data according to the data
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`dictionary.” Paper 73 at 24 (emphasis omitted). But this disclosure makes clear that
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`the data dictionary is based on “the network device” that is sending the data — not
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`an application on the device that is receiving the data. See Ex. 1056 ¶ 13 (“receiving
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`data from the network device”) (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 49 (noting that the
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`data dictionary is modeled after a device data sheet, which can be deciphered by
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`other machines). This disclosure does not suggest that the data dictionary is tailored
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`to be specific to other devices.
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`Finally, the Board found that because Craw discloses that “a health-
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`monitoring application, such as the blood pressure application, uses the disclosed
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`Case IPR2017-00319
`U.S. Pat. No. 8,923,941
`interfaces, i.e., data dictionaries, in order to display health data,” the interfaces
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`perform the same function as the claimed “application-specific interface.” Paper 73
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`at 25–26. But Petitioner’s expert testified that Craw’s “generic” interfaces support
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`many different applications, not just a health-monitoring application. Ex. 1003
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`¶¶ 75–76. Craw’s interfaces are just as generic as Lee’s Bluetooth® API and do not
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`constitute an “application-specific interface.”
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Valencell respectfully requests that the Director
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`reverse the Board’s determination that the challenged claims are unpatentable as
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`obvious over Luo and Craw, alone or in combination with Wolf.
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`Dated: December 10, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Daniel F. Olejko
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 76,958
`Bragalone Olejko Saad PC
`2200 Ross Ave.
`Suite 4600 – West
`Dallas, TX 75201
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`15
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`Case IPR2017-00319
`U.S. Pat. No. 8,923,941
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that this document was served via electronic
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`mail on December 10, 2021, to Petitioner via counsel, James M. Glass, Sam Stake,
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`and Ogi Zivojnovic at
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`the email addresses:
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`jimglass@quinnemanuel.com,
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`samstake@quinnemanuel.com, ogizivojnovic@quinnemanuel.com, pursuant
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`to
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`Petitioner’s consent in its Updated Mandatory Notices at page 1.
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`Daniel F. Olejko
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Registration No. 76,958
`Bragalone Olejko Saad PC
`2200 Ross Ave.
`Suite 4600 – West
`Dallas, TX 75201
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`16
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