throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper 18
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` Entered: June 30, 2017
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`____________
`
`
`Before KEN B. BARRETT, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Petitioner, Apple, Inc. (“Apple”), filed a Petition (Paper 5, “Pet.”)
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–8, 10–17, and 19–33 of U.S.
`Patent No. 7,116,710 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’710 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 311–319. Apple relies on the Declaration of James A. Davis, Ph.D.
`(Ex. 1006) with its Petition. Patent Owner, California Institute of
`Technology (“Caltech”), filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 17, “Prelim.
`Resp.”) to the Petition.
`We have jurisdiction under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 314,
`which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the
`information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and
`associated evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of
`claims 1–8, 11–17, 19–22, and 24–33 of the ’710 patent.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`The parties indicate that the ’710 patent was involved in the following
`active case, Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Broadcom Ltd., No. 2:16-cv-03714 (C.D.
`Cal. filed May 26, 2016), and in concluded cases, Cal. Inst. of Tech. v.
`Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01108 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 17, 2015);
`and Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., 2:13-cv-07245 (C.D. Cal.
`filed Oct. 1, 2013). Pet. 3, Paper 8, 2–3.
`The parties also identify co-pending cases IPR2017-00211 and
`IPR2017-00219, in which Apple has filed a petition for inter partes review
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`of the ’710 patent. Pet. 3; Paper 8, 2–3. Inter partes review of the
`’710 patent was previously considered and denied in Hughes Network Sys.,
`LLC v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., IPR2015-00067 (PTAB April 27, 2015) (Paper
`18) (“IPR2015-00067”) and Hughes Network Sys., LLC v. Cal. Inst. of
`Tech., IPR2015-00068 (PTAB April 27, 2015) (“IPR2015-00068”). Finally,
`patents related to the ’710 patent were challenged in IPR2015-00059,
`IPR2015-00060, IPR2015-00061, and IPR2015-00081. Pet. 3.
`
`B. The ʼ710 Patent
`The ’710 patent describes the serial concatenation of interleaved
`convolutional codes forming turbo-like codes. Ex. 1001, Title. It explains
`some of the prior art with reference to its Fig. 1, reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a prior “turbo code” system. Id. at 2:14–
`15. The ’710 patent specification describes Figure 1 as follows:
`
`A standard turbo coder 100 is shown in FIG. 1. A block
`of k information bits is input directly to a first coder 102. A
`k bit interleaver 106 also receives the k bits and interleaves
`them prior to applying them to a second coder 104. The second
`coder produces an output that has more bits than its input, that
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`is, it is a coder with rate that is less than 1. The coders 102,104
`are typically recursive convolutional coders.
`Three different items are sent over the channel 150: the
`original k bits, first encoded bits 110, and second encoded bits
`112. At the decoding end, two decoders are used: a first
`constituent decoder 160 and a second constituent decoder 162.
`Each receives both the original k bits, and one of the encoded
`portions 110, 112. Each decoder sends likelihood estimates of
`the decoded bits to the other decoders. The estimates are used
`to decode the uncoded information bits as corrupted by the
`noisy channel.
`Id. at 1:38–53(emphasis omitted).
`A coder 200, according to a first embodiment of the invention, is
`described with respect to Figure 2, reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2 of the ’710 patent is a schematic diagram of coder 200. Id. at 2:16–
`17.
`
`The specification states that “coder 200 may include an outer coder
`202, an interleaver 204, and inner coder 206.” Id. at 2:34–35. It further
`states as follows:
`The outer coder 202 receives uncoded data. The data
`may be partitioned into blocks of fixed size, say k bits. The
`outer coder may be an (n,k) binary linear block coder, where
`n>k. The coder accepts as input a block u of k data bits and
`produces an output block v of n data bits. The mathematical
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`relationship between u and v is v=T0u, where T0 is an n×k
`matrix, and the rate[1] of the coder is k/n.
`
`
`The rate of the coder may be irregular, that is, the value
`of T0 is not constant, and may differ for sub-blocks of bits in the
`data block. In an embodiment, the outer coder 202 is a repeater
`that repeats the k bits in a block a number of times q to produce
`a block with n bits, where n=qk. Since the repeater has an
`irregular output, different bits in the block may be repeated a
`different number of times. For example, a fraction of the bits in
`the block may be repeated two times, a fraction of bits may be
`repeated three times, and the remainder of bits may be repeated
`four times. These fractions define a degree sequence, or degree
`profile, of the code.
`
`
`The inner coder 206 may be a linear rate-1 coder, which
`means that then-bit output block x can be written as x=TIw,
`where TI is a nonsingular n×n matrix. The inner coder 210 can
`have a rate that is close to 1, e.g., within 50%, more preferably
`10% and perhaps even more preferably within 1% of 1.
`
`Id. at 2:41–64 (emphasis omitted). Codes characterized by a regular repeat
`of message bits into a resulting codeword are referred to as “regular repeat,”
`whereas codes characterized by irregular repeat of message bits into a
`resulting codeword are referred to as “irregular repeat.” The second
`(“inner”) encoder 206 performs an “accumulate” function. Thus, the two-
`step encoding process illustrated in Figure 2, including a first encoding
`(“outer encoding”) followed by a second encoding (“inner encoding”),
`results in either a “regular repeat accumulate” (“RRA”) code or an “irregular
`
`
`1 The “rate” of an encoder refers to the ratio of the number of input bits to
`the number of resulting encoded output bits related to those input bits. See
`Pet. 9.
`
`5
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`repeat accumulate (“IRA”) code, depending upon whether the repetition in
`the first encoding is regular or irregular.
`Figure 4 of the ’710 patent, reproduced below, shows an alternative
`embodiment in which the first encoding is carried out by a low density
`generator matrix.
`
`
`
`Figure 4 of the ’710 patent is a schematic of an irregular repeat and
`accumulate coder using a low density generator matrix (LDGM)2 coder. Id.
`at 2:20–21, 3:24–25, 3:51–54. The LDGM coder “performs an irregular
`repeat of the k bits in the block, as shown in FIG. 4.” Id. LDGM codes are
`a special class of low density parity check codes that allow for less encoding
`and decoding complexity. LDGM codes are systematic linear codes
`generated by a “sparse” generator matrix. No interleaver (as in the Figure 2
`embodiment) is required in the Figure 4 embodiment because the LDGM
`provides scrambling otherwise provided by the interleaver.
`
`
`2 A “generator” matrix (typically referred to by “G”) is used to create
`(generate) codewords. A parity check matrix (typically referred to by “H”)
`is used to decode a received message.
`6
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Apple challenges claims 1–8, 10–17, and 19–33 of the ’710 patent, of
`which claims 1, 11, 15, and 25 are independent. Pet. 21. Claims 1, 3, 11,
`15, and 25 are illustrative of the claims at issue and are reproduced below:
`1. A method of encoding a signal, comprising:
`obtaining a block of data in the signal to be encoded;
`partitioning said data block into a plurality of sub-blocks,
`each sub-block including a plurality of data elements;
`first encoding the data block to from a first encoded data
`block, said first encoding including repeating the data elements
`in different sub-blocks a different number of times;
`interleaving the repeated data elements in the first encoded
`data block; and
`second encoding said first encoded data block using an
`encoder that has a rate close to one.
`3.
`The method of claim 1, wherein said first encoding is
`carried out by a first coder with a variable rate less than one, and
`said second encoding is carried out by a second coder with a rate
`substantially close to one.
`11. A method of encoding a signal, comprising:
`receiving a block of data in the signal to be encoded, the
`data block including a plurality of bits;
`first encoding the data block such that each bit in the data
`block is repeated and two or more of said plurality of bits are
`repeated a different number of times in order to form a first
`encoded data block; and
`second encoding the first encoded data block in such a way
`that bits in the first encoded data block are accumulated.
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`15. A coder comprising:
`a first coder having an input configured to receive a stream
`of bits, said first coder operative to repeat said stream of bits
`irregularly and scramble the repeated bits; and
`a second coder operative to further encode bits output from
`the first coder at a rate within 10% of one.
`25. A coding system comprising:
`a first coder having an input configured to receive a stream
`of bits, said first coder operative to repeat said stream of bits
`irregularly and scramble the repeated bits;
`a second coder operative to further encode bits output from
`the first coder at a rate within 10% of one in order to form an
`encoded data stream; and
`a decoder operative to receive the encoded data stream and
`decode the encoded data stream using an iterative decoding
`technique.
`Ex. 1001, 7:14–25, 7:28–31, 7:49–589, 8:1–6, 8:32–41.
`
`D. The Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`The information presented in the Petition sets forth the grounds of
`unpatentability of claims 1–8, 10–17, and 19–33 of the ’710 patent as
`follows (see Pet. 34–74):
`
`Reference(s)
`Frey3
`
`Basis
`§ 102(a)
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1 and 3
`
`
`3 Brendan J. Frey and David J.C. MacKay, Irregular Turbocodes,
`PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37TH ALLERTON CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION,
`CONTROL, AND COMPUTING (1999) at 241–248 (Ex.1002, “Frey).
`
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`
`Reference(s)
`Frey and Divsalar4
`Frey, Divsalar, and
`Luby975
`Frey, Divsalar, and
`Pfister Slides6
`Frey, Divsalar, Luby97,
`and Pfister Slides
`
`Basis
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–8 and 11–14
`
`15–17, 19–22, and 24–33
`
`10
`
`23
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Interpretation
`We interpret claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which
`they appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). In applying a broadest reasonable
`construction, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary
`meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d
`1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must
`
`
`4 Dariush Divsalar, et al., Coding Theorems for “Turbo-Like” Codes,
`PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL ALLERTON CONFERENCE ON
`COMMUNICATION, CONTROL, AND COMPUTING, Sept. 23–25, 1998, at 201–
`209 (Ex. 1003, “Divsalar”).
`5 Luby, M. et al., Practical Loss-Resilient Codes, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
`TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING,
`May 4–6, 1997, at 150–159 (Ex. 1011, “Luby97”).
`6 Pfister, H., et al, The Serial Concatenation of Rate-1 Codes Through
`Uniform Random Interleavers, Presentation at Allerton Conference, Sept.
`22–24, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Pfister Slides”).
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`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`1. “close to one” (claims 1 and 3)
`Apple argues that the broadest reasonable construction of “close to
`one” as recited in claims 1 and 3 is “within 50% of one.” Pet. 24. Apple
`argues that this is consistent with the ’710 patent specification, which states
`that the inner code 210 of Figure 1, “can have a rate that is close to one, e.g.,
`within 50%, more preferably 10% and perhaps even more preferably within
`1% of 1.” Pet. 24–25 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:62–64 and citing Ex. 1006,
`¶¶ 102–103). Caltech does not provide an express claim construction.
`For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Apple, determining that
`“close to one” as recited in claims 1 and 3 is construed as “within 50% of
`one.”
`
`B. Discretion to Institute Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)
`“Congress did not mandate that an inter partes review must be
`instituted under certain conditions. Rather, by stating that the Director—and
`by extension, the Board—may not institute review unless certain conditions
`are met, Congress made institution discretionary.” Intelligent Bio-Systems,
`Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., Case IPR2013-00324, slip op. 4 (PTAB
`Nov. 21, 2013) (Paper 19). The Board’s discretion is guided by 35 U.S.C.
`§ 325(d), which provides, in part that:
`MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS -- . . . In determining whether to
`institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or
`chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and
`reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
`Office.7
`Accordingly, institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See, e.g.,
`NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Case IPR2016-00134 (PTAB May 4,
`2016) (Paper 9).
`Caltech asserts that the instant petition presents substantially the same
`prior art and arguments presented to the Board in Case Nos. IPR2015-00067
`and IPR2015-00068, both previously denied institution. Prelim. Resp. 2–6.
`Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we decline to exercise our
`discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
`We begin by noting that Apple was not a party to the prior IPRs and
`was sued for infringement of the ’710 patent by Caltech in May of 2016,
`which was after the decisions denying institution in IPR2015-00067 and
`IPR2015-00068. Pet. 3. Although not determinative, this factor weighs in
`favor of not exercising our discretion. In addition, Apple challenges
`additional claims not argued in IPR2015-00067 and IPR2015-00068. In
`IPR2015-00067, we did not reach the merits of the Petitioner’s grounds for
`unpatentability with respect to Frey and Divsalar. Case IPR2015-00067, 3–
`5 (Paper 18); see, e.g., Case IPR2015-00067, Paper 4 at 15–21 (challenging
`claim 1); Pet. 24–42 (challenging claims 1 and 3). Thus, although Frey and
`Divsalar were asserted in IPR2015-00067 and IPR2015-00068, the present
`case includes a different petitioner, challenging additional claims, and
`
`
`7 Although this provision appears in Chapter 32 of the Patent Act, which is
`directed to post-grant reviews, by its terms it is applicable also to
`proceedings under Chapter 31, which covers inter partes review
`proceedings.
`
`11
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`presenting arguments that were not addressed on their merits in IPR2015-
`00067. Accordingly, we decline to deny Apple’s petition pursuant to the
`discretion in 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
`
`C. Printed Publication Prior Art and Apple’s Expert Testimony
`Caltech contends that Apple has not established that Frey, Divsalar,
`and the Pfister Slides qualify as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 6–17. We address
`each of these allegations in turn below.
`1. Frey (Ex. 1002)
`Apple asserts that Frey was “published in the Proceedings of the 37th
`Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing” and that
`the “conference proceedings were published on or before March 20, 2000.”
`Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1015 (showing stamps from the Cornell University
`Library and the table of contents for the conference) and Ex. 1006 ¶ 63).
`Caltech asserts that the petition lacks sufficient evidence that Frey is actually
`a prior art printed publication as of the date Apple asserts, March 20, 2000.
`Prelim. Resp. 8.
`In a prior petition filed by another petitioner (Hughes
`Communications Inc.) against the ’710 patent, we found that the petitioner
`did not establish Frey as a prior art printed publication because the petitioner
`failed to provide any evidence or argument in support of their contention
`regarding the source of the printed publication or its distribution as part of
`the conference proceedings. IPR2015-00067 at 8–11 (Paper 18). In
`IPR2015-00067, we did not find the petitioner’s reliance on the declaration
`of the co-authors, Dr. MacKay and Dr. Frey, to be persuasive as it did not
`address the purported publication date and distribution of the paper in the
`
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`Allerton conference proceedings as Petitioner alleged. Id.
`In the present case, Apple offers no declaration and instead relies on
`the bare submission of a copy of the cover of the proceeding, table of
`contents of the proceeding, and library stamped pages from the proceeding
`all in support of their contention that proceeding is a prior art printed
`publication. Pet. 25.
`Without conceding the admissibility of Apple’s evidence in support of
`Frey, Caltech questions the legibility of the alleged library date stamp and
`the sufficiency of the unexplained and unsupported library stamp to meet
`Apple’s burden. Prelim. Resp. 10–11.
`We look to the underlying facts to make a legal determination as to
`whether a reference is a printed publication. Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL
`Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The determination of whether a
`given reference qualifies as a prior art “printed publication” involves a case-
`by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding its disclosure to
`members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
`2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently
`accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re
`Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221,
`226 (CCPA 1981). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a
`satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise
`made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in
`the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.”
`Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
`(citation omitted).
`
`
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`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`At this stage, we find Apple’s support for the printed publication
`status of Frey to be sufficient to move forward to a trial. We note that the
`questions raised by Caltech’s evidentiary arguments questioning Apple’s
`exhibits are relevant inquiries, which, after development of the full record,
`will be evaluated in reaching a final decision regarding the printed
`publication and prior art status of Frey.
`Based on the record at this stage and the information from Apple that
`purports to show that Frey was received at Cornell University Library as of
`March 20, 2000 (Ex. 1015, Ex. 1002), we find that Apple presents sufficient
`evidence at this stage of the proceeding to support Frey as a prior art printed
`publication. This Decision on Institution is not a final decision on the status
`of Frey as printed publication or prior art to the ’710 patent.
`2. Divsalar (Ex. 1003)
`With respect to Divsalar, Apple relies on the Board’s prior final
`written decision in a related case that found that Divsalar qualifies as prior
`art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because the balance of evidence appeared to
`show that it was published before the effective filing date of the ’710 patent.
`Pet. 28 (citing Hughes Network Sys. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., Case IPR2015-
`00059, slip op 13–22 (PTAB April 21, 2016) (Paper 42)) (“IPR2015-00059
`FWD”). In the present case, Apple relies on the same declaration from a
`librarian prepared for use in Case IPR2015-00059 as evidence that Divsalar
`was publicly available by April 30, 1999, in the University of Texas library.
`See Ex. 1012 (Declaration of Fradenburgh) ¶ 7.
`Caltech argues that Apple “misapprehends the scope of the Board’s
`prior decision in IPR2015-00059,” which did not find Divsalar to be a prior
`art printed publication based solely on the Fradenburgh Declaration (Ex.
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`1012). Prelim. Resp. 13. We agree with Caltech that our previous
`determination regarding the prior art status of Divsalar was made under the
`particular factual and procedural circumstances of that case. Specifically,
`our Final Written Decision in IPR2015-00059 relied, in part, on Caltech’s
`waiver of its objection to the Fradenburgh declaration and the failure to
`move to strike the declaration. See IPR2015-00059 FWD at 31 (denying
`Caltech’s motion to strike Ms. Fradenburgh’s testimony on the basis of no
`timely evidentiary objection); Prelim. Resp. 13. Furthermore, our findings
`in IPR2015-00059 relied on additional evidence, properly before the Board,
`in support of Divsalar as a prior art printed publication.
`Based on the evidence at this stage of the proceeding, Divisalar
`appears to be part of conference proceedings related to the 37th Allerton
`Conference held September 23–25, 1998. Ex. 1003, 1. The Fradenburgh
`declaration provides some evidence that Divsalar was available to the public
`on April 30, 1999.” See Ex. 1012, 2. Although we find that Apple presents
`sufficient evidence at this stage of the proceeding to meet the burden that
`Divsalar is a prior art printed publication for purposes of this Decision, we
`expect that Apple’s evidence in support of Divsalar’s prior art status will be
`more completely evaluated in the context of a trial based on the complete
`record in this case.
`
`3. Pfister Slides (Ex. 1005)
`Apple contends that Paul Siegel presented the Pfister Slides at the
`Allerton Conference in September 1999. Pet. 32 (citing Declaration of Paul
`Siegel, Ex. 1020, 3). Caltech correctly argues that Apple’s Petition is devoid
`of any explanation or argument as to why or how the Pfister Slides qualify
`as prior art. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. Indeed, Apple’s petition makes no
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`attempt to show how the Pfister Slides qualify as a “printed publication”
`under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), which limits IPRs to challenges based on patents
`and printed publications.
`With respect to slide presentations, Federal Circuit case law and a
`prior opinion from our Board have found that the mere presentation of slides
`at a professional conference is not per se a prior art printed publication.
`Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1349 n.4; Temporal Power Ltd. v. Beacon Power,
`LLC, Case IPR2015-00146, slip op. at 8–11 (PTAB April 27, 2015) (Paper
`10).
`
`In the present case, Apple cites to a specific page of Mr. Siegel’s
`declaration that does not support its conclusion that the Pfister Slides were
`presented and qualify as a printed publication. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1020, 3).
`Mr. Siegel’s declaration in its entirety does not address the factors cited in In
`re Klopfenstein as to whether the slides in question qualify as a printed
`publication. See Ex. 1020. Apple’s petition and Mr. Siegel’s declaration
`merely support the assertion that a presentation took place, but fail to
`provide sufficient evidence or argument regarding whether the Pfister Slides
`were published or how the Pfister Slides were made accessible to the
`relevant public, among other issues raised by slide presentations. See, e.g.,
`Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1350 (addressing slide presentation); Temporal
`Power Ltd., IPR2015-00146 at 8–11.
`With respect to the Pfister Slides, Apple fails to meet the burden
`imposed under § 314(a) to establish in its Petition a reasonable likelihood of
`success, which includes, among other things, making a threshold showing
`that the Pfister Slides are a prior art printed publication. Based on Apple’s
`Petition and supporting evidence, we find that it has not met that burden
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`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`with the Pfister Slides. Accordingly, we find that Apple has not
`demonstrated a likelihood of showing that grounds based on the Pfister
`Slides render the challenged claims unpatentable.
`4. Apple’s Expert Testimony
`Caltech argues that we should accord the declaration testimony of
`Dr. Davis (Ex. 1006) little or no weight because it appears to be copied from
`the expert report of Dr. Frey (Ex. 1017), which was produced as part of
`related litigation. Prelim. Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 22–46; Ex. 1017
`¶¶ 35–53, 55, 57–60, 63). Caltech further argues that testimony of Dr. Davis
`fails to cite sufficient references and evidence in support of the proffered
`testimony and repeats the petition’s argument. Prelim. Resp. 17–18.
`Caltech’s argument and evidence at this stage of our inquiry do not
`provide a sufficient basis to disregard Dr. Davis’s testimony in its entirety or
`accord it little weight. Dr. Davis’s testimony in inter partes review is
`subject cross-examination and will be afforded its due weight subject to
`rebuttal evidence and argument. Accordingly, we do not discount
`Dr. Davis’s testimony for purposes of this Decision.
`
`D. Anticipation by Frey of Claim 1 and 3
`Apple contends that Frey anticipates the limitations of independent
`claim 1 and dependent claim 3 of the ’710 patent. Pet. 34–42 (citing
`Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 106–126).
`
`1. Frey (Ex. 1002)
`Frey describes adding irregularity to turbocodes with systematic bits
`that participate in varying numbers of parity check equations. Ex. 1002, 1
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`(Abstract). Frey discloses how a turbocode is made irregular, showing a
`graphical representation in the fifth image of Figure 1, provided below.
`
`
`
`
`Figure 1, excerpted above, shows the systemic bits at the bottom with 2 or 4
`lines going into the permuter. The fifth image of Figure 1 “shows how a
`turbocode can be made irregular by ‘tying” some of the systematic bits
`together, i.e., by having some systematic bits replicated more than once.”
`Ex. 1002, 3. Frey states that the fifth image of Figure 1 “illustrates one way
`the [] turbocode can be made irregular. Some of the systematic bits are
`‘tied’ together, in effect causing some systematic bits to be replicated more
`than once.” Id. at 2. Frey further discloses “that too [sic] keep the rate of
`the overall code fixed at 1/2, some extra parity bits must he punctured.” Id.
`In describing the decoding of irregular turbocodes, Frey provides a
`graphical model for the irregular turbocode shown in Figure 2, below.
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`
`
`
`Figure 2 shows irregular turbocodes where fd —the fraction of the codeword
`where each bit is repeated d times. Ex. 1002, 4. Frey discloses that “an
`irregular turbocode has the form shown [above] in Fig. 2, which is a type of
`‘trellis-constrained code’” where “fd is the fraction of codeword bits that
`have degree d and D is the maximum degree.” Id. at 2. Frey further
`discloses that “[e]ach codeword bit with degree d is repeated d times before
`being fed into the permuter. Several classes of permuter lead to linear-time
`encodable codes. In particular, if the bits in the convolutional code are
`partitioned into ‘systematic bits’ and ‘parity bits’, then by connecting each
`parity bit to a degree 1 codeword bit, we can encode in linear time.” Id. at 2.
`2. Analysis
`For claim 1, Apple contends that Frey discloses “a method of
`encoding a signal” (Pet. 34–35), “obtaining a block of data in the signal to
`be encoded” (id. at 35–36), and “partitioning said data block into a plurality
`of sub-blocks, each sub-block including a plurality of data elements” (id. at
`36–37).
`Apple argues that Figure 2 of Frey shows that “Frey partitions the
`information bits into groups, where the bits in each group have the same
`19
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`degree (i.e., bits within the same subgroup are all repeated the same number
`of times).” Id. at 36. Apple asserts that
`groups of information bits [shown in Frey, Figure 2] labeled f2,
`f3,…, fD represent sub-blocks into which the data block is
`partitioned. Thus, the bits that are repeated twice (f2) constitute
`one sub-block, the bits that are repeated three times (f3) constitute
`a second sub-block, and so on. Each of these sub-blocks contains
`a plurality of bits (or “data elements”), as required by the claim.
`(Ex. 1006, ¶113.)
`Pet. 37.
`Caltech argues that Apple misreads Frey, which only discloses
`individual systematic bits shown in Figure 1. See Prelim. Resp. 20. These
`bits are copied at different rates to produce sets of bits that are permuted. Id.
`Caltech contends that Frey discloses individual bit operations and not
`partitioning into blocks of data, and sub-blocks as recited in claim 1. Id.
`Apple, Caltech argues, cites Figure 2 of Frey without sufficient explanation
`for how the labels f2, f3, . . . fD represent sub-blocks into which the data
`block is partitioned. Id. At 21 (citing Pet. 37). Caltech asserts that Figure 2
`of Frey is an individual bit copying process described in Figure 1. Id. Thus,
`Caltech contends, “[r]ather than describing partitioning of data in to sub-
`blocks including a plurality of data elements, Frey, including the limited
`provisions cited in the petition, teaches merely repeating its systemic bits on
`an individual basis.” Id. at 22.
`Caltech also argues that in the grounds based on the combination of
`Frey and Divsalar, Apple’s argument for Frey teaching the limitations of
`claim 1 acknowledges that Apple considers Frey to inherently teach the
`partitioning limitations of claim 1. Id. at 20 n.8 (citing Pet. 52). Apple’s
`argument applying Frey to claim 1 in the obviousness grounds is that
`20
`
`
`
`
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`

`IPR2017-00210
`Patent 7,116,710 B1
`irregular coding schemes such as those taught in Frey “de facto partition
`information bits into sub-blocks” whenever they encode bits a different
`number of times. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 147 and stating “in particular
`that an encoding method that meets the ‘different number of times’
`limitation of claim 1 necessarily meets the ‘partitioning’ limitation”).
`On the record before us, Apple has presented sufficient evidence that
`Frey discloses partitioning the information into blocks and sub-blocks.
`Neither party has sought a construction of “partition” or “block” as used in
`independent claim 1 (and in dependent claim 16). At this stage of the
`proceeding, Caltech’s argument that Frey is directed to bit-based individual
`repeating and not the partitioning of data in sub-blocks and blocks does not
`undercut Apple’s evidence and argument that a person of ordinary skill in
`the art would understand Frey to disclose partitioning of blocks into sub-
`blocks under an ordinary meaning as recited in the claims. Pet. 20–21, 52;
`Ex. 1002, 2–4; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 111–115, 147. Thus, on this record, we find that
`Apple has presented sufficient information that Frey discloses the
`partitioning limitations of claims 1 and 3.
`Apple has adequately shown, at this stage of the proceeding, that Frey
`discloses each of the limitations of the challenged claims; specifically the
`encoding of a block of data limitation (Pet. 34–35),

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