Paper 7
`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Date Entered: May 1, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY
`Petitioner,
`v.
`VERSATA DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC.
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Cases IPR2017-00150 and IPR2017-001511
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`____________
`
`Before KEVIN F. TURNER, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
`WILLIAM M. FINK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`1 This Decision applies to each of the listed cases, which involve the same
`patent. Because the same dispositive issue is present in each case, we
`exercise our discretion to issue one Decision to be docketed in each case.
`The parties are not authorized to use such a multiple case caption.
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`Ford Motor Company (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (IPR2017-00150)
`
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 17, 30, and 44–46 of U.S. Patent
`No. 7,882,057 B1 (IPR2017-00150, Ex. 1301, “the ’057 patent”) (see
`IPR2017-00150, Paper 2 (“’150 Pet.”)) and a Petition (IPR2017-00151)
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 1–16, 18–29, and 31–43 of the
`’057 patent (IPR2017-00151, Ex. 1201) (see IPR2017-00151, Paper 2 (“’151
`Pet.”)). Patent Owner, Versata Development Group, Inc., filed a
`Preliminary Response in each case. IPR2017-00150, Paper 6 (“’150 Prelim.
`Resp.”); IPR2017-00151, Paper 6 (“’ 151 Prelim. Resp.”). We have
`jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes
`review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the
`petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`challenged in the petition.”
`The ’057 patent is involved in Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Software,
`
`Inc., No. 2:15-cv-10628-MFL-EAS (E.D. Mich.) (“the Ford action”), a
`declaratory judgment action filed on February 19, 2015. ’150 Pet. v; Paper
`4, 4.2 In the Ford action, infringement of the ’057 patent was asserted in a
`counterclaim on October 28, 2015. ’150 Pet. v; see Ex. 1322. Infringement
`of the ‘057 patent also was asserted in a lawsuit Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v.
`
`
`2 Because the parties present identical arguments and evidence in each case
`with respect to the applicability of the Section 315(b) bar, we cite only to the
`papers and exhibits filed in IPR2017-00150 in remainder of this Decision.
`See Appendix A.
`
`2
`
`
`

`

`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`
`Ford Motor Co., No. 4:15-cv-00316-RC-CMC (E.D. Tex.) (“the Versata
`action”), filed on May 7, 2015. ’150 Pet. v–vi; Paper 4, 4.
`
`We deny the Petition because it was “filed more than 1 year after the
`date on which the petitioner [was] served with a complaint alleging
`infringement of the [’057] patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A.
`
`The relevant facts regarding the timing of the related actions between
`
`Ford and Versata are largely undisputed. Ford filed a first action (i.e., the
`Ford action) in the Eastern District of Michigan (“the Michigan court”) on
`February 19, 2015, seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of
`three Versata patents, not including the ’057 patent.3 ’150 Pet. v; ’150
`Prelim. Resp. 6; see Ex. 1328. In a later-filed Eastern District of Texas (“the
`Texas court”) case (i.e., the Versata action), filed on May 7, 2015, Versata
`asserted infringement of the ’057 patent by Ford. ’150 Pet. v; ’150 Prelim.
`Resp. 6; Ex. 1323. Ford requested an extension of time to file an answer and
`acknowledged the service date of the complaint in the Versata action as May
`7, 2015. ’150 Prelim. Resp. 6; Ex. 2310 (“Unopposed Application for
`Extension of Time to Answer Complaint”).
`
`
`3 See Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Development Group, Inc., Case IPR2017-
`00146, Paper 2, vii (“In the Ford lawsuit, Ford filed a declaratory judgment
`action on February 19, 2015 asserting non-infringement (only) of three
`Versata patents in the same patent family: U.S. Patent No. 5,825,651 (‘the
`’651 Patent’), U.S. Patent No. 6,405,308 (‘the ‘308 Patent’) and U.S. Patent
`No. 6,675,294 (the ‘294 Patent).”).
`
`3
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`

`

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`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`
`On October 14, 2015, the Michigan court denied Versata’s motion to
`
`dismiss or alternatively transfer the Ford action to the Eastern District of
`Texas. Ex. 1324, 2; ’150 Pet. 2; ’150 Prelim. Resp. 6. On October 28, 2015
`(i.e., one year before Ford filed the instant Petition for inter partes review),
`Versata answered Ford’s declaratory judgment complaint in Michigan and
`asserted the ’057 patent by filing infringement counterclaims in the Ford
`action. Ex. 1322 (“Defendant’s Answer . . . [and] Counterclaims”); ’150
`Pet. 2; ’150 Prelim. Resp. 6–7. On November 5, 2015, the Texas court
`“ordered the parties to file notice of any good faith reasons that [the Versata
`lawsuit] should not be dismissed, without prejudice, so that the issues may
`[be] dealt with in the Michigan court.” ’150 Pet. 2 (quoting Ex. 1325
`(additional text added by Petitioner)). On December 3, 2015, noting that
`“neither party has provided arguments against dismissing the case,” the
`Texas court “ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice to
`Plaintiff’s ability to assert its claims in the Michigan court.” Ex. 1327
`(emphasis added); ’150 Pet. 2; see Ex. 1326, 1.
`
`B.
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(a), “[t]he petitioner must certify that
`the patent for which review is sought is available for inter partes review and
`that the petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting an inter partes
`review challenging the patent claims on the grounds identified in the
`petition.” See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings,
`Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered
`Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,688 (Aug. 14, 2012)
`(Setting a strict standard for demonstrating standing and noting that
`4
`
`
`

`

`
`
`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`
`“[f]acially improper standing will be a basis for denying the petition without
`proceeding to the merits of the petition.”).
`According to Petitioner, the Petition is timely under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(b) because October 28, 2015, the date of service of the infringement
`counterclaim in the Ford action, is exactly one year prior to the filing of the
`instant Petition, on October 28, 2016. ’150 Pet. 1. Petitioner contends this
`counterclaim complaint is the complaint for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`’150 Pet. 2; see Ex. 1324. Petitioner argues that the Versata action in Texas
`is “irrelevant for purposes of § 315(b),” because “[t]he dismissal of an action
`without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been
`brought.” ’150 Pet. 2–3 (quoting Oracle Corp. v. Click-To-Call Techs. LP,
`Case IPR2013-00312, slip op. at 15–18 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2013) (Paper 26)
`(precedential in relevant part)).
`On this record, we disagree with Petitioner’s assessment of the effect
`of the dismissal of the Versata action. As an initial matter, it is undisputed
`that the complaint in the Versata action, served on Ford on May 7, 2015 (see
`Ex. 2310), is “a complaint alleging infringement of the patent,” and that “the
`petition requesting the proceeding [was] filed more than one year after the
`date on which the petitioner . . . [was] served.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Thus,
`according to the statutory language, the Petition filed by Ford here is time
`barred. The question is whether Ford is correct that the situation here fits
`within a judicial exception for a class of cases that were dismissed without
`prejudice as though the action had never been filed, as was the case in the
`Board’s precedential Oracle decision. In considering this argument, our
`consideration also is informed by the Board’s decisions in Apple, Inc. v.
`
`5
`
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`

`

`
`
`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
`
`Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., Case IPR2014-00319 (PTAB June 12, 2014)
`(Paper 12) (“Apple I”), reh’g denied (Paper 14) (“Apple II”) (collectively,
`“Apple”), and similar cases, where the Board did not apply the exception for
`dismissals without prejudice. Because the circumstances here align with
`Apple and differ in critical respects from Oracle and related cases, we
`determine the exception is not applicable.
`In Oracle, the Board addressed whether a 2001 infringement case,
`filed against the petitioner Ingenio’s predecessor and subsequently dismissed
`by joint stipulation in 2003, barred Ingenio under § 315(b) from filing its
`petition for inter partes review in 2013. Oracle, slip op. at 15–16. In
`determining that there was no bar based on the 2001 complaint, the Board
`observed that the case was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), and that “such dismissals” have been consistently
`interpreted as leaving the parties as though the action had never been
`brought:
`[T]he infringement suit brought by Inforocket against Keen––
`now Ingenio, LLC—was dismissed voluntarily without prejudice
`on March 21, 2003, pursuant to a joint stipulation under Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 41(a). The Federal Circuit consistently has interpreted
`the effect of such dismissals as leaving the parties as though the
`action had never been brought.
`Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (internal record citations omitted). In reaching
`that conclusion, the Board relied on two Federal Circuit cases, Graves v.
`Principi, 294 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002) and Bonneville Assocs., Ltd.
`Partnership v. Baram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Oracle, slip
`op. at 17.
`
`6
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`

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`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
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`
`
`
`In Bonneville, the Federal Circuit addressed the voluntary dismissal
`without prejudice of an appeal from the General Services Administration
`Board of Contract Appeals. 165 F.3d at 1364. The court analogized the
`basis of voluntary dismissal there to a Rule 41(a) dismissal, stating that
`effect of such a dismissal without prejudice is to render the proceedings a
`nullity. Id. Based on this reasoning, the court affirmed the Board of
`Contract Appeals’ decision finding that a subsequent appeal, filed after the
`filing deadline for appealing the decision, did not act to reinstate the
`dismissed appeal, but was barred as not timely. Id. at 1364–66.
`Similarly, in Graves, the only Federal Circuit case cited by Petitioner,
`the court addressed the effect of a voluntary dismissal under Rule 42 of the
`Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Rules of Practice and Procedure. 294
`F.3d at 1356. In holding that this dismissal put the appellant in the position
`in which he would have been had he never filed a notice of appeal, the court
`compared the circumstances to the voluntary dismissal in Bonneville, in
`which the “nullifying effect of a voluntary dismissal in accordance with Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) was applied.” Id. Accordingly, the court determined that
`the appellant was time-barred from filing a new appeal after the 120-day
`period for filing a notice of appeal had lapsed. Id.
`Here, unlike in Oracle, Bonneville, and Graves, the dismissal without
`prejudice was not pursuant to Rule 41(a), was not “voluntary,” and, most
`importantly, did not leave the parties as though the action had never been
`brought. Petitioner, citing Exhibit 1327 (“Order of Dismissal”), incorrectly
`characterizes the Versata action dismissal as under Rule 41(a)(2). ’150 Pet.
`2 (“The Texas court then dismissed the Versata lawsuit, as permitted by Fed.
`
`7
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`

`

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`
`R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).”). However, the court’s order does not state its reliance
`on Rule 41(a)(2). See Ex. 1327. Moreover, the circumstances there were
`not appropriate to Rule 41(a)(2), because there is no cited evidence that the
`plaintiff, Versata, requested the dismissal. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)
`(stating that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by
`court order, on terms the court considers proper” (emphasis added)).
`The Michigan court has acted as if the Versata action essentially was
`merged with Ford action. ’150 Prelim. Resp. 7 (quoting Ex. 2311, 40:2–6
`(The Court: “It seems to me that given that I kept the case here it is a
`relevant factor for me to try to keep the timing where it would be in the
`Eastern District of Texas, not dispositive, but something I ought to consider
`and keep my eye on?”)). Moreover, the cited evidence strongly suggests
`that the Texas court dismissed the Versata action in favor of the Ford action
`under the “first-to-file rule.” 4 Indeed, less than a month following the
`Michigan’s court denial of “Versata’s Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively to
`Transfer to the Eastern District of Texas,” the Texas court instructed “[a]s
`the first-filed court has retained jurisdiction, it is ORDERED that . . . the
`
`
`4 In the related proceeding, IPR2017-00146, Patent Owner provides
`evidence of the discussion during a hearing in the Versata action on July 29,
`2015, that strongly suggests that the Texas court dismissed the Versata
`action in favor of the Ford action under the “first-to-file rule.” IPR2017-
`00146, Ex. 2011, 3:16–21 (“[O]ne of the issues that’s going to come up is
`this first-to-file rule.”), 11:5–8 (“I’m also faced with the practical problem of
`in the Fifth Circuit under the first-to-file rule, I’m supposed to give
`deference to [Eastern District of Michigan] Judge Leitman and what he
`decides.”). It is not clear why Patent Owner failed to include this transcript
`in the instant cases.
`
`8
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`

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`
`parties shall file notice of any good faith reasons that this case should not be
`dismissed, without prejudice, so that the issues may [be] dealt with in the
`Michigan court.” Ex. 1325 (emphasis added). In addition, although Versata
`responded in the negative (Ex. 1326), and Ford elected not to respond at all,
`to the Texas court’s instruction to file any good faith reasons why the Texas
`court should maintain the case (Ex. 1327 (“Only Plaintiff responded, stating
`that it was not opposed to dismissal.”)), this does not suggest the dismissal
`was voluntary, but merely that, confronted with the Texas court’s instruction
`to file “good faith reason[s],” Versata lacked any “good faith reasons” for
`maintaining the case.
`Petitioner argues that whether the dismissal here was voluntary or not
`should not matter, because “[t]his rule applies regardless of the basis for the
`dismissal without prejudice.” ’150 Pet. 3 (citing Gordon Howard Assocs.,
`Inc. v. Lunareye, Inc., Case IPR2014-01213, slip op. at 13–15 (PTAB Feb.
`3, 2015) (Paper 11) (“Lunareye”); Nautique Boats Co. v. Malibu Boats,
`LLC, Case IPR2014-01045, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Nov. 26, 2014) (Paper
`13)). The cited portion of Lunareye addressed the applicability of the
`§ 315(a) bar, not the § 315(b) bar at issue here, in the situation of a dismissal
`without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Lunareye, slip op. at
`14. There, the Board determined that, regardless of how the dismissal was
`characterized, a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction left the parties in
`the position they were in had the original action not been filed, despite
`Lunareye’s arguments to the contrary.5 See id. at 12, 14. In Nautique Boats,
`
`
`5 We note that Petitioner also contends that the complaint in the Versata
`action was a “nullity” because the Eastern District of Texas lacked personal
`9
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`

`

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`
`again addressing the § 315(a) bar, the Board found that the dismissal of the
`declaratory judgment action at issue, whether voluntary or not, left the
`parties in the position they were in had the declaratory action not been filed.
`See Nautique Boats, slip op. at 10–11 (“Patent Owner has not shown
`persuasively that the dismissal . . . would bar Petitioner from re-filing a
`declaratory judgment action, in Florida or elsewhere.”).
`However, even if we disregard the voluntariness of the dismissal here,
`the circumstances nonetheless differ from both Lunareye and Nautique
`Boats, as well as from Oracle, in additional key respects. First, the dismissal
`of the Versata action did not “leave the parties as if the action had never
`been brought.” Bonneville, 165 F.3d at 1364. Rather, as the evidence makes
`abundantly clear, it was the presence of the first-filed Ford action in
`Michigan that caused the Texas court to dismiss the Versata action (“so that
`the issues may be dealt with in the Michigan court” (Ex. 1327; see Ex.
`1325)), after Versata already had served its infringement counterclaims in
`the Ford action (Ex. 1322). In fact, the order dismissing the Versata action
`specifically states the dismissal is “without prejudice to [Versata’s] ability
`to assert its claims in the Michigan court.” Ex. 1327 (emphasis added).
`Unlike the cases discussed above, there is no evidence suggesting that the
`parties could have refiled the action in the Texas court as if the Versata
`action had never occurred, given the case was dismissed, so that the parties
`could continue in the Michigan court.
`
`
`jurisdiction over Ford. ’150 Pet. 1–2. However, Petitioner has not provided
`evidence or further developed this argument, and there is no cited evidence
`that the Texas court found this argument persuasive.
`10
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`

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`
`
`Second, the continuation of the dismissed Versata action in Michigan
`further distinguishes this case from Oracle, in which there was roughly a
`“nine-year hiatus” (Prelim. Resp. 10) between the action dismissed in 2003
`and the second action initiated in 2012. See Oracle, slip op. at 15. Indeed,
`Petitioner does not cite any cases in which the Board applied the exception
`to the § 315(b) bar for a dismissal where, as here, there was a continuous
`chain of assertion of the involved patent going back more than one year.
`’150 Prelim. Resp. 9–10, 12. In both Graves and Bonneville, the issue was
`that dismissed appeals could not be reinstated by later time-barred appeals.
`Similarly, in both the Lunareye and Nautique Boats, there is no discussion of
`existing assertions of the patent at issue. Instead, as discussed above, both
`Lunareye and Nautique Boats decisions suggested the possibility of refiling
`at a later time. See, e.g., Lunareye, slip op. at 12 (finding no preclusive
`effect); Nautique Boats, slip op. at 10–11.
`On the other hand, as Patent Owner points out (’150 Prelim. Resp. 9–
`14), where earlier actions were dismissed without prejudice in favor of a co-
`pending action, the Board consistently has held that the dismissed complaint
`“cannot be treated as if it never existed” for purposes of § 315(b). Apple I,
`slip op. at 4–7; see Histologics, LLC v. CDx Diagnostics, Inc., IPR2014-
`00779, slip op. at 5 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2014) (Paper 6); eBay, Inc. v. Adv.
`Auctions LLC, Case IPR2014-00806, slip op. at 6–8 (PTAB Sept. 25, 2014))
`(Paper 14). For example, in Apple I, the Board determined that the
`complaint in an earlier-filed case was operative for purposes of § 315(b),
`even though it was dismissed without prejudice and consolidated into a later-
`filed case. Apple I, slip op. at 6–7.
`
`11
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`IPR2017-00151
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`
`
`
`Both Histologics and eBay are similar to Apple in relevant respects.
`In eBay, the Board determined a first, dismissed action controlled for
`purposes of § 315(b), noting that “[f]rom the day [eBay] was served with the
`complaint in the First Action to the present, [eBay] has been involved in
`litigation regarding its alleged infringement of the ’000 patent.” eBay, slip
`op. at 7. Likewise, in Histologics, the Board determined that the § 315(b)
`bar applied to an earlier dismissed action, noting that “the parties remain
`engaged in a dispute first raised in the complaint of the ’612 action, a dispute
`that has been pending continuously since that complaint was filed.”
`Histologics, slip op. at 6.
`Petitioner acknowledges the holdings in Apple, eBay, and Histologics,
`but contends those cases are distinguishable because, unlike here, they
`involved a consolidation of the dismissed case with the continued case under
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. See ’150 Pet. 3–4. We are not persuaded the outcome
`here should turn on whether the cases were consolidated under Rule 42(a).
`See Apple II, slip op. at 3 (denying request for rehearing; “[W]hether or not
`the dismissal could occur under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 would not change the
`result of the Decision.”).
`In the first place, as Petitioner observes, the Versata action and the
`Ford action could not have been consolidated under Rule 42(a) because they
`were pending in different courts. Pet. 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Second,
`despite the absence of nominal consolidation, it is indisputable that the
`Texas court dismissed the Versata action “without prejudice to [Versata’s]
`ability to assert its claims in the Michigan court.” Ex. 1327 (emphasis
`added); Ex. 1325 (instructing the parties to provide good faith reasons why
`
`12
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`

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`
`
`the Versata action should not be dismissed, “so that the issues may [be] dealt
`with in the Michigan court”). Similarly, as Patent Owner points out, in
`denying Ford’s motion for a stay of the Ford action, the Michigan court
`pointed out that it kept the case in Michigan at Ford’s request, and,
`therefore, “[w]hy isn’t it fair for Versata to say Ford wanted it here, we were
`concerned about timing, at least try to keep it like the Eastern District of
`Texas would?” Ex. 2311, 40:8–10.
`Essentially, in resolving the forum dispute in favor of the Michigan
`court, the respective courts treated the cases as if they were a single
`proceeding at least in terms of ability to assert claims and recognition of
`timing. Consequently, we agree that the relevant factor in determining
`whether the earlier complaint in the Versata action is operative for purposes
`of § 315(b) is the continuous assertion of the patent against Ford, not
`whether the case was formally consolidated. See ’150 Prelim. Resp. 9. This
`is consistent with Apple II, where, in addressing Petitioner’s request for
`rehearing, the Board emphasized that the “relevant fact” was that the earlier-
`filed case was immediately continued in the later-filed case and that “there
`was no interval during which no action was pending.” Apple II, slip op. at
`4–5.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, we find the circumstances here do not
`warrant a departure from the statutory language of § 315(b) in favor of
`extending the exception for voluntary dismissals without prejudice to a case
`where the dismissal without prejudice was not voluntary and did not leave
`the parties in the position they were in had the action never been filed.
`
`13
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`Accordingly, we find the complaint in the Versata action bars institution of
`inter partes review.
`
`
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`The Board denies institution of inter partes review because the
`Petition was not filed within the time limit imposed by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`In consideration of the foregoing, it is
`ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for institution of inter partes
`review is denied.
`FURTHER ORDERED that no inter partes review will be instituted
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) with respect to any of the challenged claims
`of the ’057 patent on the ground of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.
`
`
`
`14
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`
`APPENDIX A
`Corresponding Papers and Exhibits of
`Cases IPR2017-00150 and IPR2017-00151
`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Paper 2
`Paper 2
`Paper 4
`Paper 4
`Paper 6
`Paper 6
`Ex. 1301
`Ex. 1201
`Ex. 1322
`Ex. 1222
`Ex. 1323
`Ex. 1223
`Ex. 1324
`Ex. 1224
`Ex. 1325
`Ex. 1225
`Ex. 1326
`Ex. 1226
`Ex. 1327
`Ex. 1227
`Ex. 1328
`Ex. 1228
`Ex. 2310
`Ex. 2210
`Ex. 2311
`Ex. 2211
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`15
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`IPR2017-00150
`IPR2017-00151
`Patent 7,882,057 B1
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`FOR PETITIONER:
`John S. LeRoy
`Thomas A. Lewry
`Frank A. Angileri
`John P. Rondini
`Christopher C. Smith
`Jonathan D. Nikkila
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`FPGP0129IPR4@brookskushman.com
`FPGP0129IPR3@brookskushman.com
`
`FOR PATENT OWNER:
`Robert Greene Sterne
`Joseph E. Mutschelknaus
`Jonathan Tuminaro
`Salvador M. Bezos
`STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
`rsterne-PTAB@skgf.com
`jmustche-PTAB@skgf.com
`jtuminar-PTAB@skgf.com
`sbezos-PTAB@skgf.com
`
`Kent B. Chambers
`TERRILE, CANNATTI, CHAMBERS & HOLLAND, LLP
`kchambers@tcchlaw.com
`
`Sharoon Saleem
`JONES & SPROSS, P.L.L.C.
`sharoon.saleem@jonesspross.com
`
`
`
`16
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`
`