throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`REACTIVE SURFACES LTD. LLP,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
`
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01914
`
`Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S SUR-REPLY
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`Patent Owner submits this Sur-Reply pursuant to the Order of November 17.
`
`I. The Newly Relied-Upon Wang Reference Does Not Suggest the Use of
`Lipase for Facilitating Evaporative Fingerprint Removal.
`
`
`
`In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies in the prior art relied upon in the
`
`Petition, Petitioner submits the Wang reference and suggests that it somehow
`
`shows that “stain removal by catalytic action and evaporation were well-known.”
`
`Reply 9-10 (capitalization omitted). In fact, Wang was already considered by the
`
`Office during prosecution. As the applicants successfully argued then, while Wang
`
`discloses that enzymes such as lipase can degrade the components of a bioorganic
`
`stain, it lacks any teaching that such degradation can facilitate the removal a
`
`fingerprint stain by vaporization. Ex. 1012 at 10. Petitioner’s expert Dr. Rozzell
`
`admitted as much in his deposition, including on examination by Petitioner’s own
`
`counsel. Ex. 2017 at 54:12-18 (“Q: . . . [I]n totality, considering the disclosures of
`
`Wang, do these disclosures provide for the removal of a bioorganic stain by
`
`evaporation? A: . . . I don’t believe so. I believe the focus is on breaking down the
`
`components but not explicitly disclosing evaporation.”); see also id. at 11:8-12:13.
`
`
`
`Thus, the prior art, including Wang, gave no expectation that degrading the
`
`components of a bioorganic stain into smaller molecules would facilitate the
`
`removal of the stain by vaporization. As argued by the applicants in prosecution,
`
`Wang in particular provided “no expectation that the activity of a lipase associated
`
`coating or substrate will actually promote removal of [a] fingerprint as opposed to
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`merely degrading one or more component parts and leaving those component parts
`
`on the surface of the material,” which “may explain why [Wang] requires washing
`
`with [deionized] water to actually remove the [decomposed] stain.” Ex. 1012 at
`
`10-11 (emphasis added); see Ex. 1025 ¶ [0051] (removing an egg-white stain
`
`degraded with protease by “wash[ing] with DI water”). In his deposition, Dr.
`
`Rozzell admitted that there would be no expectation that breaking down the
`
`components of a fingerprint stain into smaller molecules with lipase would
`
`necessarily make the stain less visible. Ex. 2017 at 59:22-60:12; cf. Inst. Dec. 5-6
`
`(construing the phrase “facilitating the removal of a fingerprint by vaporization” in
`
`claim 1 to require a reduction in “visually apparent” bioorganic material). Wang
`
`does not suggest, never mind teach, the methods of the ’618 patent.
`
`II. Petitioner’s Belated Evidence Does Not Establish That Buchanan Was
`“Publicly Accessible.”
`
`
`
` The Institution Decision noted that Petitioner’s case hinges on the testimony
`
`of Dr. Rozzell. Inst. Dec. 7-8, 16-17, 23-24. The only support he offers for his
`
`assertions regarding the alleged obviousness of using lipase in a method of
`
`facilitating the removal of fingerprints by vaporization is the Buchanan paper. See
`
`Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 32-34, 40-41. Because the reply evidence belatedly submitted by
`
`Petitioner does not show that Buchanan was in fact “publicly accessible” before
`
`the ’618 patent’s priority date, Dr. Rozzell’s testimony (already described in the
`
`Institution Decision as “border[ing] on conclusory”) should be given no weight.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
` A reference is “publicly accessible” if it has been “[1] disseminated or [2]
`
`
`
`otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled
`
`in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Suffolk
`
`Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Petitioner has not
`
`shown that Buchanan was ever “disseminated” to persons in the relevant field—
`
`i.e., bioactive materials scientists. While the Pepper declaration (cited at page 25
`
`of the Reply) asserts that Buchanan appeared in the “Proceedings”1 of a conference
`
`sponsored by the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers and entitled
`
`“Forensic Evidence Analysis and Crime Scene Investigation,” see Ex. 1023 at 1,
`
`the target audience for this conference would have been forensic scientists (as its
`
`name plainly suggests). Petitioner’s own expert Eric Ray (a trained forensic
`
`scientist) admits that such persons do not qualify as POSITAs in the field of the
`
`’618 patent. Ex. 2018 at 9:8-10:6 (Mr. Ray testifying that he “would not consider
`
`[himself] to be a POSITA . . . because of [his] lack of experience in lipase-coated
`
`surfaces”). Because the target audience of the conference did not include persons
`
`in the relevant field, the fact that the Buchanan paper might have been presented
`
`there does not establish its “public accessibility.” See Coalition for Affordable
`
`Drugs VIII, LLC v. The Trustees of The Univ. of Pa., IPR2015-01835, Paper 56 at
`
`
`
`1 A conference proceeding is a collection of research papers presented at a
`
`conference. See, e.g., http://libguides.gatech.edu/confproc.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`19 (Mar. 6, 2017) (a slide set presented at an investor day was not sufficiently
`
`disseminated because there was no evidence that “the target audience would have
`
`been an ordinary artisan in the relevant field”).
`
`
`
` Not only is there no evidence that Buchanan was ever “disseminated” to the
`
`relevant POSITAs, but there is also no evidence that it was “otherwise made
`
`available” to an extent that a reasonably diligent POSITA could locate it. For
`
`example, the record lacks any evidence that a copy of the conference proceedings
`
`in which Buchanan allegedly appeared was received and catalogued by any library
`
`or online database prior to the relevant date. Cf. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., v.
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC, IPR2014-00553, Paper 57 at 7-9 (Nov. 30, 2015)
`
`(finding that a conference proceedings paper was “publicly accessible” where the
`
`petitioner provided a declaration from a university librarian with knowledge of the
`
`library’s “normal practices for recording the receipt of and cataloging and shelving
`
`of conference proceedings” as well as the catalog record for the paper). The fact
`
`that Buchanan was apparently referenced in a handful of other forensics papers, see
`
`Reply 25; Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 47-53, does not prove that it was sufficiently available to the
`
`relevant research community; at most, this suggests that the paper might have been
`
`circulated among forensic scientists and crime scene investigators.
`
`III. The Ray Declaration Does Not Bolster Petitioner’s Case.
`
` With its Reply, Petitioner has introduced a declaration from a brand new
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`expert, Mr. Ray. Much of Mr. Ray’s declaration attempts to fill the gaps in
`
`Petitioner’s initial case, particularly in Dr. Rozzell’s testimony. In particular, Mr.
`
`Ray suggests that the prior art would have revealed to the POSITA both that the
`
`lipid components of fingerprint residue tend to vaporize from the surface and that
`
`lipase enzymes can facilitate this process. See Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 20, 26-27. However,
`
`his assertions in that respect are just as unsubstantiated as Dr. Rozzell’s.
`
`
`
` To begin with, Mr. Ray, by his own admission, is not a POSITA. See supra
`
`at 3; Ex. 2018 at 36:9-12 (“I am really an expert in fingerprints and aspects of
`
`developing, comparing, researching fingerprints and fingerprint residue, but not in
`
`the art of bioactive surfaces.”). Accordingly, to the extent that he purports to opine
`
`that a POSITA would have been motivated to use lipase in a method of facilitating
`
`the removal of fingerprints, that opinion plainly lacks any competent foundation.
`
`
`
` Further, the prior art cited by Mr. Ray lends no credibility to his assertions.
`
`Thus, his declaration claims that the Ramotowski reference disclosed the tendency
`
`of fingerprint lipids to evaporate from the surface after being degraded into smaller
`
`compounds, see Ex. 1020 ¶ 20, but Ramotowski in fact makes no reference to the
`
`evaporation of lipids or their breakdown products, as Mr. Ray was forced to admit
`
`on cross-examination. Ex. 2018 at 18:9-19:7. While he asserted in his deposition
`
`that it would be the “inherent property” of compounds formed by the lipase-
`
`catalyzed breakdown of lipids to evaporate from the surface, id. at 19:13-17, there
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`is simply no teaching to that effect in Ramotowski. As such, Ramotowski fails to
`
`establish a pre-existing expectation that the action of lipase would promote the
`
`removal of a fingerprint stain as opposed to merely degrading some components of
`
`the stain and leaving those components on the surface. See supra at 1-2.
`
`
`
` Similarly, the Mong reference cited by Mr. Ray, see Ex. 1020 ¶ 20, indicates
`
`only that water evaporates from fingerprint residue over time. Ex. 2013 at 12
`
`(stating that “up to 85% of the fingerprint’s weight (presumably as water)” is lost
`
`over two weeks). This is beside the point. First, to the extent that the water
`
`portion of a fingerprint evaporates over time, the activity of a lipase would not be
`
`expected to facilitate that process. See Ex. 2018 at 34:21-35:12. Second, the loss
`
`of water does not result in the removal of the fingerprint. To the contrary, Mong
`
`explains that it results in “[t]he consolidation of the materials in the fingerprint to a
`
`waxy layer,” Ex. 2013 at 12, which, by Mr. Ray’s own admission, would actually
`
`be expected to make the remaining compounds less likely to evaporate. Ex. 2018
`
`at 27:23-28:10 (“[T]hat mixture of lower molecular weight compounds, and
`
`particularly saturated compounds, forms a harder, more crystal[l]ine shell [which]
`
`further lowers the chance of vaporization of those resulting compounds.”). Thus,
`
`Mong does not disclose that fingerprint stains can be removed from a surface by
`
`vaporization, much less that lipase would be useful in facilitating such removal. In
`
`sum, Mr. Ray’s declaration offers no support for Petitioner’s arguments.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Dated: November 27, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
` /s/ Joshua A. Lorentz
`
`
`
`Joshua A. Lorentz
`Reg. No. 52,406
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Toyota Motor Corporation
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01914
`U.S. Patent No. 8,394,618 B2
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PATENT
`
`OWNER’S SUR-REPLY was served on November 27, 2017 by email on the
`
`following counsel of record for Petitioner:
`
`David O. Simmons (dsimmons@ivcpatentagency.com)
`
`Jonathan D. Hurt (jhurt@technologylitigators.com)
`
`Mark A.J. Fassold (mfassold@wattsguerra.com)
`
`Jorge Mares (jmares@wattsguerra.com)
`
`Rico Reyes (rico@ricoreyeslaw.com)
`
`
`
`Dated: November 27, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Joshua A. Lorentz
`Joshua A. Lorentz
`Reg. No. 52,406
`Attorney for Patent Owner
`Toyota Motor Corporation
`
`
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket