`571-272-7822
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` Paper 7
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` Entered: March 23, 2017
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`IMMERSION CORPORATION,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01777
`Patent 8,749,507 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, BRYAN F. MOORE, and MINN CHUNG,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108
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`
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`
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`A. Introduction
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`IPR2016-01777
`Patent 8,749,507 B2
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`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting
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`an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 9–12, and 14–17 of U.S. Patent No.
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`8,749,507 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’507 patent”). Immersion Corporation
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`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6, “Prelim. Resp.”).
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`The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be
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`instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there
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`is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
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`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the
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`Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information
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`presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that
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`Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the
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`challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, we
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`deny Petitioner’s request to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 9–
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`12, and 14–17.
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`B. Related Proceedings
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`Petitioner asserts that the ’507 patent is the subject of the following
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`proceedings: (1) Immersion Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00325
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`(D. Del.); and (2) Certain Mobile and Portable Electronic Devices
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`Incorporating Haptics (Including Smartphones and Laptops) and
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`Components Thereof, ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-1004 (USITC). Pet. 1.
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`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention, but additionally
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`identifies Immersion Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 1-16-cv-00077 (D. Del.) as a
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`2
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`“related case.” Paper 4, 2. Patent Owner, however, does not indicate
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`whether the ’507 patent is asserted in that case.
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`II. THE ’507 PATENT
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`A. Described Invention
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`The ’507 patent describes a system and method for adaptively
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`interpreting a user’s intent based on parameters supplied by a touch-sensitive
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`input device. Ex. 1001, Abstract. Figure 1 of the ’507 patent is reproduced
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`below.
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`Figure 1 depicts an exemplary system for implementing embodiments of the
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`’507 patent. Id. at col. 2, ll. 23–25, 37–39. As shown in Figure 1, touchpad
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`102 senses the positions of a touch on the surface of the touchpad, and
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`provides an output signal comprising position data (X and Y parameters) and
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`pressure data (Z parameter) to processor 106. Id. at col. 2, ll. 41–45, col. 3,
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`ll. 51–52. According to the ’507 patent, in order to address the difficulties
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`faced in attempting to determine the intent of a user based on the X, Y, and
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`Z parameters, the disclosed invention provides systems and methods for
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`adaptive interpretation of the intent of a user of a touch-sensitive input
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`device. Id. at col. 4, ll. 56–58, 64–66.
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`Figure 3 of the ’507 patent is reproduced below.
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`
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`Figure 3 depicts a flowchart illustrating a process for detecting a finger press
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`by a user on a touchpad. Id. at col. 2, ll. 28–30, col. 7, ll. 7–9. At step 302
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`shown in Figure 3, the processor determine whether the output signal
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`received from the touchpad indicates that the pressure of a user touch
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`exceeds an upper threshold. Id. at col. 8, ll. 21–22. If so, the processor
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`checks at step 314 if the user was touching the touchpad previously. Id. at
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`col. 8, ll. 22–24. If the user was not previously touching the touchpad, the
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`processor starts the first tick counter and decides the user is now touching
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`the touchpad. Id. at col. 8, ll. 25–27. Once the processor concludes that the
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`user is touching the touchpad, the processor compares the speed of the finger
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`movement on the touchpad to a speed threshold value. Id. at col. 8, ll. 31–
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`33; see also id. at col. 7, l. 65–col. 8, l. 4 (describing a method of
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`determining the speed of the finger movement and stating that until the
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`speed falls below a speed threshold the processor will not recognize a press).
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`If the speed is less than the speed threshold, the change in pressure (from the
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`previously received value) is compared to a change threshold. Id. at col. 8,
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`ll. 41–42. If the change in pressure is determined to be greater than the
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`change threshold at step 322, the processor determines whether a first
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`interval (in the first tick counter) has elapsed at step 324. Id. at col. 8, ll. 44–
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`47. If so, the processor concludes that the user is pressing. Id. at col. 8,
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`ll. 47–48.
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`In other words, in order to determine that a user is pressing, the
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`following three conditions must be met: (1) the pressure exceeds the
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`pressure threshold; (2) the change in pressure is greater than the change
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`threshold; and (3) the first interval has elapsed. In the process described in
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`Figure 3, the first two conditions must be maintained for the duration of the
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`first interval, i.e., the user must continue to touch for the duration of the first
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`interval, before a press is recognized.
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`B. Illustrative Claim
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`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 9, and 14 are independent. Claim
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`1 is illustrative of the challenged claims and is reproduced below with the
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`key disputed limitation emphasized in italics.
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`1.
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`A method comprising:
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`receiving contact data from an input device;
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`determining an interaction with a displayed object on a
`screen based on the contact data;
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`responsive to determining the interaction, determining a
`gesture based on the contact data comprising:
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`determining a pressure and a change in pressure based on
`the contact data, and
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`determining a press if:
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`the pressure is greater than a pressure threshold,
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`the change in pressure is greater than a change in
`pressure threshold, and
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`a first interval has elapsed; and
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`responsive to determining the gesture, outputting the
`haptic effect.
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`Ex. 1001, col. 10, ll. 30–44.
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`
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`III. PETITIONER’S CHALLENGES
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`A. Prior Art Cited in Petitioner’s Challenges
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`Petitioner cites the following references in its challenges to
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`patentability:
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`Reference and Relevant Date
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`Designation Exhibit No.
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,673,066 (issued Sept. 30, 1997) Toda1
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`Ex. 1003
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`U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2002/0033795
`Al (published Mar. 21, 2002)
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`Shahoian
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`Ex. 1004
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`1 For clarity and ease of reference, we only list the first named inventor.
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`Reference and Relevant Date
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`Designation Exhibit No.
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,072,474 (issued June 6, 2000) Morimura
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`Ex. 1005
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`B. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
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`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 3):
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`Claims Challenged
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`Statutory Basis
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`References
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`1–5, 9–12, and 14–17
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`§ 103(a)
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`Toda and Shahoian
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`1, 9, and 14
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`§ 103(a)
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`Morimura and Shahoian
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`
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`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
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`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
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`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed
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`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (holding that 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.100(b) “represents a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority
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`that Congress delegated to the . . . Office”). Under the broadest reasonable
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`interpretation (BRI) standard, and absent any special definitions, claim terms
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`generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
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`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in view of the specification. In
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`re Translogic Tech. Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`Petitioner and Patent Owner address the claim term “pseudo pressure”
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`recited in claims 2, 10, and 15. Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp. 10–13. Petitioner also
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`discusses the claim terms “pressure,” “determining a press if . . . the change
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`in pressure is greater than a change in pressure threshold,” “gesture,” and
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`“softkey.” Pet. 10–11. For purposes of this decision, we need not construe
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`explicitly the claim language identified above in order to determine whether
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`there is a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing with respect to the
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`challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &
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`Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be
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`construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve
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`the controversy.”).
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`
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`V. ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER’S PRIOR ART CHALLENGES
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`A. Obviousness Based on the Combination of Toda and Shahoian
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`Petitioner contends claims 1–5, 9–12, and 14–17 are unpatentable
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Toda and
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`Shahoian. Pet. 12–47. We have reviewed the parties’ contentions and
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`supporting evidence. Given the evidence of record, we are not persuaded
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`that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this
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`asserted ground as to any of these challenged claim for the reasons explained
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`below.
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`1. Relevant Principles of Law
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`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the
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`claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a
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`whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
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`person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of
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`obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations,
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`including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences
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`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in
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`the art; and (4) where in evidence, objective indicia of non-obviousness (i.e.,
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`secondary considerations). Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
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`(1966).
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`2. Overview of Toda (Ex. 1003)
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`Toda describes a method of detecting a press (called a “switch input
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`operation”) on a touch-sensitive tablet. Ex. 1003, col. 2, ll. 7–26. To
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`determine that a touch is an intentional switch input operation, Toda
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`compares the pressure profile of the touch with the empirically determined
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`features of a known intentional touch. Id. at col. 8, l. 23–col. 9, l. 3.
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`Figure 9(a) of Toda is reproduced below.
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`Figure 9(a) depicts an empirically measured pressure profile of a known
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`intentional switch input operation. Id. at col. 4, ll. 4–10. As shown in
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`Figure 9(a) above, Toda identifies the placement of two peaks, P1 and P2, in
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`the pressure profile as the salient features in determining an intentional
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`press. Id. at col. 8, ll. 41–58. For example, in an exemplary embodiment,
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`the criteria for recognizing an intentional switch input operation include the
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`following tests: (1) a peak P1 is detected within 30 milliseconds after the
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`initial touch; (2) a peak P2 is detected within 60 milliseconds after the peak
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`P1; and (3) the touch pressure F of the peak P2 is greater than 75 g. Id. at
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`col. 8, ll. 59–67.
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`Figure 15(a) of Toda is reproduced below.
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`
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`Figure 15(a) depicts an empirically measured pressure profile of a known
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`intentional switch input operation when a finger is moved to perform the
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`operation. Id. at col. 4, ll. 35–38. According to Toda, a relevant feature in
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`the profile of Figure 15(a) is that the touch pressure rises sharply from P3
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`(hence, a “rising point”) to the peak P4. Id. at col. 11, ll. 7–11. In an
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`exemplary embodiment, the criteria for recognizing an intentional switch
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`input operation include the following tests: (1) a rising point P3 is detected;
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`(2) a peak P4 is detected within 150 milliseconds after the peak P3; and (3)
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`the touch pressure at the peak P4 is greater than 150 g. Id. at col. 11, ll. 7–
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`13.
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`In another embodiment, in order to detect a rising point P3, the change
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`in pressure is measured three times. According to Toda, a rising point is
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`determined when the pressure increases by more than 10 g for three times
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`sequentially. Id. at col. 11, ll. 40–52.
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`3. Overview of Shahoian (Ex. 1004)
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`Shahoian describes a touch input device with a haptic feedback.
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`Ex. 1004, Abstract. At least one actuator is coupled to the touch input
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`device to provide a haptic sensation to the user. Id.
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`4. Discussion
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`a. Claims 1, 9, and 14
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`Independent claims 1, 9, and 14 all recite “determining a press if: the
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`pressure is greater than a pressure threshold, the change in pressure is greater
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`than a change in pressure threshold, and a first interval has elapsed” (the
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`“determining a press limitation”). Petitioner relies on Toda for all but one
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`limitation recited in these independent claims, including the “determining a
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`press limitation.” Pet. 17–35, 43–46. As discussed below, Petitioner does
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`not demonstrate sufficiently how Toda teaches or renders obvious the
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`“determining a press limitation.”
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`The plain language of the “determining a press limitation” indicates
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`that the limitation recites a single concept—i.e., determining a press when
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`all three conditions recited in the limitation are satisfied. This reading of the
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`claim limitation is consistent with the disclosure in the written description of
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`the ’507 patent discussed in Section II.A above. As discussed above, the
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`Specification describes that, in order to determine that a user is pressing, at
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`least the following three conditions must all be met: (1) the pressure
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`exceeds the pressure threshold; (2) the change in pressure is greater than the
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`change threshold; and (3) the first interval has elapsed. Ex. 1001, col. 8,
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`ll. 21–48, Fig. 3. Thus, a proper obviousness analysis must address the
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`“determining a press limitation” as an integral whole and show how a
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`reference or a combination of references renders the limitation as a whole
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`obvious. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406.
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`Petitioner, however, breaks up the “determining a press limitation”
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`into four distinct elements identified by Petitioner as elements [1.5], [1.6],
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`[1.7], and [1.8], and largely addresses them separately, arguing Toda teaches
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`or renders obvious each of these limitations individually. See Pet. 24–30.
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`For purposes of this Decision, we focus on the element identified by
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`Petitioner as element [1.8], i.e., the limitation reciting “a first interval has
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`elapsed,” to illustrate the deficiencies in Petitioner’s approach.
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`Petitioner presents two separate theories based on two different
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`embodiments of Toda to argue Toda teaches or renders obvious the
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`condition “a first interval has elapsed” as recited in the claims. Id. at 26–30.
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`First, Petitioner argues that the embodiment depicted in Figure 17 of Toda
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`teaches elapsing of “a first interval” because Toda describes measuring a
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`change in pressure for three consecutive times. Id. at 26–27 (citing
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`Ex. 1003, col. 11, ll. 42–45, Fig. 17 (step 123), Fig. 19A (step 123)).
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`Petitioner argues that the “three sampling times” correspond to “a first
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`interval” recited in the claims. Id. at 27. Petitioner, however, does not
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`explain adequately how the three sequential sampling is conducted over a
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`predetermined interval as a condition to detecting a press.
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`The cited portion of Toda describes detecting or recognizing a “rising
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`point P3” in a pressure profile 2 by determining whether the pressure
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`increases by more than 10 g for three consecutive times. Ex. 1003, col. 11,
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`ll. 40–52 (“it is judged whether the rising step P3 is detected”); Fig. 17 (step
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`123) (“IS RISING POINT P3 DETECTED?”). Toda, however, does not
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`describe any time “interval” associated with the three sequential
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`measurements. Nor is there any disclosure in Toda of an expiration of a
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`time period or interval as a condition to detecting the rising point P3.
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`Hence, the cited portion of Toda does not teach or render obvious the
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`condition “a first interval has elapsed” recited in the claims.
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`Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
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`have recognized “determining . . . a time interval has passed” would be “one
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`factor” to determining a press because Toda teaches that determining a
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`switch input operation takes about 120 to 600 milliseconds to measure the
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`pressure profile. Pet. 28–29. Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. To
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`demonstrate obviousness, Petitioner must show why Toda teaches or
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`suggests requiring elapsing of a time interval as a condition to detecting a
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`press, not that Toda shows a passage of a time is a “factor” in determining a
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`press.
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`Petitioner further contends that conditioning the detection of a press
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`on the passage of a time interval would have been within the skill of a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art because Toda considers various passage of
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`2 The “rising point P3” is depicted in Figure 15(a), which is described in the
`paragraphs of Toda preceding the passages cited by Petitioner. See
`Ex. 1003, col. 11, ll. 7–11, Fig. 15(a).
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`time in its detection algorithm. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 1003, Fig. 11 (steps
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`103, 108), Fig. 18A (steps 103, 108)). We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s
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`argument in this regard because the cited steps of Toda show detecting a
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`peak in a pressure profile within a certain time period. Toda does not show
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`that the detection of the peaks is conditioned on the passage of a specified
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`time interval. Rather, the detection of the peaks can occur anytime as long
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`as it occurs within the specified time interval.
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`Petitioner’s second theory is similarly deficient. Petitioner contends
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`that step 103 of the flowchart depicted in Figure 11 of Toda teaches elapsing
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`of a time interval because Figure 11 shows that, if the time interval of 30
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`milliseconds elapses, the process follows the “no” branch towards routine
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`“3,” where, as shown in Figure 17, a press (i.e., “Switch Inputting On”) is
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`eventually determined. Id. at 27. Hence, Petitioner argues that Toda teaches
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`detecting a press “based in part on a time interval of 30 ms having passed.”
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`Id.
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`As discussed above, step 103 of Figure 11 determines whether a peak
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`P1 has occurred, not if a time interval has elapsed. More importantly, it is
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`not enough to show Toda teaches detecting a press “based in part” on a
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`passage of a time interval. It is not even enough to show Toda teaches each
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`of the claim limitations identified by Petitioner as elements [1.5], [1.6],
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`[1.7], and [1.8] individually. Rather, Petitioner must show how Toda
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`teaches, suggests, or renders obvious the “determining a press limitation” as
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`a whole. As discussed above, in the process depicted in Figure 3 of the ’507
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`patent, the “first interval has elapsed” condition means that the other two
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`conditions—i.e., the pressure exceeds the pressure threshold, and the change
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`in pressure is greater than the change threshold—must be maintained for the
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`duration of the first interval before a press is determined. In other words, the
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`meaning of the “first interval has elapsed” condition as an integral part of the
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`“determining a press limitation” may be very different from its meaning in
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`isolation. Thus, to show obviousness, consideration of “the subject matter,
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`as a whole” of the “determining a press limitation” is required. See KSR,
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`550 U.S. at 406.
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`In order to demonstrate that Toda renders the “determining a press
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`limitation” obvious, Petitioner must identify the differences between the
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`teachings of Toda and the claimed method of determining a press, see KSR,
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`550 U.S. at 406, and explain how the algorithms of Toda could be modified
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`to achieve the claimed method of the ’507 patent. See Comaper Corp. v.
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`Antec Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Determining
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`obviousness requires considering whether two or more pieces of prior art
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`could be combined, or a single piece of prior art could be modified, to
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`produce the claimed invention.”) (emphasis added). Petitioner makes no
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`such showing in the Petition. Petitioner does not identify any difference
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`between the algorithms of Toda and the claimed process of determining a
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`press, nor does Petitioner show how Toda’s algorithms can be modified to
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`achieve the claimed process of the ’507 patent.
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`Hence, Petitioner does not demonstrate that the “determining a press
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`limitation” recited in claims 1, 9, and 14 is obvious in view of Toda.
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`Shahoian is relied upon by Petitioner only to teach the last limitation of the
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`claims, i.e., the limitation reciting “output[ting] haptic effect.” Pet. 30–35,
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`45, 46. Hence, Shahoian cannot and does not remedy the above-identified
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`deficiencies in Petitioner’s analysis of the “determining a press limitation.”
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`Accordingly, on this record, the information presented in the Petition does
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`not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in its
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`challenge to independent claims 1, 9, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
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`obvious over the combination of Toda and Shahoian.
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`b. Claims 2–5, 10–12, and 15–17
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`Claims 2–5 depend from claim 1. Similarly, claims 10–12 depend
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`from claim 9, and claims 15–17 depend from claim 14. Petitioner’s
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`arguments and evidence presented with respect to these dependent claims do
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`not remedy the deficiencies in Petitioner’s analysis of the challenged
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`independent claims discussed above. Therefore, Petitioner does not
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to
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`dependent claims 2–5, 10–12, and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
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`obvious over the combination of Toda and Shahoian.
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`B. Obviousness Based on the Combination of Morimura and Shahoian
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`Petitioner contends claims 1, 9, and 14 are unpatentable under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Morimura and Shahoian.
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`Pet. 48–66. We have reviewed the parties’ contentions and supporting
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`evidence. Given the evidence of record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner
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`has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this asserted ground
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`as to any of these challenged claim for the reasons explained below.
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`1. Overview of Morimura (Ex. 1005)
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`Morimura describes a document processing device with a pen or
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`stylus input interface, such as a Japanese word processor. Ex. 1005, col. 1,
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`ll. 5–11. Morimura discloses a variable plotting/editing process, which
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`allows varying the line width of the drawing pen depending on the “tool
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`force” or pressure applied to the pen. Id. at col. 7, ll. 32–55, col. 10, ll. 20–
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`30.
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`2. Discussion
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`In this ground of challenge based on the combination of Morimura
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`and Shahoian, Petitioner relies on Morimura for all but one limitation recited
`
`in claims 1, 9, and 14, including the “determining a press limitation.” Pet.
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`51–65. Shahoian is relied upon by Petitioner only to teach the last limitation
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`of the claims, i.e., the limitation reciting “output[ting] haptic effect.” Id. at
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`60–62, 64, 65. Similar to our analysis above with respect to the ground
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`based on Toda and Shahoian, Petitioner does not demonstrate sufficiently
`
`how Morimura teaches or renders obvious the “determining a press
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`limitation.”
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`Petitioner contends that Figure 8 of Morimura inherently discloses the
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`limitation “a first interval has elapsed.” Id. at 59. Petitioner asserts that
`
`obtaining a change in tool force by subtracting the previous tool force P0
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`from the current tool force P, as described in Morimura, inherently discloses
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`the “first interval has elapsed” limitation because “obtaining the tool force at
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`two different points in time necessarily requires waiting for a first time
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`interval to elapse after the determination of the first tool force and before the
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`determination of the second tool force.” Id.
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`As discussed above, however, it is not sufficient to show a mere
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`passage of time to satisfy the “first interval has elapsed” limitation. Rather,
`
`Petitioner must show Morimura discloses requiring elapsing of a time
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`interval as a condition to detecting a press. Petitioner’s inherency argument
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`is not persuasive because Petitioner does not explain why conditioning
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`detecting a press on a passage of a time interval is the “the natural result
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`flowing from” the operation of obtaining a change in tool force. See PAR
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`Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
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`(quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981)).
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`Petitioner’s obviousness argument is similarly unpersuasive because it
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`is focused on mere elapse of time and does not address the recited claim
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`limitation of requiring expiration of a time interval as a condition to
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`detecting a press. Pet. 59–60.
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`Furthermore, similar to our analysis above with respect to the ground
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`based on Toda and Shahoian, Petitioner does not present an obviousness
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`analysis for the “detecting a press limitation” as a whole. Petitioner does not
`
`identify any difference between the algorithms of Morimura and the claimed
`
`process of determining a press, nor does Petitioner show how Morimura’s
`
`algorithms can be modified to achieve the claimed process of the ’507
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`patent. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406; Comaper, 596 F.3d at 1351–52.
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`Hence, Petitioner does not demonstrate the “determining a press
`
`limitation” recited in claims 1, 9, and 14 is obvious in view of Morimura.
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`As discussed above, Shahoian is relied upon by Petitioner only to teach the
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`last limitation reciting “output[ting] haptic effect.” Hence, Shahoian cannot
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`and does not remedy the above-identified deficiencies in Petitioner’s
`
`analysis of the “determining a press limitation.” Accordingly, on this
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`record, the information presented in the Petition does not demonstrate a
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`reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing in its challenge to claims 1, 9,
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`and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of
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`Morimura and Shahoian.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`Based on the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition, we
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`conclude Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that
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`Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims of
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`the ’507 patent is unpatentable based on any asserted ground of
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`unpatentability. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review with
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`respect to any of the challenged claims of the ’507 patent.
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`
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`VII. ORDER
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`In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is
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`denied as to all challenged claims of the ’507 patent, and no trial is
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`instituted.
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Gianni Minutolli
`gianni.minutoli@dlapiper.com
`
`Robert Buergi
`robert.buergi@dlapiper.com
`
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Michael Fleming
`mfleming@irell.com
`
`Babak Redjaian
`bredjaian@irell.com
`
`
`
`