Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/16/16 Page 1 of 40 PageID #: 2623
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`UNILOC USA, INC. and
`UNILOC LUXEMBOURG, S.A.,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`AVAYA INC.,
`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
`SHORETEL, INC.
`HUAWEI ENTERPRISE USA, INC.,
`NEC CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
`UNIFY INC.,
`FACEBOOK, INC.,
`WHATSAPP INC.,
`OOVOO, LLC,
`TANGOME, INC. D/B/A TANGO,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`6:15-CV-1168-JRG LEAD CASE
`6:15-CV-1175-JRG
`6:15-CV-1169-JRG
`6:16-CV-0099-JRG
`6:16-CV-0100-JRG
`6:16-CV-0101-JRG
`6:16-CV-0223-JRG
`6:16-CV-0225-JRG
`6:16-CV-0324-JRG
`6:16-CV-0380-JRG
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`Facebook v. Uniloc, No. IPR2016-01756
`Uniloc's EX2002 Page 1
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/16/16 Page 2 of 40 PageID #: 2624
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Pages
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`IV. 
`
`V. 
`
`VI. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`
`PROCEDURAL POSTURE ................................................................................................1 
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2 
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................3 
`
`TERMS WITH CONSTRUCTIONS ON WHICH THE PARTIES AGREE .....................5 
`
`DISPUTED TERMS FOUND IN THE ASSERTED PATENTS .......................................6 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`D. 
`
`E. 
`
`“conference call server” ...........................................................................................6 
`
`“application sharing capability” .............................................................................10 
`
`“voice over internet protocol” ................................................................................11 
`
`“publicly switched telephone network” .................................................................12 
`
`“a cellular communications path” ..........................................................................13 
`
`VII.  DISPUTED TERMS FOUND IN THE ʼ194 PATENT ....................................................14 
`
`A. 
`
`“without requiring registration with a conference call server for
`establishing the voice communication by the potential members including
`the first party and the at least one other party” ......................................................14 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`“Registration” ............................................................................................15 
`
`“The First Party And The At Least One Other Party” ...............................17 
`
`“Before, During, or After” .........................................................................20 
`
`“instant messaging” ...............................................................................................20 
`
`“said display for the first party” .............................................................................26 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`VIII.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................29 
`
`
`i
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/16/16 Page 3 of 40 PageID #: 2625
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Pages
`
`Cases 
`
`Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
`483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007)........................................................................................... 14
`
`Adaptix, Inc. v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
`74 F. Supp. 3d 832 (E.D. Tex. 2014) ................................................................................ 26
`
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)......................................................................................... 25
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......................................................................................... 29
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009)........................................................................................... 5
`
`Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc.,
`1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................................................... 5
`
`IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc.,
`659 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 2011)......................................................................................... 22
`
`In re Packard,
`751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 26
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................... 3, 21
`
`Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,
`256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................... 3
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................... 14, 29
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................... 3, 4, 5
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ...................................................................................................... 26
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................... 28, 29
`
`ii
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`Case 6:15-cv-01168-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/16/16 Page 4 of 40 PageID #: 2626
`Pages
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 3, 4, 5
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni,
`158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998)........................................................................................... 3
`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`77 F. Supp.3d 535 (E.D. Tex. 2014) ................................................................................. 29
`
`Sterner Lighting, Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc.,
`431 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1970) ............................................................................................ 25
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comp. Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)....................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in N.Y.C. v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)........................................................................................... 4
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................................................................................. 17, 18, 20
`
`35 U.S.C. § 254 ............................................................................................................................. 29
`
`35 U.S.C. § 255 ............................................................................................................................. 29
`
`
`
`iii
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`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
` Plaintiffs’ proposed constructions lack intrinsic support, add ambiguity, and disregard
`
`the prosecution history. Defendants’ constructions, on the other hand, come directly from the
`
`specification and/or prosecution history, and are consistent with the plain meaning of the terms
`
`as evidenced by dictionary definitions.
`
` Plaintiffs’ critiques of Defendants’ proposed
`
`constructions misinterpret—and do not address—Defendants’ actual constructions by
`
`disregarding terms within the disputed phrases and words within Defendants’ constructions.
`
`Defendants therefore respectfully request that the Court adopt Defendants’ proposed
`
`constructions.
`
`II.
`
`PROCEDURAL POSTURE
`
`From December 28, 2015 until April 26, 2016, Uniloc USA, Inc. and Uniloc
`
`Luxembourg, S.A. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Avaya, Inc. (“Avaya”), ShoreTel
`
`Inc. (“ShoreTel”), Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), Huawei Enterprise USA, Inc. (“Huawei”),
`
`NEC Corporation of America (“NECAM”), Unify Inc. (“Unify”), Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”),
`
`WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”), ooVoo, LLC (“ooVoo”) and TangoMe, Inc. d/b/a Tango
`
`(“Tango”) (collectively “Defendants”), accusing the Defendants of infringing U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`7,804,948 (the “’948 Patent”),1 7,853,000 (the “’000 Patent”),2 and/or 8,571,194 (the “’194
`
`Patent”)3 (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). Jury selection in the consolidated action is
`
`scheduled to begin on August 14, 2017.
`
`Avaya, ShoreTel, Cisco, and NECAM (the “Transfer Defendants”) have filed motions to
`
`transfer their actions to the Western District of Washington based on a forum selection clause in
`
`
`1 See D.I. 144-2, ʼ948 Patent.
`2 See D.I. 144-3, ʼ000 Patent.
`3 See D.I. 144-4, ʼ194 Patent.
`
`1
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`Uniloc’s prior license agreement on the Asserted Patents and other factors favoring transfer. See
`
`Case Nos. 6:15-cv-1168, D.I. 145; 6:15-cv-1169, D.I. 26; 6:15-cv-1175, D.I. 28; 6:16-cv-100,
`
`D.I. 30. The Transfer Defendants join in this brief due to their current obligation to do so under
`
`the Docket Control Orders in their respective cases. But for the reasons discussed in their
`
`motions to transfer, they believe the actions against them must proceed (including with respect to
`
`claim construction) in the Western District of Washington.
`
`III. BACKGROUND
`
`The Asserted Patents generally relate to “a method for initiating a conference call
`
`between two or more users, and more particularly to initiating a voice conference call between
`
`two or more users using a central server to communicate parameters for the call and for initiating
`
`the call itself.” ʼ948 Patent at 1:13-17.4 In such a client-server IM system, “a communications
`
`channel [is] established through [the] instant messaging service to transmit a request to initiate a
`
`conference call from a network access device associated with a conference call requester to a
`
`conference call server.” Id. at 3:51-55. “The conference call request message may then be
`
`received [and parsed] by the conference call server.” Id. at 6:51-57. The conference call server
`
`may then initiate the conference call either directly or through a third party conference call
`
`service provider.” by e.g., “initiat[ing] a series of outbound calls to each of the selected users
`
`from the instant messaging session, and seamlessly join[ing] those users in a conference call
`
`using a conference bridge.” Id. at 11:34-40; 4:24-28.
`
`All of the claimed embodiments in the asserted claims require the conference call to be
`
`“automatically” initiated or established. See id. at 11:58-12:17 (claim 1: “automatically
`
`
`4 The Asserted Patents are related and share a common specification. The ʼ194 Patent is a
`continuation of the ʼ000 Patent, which is a continuation of the ʼ948 Patent. For the sake of
`convenience, Defendants cite only to the ʼ948 Patent’s specification.
`
`2
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`establishing a conference call connection . . .”), 13:28-54 (claim 23: “automatically initiating a
`
`conference call . . .”), 15:33-59 (claim 51: same)); ’000 Patent at 11:65-12:18 (claim 1: “a
`
`conference call connection . . . is automatically established . . .”), 13:17-14:17 (claim 23: same);
`
`’194 Patent at12:2-27 (claim 1: “automatically initiate voice communication”). The Asserted
`
`Patents indicate that such initiation/establishment may be performed “through actuation of a ‘call
`
`now’ button or icon” in the user’s “IM service.” ’948 Patent at 7:40-41. Such an option is the
`
`alternative to one where the user is “provided with a list of participants of the on-going IM
`
`session” and “provided with the opportunity to add or remove potential participants from a
`
`planned conference call.” Id. at 7:41-44; cf. ’194 Patent, claim 1 (“without requiring individual
`
`selection of potential members including the first party and the at least one other party”).
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 388-90
`
`1996). “Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed
`
`with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with
`
`the claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
`
`Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Thus, the
`
`Court should construe claims in a manner that “most naturally aligns with the patent’s
`
`description of the invention.” Id.
`
`Claim construction is “centered on the claim language itself, for that is the language the
`
`patentee has chosen to ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
`
`patentee regards as his invention.’” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`
`381 F.3d 1111, at 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve,
`
`Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Following that principle, courts interpret claim
`
`3
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`terms by inquiring “how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term” in order
`
`to provide “an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`
`1313. A disputed claim term should thus be construed in a manner consistent with its “ordinary
`
`and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
`
`of the patent application.” Id., 415 F.3d at 1312–13. The ordinary and customary meaning of a
`
`claim term may be determined solely by viewing the term within the context of the claim’s
`
`overall language. See id. at 1314 (“Quite apart from the written description and the prosecution
`
`history, the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim
`
`terms.”).
`
`The patent specification provides further context for understanding the claims. See
`
`Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
`
`part.”). But, courts do not import limitations into the claims unless there is a restriction in the
`
`specification or prosecution history:
`
`The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning
`as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of
`the specification and prosecution history. There are only two exceptions to this
`general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term
`either in the specification or during prosecution.
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comp. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012);5 see also Trustees
`
`of Columbia Univ. in N.Y.C. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, at 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`
`(quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-21 (“Even when guidance is not provided in explicit
`
`definitional format, the specification may define claim terms by implication such that the
`
`meaning may be found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”)).
`
`5 Emphasis is added unless otherwise indicated herein.
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`4
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`A final source of intrinsic evidence is the prosecution history, i.e., the back and forth
`
`negotiation between the applicant and the Patent Office. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Courts
`
`should only use the prosecution history to limit the plain meaning and natural scope of the claims
`
`where the applicant made a “clear and unmistakable” surrender of claim scope. Cordis Corp. v.
`
`Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v.
`
`Cybex Int’l, Inc., 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366-67 (same).
`
`The court also may consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries or technical treatises,
`
`if such sources are “helpful in determining ‘the true meaning of language used in the patent
`
`claims.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). But extrinsic evidence
`
`may not be used to contradict the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term. Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1322-23.
`
`V.
`
`TERMS WITH CONSTRUCTIONS ON WHICH THE PARTIES AGREE
`
`Consistent with the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Statement Pursuant to P.R. 4-3 (D.I.
`
`123), Plaintiffs and the Defendants sued on the ’948 and ’000 Patents previously agreed upon the
`
`following constructions for terms appearing in those patents.6,7,8
`
`
`6 Only the ’194 Patent is asserted against defendants NEC, Unify, Facebook, Whatsapp, ooVoo
`and Tango. Therefore, these defendants join only in the brief with respect to the disputed terms
`for the asserted claims in the ’194 Patent. Should Plaintiffs later assert the ’000 Patent and/or
`’948 Patent against any of these defendants, each reserves the right to address claim construction
`regarding the ’000 Patent and/or ’948 Patent at an appropriate time following any such assertion.
`7 Plaintiffs claim that they have accused Defendants of infringing claims 1-2, 5-10, 12, 18-25, 29,
`51-53, and 65 of the ʼ948 Patent; 1-2, 5-10, 12, and 18-23 of the ʼ000 Patent; and claims 1-5 of
`the ʼ194 Patent. D.I. 144 at 1. But Plaintiffs are incorrect. See supra n.6. Moreover, Plaintiffs
`have not accused ShoreTel of infringing claims 7, 10, or 53 of the ʼ948 Patent or claims 7 or 10
`of the ʼ000 Patent. Plaintiffs have not accused NECAM, Facebook, Whatsapp, or Tango, of
`infringing claim 2 of the ʼ194 Patent. Plaintiffs have not accused Whatsapp of infringing claim 5
`of the ʼ194 Patent.
`8 Defendants’ proposed claim constructions are based on the claims presently asserted by
`Plaintiffs. Should Plaintiffs attempt to assert additional claims, Defendants reserve the right to
`pursue construction of terms from any additional claims Plaintiffs are permitted to assert.
`
`5
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`
`Terms and Phrases
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`“network [access / accessible] device”
`
`“address”
`
`“automatic number identifier”
`
`“any device capable of communicating over a network
`to one or more other Network Access Devices using a
`common protocol”9
`“the identifier for where a participant to a conference
`call may be contacted, and may be, but is not limited to,
`a PSTN or cellular phone number, such as an ANI, or a
`unique identifier associated with a voice over Internet
`protocol communications path”
`“the direct phone number of a call participant, and is
`typically the number at which a person may be directly
`dialed”
`
`VI. DISPUTED TERMS FOUND IN THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`A.
`
`“conference call server”
`
`Terms and Phrases
`
`“conference call server” (’948
`Patent, claims 1, 23, 51; ’000
`Patent, claims 1, 23; ’194
`Patent, claims 1)
`
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed
`Construction
`“computer or program that
`facilitates the establishment of
`the conference call”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`“a central server that
`communicates parameters for
`the conference call and
`directly or indirectly initiates
`the conference call itself”
`
`The Court should not adopt Plaintiffs’ construction because it eliminates the “server”
`
`aspect of the claim term, is not supported by the specification, and adds ambiguity to the term.
`
`Defendants’ construction, on the other hand, is based on the specification, drawing on language
`
`describing the conference call server in the Field of Invention, and clarifying that the conference
`
`call server may indirectly initiate the conference call. The Field of Invention provides:
`
`The present invention relates generally to a method for initiating a conference call
`between two or more users, and more particularly to initiating a voice conference
`call between two or more users using a central server to communicate
`parameters for the call and for initiating the call itself.
`
`ʼ948 Patent at 1:13-17.
`
`9 Such NADs can include but are not limited to computers, servers, workstations, Internet
`appliances, terminals, hosts, personal digital assistants (hereafter ‘PDAs’), and digital cellular
`telephones.
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`6
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`Plaintiffs raise two issues with Defendants’ construction. First Plaintiffs incorrectly
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`assert that Defendants’ construction reads out embodiments of the specification where the
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`conference call server initiates the conference call indirectly through a third party conference call
`
`service provider. See, e.g., D.I. 144 at 9 (quoting ’948 Patent at 11:34-40 (“The [conference call
`
`requester] may select potential targets from the display, or manually add potential targets to a
`
`potential target list, to be included in a conference call request to be generated 1510 on and
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`transmitted 1512 by the NAD to the conference call server, which may then initiate the
`
`conference call either directly or through a third party conference call service provider.”)
`
`(emphasis in original)). In fact, Defendants’ construction clarifies the language in the Field of
`
`Invention to make clear that the conference call server initiates the call directly or indirectly. In
`
`every example in the specification the conference call server directly initiates the call, or
`
`indirectly initiates it through a third-party conference call service. See, e.g., ’948 Patent at 4:23-
`
`28 (“The central server may directly or indirectly establish a conference bridge[.]).10
`
`
`10 See also ʼ948 Patent at 1:13-17 (“The present invention relates generally to . . . initiating a
`voice conference call between two or more users using a central server to communicate
`parameters for the call and for initiating the call itself.”); id. at 3:55-58 (“The conference call
`server, upon receiving the request, may initiate the formation of a conference bridge[.]”); id. at
`4:23-28 (“The central server may directly or indirectly establish a conference bridge[.]); id. at
`6:31-35 (“[I]nformation contained in the message may be correctly parsed to allow the
`conference call server to properly initiate, or request initiation of, a conference bridge.”); id. at
`6:51-59 (“The conference call server may then initiate 114 or request initiation of a conference
`bridge[.]); id. 7:16-18 (“The conference call server could then generate 208 a list of targets for
`the conference call, and then initiate 210 the conference call.”); id. at 8:11-12 (“The conference
`call sever may then initiate a conference call bridge between the conference requester and the
`targets.”); id. at 8:25-28 (“The conference call server may further utilize third party conference
`call providers for the actual initiation of a conference call based on parameters generated by the
`conference call server or conference call requester.”); id. at 8:52-56 (“Where the conference call
`server initiates the conference call itself, the conference call server may use such geographic
`information to select specific long distance or data carriers[.]”); id. at 11:34-46 (The conference
`call server “may then initiate the conference call either directly or through a third party
`conference call service provider.”).
`
`7
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`Plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the claims also are wrong. Plaintiffs correctly point out
`
`that claim 1 of the ’948 Patent includes the limitation “said conference call connection initiated
`
`by said conference call server.” D.I. 144 at 9 (quoting ’948 Patent claim 1). Plaintiffs then
`
`assert that dependent claim 41 shows that the conference call server need not initiate the call
`
`because it states that “the step of initiating a conference call comprises communicating
`
`information from said conference call server to a third party conference call service, said third
`
`party conference call service establishing a conference bridge[.]” D.I. 144 at 10 (quoting ’948
`
`Patent claim 41). But claim 13, which is a nested dependent claim based on claim 1, contains the
`
`same limitation—i.e., “the step of initiating a conference call comprises communicating
`
`information from said conference call server to a third party conference call service, said third
`
`party conference call service establishing a conference bridge[.]” ’948 Patent at 12:59-64. Thus,
`
`the claims themselves demonstrate that the third party conference call service feature is a mere
`
`example of how the conference call server initiates the conference call.
`
`Second, although Plaintiffs do not take issue with the requirement that the conference call
`
`server is “a central server that communicates parameters for the conference call,” Plaintiffs assert
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`that the jury would benefit from clarification of the term “server.” D.I. 144 at 10. Even if
`
`Plaintiffs’ proposed clarification were necessary—and it is not—Plaintiffs’ proposal is not
`
`faithful to its own dictionary definition. The Microsoft dictionary Plaintiffs cite defines server
`
`as: “On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a
`
`client.” D.I. 144-6 at 474 (comparing “server” to “client” definition 3, which states “client” is,
`
`“[o]n a local area network or the Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources
`
`provided by another computer (called a server)” (emphasis in original)); see also Ex. 1,
`
`8
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`Microsoft Computer Dictionary 5th Edition at 102.11 The specification supports Microsoft’s
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`definitions: “Instant messaging (hereafter ‘IM’) systems employ a client-server model on
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`Internet protocol (hereafter ‘IP’) networks to deliver text chat and other information to
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`distributed users in real-time.” ʼ948 Patent at 3:21-24. Accordingly, to the extent the Court
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`believes that the term “server,” by itself, requires additional clarification, it should substitute that
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`word in Defendants’ construction with the full (and correct) dictionary definition of “server”
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`provided by Plaintiffs, as indicated below:
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`a central [computer or program on the Internet or other network that responds to
`commands from a client] that communicates parameters for the conference call
`and directly or indirectly initiates the conference call itself.
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`The Court should not adopt Plaintiff’s construction—“computer or program that
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`facilitates the establishment of the conference call”—for three reasons. First, it eliminates the
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`requirement that a “conference call server” be a “server.” In fact, Plaintiffs’ proposal would also
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`encompass client computers since it replaces the word “server” with a mere computer or
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`program, omitting the claimed architectural requirement of a server. Second, Plaintiffs’
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`construction omits the requirement that the conference call server communicates parameters for
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`the conference call—an aspect of Defendants’ construction that Plaintiffs do not contest. The
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`essence of the conference call server is that it communicates those parameters in order to directly
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`or indirectly initiate the call. See supra n.10. Third, by merely requiring that the “computer or
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`program” facilitate[] the establishment” of a conference call, Plaintiffs’ construction introduces
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`unnecessary ambiguity into the term. “Facilitates the establishment” does not appear anywhere
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`in the intrinsic record, and is likely to be the subject of ongoing disputes between the parties.
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`Every component of a conference call system—the client, the server and all of the components in
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`11 “Ex.” herein refers to the exhibits to the accompanying declaration of C. Austin Ginnings in
`Support of Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief.
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`9
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`between—as well as the individuals using the system may be asserted to “facilitate the
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`establishment” of a conference call. Plaintiffs’ construction thus eviscerates the conference call
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`server required by the asserted claims, and adds further ambiguity to the term rather than the
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`clarification sought by the claim construction process. For these reasons, the Court should adopt
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`Defendants’ construction and reject Plaintiffs’ construction.
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`B.
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`“application sharing capability”
`
`Terms and Phrases
`
`“application sharing
`capability” (ʼ948 Patent,
`claims 9, 10, 36-38, 52, 53,
`54; ʼ000 Patent, claims 9, 10,
`11)
`
`Uniloc’s Proposed
`Construction
`“the ability to grant two or
`more devices access to a
`single application”
`
`Defendants’ Proposed
`Construction
`“ability to allow two or more
`network access devices to
`access a single application on
`a network access device”
`
`Defendants’ construction—unlike that of Plaintiffs’—clarifies that network access
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`devices are used to access a single application on a network access device. Plaintiffs agree that a
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`network access device is used to access the single application. D.I. 144 at 11 (citing ʼ948 Patent
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`at 9:30-48; Ex. 2, U.S. Patent Publication No. 20030018725 at 3). Plaintiffs incorrectly assume
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`that Defendants’ construction requires that the application reside on one of the user’s network
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`access devices. D.I. 144 at 11-12. But Defendants’ proposed construction merely requires “a
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`single application on a network access device” where the “network access device” is “any device
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`capable of communicating over a network to one or more other Network Access Devices using a
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`common protocol” and “can include . . . computers, servers[.]”
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`Defendants’ construction is consistent with the intrinsic evidence. See, e.g.,’948 Patent at
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`5:5-9 (describing figure 9 illustrating that the target network access devices (at least two) have
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`access to application sharing capabilities); ʼ948 Patent at 9:30-38 (“[T]he ability of multiple
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`viewers to view the interface with a particular software application operating on a particular set
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`of data, and may include the ability of each viewer to simultaneously operate the shared
`
`10
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`application”); Ex. 2, U.S. Patent Publication No. 20030018725 ¶¶8-10. Contrary to Plaintiffs’
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`arguments, Defendants’ construction does not specify whether the network access device is that
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`of a user. See D.I. 144 at 12. Similarly, contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion , Defendants’
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`construction does not prohibit the application from being located on a server. Indeed, each of the
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`examples in Plaintiffs’ brief is covered by Defendants’ proposed construction. See id. at 10-13
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`(e.g., “server or other clo