Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
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` Paper No. 31
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`Entered: March 13, 2018
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`REALTIME DATA LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`571.272.7822
`
` Paper No. 31
`
`Entered: March 13, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`REALTIME DATA LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`I.
`
`We have jurisdiction to hear this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 6, and this Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine that
`Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 5, 35–
`46, 97, 98, and 112 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,880,862
`B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’862 Patent”) are unpatentable.
`A. Procedural History
`
`Apple, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting
`an inter partes review of the challenged claims of the ’862 Patent. Realtime
`Data, LLC (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6,
`“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of
`(1) Claims 5, 35–46, and 97 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)1 in
`view of Settsu2; (2) Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Zwiegincew3; (3) Claims 5, 35–46,
`and 97 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Settsu and Dye4;
`and (4) Claims 5, 35–46, 97, 98, and 112 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to
`35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. effective on March 16, 2013. The ’862 patent issued
`from an application filed before March 16, 2013; therefore, we apply the
`pre-AIA versions of the statutory bases for unpatentability.
`2 U.S. Patent No. 6,374,353 B1, filed Mar. 3, 1999, issued Apr. 16, 2002
`(Ex. 1006, “Settsu”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,317,818 B1, filed Mar. 30, 1999, issued Nov. 13, 2001
`(Ex. 1010, “Zwiegincew”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 6,145,069, filed Apr. 26, 1999, issued Nov. 7, 2000
`(Ex. 1008, “Dye”).
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`§ 103(a) in view of Settsu, Zwiegincew, and Dye. See Paper 7 (“Dec. to
`Inst.”), 30.
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 15, “PO Resp.”), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 17,
`“Reply”). Patent Owner also filed Objections to Evidence in Petitioner’s
`Reply (Paper 18) and a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 25). Petitioner
`opposed the Motion to Exclude (Paper 26) and Patent Owner submitted a
`Response in support of its Motion to Exclude (Paper 29). In addition, Patent
`Owner filed a list of alleged improper reply arguments (Paper 19) to which
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 20).
`An oral argument was held on January 8, 2018. A transcript of the
`oral argument is included in the record. Paper 30 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`
`The parties identify the following cases as related to the challenged
`patent: Realtime Data, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 4:14-cv-
`00827 (E.D. Tex.), Realtime Data, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No.
`6:15-cv-00885 (E.D. Tex.), and Realtime Data, LLC v. Apple, Inc., Case No.
`3:16-cv-02595 (N.D. Cal.) (transferred from Realtime Data, LLC v. Apple,
`Inc., Case No. 6:15-cv-00885 (E.D. Tex.)). Pet. 1; Paper 5, 2.
`
`C. The ’862 Patent
`
`The ’862 Patent relates to “providing accelerated loading of operating
`
`system and application programs upon system boot or application launch,”
`and the use of data compression and decompression techniques for such
`purpose. Ex. 1001, 1:20–26. The specification discusses the limits of prior
`art storage devices, particularly the significant bandwidth limitations of
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`“mass storage devices” such as hard disk drives. Id. at 1:43–57, 2:9–18.
`According to the specification,
`“[A]ccelerated” data storage comprises receiving a digital data
`stream at a data transmission rate which is greater than the data
`storage rate of a target storage device, compressing the input
`stream at a compression rate that increases the effective data
`storage rate of the target storage device and storing the
`compressed data in the target storage device.
`Id. at 5:41–47. One embodiment of the ’862 Patent is illustrated in Figure 1,
`reproduced below.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, data storage controller 10 is “operatively connected”
`to hard disk 11 and to host system’s bus 16. Id. at 5:63–6:53. Controller 10
`includes cache 13 for data storage/preloading, and data compression engine
`12 for data compression/decompression. Id. at 5:63–6:53, 20:50–22:11.
`The ’862 Patent explains that, following reset or power on of a computer
`system, the “initial bus commands inevitably instruct the boot device
`controller [e.g., controller 10] to retrieve data from the boot device (such as
`a disk) [e.g., hard disk 11] for the operating system.” Id. at 20:36–49.
`
`D. Illustrative Claims
`
`As noted above, an inter partes review was instituted as to claims 5,
`
`35–46, 97, 98, and 112 of the ’862 Patent. Dec. to Inst. 30. Of the
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`challenged claims, claims 5 is the only independent claim. Claim 5 is
`illustrative of the challenged claims, and is reproduced below:
`5.
`A method for booting a computer system, the method
`comprising:
`storing boot data in a compressed form that is associated with a
`portion of a boot data list in a first memory;
`loading the stored compressed boot data from the first memory;
`accessing the loaded compressed boot data;
`decompressing the accessed compressed boot data;
`utilizing the decompressed boot data to at least partially boot the
`computer system; and
`updating the boot data list,
`wherein the loading, the accessing, and the decompressing occur
`within a period of time which is less than a time to access the
`boot data from the first memory if the boot data was stored in
`the first memory in an uncompressed form.
`Ex. 1001, 26:60–27:8.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (“We
`conclude that the regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the
`rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office.”). Under
`that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An inventor, however, may provide a
`meaning for a term that is different from its ordinary meaning by defining
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`the term in the specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Limitations, however, are not to be read from the specification into the
`claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In addition,
`the Board may not “construe claims during [an inter partes review] so
`broadly that its constructions are unreasonable under general claim
`construction principles.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d
`1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`The parties dispute the proper construction of the terms “boot data
`list” and “non-accessed boot data.”
`1. “boot data list”
`Patent Owner contends the term “boot data list” should mean “record
`used to identify and load boot data into memory.” PO Resp. 15. According
`to Patent Owner, both the ’862 patent’s specification and the provisional
`application to which the ’862 patent claims priority establish that the
`claimed “boot data list” is a record of boot data separate from the boot data
`itself. Id. at 15–16. Patent Owner argues that “[b]oot data comprises
`information such as program code relating to portions of the operating
`system and certain application programs.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, Abs., 3:48–
`50; Ex. 2010, 58). Patent Owner reasons that the system stores boot data in
`a compressed form on a boot device (id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1001, Abs., 3:51–
`52, 3:60–61; Ex. 2010, 58)), loads boot data into memory upon initialization
`of the computer system (id. (citing Ex. 1001, Abs., 3:45–46, 4:16–17; Ex.
`2010, 58)), and services requests for boot data using the loaded boot data (id.
`(citing Ex. 1001, Abs., 3:46–47, 4:1–3, 4:17–19, 21:45–59, Fig. 7B)).
`Patent Owner then argues that “the intrinsic evidence describes a ‘boot data
`list’ as comprising a list of data—specifically, boot data—that is to be used
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`for booting a computer system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:44–45, 4:15–16; Ex.
`2010, 58). Patent Owner further argues that “[i]n one exemplary
`embodiment, a data storage controller retrieves and reads the ‘boot data list’
`upon power-on/reset and preloads the boot data specified on the list into
`memory.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 21:43–48, Figs. 7B, 8A, 8B).
`Petitioner contests Patent Owner’s proffered construction arguing that
`it is overly narrow and improperly imports limitations. Reply 1. Petitioner
`contends boot data list should be given its ordinary meaning and at least be
`construed broadly enough to include a list of data associated with data
`requests expected to result from a system power-on/reset. Id. at 2 (citing
`Pet. 13–16, 19–30). According to Petitioner, Patent Owner improperly
`attempts to import functional use to the term “boot data list,” which renders
`other claim language directed to use of the boot data list redundant and
`unnecessary. Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s reliance
`on dependent claim 6 is misplaced, because claim 6 explicitly defines the
`“boot data list” as being “used for booting the system,” not “used to identify
`and load boot data into memory.” Id. at 2–3 (citing PO Resp. 17). Petitioner
`also argues that the terms “load” and “into memory” are additional features
`added in claim 6 that would be rendered duplicative and redundant if also
`imported into the term “boot data list.” Id. at 3. Petitioner additionally notes
`that the term “identify” is not used in the claims (or elsewhere in the
`specification). Petitioner concludes that the claims do not support Patent
`Owner’s attempt to limit “boot data list” as being “used to identify and load
`boot data into memory.” Id.
`Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner’s proposed claim
`construction is not supported by the ’862 patent’s specification, specifically
`the description of Figure 7B. Id. at 3 (citing PO Resp. 17–20). According to
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`Petitioner, Patent Owner recognizes that this description is merely “one
`exemplary embodiment” of the ’862 patent, but fails to explain sufficiently
`why the claimed boot data list should be limited to this embodiment. Id.
`(citing PO Resp. 17). Additionally, Petitioner argues that the ’862 patent
`does not limit use of the boot data list “to identify and load boot data into
`memory,” as Patent owner contends, citing to the ’862 patent’s disclosure of
`“a list of boot data used for booting a computer system.” Id. at 2 (citing
`Ex. 1001, Abstract, 3:42–59).
`We are charged with interpreting claim terms according to their
`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
`which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Therefore, we consult the
`patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms. Trading
`Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
`(holding claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are
`a part” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979
`(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). We must be
`careful, however, not to import improperly limitations into the claims or to
`read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the
`claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van
`Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Given our mandate under
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and the patent’s various descriptions of “boot data
`list,” we understand that the examples laid out in the specification are
`exemplary and are not to be read as limitations in the claims.
`Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction imports selected
`limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into the claim and
`provides an overly narrow interpretation of the claim term. Additionally,
`Patent Owner has not pointed to any definitions or disavowals in the
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`specification or otherwise clearly explained why the specification’s
`disclosure of “boot data lists” should not guide our claim construction
`analysis. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions, which
`appear to be based on a narrow reading of the claim that is inconsistent with
`the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.
`Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction
`as it would limit unnecessarily the scope of the claims. Instead, we find the
`broadest reasonable construction of “boot data list” to encompass a “list of
`boot data.”
`
`2. “non-accessed boot data”
`Patent Owner contends that the term “non-accessed boot data,” as
`used in claims 96, 100, 102, and 106, should mean “boot data identified in
`the boot data list that was not requested during system boot-up.” PO Resp.
`20 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 55–60, 61–66). According to Patent Owner, “[t]he
`specification explains that ‘non-accessed boot data’ is boot data that has
`been retrieved and recorded in the boot data list during a previous system
`boot-up but was not requested during a subsequent system boot-up.” Id. at
`20–21. Patent Owner argues that if the boot data is not requested during
`system boot-up, then that boot data is “excluded” from the boot data list. Id.
`at 21 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 7B, 22:5–11).
`Petitioner contests Patent Owner’s position arguing that the intrinsic
`record does not limit functionally the term “non-accessed” to “not
`requested” or limit temporally the term “non-accessed” to “during system
`boot-up.” Reply 5. Rather, according to Petitioner, under the broadest
`reasonable interpretation, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`viewed the term “non-accessed boot data” per its ordinary meaning as
`simply boot data that was not accessed. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 203–205).
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`Petitioner argues that the embodiments in the specification are non-limiting
`examples. Id. at 5–6. Petitioner further argues that Patent Owner’s reliance
`on the embodiment of Figure 7B is misplaced because the very next
`embodiment illustrated in Figures 8a and 8b includes references to a “non-
`requested data block” “[d]uring the application launch process.” Id. at 6
`(citing Ex. 1001, 22:12–23:26; Ex. 1002 (Part 1), 156–157, 160–162).
`Petitioner notes that Patent Owner’s citations include the application launch
`embodiment, which contradicts limiting non-accessed boot data to only data
`“not requested during system boot-up.” Id. Petitioner concludes that
`adopting Patent Owner’s construction would exclude improperly a specific
`embodiment (during application launch) that Patent Owner cites now in
`support of its construction and also cited during prosecution to show written
`description support for the dispute term. Id.
`We determine that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unduly
`narrow and improperly attempts to import limitations from the specification.
`Rather, we agree with Petitioner’s position and we construe “non-accessed
`boot data” as “boot data that has not been accessed.”
`3. Additional claim terms
`We determine that no additional claim terms require express
`construction at this stage (see Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms which are in controversy
`need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy)).
`
`B. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if “the differences
`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
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`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,
`i.e., secondary considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
`City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`“A determination of whether a patent claim is invalid as obvious
`under § 103 requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is error
`to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those factors are considered.”
`Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en
`banc) (citations omitted). “This requirement is in recognition of the fact that
`each of the Graham factors helps inform the ultimate obviousness
`determination.” Id.
`“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the
`onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is
`unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review
`petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the
`grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden never shifts to
`Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800
`F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek,
`Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of
`proof in inter partes review). Furthermore, Petitioner cannot satisfy its
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`burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.”
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Thus, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how
`the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged
`claims unpatentable. At this final stage, we determine whether a
`preponderance of the evidence of record shows that the challenged claims
`would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art.
`We analyze the instituted grounds of unpatentability in accordance
`with the above-stated principles.
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the
`time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
`at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of
`resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of
`maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v.
`Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The person of ordinary
`skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the
`relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573,
`1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected
`by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
`Cir. 2001). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of
`ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems
`encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational
`level of active workers in the field. GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. In a given case,
`one or more factors may predominate. Id. Generally, it is easier to establish
`obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention
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`Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A
`less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of
`nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”).
`Petitioner’s declarant, Charles J. Neuhauser, Ph.D. (“Dr. Neuhauser”),
`opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’685 patent
`would have had “a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer
`engineering, or a related area of study” as well as “between three and five
`years of practical experience in the design and implementation of computer
`systems, such as personal computers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15. Dr. Neuhauser
`further opines that, in the alternative, a person with “a Master’s Degree in
`the area of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related area of
`study and somewhat less practical experience would be similarly qualified.”
`Id.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Neuhauser’ testimony. See
`generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Godmar Back (“Dr.
`Back”), however, provides his own assessment regarding a person of
`ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’862 patent and agrees with Dr.
`Neuhauser’s testimony. Ex. 2008 ¶ 50.
`
`We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’
`assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that
`either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art
`at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant
`proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
`2001). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment.
`Based on our review of the ’862 patent, the types of problems and solutions
`described in the ’862 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr.
`Neuhauser and Dr. Back, we adopt and apply Dr. Back’s definition of a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for
`purposes of this Decision.
`D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art
`
`Settsu
`1.
`
`Settsu is a U.S. Patent titled “Information Processing Apparatus
`Method [sic] of Booting Information Processing Apparatus at a High Speed”
`and relates to “[a] method of booting up an information processing
`apparatus. . . .” Ex. 1006, [54], [57]. One embodiment of Settsu is shown in
`Figure 1, reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 illustrates an information processing apparatus with boot device 3,
`firmware 6, memory device 2, and boot block 4. Id. at 8:2–8. According to
`Settsu, boot block 4 includes a mini operating system (OS) module that has
`OS functions required for bootstrap processing, and an OS main body
`module located in file system 5 that provides the apparatus with the OS
`functions not included on mini OS module 7. Id. at 8:13–21.
`
`Two other embodiments of Settsu are shown in Figures 6 and 13,
`reproduced below.
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`Figures 6 and 13 illustrate dividing up Mini OS Module 7. Id. at 10:59–
`11:3, 13:66–14:6. Settsu discloses that Mini OS Module 7 can include OS
`loading and decompression processing module 50 so that modules can be
`stored as compressed files on a boot device. Id. at 14:6–12, 14:58–63. Each
`of these modules is decompressed each time it is loaded into memory, and
`“the time required for I/O [(input/output)] processing can be reduced” as a
`result, which “provides an advantage of being able to further reduce the time
`required for booting up the information processing apparatus.” Id. at 14:64–
`15:4.
`
`Dye
`2.
`Dye is a U.S. Patent titled “Parallel Decompression and Compression
`
`System and Method for Improving Storage Density and Access Speed for
`Non-Volatile Memory and Embedded Memory Devices.” Ex. 1008, at [54].
`Dye relates to controllers for flash or embedded memory that include data
`compression and decompression engines “for increased effective memory
`density and improved bandwidth.” Id. at 1:17–22, 2:42–46. According to
`Dye, such a controller enables conventional flash memory to “achieve higher
`bandwidth, more effective density, with less system power and noise. . . .”
`Id. at 3:3–12, 3:23–28. The technology permits data to be “saved in either a
`normal or compressed format, retrieved from the Flash Memory Array for
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`IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`MPU [(microprocessing unit)] execution in a normal or compressed format,
`or transmitted and stored on a medium in a normal or compressed format.”
`Id. at 3:66–4:8.
`Figure 10B of Dye is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 10B, above, illustrates a preferred embodiment “provid[ing] a parallel
`implementation of dictionary based (or history table based)
`compression/decompression.” Ex. 1008 18:61–63. In the preferred
`embodiment illustrated in Dye’s Figure 10B, the history table becomes a
`four symbol parallel flow. Id. at 19:15–17. “[Four] symbols are analyzed in
`parallel, and multiple compressed outputs may also be provided in parallel.”
`Id. at 19:18–19. “Other alternate embodiments may contain a plurality of
`compression windows for decompression of multiple streams. . . .” Id. at
`19:19–21.
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`IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`Figure 13 of Dye is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 13, above, is a hardware diagram illustrating “operation of the
`parallel compression algorithm.” Id. at 22:66–67. Each entry of the history
`table contains a symbol of data, which is compared with the input stream.
`Id. at 23:1–3. In Figure 13, Entry D Data Byte 602 is compared with each
`symbol of input data stream 610, shown as four data bytes, Data 0, 1, 2, and
`3. Id. at 23:5–7. Comparators 608 compare each data byte to Entry D Data
`Byte 602, generating four compare signals (D0 through D3), with D1
`through D3 being used by the next entry in the history table and Do being
`used by Results Calculation 606. Id. at 23:7–55. Results Calculation 606
`sends Output Mask and Output Count to logic shown in Dye’s Figure 14.
`Id. at 23:19–24.
`3.
`Zwiegincew
`Zwiegincew is a U.S. Patent titled “Pre-Fetching of Pages Prior to a
`
`Hard Page Fault Sequence,” and it recognizes problems of slow boot that
`result when hard page faults occur during the boot process. Ex. 1010, [54],
`1:45–51, 2:12–15, 6:50–51. To improve boot speed, Zwiegincew proposes
`pre-fetching, from a hard disk to memory, pages that are expected to be
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`IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`requested during the boot process, thereby reducing occurrence of hard page
`faults. Id. at [57], 1:5–3:55. “Copies of, or references to, the . . . pages are
`stored in a scenario file” and, “[w]hen a hard page fault scenario is detected,
`a corresponding scenario file is fetched from disk storage and the determined
`pages, or copies thereof, are transferred into RAM.” Id. at [57].
`Zwiegincew also recognizes benefits of compressing pre-fetched page data.
`For instance, Zwiegincew’s system includes “a disk
`compressor/decompressor,” which employs “compression algorithms” on
`pre-fetched data to achieve pre-fetch time improvements. Id. at 8:66–9:13,
`Figs. 1–2.
`
`E. Alleged Obviousness of the Challenged Claims in View of Settsu
`
`Petitioner contends Settsu teaches or suggests each element of claims
`
`5, 35–46, and 97. Pet. 16–60. Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s
`contentions. PO Resp. 24–31. For reasons that follow, we determine based
`on the entirety of the record before us, Petitioner has established by a
`preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’862 patent
`are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Settsu.
`
`1.
`Analysis of Cited Art as Applied to Independent Claim 5
`
`Petitioner contends the teachings of Settsu renders every element of
`claim 5 of the ’862 patent obvious. Pet. 16–38. Patent Owner disputes
`Petitioner’s contentions. PO Resp. 24–31. Patent Owner specifically argues
`that Petitioner fails to show that Settsu teaches “updating the boot data list.”
`Id. at 24–30.
`
`After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine
`based on the entirety of the record before us, Petitioner has established by a
`preponderance of the evidence that challenged claim 5 of the ’862 patent is
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`IPR2016-01739
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Settsu. We address
`the issues disputed by Patent Owner in more detail below.
`
`Petitioner contends Settsu describes a boot data list in at least two
`ways: “(1) in the form of lists of boot data that are stored within the OS
`functional module files themselves; and (2) in the form of lists of boot data
`that are referenced by mini OS module 7 in the course of booting the OS.”
`Pet. 19–21, 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70, 77, 116; Ex. 1006, 5:39–51, 7:65–
`8:23, 13:49–65, 14:44–52, 16:7–17:62, Figs. 12, 20 (ST213)). With respect
`to the function definition file, Petitioner notes that “Settsu describes that the
`function definition file includes a ‘listing [of] a minimum number of OS
`functional modules . . . required for the application module 70 to run on the
`OS.’” Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1006, 16:26–31). Petitioner further notes that
`“Settsu’s processing module 72 refers to the function definition file 71 and
`‘loads one of the plurality of OS functional modules listed in the function
`definition file 71 into the memory 2.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 16:65–17:1).
`
`Petitioner then argues that Settsu’s description renders obvious
`updating both types of lists. Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 117). According to
`Petitioner, Settsu OS main body module is divided into “a plurality of
`functional modules” that “are separately stored as compressed files” in “file
`system 5 of boot device 3.” Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1006, 13:55–65). From this
`description, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
`have understood that OS modules, such as Settsu’s, require updates when
`new, updated code becomes available. Id.
`
`Petitioner supports it position with the Declaration of Dr. Neuhauser.
`Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 117). Dr. Neuhauser specifically opines that an
`OS functional module file stored on boot device 3, as described by Settsu,
`includes a list of data necessary for starting the OS and, thus, is a boot data
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`IPR2016-01739
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`“list” (that is, a list of data) under a broadest reasonable interpretation.
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (citing Ex. 1014 for a definition of the term “file” as “[a]
`complete, named collection of information, such as a program, a set of data
`used by a program, or a user-created document” that “binds a
`conglomeration of instructions . . . into a coherent unit”). As supported by
`the cited definition, Dr. Neuhauser testifies one of ordinary skill would have
`understood Settsu’s compressed OS functional module files to be lists of
`data (including, e.g., program instructions). Id. Based on Dr. Neuhauser’s
`testimony, Petitioner concludes that through its description of storing
`compressed OS functional module files on boot device 3, Settsu teaches
`storing boot data in a compressed form that is associated with a portion of a
`boot data list as recited by claim 5. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79).
`
`Dr. Neuhauser further testifies that to benefit from updates in Settsu’s
`system or simply to account for changes in user preference, a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Settsu’s system updates
`the OS data stored in boot device 3. Ex. 1003 ¶ 117 (citing Ex. 1026, 110–
`112) (describing regular updates to the Windows 98 operating system).
`According to Dr. Neuhauser, to accomplish these updates, a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood that updates occur to boot
`data lists in Settsu; namely, updates to lists of boot d
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