throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
` Paper No. 57
`
` Entered: March 13, 2018
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`REALTIME DATA LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
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`

`

`IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`I.
`
`We have jurisdiction to hear this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 6, and this Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine that
`Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6,
`7, 13, 23–34, 47–58, 83–96, 99, 100, 105–111, 113, and 116 (“the
`challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,880,862 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’862
`Patent”) are unpatentable. Additionally, we grant Patent Owner’s
`Contingent Motion to Amend with respect to proposed substitute claims
`118–173.
`A. Procedural History
`
`Apple, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting
`an inter partes review of the challenged claims of the ’862 Patent. Realtime
`Data, LLC (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 6,
`“Prelim. Resp.”).
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of
`(1) all claims challenged as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)1 in view
`of Sukegawa2 and Dye3; (2) all claims challenged as unpatentable under 35
`U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Sukegawa, Dye, and Settsu4; (3) all claims
`
`
`1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to
`35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. effective on March 16, 2013. The ’862 patent issued
`from an application filed before March 16, 2013; therefore, we apply the
`pre-AIA versions of the statutory bases for unpatentability.
`2 U.S. Patent No. 5,860,083, issued Jan. 12, 1999 (Ex. 1005, “Sukegawa”).
`3 U.S. Patent No. 6,145,069, filed Apr. 26, 1999, issued Nov. 7, 2000
`(Ex. 1008, “Dye”).
`4 U.S. Patent No. 6,374,353 B1, filed Mar. 3, 1999, issued Apr. 16, 2002
`(Ex. 1006, “Settsu”).
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`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`challenged as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Sukegawa,
`Dye, and Burrows5; (4) all claims challenged as unpatentable under 35
`U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Sukegawa, Dye, Settsu, and Burrows; and (5) all
`claims challenged as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of
`Sukegawa, Dye, Settsu, and Zwiegincew6. See Paper 7 (“Dec. to Inst.”), 24.
`After institution of trial, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 20, “PO Resp.”), to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 23,
`“Reply”). In addition, Patent Owner filed a Motion to Amend Claims (Paper
`19, “Mot. to Amend.”), which was opposed by Petitioner (Paper 24,
`“Opp.”). Patent Owner submitted a Reply in Support of its Motion to
`Amend. Paper 31, “PO Reply.” During the intervening time, new case law
`was issued by the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit,7 and the parties
`submitted additional briefing based on the new case law. Papers 37 (“Pet.
`Suppl. Opp.”), 39 (“PO Suppl. Brief in Support of Mot. to Amend”).
`Patent Owner also filed objections to Evidence in Petitioner’s Reply
`(Papers 25, 44) and a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 46). Petitioner
`opposed the Motion to Exclude (Paper 48) and Patent Owner submitted a
`Response in support of its Motion to Exclude (Paper 49). In addition Patent
`Owner filed a list of alleged improper reply arguments (Paper 32) to which
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 33).
`
`
`5 Michael Burrows et al., On-line Data Compression in a Log-structured
`File System (1992) (Ex. 1007, “Burrows”).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 6,317,818 B1, filed Mar. 30, 1999, issued Nov. 13, 2001
`(Ex. 1010, “Zwiegincew”).
`7 See Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
`discussed infra Section II.
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`An oral argument was held on January 8, 2018. A transcript of the
`oral argument is included in the record.8 Paper 56 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`
`The parties identify the following cases as related to the challenged
`patent: Realtime Data, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 4:14-cv-
`00827 (E.D. Tex.), Realtime Data, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No.
`6:15-cv-00885 (E.D. Tex.), and Realtime Data, LLC v. Apple, Inc., Case No.
`3:16-cv-02595 (N.D. Cal.) (transferred from Realtime Data, LLC v. Apple,
`Inc., Case No. 6:15-cv-00885 (E.D. Tex.)). Pet. 1; Paper 5, 2.
`
`C. The ’862 Patent
`
`The ’862 Patent relates to “providing accelerated loading of operating
`
`system and application programs upon system boot or application launch,”
`and the use of data compression and decompression techniques for such
`purpose. Ex. 1001, 1:20–26. The specification discusses the limits of prior
`art storage devices, particularly the significant bandwidth limitations of
`“mass storage devices” such as hard disk drives. Id. at 1:43–57, 2:9–18.
`According to the specification,
`“[A]ccelerated” data storage comprises receiving a digital data
`stream at a data transmission rate which is greater than the data
`storage rate of a target storage device, compressing the input
`stream at a compression rate that increases the effective data
`storage rate of the target storage device and storing the
`compressed data in the target storage device.
`
`
`8 Petitioner filed Objections to Demonstrative Exhibits. Paper 52. In this
`Final Written Decision, we rely directly on the arguments presented properly
`in the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record. The demonstrative exhibits
`were only considered to the extent they are consistent with those arguments
`and evidence; therefore, the objections are overruled.
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`Id. at 5:41–47. One embodiment of the ’862 Patent is illustrated in Figure 1,
`reproduced below.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1, data storage controller 10 is “operatively connected”
`to hard disk 11 and to host system’s bus 16. Id. at 5:63–6:53. Controller 10
`includes cache 13 for data storage/preloading, and data compression engine
`12 for data compression/decompression. Id. at 5:63–6:53, 20:50–22:11.
`The ’862 Patent explains that, following reset or power on of a computer
`system, the “initial bus commands inevitably instruct the boot device
`controller [e.g., controller 10] to retrieve data from the boot device (such as
`a disk) [e.g., hard disk 11] for the operating system.” Id. at 20:36–49.
`
`D. Illustrative Claims
`
`As noted above, an inter partes review was instituted as to claims 1–4,
`
`6, 7, 13, 23–34, 47–58, 83–96, 99, 100, 105–111, 113, and 116 of the ’862
`Patent. Dec. to Inst. 24. Claims 1, 7, 22, and 27 are independent. Claim 1
`is illustrative of the challenged claims, and is reproduced below:
`1.
`A method for providing accelerated loading of an operating
`system in a computer system, the method comprising:
`loading a portion of boot data in a compressed form that is
`associated with a portion of a boot data list for booting the
`computer system into a memory;
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`accessing the loaded portion of the boot data in the compressed
`form from the memory;
`decompressing the accessed portion of the boot data in the
`compressed form at a rate that decreases a boot time of the
`operating system relative to loading the operating system
`utilizing boot data in an uncompressed form; and
`updating the boot data list,
`wherein the decompressed portion of boot data comprises a
`portion of the operating system.
`Ex. 1001, 26:38–51.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (“We
`conclude that the regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the
`rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office.”). Under
`that standard, and absent any special definitions, we give claim terms their
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). An inventor, however, may provide a
`meaning for a term that is different from its ordinary meaning by defining
`the term in the specification with “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`Limitations, however, are not to be read from the specification into the
`claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In addition,
`the Board may not “construe claims during [an inter partes review] so
`broadly that its constructions are unreasonable under general claim
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`construction principles.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d
`1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`The parties dispute the proper construction of the terms “boot data
`list” and “non-accessed boot data.”
`1. “boot data list”
`Patent Owner contends the term “boot data list” should mean “record
`used to identify and load boot data into memory.” PO Resp. 19. According
`to Patent Owner, both the ’862 patent’s specification and the provisional
`application to which the ’862 patent claims priority establish that the
`claimed “boot data list” is a record of boot data separate from the boot data
`itself. Id. at 20. Patent Owner argues that “[b]oot data comprises
`information such as program code relating to portions of the operating
`system and certain application programs.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:48–50; Ex.
`2010, 58). Patent Owner reasons that the system stores boot data in a
`compressed form on a boot device (id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:51–52, 3:60–61;
`Ex. 2010, 58)), loads boot data into memory upon initialization of the
`computer system (id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:45–46, 4:16–17; Ex. 2010, 58)),
`and services requests for boot data using the loaded boot data (id. (citing Ex.
`1001, 3:46–47, 4:1–3, 4:17–19, 21:45–59, Fig. 7B)). Patent Owner then
`argues that “the intrinsic evidence describes a ‘boot data list’ as comprising
`a list of data—specifically, boot data—that is to be used for booting a
`computer system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:44–45, 4:15–16; Ex. 2010, 58).
`Patent Owner further argues that “[i]n one exemplary embodiment, a data
`storage controller retrieves and reads the ‘boot data list’ upon power-on/reset
`and preloads the boot data specified on the list into memory.” Id. at 21
`(citing Ex. 1001, 21:43–48, Figs. 7B, 8A, 8B).
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`Petitioner contests Patent Owner’s proffered construction arguing that
`is it overly narrow and improperly imports limitations. Reply 1. Petitioner
`contends boot data list should be given its ordinary meaning and at least be
`construed broadly enough to include a list of data associated with data
`requests expected to result from a system power-on/reset. Id. at 2 (citing
`Pet. 3–6, 10–13). According to Petitioner, Patent Owner improperly
`attempts to import functional use to the term “boot data list,” which renders
`other claim language directed to use of the boot data list redundant and
`unnecessary. Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s reliance
`on dependent claim 6 is misplaced, because claim 6 explicitly defines the
`“boot data list” as being “used for booting the system,” not “used to identify
`and load boot data into memory.” Id. at 2–3 (citing PO Resp. 21). Petitioner
`also argues that the terms “load” and “into memory” are additional features
`added in claim 6 that would be rendered duplicative and redundant if also
`imported into the term “boot data list.” Id. at 3. Petitioner additionally notes
`that the term “identify” is not used in the claims (or elsewhere in the
`specification). Petitioner concludes that the claims do not support Patent
`Owner’s attempt to limit “boot data list” as being “used to identify and load
`boot data into memory.” Id.
`Petitioner further contends that Patent Owner’s proposed claim
`construction is not supported by the ’862 patent’s specification, specifically
`the description of Figure 7B. Id. at 3 (citing PO Resp. 21–24). According to
`Petitioner, Patent Owner recognizes that this description is merely “one
`exemplary embodiment” of the ’862 patent, but fails to explain sufficiently
`why the claimed boot data list should be limited to this embodiment. Id.
`(citing PO Resp. 21). Additionally, Petitioner argues that the ’862 patent
`does not limit use of the boot data list “to identify and load boot data into
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`memory,” as Patent Owner contends, citing to the ’862 patent’s disclosure of
`“a list of boot data used for booting a computer system.” Id. at 2 (citing
`Ex. 1001, Abstract, 3:42–59).
`We are charged with interpreting claim terms according to their
`broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
`which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Therefore, we consult the
`patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms. Trading
`Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
`(holding claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are
`a part” (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979
`(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996))). We must be
`careful, however, not to import improperly limitations into the claims or to
`read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the
`claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. In re Van
`Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Given our mandate under
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) and the patent’s various descriptions of “boot data
`list,” we understand that the examples laid out in the specification are
`exemplary and are not to be read as limitations in the claims.
`Patent Owner’s proffered claim construction imports selected
`limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into the claim and
`provides an overly narrow interpretation of the claim term. Additionally,
`Patent Owner has not pointed to any definitions or disavowals in the
`specification or otherwise clearly explained why the specification’s
`disclosure of “boot data lists” should not guide our claim construction
`analysis. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions, which
`appear to be based on a narrow reading of the claim that is inconsistent with
`the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims.
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`Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction
`as it would limit unnecessarily the scope of the claims. Instead, we find the
`broadest reasonable construction of “boot data list” to encompass a “list of
`boot data.”
`
`2. “non-accessed boot data”
`Patent Owner contends that the term “non-accessed boot data,” as
`used in claims 96, 100, 102, and 106, should mean “boot data identified in
`the boot data list that was not requested during system boot-up.” PO Resp.
`25 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 60–65, 66–71). According to Patent Owner, “the
`specification explains that ‘non-accessed boot data’ is boot data that has
`been retrieved and recorded in the boot data list during a previous system
`boot-up but was not requested during a subsequent system boot-up.” Id. at
`25–26. Patent Owner argues that if the boot data is not requested during
`system boot-up, then that boot data is “excluded” from the boot data list. Id.
`at 28 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 7B, 22:5–11).
`Petitioner contests Patent Owner’s position, arguing that the intrinsic
`record does not limit functionally the term “non-accessed” to “not
`requested” or limit temporally the term “non-accessed” to “during system
`boot-up.” Reply 5. Rather, according to Petitioner, under the broadest
`reasonable interpretation, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`viewed the term “non-accessed boot data” per its ordinary meaning as
`simply boot data that was not accessed. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 654–662).
`Petitioner argues that the embodiments in the specification are non-limiting
`examples. Id. at 5–6. Petitioner further argues that Patent Owner’s reliance
`on the embodiment of Figure 7B is misplaced because the very next
`embodiment illustrated in Figures 8a and 8b includes references to a “non-
`requested data block” “[d]uring the application launch process.” Id. at 6
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`(citing Ex. 1001, 22:12–23:26; Ex. 1002 (Part 1), 156–157, 160–162).
`Petitioner notes that Patent Owner’s citations include the application launch
`embodiment, which contradicts limiting non-accessed boot data to only data
`“not requested during system boot-up.” Id. Petitioner concludes that
`adopting Patent Owner’s construction would exclude improperly a specific
`embodiment (during application launch) that Patent Owner cites now in
`support of its construction and also cited during prosecution to show written
`description support for the disputed term. Id.
`We determine that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unduly
`narrow and improperly attempts to import limitations from the specification.
`Rather, we agree with Petitioner’s position and we construe “non-accessed
`boot data” as “boot data that has not been accessed.”
`3. Additional claim terms
`We determine that no additional claim terms require express
`construction at this stage (see Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.,
`200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms which are in controversy
`need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy)).
`
`B. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if “the differences
`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
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`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness,
`i.e., secondary considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
`City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`“A determination of whether a patent claim is invalid as obvious
`under § 103 requires consideration of all four Graham factors, and it is error
`to reach a conclusion of obviousness until all those factors are considered.”
`Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en
`banc) (citations omitted). “This requirement is in recognition of the fact that
`each of the Graham factors helps inform the ultimate obviousness
`determination.” Id.
`“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the
`onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is
`unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
`Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review
`petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the
`grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden never shifts to
`Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800
`F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek,
`Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of
`proof in inter partes review). Furthermore, Petitioner cannot satisfy its
`burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.”
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Thus, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how
`the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged
`claims unpatentable. At this final stage, we determine whether a
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`preponderance of the evidence of record shows that the challenged claims
`would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art.
`We analyze the instituted grounds of unpatentability in accordance
`with the above-stated principles.
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the
`time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
`at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of
`resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of
`maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v.
`Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The person of ordinary
`skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the
`relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573,
`1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected
`by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
`Cir. 2001). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of
`ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems
`encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational
`level of active workers in the field. GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. In a given case,
`one or more factors may predominate. Id. Generally, it is easier to establish
`obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention
`Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A
`less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of
`nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”).
`Petitioner’s declarant, Charles J. Neuhauser, Ph.D. (“Dr. Neuhauser”),
`opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’685 patent
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`would have had “a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer
`engineering, or a related area of study” as well as “between three and five
`years of practical experience in the design and implementation of computer
`systems, such as personal computers.” Dr. Neuhauser further opines that, in
`the alternative, a person with “a Master’s Degree in the area of electrical
`engineering, computer engineering, or a related area of study and somewhat
`less practical experience would be similarly qualified.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Neuhauser’ testimony. See
`generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Godmar Back (“Dr.
`Back”), however, provides his own assessment regarding a person of
`ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’862 patent and agrees with Dr.
`Neuhauser’s testimony. Ex. 2008 ¶ 55.
`
`We do not observe a meaningful differences between the parties’
`assessments of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We further note that
`either assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art
`at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in the instant
`proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
`2001). Our analysis in this Decision is supported by either assessment.
`Based on our review of the ’862 patent, the types of problems and solutions
`described in the ’862 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr.
`Neuhauser and Dr. Back, we adopt and apply Dr. Back’s definition of a
`person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention for
`purposes of this Decision.
`D. Overview of the Asserted Prior Art
`
`1.
`Sukegawa
`
`Sukegawa is a U.S. Patent titled “Data Storage System Having Flash
`Memory and Disk Drive” and relates to “a data storage system using a flash
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`memory unit and an HDD [(hard disk drive)].” Ex. 1005, [54], [57]. Figure
`1 of Sukegawa is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 is “a block diagram showing a main part of a data storage system
`according to the present invention.” Id. at 3:44–45. As shown in Figure 1, a
`data storage system includes flash memory unit 1, hard disk drive (HDD) 2,
`cache system controller 3, and device driver 5. Id. at 4:4–14. Sukegawa
`teaches device driver 5 controls flash memory 1 under management of the
`operation system of host system 4. Id. at 4:12–14. Controller 3 performs
`data input/output control for flash memory unit 1 and HDD 2 via respective
`device driver 5. Id. at 4:17–21. The flash memory unit is used, for example,
`to store “data which is used frequently for a relatively long time period.” Id.
`at Abstract. Such data could include “control information necessary for
`starting an application program (AP) and an OS [(operating system)].” Id. at
`2:65–3:3. Although such control information is stored on the HDD, the data
`may be stored also on the flash memory unit so that the OS may be started
`using the control information on the flash memory unit instead of the HDD.
`Id. at 6:45–54. This is advantageous because the flash memory unit has a
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`“higher access speed,” which allows the OS to be started more quickly. Id.
`at 6:54–58.
`Figure 4 of Sukegawa, reproduced below, teaches an embodiment of a
`system having a data storage mode for storing control information necessary
`for storing the OS in the permanent storage area 10A of flash memory unit 1,
`when the OS is started in a series of operations from turn-on of power to
`completion of the starting operation. Id. at 6:20–26.
`
`
`As illustrated in Figure 4 of Sukegawa, above, when the system is
`
`switched on and the user sets the data storage mode via the user interface,
`controller 3 stores control information in permanent storage area 10A in
`flash memory unit 1 and when the OS is started at the time of the next
`turning-on of power, the control information necessary for starting the OS is
`read out not from permanent storage area 10A or cache memory area, and
`transferred to the host system 4. Id. at 6:27–54. “Thus, the control
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`
`
`information can be accessed from the permanent storage area 10A in the
`flash memory unit 1 having a higher access speed than the HDD 2. As a
`result, the OS can be started at higher speed.” Id. at 6:45–58.
`
`2.
`Dye
`
`Dye is a U.S. Patent titled “Parallel Decompression and Compression
`System and Method for Improving Storage Density and Access Speed for
`Non-Volatile Memory and Embedded Memory Devices.” Ex. 1008, at [54].
`Dye relates to controllers for flash or embedded memory that include data
`compression and decompression engines “for increased effective memory
`density and improved bandwidth.” Id. at 1:17–22, 2:42–46. According to
`Dye, such a controller enables conventional flash memory to “achieve higher
`bandwidth, more effective density, with less system power and noise.” Id. at
`3:3–12, 3:23–28. The technology permits data to be “saved in either a
`normal or compressed format, retrieved from the Flash Memory Array for
`MPU [(microprocessing unit)] execution in a normal or compressed format,
`or transmitted and stored on a medium in a normal or compressed format.”
`Id. at 3:66–4:8.
`Figure 10B of Dye is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 10B, above, illustrates a preferred embodiment “provid[ing] a
`
`parallel implementation of dictionary based (or history table based)
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`
`
`compression/decompression.” Ex. 1008 18:61–63. In the preferred
`embodiment illustrated in Dye’s Figure 10B, the history table becomes a
`four symbol parallel flow. Id. at 19:15–17. “[Four] symbols are analyzed in
`parallel, and multiple compressed outputs may also be provided in parallel.”
`Id. at 19:17–19. “Other alternate embodiments may contain a plurality of
`compression windows for decompression of multiple streams.” Id. at 19:19–
`21.
`
`Figure 13 of Dye is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 13, above, is a hardware diagram illustrating “operation of the
`
`parallel compression algorithm.” Id. at 22:66–67. Each entry of the history
`table contains a symbol of data, which is compared with the input stream.
`Id. at 23:1–3. In Figure 13, Entry D Data Byte 602 is compared with each
`symbol of input data stream 610, shown as four data bytes, Data 0, 1, 2, and
`3. Id. at 23:5–7. Comparators 608 compare each data byte to Entry D Data
`Byte 602, generating four compare signals (D0 through D3), with D1
`through D3 being used by the next entry in the history table and D0 being
`used by Results Calculation 606. Id. at 23:7–55. Results Calculation 606
`
`18
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`

`IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
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`
`sends Output Mask and Output Count to logic shown in Dye’s Figure 14.
`Id. at 23:19–24.
`
`3.
`Settsu
`
`Settsu is a U.S. Patent titled “Information Processing Apparatus
`Method [sic] of Booting Information Processing Apparatus at a High Speed”
`and relates to “[a] method of booting up an information processing
`apparatus.” Ex. 1006, [54], [57]. One embodiment taught in Settsu involves
`dividing the main body of an operating system into modules and storing
`each module as compressed files on a boot device. Id. at 14:58–63. Each of
`these modules is decompressed each time it is loaded into memory, and “the
`time required for I/O [(input/output)] processing can be reduced” as a result,
`which “provides an advantage of being able to further reduce the time
`required for booting up the information processing apparatus.” Id. at 14:64–
`15:4.
`
`Burrows
`4.
`Burrows is a conference report titled “On-line Data Compression in a
`
`Log-Structured File System,” which “appeared in the proceedings of the
`Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming
`Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS-V), 12–15 October, 1992,
`published by ACM Press.” Ex. 1007, Title, iv. According to Burrows,
`“[b]uilding a file system that compresses the data it stores on disk is clearly
`an attractive idea,” at least because “more data would fit on the disk” and
`using a “fast hardware data compressor” would “increase the effective disk
`transfer rate by the compression factor, thus speeding up the system.” Id. at
`1. Burrows teaches a particular type of file system utilizing data
`compression and reports the results of tests of that system.
`
`19
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`

`IPR2016-01737
`Patent 8,880,862 B2
`
`
`
`Zwiegincew
`5.
`Zwiegincew is a U.S. Patent titled “Pre-Fetching of Pages Prior to a
`
`Hard Page Fault Sequence,” and it recognizes problems of slow boot that
`result when hard page faults occur during the boot process. Ex. 1010, [54],
`1:45–51, 2:12–15, 5:50–51. To improve boot speed, Zwiegincew proposes
`pre-fetching, from a hard disk to memory, pages that are expected to be
`requested during the boot process, thereby reducing occurrence of hard page
`faults. Id. at [57], 1:5–3:55. “Copies of, or references to, the . . . pages are
`stored in a scenario file” and, “[w]hen a hard page fault scenario is detected,
`a corresponding scenario file is fetched from disk storage and the determined
`pages, or copies thereof, are transferred into RAM.” Id. at [57].
`Zwiegincew also recognizes benefits of compressing pre-fetched page data.
`For instance, Zwiegincew’s system includes “a disk
`compressor/decompressor,” which employs “compression algorithms” on
`pre-fetched data to achieve pre-fetch time improvements. Id. at 8:66–9:13,
`Figs. 1–2.
`
`E. Alleged Obviousness of the Challenged Claims in View of Sukegawa and
`Dye
`Petitioner contends the combination of Sukegawa and Dye teaches or
`
`suggests each element of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 13, 23–34, 47–58, 83–96, 99, 100,
`105–111, 113, and 116. Pet. 6–59; Reply 7–11. Patent Owner disputes
`Petitioner’s contentions. PO Resp. 29–36, 41–74. For reasons that follow,
`we determine

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