Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 1 of 53
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`
`
`
`Misc. Action No. 07-493 (RMC)
`
`MDL No. 1880
`
`
`
`IN RE PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO.
`
`KG PATENT LITIGATION
`
`The Document Relates To:
`
`FIRST WAVE CASES: Nos. 07-CV-1118,
`07-CV-1222, 07-CV-2086, 07-CV-2087,
`07-CV-2088, 08-CV-985
`
`
`
`PAPST’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 1
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 2 of 53
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
`
`TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND.......................................................................................... 1 
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 3 
`
`I. 
`
`Intrinsic Evidence ................................................................................................................ 4 
`
`II.  Extrinsic Evidence ............................................................................................................... 5 
`
`III.  Construction of Means-Plus-Function Terms ...................................................................... 6 
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7 
`
`I.  Proper Construction of Terms From the Old Patents Affected by the Federal Circuit
`Opinion ............................................................................................................................ 8 
`
`A.  Term 1: “second connecting device” ............................................................................... 9 
`
`B.  Term 2: “input/output device customary in a host device” and “storage device
`customary in a host device” ...................................................................................... 17 
`
`C.  Term 3: “driver[s] for the [input/output][storage] device customary in a host device”;
`Term 4: “usual driver for the [input/output][storage] device” .................................. 21 
`
`D.  Term 11: “simulating a virtual file system” ................................................................... 24 
`
`II.  Old Patent Terms That Need No Further Construction ..................................................... 26 
`
`A.  Term 5: “first connecting device” .................................................................................. 26 
`
`B.  Term 6: “first command interpreter”; Term 7: “second command interpreter” ............. 31 
`
`C.  Term 8: “the digital data” ............................................................................................... 34 
`
`D.  Term 9: “sends a signal…which signals to the host device that it is [an input/output][a
`storage device] customary in a host device” and Term 10: “responding to the inquiry
`from the host device by the interface device in such a way that it is [an input/output
`device][a storage device] customary in a host device” ............................................. 35 
`
`III.  New Patent Terms .............................................................................................................. 36 
`
`A.  Term 12: “without requiring any end user action” terms ............................................... 36 
`
`B.  Term 13: “automatic recognition process” ..................................................................... 38 
`
`C.  Term 14: “customary driver” ......................................................................................... 40 
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 2
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 3 of 53
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`D.  Term 15: “processor” ..................................................................................................... 41 
`
`E.  Term 16: “automatic [] transfer”; “automatically transfer”; and “automatically
`transferring data form the analog source to the host device in response to a digital
`read command from the host device” ....................................................................... 44 
`
`F.  Term 17: “at least one parameter” terms ........................................................................ 45 
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 45 
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 3
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 4 of 53
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Cases 
`
`Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc.,
` 253 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................... 16
`
`Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,
`616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 41
`
`AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc'ns, Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1236,(Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 43
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 27, 33
`
`B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc.,
`616 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
`528 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ...................................................................................... 20
`
`Bonutti v. Lantz Med., Inc.,
`No. 1:14-cv-00909-SEB-MJD, 2016 WL 247752 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 2016) ..................... 13, 27
`
`Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC,
`748 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................ 44
`
`CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc.,
`418 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................................... 39, 44
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp.,
`561 F.3d 1319(Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`Finjan, Inc., v. Proofpoint, Inc., No.
`13-CV-05808-HSG, 2015 WL 7770208 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) .......................................... 13
`
`Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.,
` 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................. 13
`
`iii
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 4
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 5 of 53
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`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG,
`667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 22
`
`In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig.,
`778 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbot Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... 18, 20
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc.,
`381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................................................. 4
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen’l Ins.,
`No. 6:15-cv-59, 2016 WL 125594 10 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) ....................................... 14, 28
`
`Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp.,
`175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 10
`
`K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,
`191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................................... 36
`
`M2M Solutions LLC v. Sierra Wireless Am. Inc.,
`No. 12-30-RGA, 2015 WL 5826816 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015) .................................................... 12
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) .................................................. 3, 4, 5
`
`Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316 ................................................................................ 7
`
`Mass Engineered Design, Inc. v. Spaceco Bus. Solutions, Inc.,
`No. 6:14-CV-411, 2016 WL 826048 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2016) ............................................... 14
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem Co.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
`325 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................. 6, 7, 15, 30
`
`O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2008) .................................................................................................... 8
`
`Operating Sys. Solutions, LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
` No. 8:11-cv-1754-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 3801467, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2013) ............ 20
`
`OPTIS Wireless Tech. LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
` No. 2:15-cv-300-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 1599478 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2016) ............... 14, 27, 29
`
`Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2005) ................................ 8
`
`iv
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 5
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 6 of 53
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`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ......................................................................................... passim
`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.,
` No. 6:13-cv-447-JRG-KNM, 2015 WL 4208754 (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2015) ............................ 12
`
`SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
` 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ..................................................................................... 20
`
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870, 876-81 (Fed. Cir. 2004). .............................................................................. 18, 20
`
`Syncpoint Imaging, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-00247-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 55118 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) ......................... 29, 43
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comp. Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................... passim
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`248 Fed. App’x. 170 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................... 22
`
`Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc.,
`38 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................... 3
`
`Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp.,
` 436 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 5, 36, 45
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 .................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .......................................................................................... 40, 44
`
`Statutes 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`v
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 6
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 7 of 53
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG (“Papst”) respectfully submits this Opening
`
`Claim Construction Brief in support of its proposed constructions as set forth in the parties’1
`
`Joint Claim Construction Statement. (D.I. 629.) Papst’s proposed constructions are based on
`
`the intrinsic record of each of the patents; on the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms
`
`to one of skill in the art at the time of the invention; and on the purpose and objectives of the
`
`patents-in-suit. In contrast, the First Wave Camera Manufacturers’ (“CMs”) proposals rewrite
`
`the plain language of the claims and depart from the fundamental invention by improperly
`
`reading limitations into the claims and casting normal and commonly-used claim terms as
`
`“means-plus-function” terms. That result-driven approach is at odds with the positions already
`
`taken in this case, the Federal Circuit’s February 2, 2015 opinion (the “Opinion”),2 prevailing
`
`case law, and the common-sense reading of the asserted claims. For the reasons set forth herein,
`
`Papst respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed constructions.
`
`TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
`
`The patents-in-suit3 are the product of breakthrough work by Michael Tasler. Mr. Tasler
`
`created a unique method for achieving high data transfer rates for data acquisition systems (e.g.,
`
`still pictures, videos, voice recordings) to a general-purpose computer, without requiring an end
`
`user to purchase, install, and/or run specialized software for each system. (‘399 Patent at 4:23-
`
`
`1 “Parties” collectively refers to Papst and First Wave Defendants—Panasonic Corporation (f/k/a
`Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.), Panasonic Corporation of North America,
`JVCKENWOOD Corporation (f/k/a Victor Company of Japan, Ltd.), JVC Company of America,
`FUJIFILM Corporation, FUJIFILM North America Corporation, Samsung Techwin Co., Ltd.,
`Samsung Opto-Electronics America, Inc., Nikon Corporation, Nikon Inc., Olympus Corporation
`and Olympus Imaging America Inc.
`2 In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 778 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`3 The Court has divided the patents-in-suit into two groups: i) the Old Patents (U.S. Patent Nos.
`6,470,399 and 6,895,449 (the “ʼ399” and “ʼ449” patents, respectively) and ii) the New Patents
`(U.S. Patent Nos. 8,504,746 and 8,966,144 (the “ʼ746” and “ʼ144” patents, respectively).
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 7
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 8 of 53
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`27.)4 At the time of the invention, there were an increasing number and variety of data
`
`acquisition systems with the ability to capture high volumes of information. (‘399 Patent at
`
`1:34-54.) As such, there was an increasing demand to transfer that information to commercially-
`
`available, general purpose computers. (‘399 Patent at 1:20-34.) But at that time—and today—
`
`performing that data transfer operation required either loading specialized, sophisticated software
`
`onto a general purpose computer, which increases the risk of error and the level of complexity
`
`for the operator, or specifically matching interface devices for a data acquisition system to a host
`
`system which may maximize data transfer rates, but lacks the flexibility to operate with different
`
`devices. (ʼ399 Patent at 1:15-2:14.)
`
`Mr. Tasler recognized that the existing options were wasteful and inefficient and sought a
`
`solution that would achieve high data transfer rates, without specialized software, while being
`
`sufficiently flexible to operate independent of device or host manufacturers. (ʼ399 Patent at
`
`2:16-36, 3:24-29.) The resulting invention would allow a data acquisition system to identify
`
`itself as a type of common device so as to leverage the inherent capabilities of general-purpose,
`
`commercially-available computers. (ʼ399 Patent at 5:6-20.) Accordingly, by using Mr. Tasler’s
`
`invention, users could avoid loading specific software; improve data transfer efficiency; save
`
`time, processing power, and memory space; and avoid the waste associated with purchasing
`
`specialized computers or loading specific software for each device. (’399 Patent at 3:25-28,
`
`4:23-36, 8:23-59, 9:23-28, 10:10-14, 12:23-40.) The patents-in-suit claim variations of this
`
`concept, and provide a crucial, yet seemingly simple, method and apparatus for a high data rate,
`
`device-independent information transfer. (E.g., ʼ399 Patent at 3:24-28.)
`
`
`4 Citations to the ’399, ’449, ’144, and ’746 Patents refer to Exhibits A-D, respectively.
`2
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 8
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 9 of 53
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`
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`Papst is the owner of the patents-in-suit. This Court previously construed a large number
`
`of disputed terms from the Old Patents (D.I. 336-37) and entered judgment of non-infringement5
`
`of the Old Patents based on its construction of five terms: “interface device,” “data
`
`transmit/receive device,” “second connecting device,” “virtual files” and “simulating a virtual
`
`file system,” and “input/output device customary in a host device” and “storage device
`
`customary in a host device.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the constructions of those
`
`terms and the Court’s judgment of non-infringement. Opinion at 1255. In the interim, the Patent
`
`Office issued two continuation patents to Papst, the ʼ144 and ʼ746 patents-in-suit (the “New
`
`Patents”). Those continuation patents stem from the same invention claimed in the Old Patents,
`
`share the same priority date, but claim permissible variations in claim language and scope. E.g.,
`
`Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 555 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For
`
`the Old Patents, the Court directed the parties to propose only the five terms that were addressed
`
`by the Opinion and other terms that were impacted by the Opinion or an intervening change in
`
`law. (D.I. 608 at 6.) For the New Patents, the Court directed the parties to identify no more than
`
`ten terms in total that require the Court’s construction. (Id.)
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`
`
`Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977–78 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 388–90
`
`(1996). “Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed
`
`with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with
`
`the claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Thus, the
`
`
`5 D.I. 524, 528, 534, 545.
`
`3
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 9
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 10 of 53
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`Court should construe claims in a manner that “most naturally aligns with the patent’s
`
`description of the invention.” Id.
`
`I.
`
`Intrinsic Evidence
`
`
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
`
`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting
`
`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004)). Claim construction is “centered on the claim language itself, for that is the language the
`
`patentee has chosen to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
`
`patentee regards as his invention.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d at 1116. Following that
`
`principle, courts interpret claim terms by inquiring “how a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`understands a claim term” in order to provide “an objective baseline from which to begin claim
`
`interpretation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. A disputed claim term should thus be construed in a
`
`manner consistent with its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the
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`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
`
`i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. The
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`ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may be determined solely by viewing the term
`
`within the context of the claim’s overall language. See id. at 1314 (“Quite apart from the written
`
`description and the prosecution history, the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to
`
`the meaning of particular claim terms.”).
`
`
`
`The patent specification provides further context for understanding the claims. See
`
`Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a
`
`part.”). But, courts may not import limitations into the claims unless there is an unambiguous
`
`restriction in the specification or prosecution history:
`
`4
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 10
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 11 of 53
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`The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
`meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in
`the context of the specification and prosecution history. There are only
`two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a
`definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee
`disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or
`during prosecution.
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comp. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
`
`Accord Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hile
`
`... claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification … it does not follow that limitations
`
`from the specification may be read into the claims.”); Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., 436
`
`F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In examining the specification for proper context, however,
`
`this court will not at any time import limitations from the specification into the claims.”).
`
`A final source of intrinsic evidence is the prosecution history, i.e. the back and forth
`
`negotiation between the applicant and the Patent Office. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. “[B]ecause
`
`the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,
`
`rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and
`
`thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. Courts should only use the prosecution
`
`history to limit the plain meaning and natural scope of the claims where the applicant made a
`
`“clear and unmistakable” surrender of claim scope. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d
`
`1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366-67 (same).
`
`II. Extrinsic Evidence
`
`
`
`The court also may consider extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries or technical treatises,
`
`if such sources are “helpful in determining ‘the true meaning of language used in the patent
`
`claims.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980). Likewise, the testimony
`
`from an expert in the field “can be useful to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide
`
`background on the technology at issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the
`
`5
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 11
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 12 of 53
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`court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of
`
`skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular
`
`meaning in the pertinent field.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. But extrinsic evidence may not be
`
`used to contradict the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–
`
`23.
`
`III. Construction of Means-Plus-Function Terms
`
`The Patent Act permits applicants to draft claims in functional language by referring to a
`
`“means” or “step for” performing a function without reciting the structure, material, or acts in
`
`support thereof, i.e., in “means-plus-function” form. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) (formerly 35
`
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶6)6; see, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2003). That statutory provision strikes a balance by allowing an applicant to express a claim
`
`limitation through a functional description using the word “means,” but confines the structure of
`
`that “means” to the structure in the specification that corresponds to the claimed function and
`
`equivalents thereof. E.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2015).
`
`
`
`To determine whether an applicant has elected to make use of § 112, ¶6 the Court must
`
`first examine the words of the claim itself. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. A claim that does not
`
`include the word “means” is presumed not to be subject to § 112, ¶6. Id. (“[O]ur precedent has
`
`long recognized the importance of the presence or absence of the word “means.”) A challenger
`
`can only overcome that presumption by demonstrating that “the claim term fails to ‘recite
`
`sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for
`
`performing that function.’” Id. If the claim term, when read in context with the rest of the claim
`
`6 The statutory section referring to means-plus-function limitations was changed to § 112(f) on
`September 16, 2012. Because the patents-in-suit were filed prior to that date, they are not
`subject to the AIA and all citations will refer to the pre-AIA § 112, ¶6.
`6
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 12
`
`

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`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 13 of 53
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`and the specification, connotes sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function,
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`then it is not a means-plus-function term. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Masco Corp. v. United
`
`States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`
`
`
`If the Court has determined that a term is in means-plus-function format, the Court must
`
`then determine the claimed function and then identify the corresponding structure in the written
`
`description of the patent that performs that function. Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 616
`
`F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010). When construing a means-plus-function limitation, the claim
`
`“shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
`
`specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112. The court must first determine the
`
`claimed function and then identify the corresponding structure in the written description of the
`
`patent that performs that function. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d
`
`1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’
`
`structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure
`
`to the function recited in the claim.” B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1997). For that reason, claim interpretation under § 112, ¶6 does not permit
`
`incorporation of structure from the written description beyond that necessary to perform the
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`claimed function. E.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1999)); Northrup, 325 F.3d at 1352.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`The Court directed the parties to propose constructions for claim terms from the Old and
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`New Patents. (D.I. 608, 628.) After meeting and conferring, the parties agreed that one Old
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`Patent term addressed in the Opinion needs no construction and agreed on a proposed
`
`construction for another term; the Parties also agreed that three terms from the New Patents need
`
`7
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 13
`
`

`
`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 14 of 53
`
`
`no construction. (D.I. 629, Ex. A at 1-2.) For the remaining terms in dispute from the Old
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`Patents, Papst proposes construing only those terms specifically addressed by the Federal Circuit,
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`along with Terms 3 and 4, which were plainly affected by the Opinion. Conversely, the CMs’
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`Old Patent proposed constructions stray from the Court’s specific direction, and their New Patent
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`proposed constructions improperly seek to import specific embodiments from the specification
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`into the claims. The Court need not credit those contortions, but should adopt Papst’s
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`constructions, which comport with the Court’s instructions, prevailing law, and the plain
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`meaning of the claims at issue.
`
`I.
`
`Proper Construction of Terms From the Old Patents Affected by the Federal
`Circuit Opinion
`
`
`
`The Opinion addressed five terms from the Old Patents: 1) “interface device,” 2) “data
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`transmit/receive device,” 3) “second connecting device,” 4) “virtual files” / “simulating a virtual
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`file system,” and 5) “input/output device customary in a host device” / “storage device
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`customary in a host device.” Opinion at 1261-70. The Federal Circuit instructed that, on
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`remand, the Court should “ensure that final constructions serve their purpose of genuinely
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`clarifying the scope of claims for the finder of fact.” Opinion at 1261 (citing O2 Micro Int'l Ltd.
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`v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2008)); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva
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`Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2005). Accordingly, the Court ordered the
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`parties to propose constructions limited to those five terms, plus terms that were “impacted by
`
`the Federal Circuit Opinion or by an intervening change in law.”7 (D.I. 608 at 6.)
`
`
`
`
`7 The Parties agree the Opinion affects the construction of Terms 3 and 4, but propose different
`constructions in view of the Opinion.
`
`8
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex. 1014, p. 14
`
`

`
`Case 1:07-mc-00493-RMC Document 630 Filed 06/03/16 Page 15 of 53
`
`
`Previous Construction
`(D.I. 337)
`“a physical plug or socket for
`permitting a user readily to
`attach and detach the interface
`device with a plurality of
`dissimilar data
`transmit/receive devices,
`including a sampling circuit
`for sampling the analog data
`provided by the data
`transmit/receive device and an
`analog-to-digital converter for
`converting data sampled by
`the sampling circuit into
`digital data.”(’399 Patent)
`Vacated by Federal Circuit.
`
`
`
`A. Term 1: “second connecting device”
`
`Papst’s Proposal
`
`CMs’ Proposal
`
`Subject to 35 U.S.C. §112 (6)
`
`Function: [Agreed]
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`Structure: 15xx structures as
`described at ʼ399, col. 9:49-64
`and Fig. 2
`
`“a component or group of
`components for interfacing the
`interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
`
`If subject to §112 (6):
`
`Function: [Agreed]
`
`Structure: Fig. 1 and
`associated text
`
`
`Papst’s proposed construction follows the Opinion and comports with the purpose of the
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`patent and the plain reading of the claims. The Federal Circuit emphasized that the construction
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`of this term cannot limit the scope of the claim to the embodiment described in the specification:
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`The principal basis for the district court's inclusion of those requirements was the
`basis we have already rejected [in the discussion of “interface device”]—the view
`that other claim language and the written description require the interface device
`(of which the second connecting device is a part, according to the claims) to be
`stand-alone. For “second connecting device,” the district court added that a
`preferred embodiment from the written description includes pin connectors and
`other socket-like structures.…But we see nothing to take that embodiment
`outside the reach of the usual rule that claims are generally not limited to
`features found in what the written description presents as mere embodiments,
`where the claim language is plainly broader.
`
`Opinion at 1265 (emphasis added). Following that guidance, Papst proposes a construction
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`based on the plain and ordinary meaning of “connecting device” and its usage in the claims.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim are generally
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`given their ordinary and customary meaning