throbber
Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 233469
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
`
`PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`



`§ Civil Action No. 6:15-cv-1095

`§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED



`
`PLAINTIFF’S SUR-REPLY TO LG ELECTRONICS, INC., LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`AND LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A., INC.’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
`OPINIONS AND TESTIMONY OF ROBERT ZEIDMAN
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 1
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 233470
`
`Plaintiff respectfully files this Sur-reply to LG’s Motion to Exclude Opinions and
`
`Testimony of Zeidman (Dkt. 426).1
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`Zeidman’s Opinions for the “A Processor” Limitations Are Admissible.
`
`LG does not and cannot dispute that the claim construction principle on which Zeidman
`
`relies—i.e., “a” means “at least one” or “one or more”—has been described by the Federal
`
`Circuit and this District as “a rule.” See, e.g., Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512
`
`F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. V. Samsung Elect. Co.,
`
`No. 4:14-cv-371, 2015 WL 3761904 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2015).
`
`Furthermore, LG has not proven and cannot prove an exception to this general rule—
`
`there is no disclaimer, no prosecution history estoppel, and no “clear intent” in the Patents or
`
`during prosecution to depart from the “rule” that “a” means “one or more.” See Dkt. 463 at 4-7.
`
`LG’s continued reliance on In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) is misplaced.
`
`The claim language here is different than the language in Varma, and the colloquial “two dogs”
`
`analogy in Varma is not applicable here. The claim limitation at issue in Varma was “a
`
`statistical analysis request corresponding to two or more selected investments.” Id. at 1356
`
`(emphasis added). The Federal Circuit concluded that the claim “language on its face excludes
`
`Interpretation 1”—i.e., “a request that calls for a statistical analysis of a single investment.” It
`
`held instead that “[a] single request must correspond to at least two investments.” Id. at 1362
`
`(emphasis added). Here, there is no similar “corresponding,” prescribed ratio, or any other
`
`language that would overcome the effect of the general rule of claim construction applicable
`
`here. See, e.g., Dkt. 463 at 4-6.
`
`1 Unless otherwise noted, all capitalized terms have the same meaning set forth in Papst’s Response to LG’s Motion
`(Dkt. 463).
`
`1
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 2
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 233471
`
`Nevertheless, LG reasserts that a single processor “must be configured to do all of the”
`
`actions set forth in the “wherein” limitations that follow the “a processor” limitation. Dkt. 507 at
`
`1-2; Dkt. 426 at 7-8. But the Federal Circuit has previously considered and rejected an argument
`
`substantively similar to LG’s argument. See 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687
`
`F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`In 01 Communique, the district court had determined that the asserted claims required “a
`
`‘locator server computer’ that includes a ‘location facility’” and further construed “location
`
`facility” as capable of performing four functions:
`
`a component of a locator server computer that itself: 1) creates communication
`sessions between a remote computer and personal computer; 2) receives a request
`for communication with the personal computer from the remote computer; 3)
`locates the personal computer (and “determines the then location of the personal
`computer”); and 4) creates a communication channel between a remote computer
`and the personal computer.
`
`Id. The district court then held that “LogMeIn d[id] not infringe the [Asserted] Patent” because
`
`“‘the LogMeIn system does not contain any component that itself performs all the four functions
`
`required of the location facility under the Court’s construction of the term.’” Id.
`
`As described by the Federal Circuit, the issue on appeal in 01 Communique was “whether
`
`the location facility must be contained entirely on a single locator server computer as held by the
`
`district court and asserted by LogMeIn, or whether it may be distributed among multiple locator
`
`server computers as asserted by 01 Communique.” Id. at 1296. In overturning the district court,
`
`the Federal Circuit first stated that the district court’s conclusion and LogMeIn’s arguments were
`
`“at odds with our well-established precedent” that “the words ‘a’ or ‘an’ in a patent claim carry
`
`the meaning of ‘one or more.’” Id. at 1297 (citing TiVO, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516
`
`F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). It further concluded that there was no evidence of the clear
`
`intent, disclaimer, or prosecution history estoppel needed to depart from that general claim
`
`2
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 3
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 233472
`
`construction rule. Id. at 1297-1299. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit agreed that the “location
`
`facility” must perform the four functions identified by the district court, but it held that “the
`
`locator server computer may comprise one or more computers, and the location facility may be
`
`distributed among one or more locator server computers.” Id. at 1299-1300.
`
`Accordingly, whereas LG’s arguments misapply the applicable law, Zeidman’s opinions
`
`and proffered testimony regarding the “a processor” limitations are based on the correct legal
`
`standards. Those opinions are admissible. And LG’s Motion should be denied.
`
`II.
`
`Zeidman’s Opinions for the “Customary” Terms Are Admissible.
`
`Zeidman has not and will not present to the jury contradictory opinions regarding the
`
`terms “still imaging device” or “mass storage device.” His opinion is and has always been that
`
`the Accused Products are neither still imaging devices nor mass storage devices but instead are
`
`cell phones that communicate with the host computer by identifying themselves as still image
`
`devices or mass storage devices. With regard to these terms, this is the only opinion set forth in
`
`Zeidman’s report, the only opinion Zeidman testified to during his deposition, and the only
`
`opinion Zeidman and Papst intend to present to the jury.
`
`LG’s assertion in its Reply that Zeidman has “admitted” the Accused Products are still
`
`imaging devices or mass storage devices is wrong. See Dkt. 507 at 2-3. Every one of the alleged
`
`“admissions” that make up the basis of LG’s Motion are out-of-context quotes from the tens of
`
`thousands of pages of claim charts that were attached to Zeidman’s report. In context, these
`
`quotes are invariably surrounded by other language clarifying that the Accused Products merely
`
`identify themselves as mass storage devices or still imaging devices. For example, LG points to
`
`the caption to an image of LG’s user manual (see Dkt. 507 at 2 citing Dkt. 405-2 at ZEIDMAN-
`
`LG-009252). But that caption (and the other captions that LG takes out of context) is under a
`
`section of the claim chart explicitly titled: “The Accused Device identifies itself as a mass
`3
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 4
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 233473
`
`storage device.” Ex. 4 at ZEIDMAN-LG-009251. In full, that section describes the steps by
`
`which the cellphone “identifies itself” as a mass storage device. See id. at ZEIDMAN-LG-
`
`009251-9254. Likewise, in the analysis of Claim 1(e) (which includes the key limitation
`
`“wherein the analog data acquisition device is not within the class of devices”), LG’s out-of-
`
`context alleged “admission” is followed directly by Zeidman’s actual and consistent conclusion:
`
`“The above steps are independent of the actual analog source of the data. The Accused Device is
`
`not actually within the class of devices device, but is a cellphone.” Id. at ZEIDMAN-LG-
`
`009284-9285.
`
`Contrary to LG’s mischaracterizations (see Dkt. 507 at 3), Zeidman has not opined and
`
`Papst has not argued that the Accused Products are still imaging devices in certain
`
`circumstances. LG wholly ignores the opening and closing clauses in the sentence “In the
`
`Responder/Initiator relationship, the Accused PTP/MTP Products are still imaging devices
`
`compliant with PTP for the purpose of transferring photos.” The import of this sentence is
`
`precisely that the Accused Products are not still imaging devices, but that they identify and act as
`
`such in this one relationship and for this one purpose. That is precisely the in-context thesis of
`
`the Zeidman report and the opinion that Zeidman will offer the jury.2
`
`The other alleged “admissions” cited by LG likewise occur under headings, above
`
`conclusions, and among other sentences that make perfectly clear that the Accused Products are
`
`cell phones that merely identify as mass storage devices or still imaging devices. Indeed, while
`
`LG makes much of the number of times it or its expert has misconstrued Zeidman’s opinion
`
`(“1200 times,” see Dkt. 507 at n.3), it disregards the fact that Zeidman states in some variant that
`
`2 Papst referred in its Response to the USB Specification Revisions 2 to demonstrate that, contrary to LG’s assertion
`in its Motion (Dkt. 426 at 11), “a digital camera is a still imaging devices” and one that is supported by the USB
`specification. See Dkt. 463 at 9 & Ex. 3. In its Reply, LG does not deny that the USB specification confirms the
`accuracy of Zeidman’s testimony that a digital camera is a still imaging device. See Dkt. 507 at n.2.
`4
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 5
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 233474
`
`the Accused Products “identify(ies) as” or “identify(ies) itself to a computer as” or “identify(ies)
`
`itself as” a mass storage or still imaging device more than 10,000 times throughout his report.
`
`See Declaration of Christopher V. Goodpastor, dated 7/27/17, at ¶ 3.
`
`To persist in calling LG’s cited out-of-context phrases “admissions” is absurd. Put
`
`simply, it is unmistakable that Zeidman’s opinion is that the Accused Products are cell phones
`
`that identify as mass storage or still imaging devices. To the extent that LG found Zeidman’s
`
`report ambiguous as a result of the so-called “admissions,” LG had the opportunity to clarify
`
`Zeidman’s opinions at deposition. When asked at his deposition whether the Accused Products
`
`were mass storage or still imaging devices, Zeidman consistently and unambiguously responded
`
`“Actually, no,” “These are smartphones and cell phones.” Dkt. 463-2 at 103:19-22; Dkt. 481-11
`
`at 73. If minor phrases in Zeidman’s report—out-of-context, in isolation, and subjected to LG’s
`
`motivated misconstruction—are imprecise or ambiguous, then LG may cross examine Zeidman
`
`about them. His opinions should not be excluded.3
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For all the reasons set forth in Papst’s Response and this Sur-Reply, LG’s Motion to
`
`Exclude Opinions and Testimony of Papst’s Expert Zeidman should be denied.
`
`3 Likewise, to the extent that the Court believes there is any ambiguity in Zeidman’s report or opinions, Papst should
`be given an opportunity to correct the ambiguity because doing so will not change the substance of the opinions
`Zeidman has offered in this case or the opinions he intends to present to the jury.
`5
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 6
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 233475
`
`Dated: July 27, 2017
`
`By:
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
` /s/ Christopher V. Goodpastor
`Christopher V. Goodpastor
`State Bar No. 00791991
`Andrew G. DiNovo
`State Bar No. 00790594
`Adam G. Price
`State Bar No. 24027750
`Jay D. Ellwanger
`State Bar No. 24036522
`DINOVO PRICE ELLWANGER LLP
`7000 N. MoPac Expressway, Suite 350
`Austin, Texas 78731
`Telephone: (512) 539-2626
`Facsimile: (512) 539-2627
`Email: cgoodpastor@dpelaw.com
`adinovo@dpelaw.com
` aprice@dpelaw.com
`jellwanger@dpelaw.com
`
`T. John Ward, Jr.
`State Bar No. 00794818
`Claire Abernathy Henry
`State Bar No. 24053063
`Wesley Hill
`State Bar No. 24032294
`WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC
`P.O. Box 1231
`Longview, Texas 75606-1231
`Telephone: (903) 757-6400
`Facsimile: (903) 757-2323
`Email: jw@wsfirm.com
` claire@wsfirm.com
` wh@wsfirm.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
`PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO. KG
`
`6
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 7
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 541 Filed 07/27/17 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 233476
`
`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
`
`This is to certify that Exhibit 4 to this document should be filed under seal because it
`contains material designated as confidential under the Stipulated Protective Order approved and
`entered in this case on July 27, 2016 (Dkt. 107).
`
`/s/ Christopher V. Goodpastor
`Christopher V. Goodpastor
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on the 27th day of July 2017, all counsel of record who are deemed
`to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the
`Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) and are being served with a copy of Exhibit
`4 to this document via electronic mail.
`
`/s/ Christopher V. Goodpastor
`Christopher V. Goodpastor
`
`7
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al.
`Ex 1015, p. 8
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket