Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 1 of 52 PageID #: 10318
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`TYLER DIVISION
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`This Memorandum Opinion construes disputed claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,470,399
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`(“the ’399 Patent”), 6,895,449 (“the ’449 Patent”), 8,504,746 (“the ’746 Patent”), 8,966,144 (“the
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`’144 Patent”), and 9,189,437 (“the ’437 Patent”) (collectively, the “patents-in-suit”) asserted by
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`Plaintiff Papst Licensing GmbH & Co., KG (“Plaintiff”) against Defendants Apple Inc. (“Apple”),
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`Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo”), Motorola Mobility LLC (“Motorola”), LG Electronics,
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`Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., LG Electronics MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., (“LG”), Huawei
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`Technologies Co., Ltd., Huawei Technologies USA, Inc. (“Huawei”), Samsung Electronics Co.,
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`Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (“Samsung”), and ZTE (USA) Inc. (“ZTE”) (collectively
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`“Defendants”). On January 5, 2017, the parties presented oral arguments on the disputed claim
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`terms at a Markman hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS the following
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`constructions.1
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`1 For ease of reference, the Court’s constructions are reproduced in Appendix A.
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` [LEAD CASE]
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` CASE NO. 6:15-cv-01095
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`PAPST LICENSING GMBH & CO.
`KG,
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`vs.
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`Plaintiff,
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`
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`APPLE INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.1
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`

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`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 2 of 52 PageID #: 10319
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3
`APPLICABLE LAW ...................................................................................................................... 3
`Section 112(b): Indefiniteness .................................................................................................... 5
`Section 112(f): Means-Plus-Function Limitations ...................................................................... 6
`AGREED TERMS .......................................................................................................................... 7
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ................................................................... 7
`1. “connecting device” Terms .................................................................................................... 7
`2. “first command interpreter” and “second command interpreter” ........................................ 13
`3. “multi-purpose interface” ..................................................................................................... 17
`4. “specific driver for the multi-purpose interface” ................................................................. 19
`5. “parameter” and “signal” Terms .......................................................................................... 20
`6. “customary” Terms .............................................................................................................. 25
`7. “automatic” Terms ............................................................................................................... 29
`8. “data transmit/receive device” ............................................................................................. 34
`9. “simulating a virtual file system to the host” ....................................................................... 37
`10. “user-loaded” Terms .......................................................................................................... 39
`11. “input/output (i/o) port” ..................................................................................................... 43
`12. “analog signal acquisition channel[s],” “acquisition channels,” and “analog acquisition
`channel” .................................................................................................................................... 44
`APPENDIX A: COLLECTED CONSTRUCTIONS ................................................................... 47
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`Page 2 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.2
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`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 3 of 52 PageID #: 10320
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`BACKGROUND
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`
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`“The five asserted patents share a common specification.” Dkt. No. 185 at 1 n.1. “The
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`Patents generally relate to a unique method for achieving high data transfer rates for data
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`acquisition systems (e.g., still pictures, videos, voice recordings) to a general-purpose computer,
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`without requiring an end user to purchase, install, and/or run specialized software for each system.”
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`Dkt. No. 175 at 1 (citing ’399 Patent at 4:23–27).
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`Terms in the ’399 and ’449 Patents have been construed in a Multi-District Litigation
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`proceeding: In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Patent Litig., MDL No. 1880, Misc. Action
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`No. 07-493 (D.D.C.) (“Papst MDL”). Claim constructions reached in the Papst MDL have been
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`addressed by the Federal Circuit. See In re Papst Licensing Digital Camera Patent Litig., 778
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`F.3d 1255, 1261–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Papst Opinion”).
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`APPLICABLE LAW
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
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`which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
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`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
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`1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Court examines a patent’s intrinsic evidence to define the
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`patented invention’s scope. Id. at 1313–14; Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
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`Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Intrinsic evidence includes the claims, the rest
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`of the specification and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; Bell Atl. Network
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`Servs., 262 F.3d at 1267. The Court gives claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as
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`understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1312–13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`Page 3 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.3
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`Claim language guides the Court’s construction of claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
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`“[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. Other
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`claims, asserted and unasserted, can provide additional instruction because “terms are normally
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`used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. Differences among claims, such as additional
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`limitations in dependent claims, can provide further guidance. Id.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id. (quoting
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[T]he specification
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`‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the
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`single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
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`Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,
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`299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the specification, a patentee may define his own terms,
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`give a claim term a different meaning than it would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow
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`some claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Although the Court generally presumes terms
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`possess their ordinary meaning, this presumption can be overcome by statements of clear
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`disclaimer. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
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`1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This presumption does not arise when the patentee acts as his own
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`lexicographer. See Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
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`2004).
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`The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
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`accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
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`the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. For example,
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`“[a] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim ‘is
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`rarely, if ever, correct.’” Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group Inc., 362 F.3d 1367,
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`Page 4 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.4
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`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 5 of 52 PageID #: 10322
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`1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583). But, “[a]lthough the
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`specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims,
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`particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into
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`the claims.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
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`see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`Although “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative
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`meaning of claim language,” the Court may rely on extrinsic evidence to “shed useful light on the
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`relevant art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quotation omitted). Technical dictionaries and treatises
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`may help the Court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in
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`the art might use claim terms, but such sources may also provide overly broad definitions or may
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`not be indicative of how terms are used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may
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`aid the Court in determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but “conclusory,
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`unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful.” Id.
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`Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in
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`determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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`Section 112(b): Indefiniteness
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`Patent claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded
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`as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). “A claim is invalid for indefiniteness if its language, when
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`read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, ‘fail[s] to inform, with reasonable
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`certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.’” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v.
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`Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
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`Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)). Whether a claim meets this definiteness requirement is a
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`matter of law. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A party seeking to
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`Page 5 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.5
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`invalidate a patent must overcome a presumption that the patent is valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282;
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`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum
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`Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As such, the burden is on the challenging party to prove
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`the patent’s invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2243; U.S.
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`Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d at 1212. The ultimate issue is whether someone working in the relevant
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`technical field could understand the bounds of a claim. Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare
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`Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 783 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
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`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc., 783 F.3d at 1378
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`(internal quotation omitted). Likewise, when a subjective term is used in a claim, “the court must
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`determine whether that patent’s specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of
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`the [limitation].” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`Section 112(f): Means-Plus-Function Limitations
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`Asserted patents may contain means-plus-function limitations that require construction.
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`Where a claim limitation is expressed in means-plus-function language and does not recite definite
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`structure in support of its function, the limitation is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (formerly 35
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`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6). Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In
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`relevant part, § 112(f) mandates that “such a claim limitation be construed to cover the
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`corresponding structure . . . described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. (citing 35
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`U.S.C. § 112(f)). Accordingly, when faced with means-plus-function limitations, courts “must turn
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`to the written description of the patent to find the structure that corresponds to the means recited
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`in the [limitation].” Id.
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`Page 6 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.6
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`“It is well settled that a claim limitation that actually uses the word ‘means’ invokes a
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`rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies. In contrast, a claim term that does not use ‘means’
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`will trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.” Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comp.,
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`Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit elaborated that
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`“[w]hen a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, ¶ 6
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`will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite
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`structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
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`“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the
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`art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id.
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`AGREED TERMS
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`The parties have presented no agreed-upon constructions. See Dkt. No. 151 at 2.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`1. “connecting device” Terms
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`“a first connecting device for interfacing the host device with the interface device via the
`multi-purpose interface of the host device”
`(’399 Patent, Claims 1, 11; ’449 Patent, Claims 1, 17)
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`
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`“interfacing of the host device with a first connecting device of the interface device via
`the multi-purpose interface of the host device”
`(’399 Patent, Claim 14)
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`“a component or group of components for
`interfacing the interface device with the host
`device”
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`If M+F [(means-plus-function)], alternatively:
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`Function: Agreed
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Samsung, Lenovo, and Motorola: Subject to
`§112(6)
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`Function: [Agreed] interfacing the host device
`with the interface device via the multi-
`purpose interface of the host device.
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`Page 7 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.7
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`Structure: Fig. 1 and associated text (’399 and
`’449 Patents)
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`Structure: 12xx structures as described at
`’399, col. 9:30–48 and Fig. 2.
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`“a second connecting device for interfacing the interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
`(’399 Patent, Claims 1, 11; ’449 Patent, Claims 1, 17)
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`“interfacing of the data transmit/receive device with a second connecting device of the
`interface device”
`(’399 Patent, Claim 14)
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`“a component or group of components for
`interfacing the interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
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`If M+F [(means-plus-function)], alternatively:
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`Function: Agreed
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`Structure: Fig. 1 and associated text (’399 and
`’449 Patents)
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Samsung, Lenovo, and Motorola: Subject to
`§112(6)
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`Function: [Agreed] interfacing the interface
`device with the data transmit/receive device.
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`Structure: 15xx structures as described at
`’399, col. 9:49–64 and Fig. 2.
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`Dkt. No. 151, Ex. A at 1–2; Dkt. No. 175 at 4; Dkt. No. 185 at 2–3; Dkt. No. 197, Ex. A at 25–26,
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`30–32 & 37.
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`Plaintiff argues that its proposed construction is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
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`findings in the Papst Opinion. Dkt. No. 175 at 5. Plaintiff also submits that “[t]he words of the
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`claims themselves explain the location of the first and second connecting device . . . .” Id. Further,
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`Plaintiff argues, “[t]he varied usage of a term in the specification is evidence that it should be
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`interpreted broadly.” Id. at 6. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot overcome the
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`presumption that these non-means terms should not be treated as means-plus-function terms. Id.
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`at 7–8.
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`Defendants respond that these disputed terms are means-plus-function terms because “they
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`have no structural meaning and the specification does not redefine the meaning of ‘connecting
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`Page 8 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.8
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`device’ in a way that connotes structure . . . .” Dkt. No. 185 at 3. In particular, Defendants argue
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`that “device” is a “nonce” word that is tantamount to “means.” Id. at 3–4. Further, Defendants
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`argue, “nothing in the specification or prosecution would inform one of skill in the art about the
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`structural nature of the ‘connecting device’ term or otherwise impart structure to it.” Id. at 4.
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`Plaintiff replies that a “term that identifies a variety of structures provides sufficient
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`structure.” Dkt. No. 191 at 1.
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`At the January 5, 2017 hearing, Defendants also urged that the word “component,”
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`proposed by Plaintiff, is another “nonce” word that lacks structure. Docket No. 220 at 14:8–20.
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`Plaintiff responded that Defendants are attempting to eliminate any consideration of the
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`understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See id. at 21:19–22:3.
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`
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`Title 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (formerly 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6) provides: “An element in a claim
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`for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without
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`the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
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`cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
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`thereof.”
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`“[T]he failure to use the word ‘means’ . . . creates a rebuttable presumption . . . that § 112,
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`para. 6 does not apply.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348 (citations and internal quotation marks
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`omitted). “When a claim term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and §
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`112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently
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`definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that
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`function.” Id. at 1349 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Williamson, in an en banc portion of the decision, abrogated prior statements that the
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`absence of the word “means” gives rise to a “strong” presumption against means-plus-function
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`Page 9 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.9
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`treatment. Id. (citation omitted). Williamson also abrogated prior statements that this presumption
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`“is not readily overcome” and that this presumption cannot be overcome “without a showing that
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`the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be construed as structure.” Id. (citations
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`omitted). Instead, Williamson found, “[h]enceforth, we will apply the presumption as we have
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`done prior to Lighting World . . . .” Id. (citing Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,
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`382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In a subsequent part of the decision not considered en
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`banc, Williamson affirmed the district court’s finding that the term “distributed learning control
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`module” was a means-plus-function term that was indefinite because of lack of corresponding
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`structure, and in doing so Williamson stated that “‘module’ is a well-known nonce word.” 792
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`F.3d at 1350.
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`Williamson further noted that “[g]eneric terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’
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`and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in
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`a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ because they ‘typically do not connote
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`sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.” Id. (emphasis added;
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`citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`
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`The term “connecting device,” as used in the ’399 Patent and ’449 Patent claims that are
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`at issue here, is not a “nonce” term (see id.) but rather connotes a class of electrical connection
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`structures, for example as disclosed in the specification as follows:
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`In the preferred embodiment of the interface device 10 shown in FIG. 2, the first
`connecting device 12 of FIG. 1 contains the following components: an SCSI
`interface 1220 and a 50-pin SCSI connector 1240 for attachment to an SCSI
`interface present on most host devices or laptops. The SCSI (small computer
`system interface) interface 1220 translates the data received via the SCSI connector
`1240 into data understood by the DSP 1300, as known by those skilled in the art.
`Further, the first connecting device 12 comprises an EPP (enhanced parallel port)
`with a data transfer rate of approx. 1 MBps which delivers a more moderate data
`transfer rate of 1 MBps by comparison to the data transfer rate of 10 MBps of the
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`Page 10 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.10
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`SCSI interface. The EPP 1260 is connected to a 25-pin D-shell connector 1280 to
`permit attachment to a printer interface of a host device for example. Optionally,
`the first connecting device 12 also comprises a 25-pin connector 1282 which
`permits the attachment of 8 digital outputs and 8 digital inputs 1284 at a host device.
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` *
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` * *
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`As described above, the first connecting device 12 comprises the SCSI interface
`1220 with a peak transfer rate of 10 MBps. An optional PCMCIA-to-SCSI adapter
`permits high-speed communication with laptop computers which are desirable and
`in widespread use, particularly by mobile service technicians. The EPP 1260 with
`its associated connector 1280 permits data transfer at a more moderate rate.
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`’399 Patent at 9:29–47 & 10:59–65 (emphasis added). The opinion of Plaintiff’s expert is also
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`persuasive in this regard. See Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 8, Nov. 21, 2016 Fernald Decl. at ¶ 38
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`(“a component or group of components necessary to contribute to an electrical connection between
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`the two devices to be interfaced together”). Further, surrounding claim language provides context
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`as to the “inputs and outputs” and how a connecting device “interacts with other components . . .
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`in a way that . . . inform[s] the structural character of the limitation-in-question or otherwise
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`impart[s] structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. For example, a portion of Claim 1 of the ’399
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`Patent recites (emphasis added): “the data transmit/receive device attached to the second
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`connecting device of the interface device.” At the January 5, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff was amenable
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`to construing the disputed terms as being “electrical” components. E.g., Docket No. 220 at 11:4–
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`7 (“These are connecting devices or components that provide those electrical connections and
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`nothing more is needed than those electrical connections.”).
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`
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`This finding of structure follows from the long-standing principles articulated prior to the
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`abrogated Lighting World decision. See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d
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`1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“when the structure-connoting term ‘circuit’ is coupled with a
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`description of the circuit’s operation, sufficient structural meaning generally will be conveyed to
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`Page 11 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.11
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`persons of ordinary skill in the art, and § 112 ¶ 6 presumptively will not apply”; noting “language
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`reciting [the circuits’] respective objectives or operations”); Apex, 325 F.3d at 1372 (“While we
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`do not find it necessary to hold that the term ‘circuit’ by itself always connotes sufficient structure,
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`the term ‘circuit’ with an appropriate identifier such as ‘interface,’ ‘programming’ and ‘logic,’
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`certainly identifies some structural meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art.”); Personalized
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`Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Even though
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`the term ‘detector’ does not specifically evoke a particular structure, it does convey to one
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`knowledgeable in the art a variety of structures known as ‘detectors.’ We therefore conclude that
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`the term ‘detector’ is a sufficiently definite structural term to preclude the application of § 112,
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`¶ 6.”); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that
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`“detent mechanism” was not a means-plus-function term because it denotes a type of device with
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`a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts).2
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`
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`Defendants have cited TracBeam, LLC v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 6:14-CV-678-RWS, 2016 WL
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`3751624, at *6 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2016), but TracBeam is distinguishable because there the Court
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`found that the context in which the terms at issue were used failed to suggest any structure. Here,
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`by contrast, the above-discussed context provided by the claims and the specification demonstrate
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`that the “connecting device” terms refer to electrical connections.
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`
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`The Court therefore hereby construes the disputed terms as set forth in the following chart:
`
`
`2 Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (“‘detent’ denotes a type of device with a generally understood
`meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms”);
`id. (“It is true that the term ‘detent’ does not call to mind a single well-defined structure, but the
`same could be said of other commonplace structural terms such as ‘clamp’ or ‘container.’ What
`is important is not simply that a ‘detent’ or ‘detent mechanism’ is defined in terms of what it
`does, but that the term, as the name for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in
`the art.”)
`
`Page 12 of 52
`
`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.12
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 13 of 52 PageID #: 10330
`
`Construction
`
`“first connecting device”:
`“a first electrical component, or group of
`electrical components, for interfacing the
`interface device with the host device”
`
`
`
`“second connecting device”:
`“a second electrical component, or group
`of electrical components, for interfacing the
`interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
`
`
`Term
`
`“a first connecting device for interfacing
`the host device with the interface device via
`the multi-purpose interface of the host
`device”
`
`(’399 Patent, Claims 1, 11; ’449 Patent,
`Claims 1, 17)
`
`
`
`“interfacing of the host device with a first
`connecting device of the interface device via
`the multi-purpose interface of the host
`device”
`
`(’399 Patent, Claim 14)
`
`“a second connecting device for interfacing
`the interface device with the data
`transmit/receive device”
`
`(’399 Pat., Cls. 1, 11; ’449 Pat., Cls. 1, 17)
`
`
`
`“interfacing of the data transmit/receive
`device with a second connecting device of
`the interface device”
`
`(’399 Pat., Cl. 14)
`
`
`
`2. “first command interpreter” and “second command interpreter”
`
`
`“first command interpreter” (’399 Patent, Claims 1, 11)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`“a program that receives a command and
`executes some function based on that
`command”3
`
`If M+F [(means-plus-function)], alternatively:
`
`3 Plaintiff previously proposed: “a component or group of components for interfacing the
`interface device with the data transmit/receive device.” Dkt. No. 151, Ex. A at 2.
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Samsung, Lenovo, and Motorola: Subject to
`§112(6)
`
`Function: [Agreed] when receiving an inquiry
`from the host device as to a type of a device
`
`Page 13 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.13
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 14 of 52 PageID #: 10331
`
`
`Function: Agreed
`
`Structure: ’399 patent Fig. 1; 6:19–26, 6:48–
`55
`
`attached to the multi-purpose interface of the
`host device, sends a signal, regardless of the
`type of the data transmit/receive device
`attached to the second connecting device of
`the interface device, to the host device which
`signals to the host device that it is an
`input/output device customary in a host
`device, whereupon the host device
`communicates with the interface device by
`means of the [driver for the input/output
`device customary in a host device] [specific
`driver for the multi-purpose interface].
`
`Structure: No algorithm, source code, or flow
`chart is disclosed for performing the recited
`function, therefore the term is indefinite.
`
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`Samsung, Lenovo, and Motorola: Subject to
`§112(6)
`
`Function: [Agreed] interpret a data request
`command from the host device to the type of
`input/output device signaled by the first
`command interpreter as a data transfer
`command for initiating a transfer of the digital
`data to the host device.
`
`Structure: No algorithm, source code, or flow
`chart is disclosed for performing the recited
`function, therefore the term is indefinite.
`
`
`
`“second command interpreter” (’399 Patent, Claims 1, 11)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`“a program that receives a command and
`executes some function based on that
`command”4
`
`If M+F [(means-plus-function)], alternatively:
`
`Function: Agreed
`
`Structure: ’399 patent Fig. 1; 6:19–26, 6:48–
`55
`
`
`Dkt. No. 151, Ex. A at 2–3; Dkt. No. 175 at 15; Dkt. No. 185 at 9; Dkt. No. 197, Ex. A at 38–39
`
`& 41–42.
`
`
`4 Plaintiff previously proposed: “a component or group of components for interfacing the
`interface device with the data transmit/receive device.” Dkt. No. 151, Ex. A at 2.
`
`Page 14 of 52
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`Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG - Exhibit 2009, p.14
`
`

`

`Case 6:15-cv-01095-RWS Document 275 Filed 03/07/17 Page 15 of 52 PageID #: 10332
`
`
`
`Plaintiff argues that its proposal is supported by the specification as well as by “[t]he
`
`common and ordinary meaning of command interpreter at the time of the invention.” Dkt. No. 175
`
`at 16. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants cannot overcome the presumption that these non-means
`
`terms should not be treated as means-plus-function terms. Id. at 17.
`
`
`
`Defendants respond that “command interpreter” is purely functional in nature and does not
`
`connote any structure. Dkt. No. 185 at 10. Defendants also urge that “[t]he specification fails to
`
`disclose any structure corresponding to the claimed functions” and “fails to disclose an algorithm
`
`for performing the claimed functions.” Id. at 12, 14.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff replies that “‘[c]ommand interpreter’ is a well-understood structure in computer
`
`science,” and “the claims also explain exactly how the commands are interpreted.” Dkt. No. 191
`
`at 3–4.
`
`
`
`Legal principles regarding 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339, are
`
`discussed above as to the “connecting device” terms.
`
`
`
`Here, “command interpreter” is not a “nonce” term (see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350) but
`
`rather connotes a class of structures. See ’399 Patent at 6:48–55; see also Dkt. No. 175, Ex. 9, The
`
`IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms 549 (6th ed. 1996) (“A computer
`
`program that translates and executes each statement or construct of a computer program before
`
`translating and executing the next.”); id., Ex. 11, Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary 101 (3d
`
`ed. 1997); id., Ex. 8, Nov. 21, 2016 Fernald Decl. at ¶ 45. Also, surrounding claim language
`
`provides context as to the “inputs and outputs” and how a command interpreter “interacts with
`
`other components . . . in a way that . . .