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`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`______________________________________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`______________________________________________
`
`
`I.M.L. SLU
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`WAG ACQUISITION, LLC
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`_______________________________________
`
`Inter Partes Review Case No. IPR2016-01656
`U.S. Patent No. 8,122,141
`_______________________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S LETTER MOTION
`FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`Facing RPI issues of its own, IML belatedly seeks to distract the Board with
`
`a groundless RPI challenge against its own accuser.
`
`WAG takes RPI designations seriously. IML’s RPI challenge is based on a
`
`one-page letter from litigation adversaries in district court, and an article and press
`
`release regarding a funding arrangement between the undersigned’s law firm and a
`
`litigation funder. This alone is not sufficient to raise an RPI concern, or merit
`
`additional discovery.
`
`To support its contentions, IML cites to two decisions in its “letter,” Bio-Rad
`
`Labs., Inc. v. Cal. Inst. Of Tech., IPR2015-00009 (Paper 9) (PTAB March 6, 2015)
`
`and Motorola Mobility LLC v. Patent of Michael Arnouse, IPR2013-00010 (Paper
`
`27) (PTAB April 5, 2013).1 As IML itself acknowledges, this authority pertains
`
`only to “the question of the real party in interest when a patent has been assigned
`
`or licensed.” (IML’s “letter” at 2 (emphasis added).)
`
`Here, there is no allegation that WAG has assigned or licensed the
`
`challenged patents to anybody. The full chain of title of the challenged patents is a
`
`
`1 Despite repeated requests from WAG after IML generally raised the issue, IML
`
`provided no authority to WAG on the question of Real Parties in Interest for Patent
`
`Owners. This authority, which WAG provided to IML, is the only Board authority
`
`of which WAG is aware regarding Real Parties in Interest for Patent Owners.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`matter of public record with the USPTO and shows ownership vested solely in
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`WAG. IML points to no assignments or exclusive licenses of the challenged
`
`patents.
`
`IML instead cites to a letter from opposing counsel in separate WAG
`
`litigations that purports to reserve those defendants’ right to challenge WAG’s
`
`standing in the district court. The defendants in question (many of which have
`
`joined in the present IPR2016-01658) have since made their (sealed) motion on
`
`this issue in district court. WAG believes the district court motion to be unfounded
`
`and is opposing it. Although some of these same defendants were petitioners in
`
`their own recent IPRs concerning the patents now in dispute (IPR2016-01238 and
`
`IPR2016-01239), none of them raised any issue concerning WAGs disclosure of
`
`RPIs.2
`
`
`2 To appreciate just how belated the present application is, the Board should note
`
`that, as reflected in the public dockets of the related litigation, the defendants in
`
`that litigation were aware of the involvement of a funder since at least the time
`
`they moved for Hague discovery on the topic in December of 2016, which long
`
`preceded the September 2017 oral argument in their two recent IPRs (IPR2016-
`
`01238 and IPR2016-01239).
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`Board decisions regarding RPI disclosure for Patent Owners address that
`
`issue in the context of standing. See Bio-Rad, IPR2015-00009 (Paper 9 at 3).
`
`A patent plaintiff lacks “constitutional standing” when it would suffer no
`
`legally cognizable injury due to infringement. WAG easily meets the requirements
`
`for constitutional standing. It is the record owner of the U.S. patents at issue and as
`
`such holds legal title. IML has not even questioned whether WAG retains the
`
`exclusive rights to practice under the patents, to license third parties to practice
`
`under the patents, or to sue third parties for infringement thereof. WAG alone, with
`
`these exclusive rights, is constitutionally injured by infringers. See Prop. Dev., Inc.
`
`v. TCI Cablevision of California, Inc., 248 F. 3d 1333, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`With no other party that can lawfully exercise or grant such rights, WAG is clearly
`
`injured by an infringer that practices in the U.S. without permission.
`
`In district court litigation, there is also a concept of “prudential standing,”
`
`which comes into play, even where constitutional standing exists, when a third
`
`party possess a sufficient ownership interest such that it must be joined as an
`
`additional plaintiff to avoid injustice. The policies behind the prudential standing
`
`requirement are (i) to avoid creating “a substantial risk of multiple suits and
`
`multiple liabilities against an alleged infringer for a single act of infringement”
`
`(Int’l Gamco, Inc. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007)), and (ii) to avoid harm to an unrepresented third party that has substantial
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`rights in the patents, by reason or a ruling that might invalidate or render the
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`patents unenforceable (Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Electronics Co. Ltd.,
`
`814 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). A successful challenge based on prudential
`
`standing requires a third party that possesses ownership rights that rise to the level
`
`of posing such threats.
`
`Here, there is no such party or plausible allegation thereof. IML avers,
`
`without more, that WAG has a litigation funder. This much is a publicly known
`
`fact. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent in such funding that would implicate
`
`standing issues. It has long been held that merely financing the patent owner does
`
`not make the funder a co-owner of a patent. Luminara Worldwide, 814 F.3d at
`
`1351. There is no suggestion that the funder here holds or can exercise, by grant or
`
`otherwise, any exclusionary right in the subject patents. There is thus no basis even
`
`to postulate here that the funder could take any action that would give rise to
`
`“multiple suits” or “multiple liabilities” against an alleged infringer.
`
`Nor is the risk of invalidation posed by an IPR proceeding a reason to
`
`require the Patent Owner to name its litigation funder as an RPI merely because of
`
`its financial interest in any licensing or litigation enforcement proceeds. The
`
`funder’s interest is 100% derivative from the Patent Owner’s; the funder has no
`
`separate interest apart from the expectation of gain from participating in the Patent
`
`Owner’s licensing or enforcement income. Because its rights derive from the
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Patent Owner’s, the funder had the opportunity to protect itself in proceedings like
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`this one through contract with the Patent Owner. The situation is markedly
`
`different than, for example, a restricted field of use license, where the licensor
`
`retains enforcement rights in other fields of use, which would be threatened if the
`
`patent was invalidated in the licensee’s separate action. See Int’l Gamco, 504 F.3d
`
`at 1278-79. There is no such risk posed here.
`
`IML cites to no Board authority granting discovery under circumstances
`
`such as those found here, based on attorney argument in another forum. Beyond
`
`that, IML presents only a press release and article regarding a funding arrangement
`
`with the undersigned’s firm, which even taken at face value fall short of supporting
`
`a case for making the funder a RPI.3
`
`Of course, should the Board deem IML’s current evidence sufficient for
`
`further discovery, WAG will comply, but the Board should not permit the hastily
`
`asserted and unsupported insinuations that WAG somehow has its own hidden
`
`“real parties” to distract from Petitioner’s real and serious RPI and privity issues
`
`that have been before the Board for over a year.
`
`
`3 It is also baffling that IML is asking for discovery from the Board after
`
`stonewalling on discovery in these cases for over a year, which discovery WAG
`
`looks forward to addressing at Oral Argument.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`
`Case IPR2016-01656
`Patent 8,122,141
`
`
`
` Dated: November 28, 2017
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/Ronald Abramson/
`Ronald Abramson
`(Attorney for Patent Owner)
`Reg. No. 34,762
`212-822-0163
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned hereby certifies that on
`
`November 28, 2017, a complete and entire copy of this Patent Owner’s Response
`
`to Petitioner’s Letter Motion for Additional Discovery was provided to the
`
`Petitioner by filing through the PTAB E2E System and via email to
`
`bjacob@kelleydrye.com and syovits@kelleydrye.com, as authorized in Petitioner’s
`
`Amended Mandatory Notices.
`
`
`
`Dated: November 28, 2017
`
`
`
`/Ronald Abramson/
`Ronald Abramson
`(Attorney for Patent Owner)
`Reg. No. 34,762
`212-822-0163
`
`
`
`

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