Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 1 of 29 PageID #: 18971
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`1
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`PI 2006
`Semiconductor Components v. Power Integrations
`IPR2016-01600
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 2 of 29 PageID #: 18972
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO3OZ—LPS Document731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 2of29 Page|D#: 18972
`«>339.
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`STA
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`U.S. District Judge:
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`Pending before the Court are the parties’ post-trial motions. Plaintiff Power Integrations,
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`Inc. (“Power”) filed the following post-trial motions: (1) Power’s Motion for Judgment as a
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`Matter of Law (JMOL) of Invalidity of the ‘972 Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 613); (2) Power’s
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`Motion for JMOL of Non-Infringement of the ‘972 Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 614);
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`(3) Power’s Motion for JMOL of Anticipation of the ‘595 Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 615);
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`(4) Power’s Motion for JMOL of Infringement of the ‘605 Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 616);
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`(5) Power’s Motion for JMOL of Infringement of the ‘Z70 Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 618);
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`and (6) Power’s Motion for JMOL that the ‘876 Patent is Literally Infringed by the SG584lJ-
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`Type Products, or for a New Trial (D.I. 617).
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`Defendants Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., Fairchild Semiconductor
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`Corporation, and System General Corporation (collectively, “Fairchild”) filed the following post-
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`trial motions: (1) Fairchild’s Motion for JMOL of Infringement of the ‘972 Patent, or for a New
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`Trial; (2) Fairchild’s Motion for JMOL of Anticipation of the ‘605 Patent, or for a New Trial;
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`(3) Fairchild’s Motion for JMOL of Anticipation of the ‘270 Patent; (4) Fairchild’s Motion for
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`JMOL of Anticipation of the‘876 Patent; (5) Fairchild’s Motion for JMOL of no Literal
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`Infringement of the ‘876 Patent, or for a New Trial; (6) Fairchild’s Motion for JMOL of No
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`Induced Infringement of the ‘SSI and the ‘876 Patents, or for a New Trial; and (7) Fairchild’s
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`Motion for JMOL of Non-Infringement of the ‘85l Patent, or for a New Trial (D.I. 619).‘
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`‘The parties’ inequitable conduct claims are not addressed in this Opinion and will be resolved
`by the Court in due course.
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 3 of 29 PageID #: 18973
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 3 of 29 Page|D #: 18973
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Power filed this patent infringement action on May 23, 2008, alleging that Fairchild
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`infringes four patents: United States Patent Nos. 6,249,876 (“the ‘876 patent”); 6,107,851 (“the
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`‘851 patent”); 7,110,270 (“the ‘270 patent”); and 7,834,605 (“the ‘605 patent”). (D.I. 1)
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`Fairchild filed a counterclaim, alleging that Power infi°inges two Fairchild patents: United States
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`Patent Nos. 7,259,972 (“the ‘972 patent”); and 7,352,595 (“the ‘595 patent”). (D.I. 49)
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`Afier a ten-day trial,2 the jury returned the following verdict. (D.I. 576) For the ‘876
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`patent, the jury found that Fairchi1d’s FAN103 -type products literally infringe and that
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`Fairchild’s SG5 841J-type products infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury also
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`found that Fairchild induced infringement for both the FAN103 and SG5841J products, and that
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`claims 1 and 21 of Power’s ‘876 patent are valid. For the ‘851 patent, the jury found in favor of
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`Power and against Fairchild with respect to literal infiingement, indirect infringement, and
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`validity of the only asserted claim, claim 18. For the ‘270 patent, the jury found in favor of
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`Fairchild and against Power with respect to literal and indirect infringement of claims 6 and 7.
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`The jury also determined that claims 6 and 7 of the ‘270 patent are valid. For the ‘605 patent, the
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`jury found in favor of Fairchild and against Power with respect to literal and indirect
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`infringement of claims 1 and 2. The jury determined that claims 1 and 2 of Power’s ‘605 patent
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`are valid. With respect to Fairchild’s patents, the jury found that Power directly infringed claims
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`6, 7, 18, and 19 of the ‘972 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, but did not literally infringe
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`those claims and did not induce infiingement. The jury also found that claims 6, 7, 18, and 19 of
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`2The trial transcript appears in the record as D.I. 593-602. All citations to the trial transcript are
`in the format “Tr.” followed by the page number.
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`3At trial, both parties properly made motions for judgment as a matter of law, which were taken
`under advisement. (See Tr. at 2258-72)
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`Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would
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`not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [a] party” on an issue. Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`50(a)(l). “Entry ofjudgment as a matter of law is a sparingly invoked remedy,” one “granted
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`only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the
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`advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury
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`reasonably could find liability.” Marra v. Phila. Housing Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir.
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`2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`To prevail on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury trial, the
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`moving party “must show that the jury’s findings, presumed or express, are not supported by
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`substantial evidence or, if they were, that the legal conclusions implied [by] the jury’s verdict
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`cannot in law be supported by those findings.”3 Parmu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘“Substantial’ evidence is such relevant evidence
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`from the record taken as a whole as might be acceptable by a reasonable mind as adequate to
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`support the finding under review.” Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888,
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 4 of 29 PageID #: 18974
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 4 of 29 Page|D #: 18974
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`Fairchild’s ‘972 patent are valid. For the ‘595 patent, the jury found that Power does not infringe
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`claims 17 and 22 either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury also found that
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`claims 17 and 22 of Fairchild’s ‘595 patent are valid.
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`The parties completed their extensive briefing of post-trial motions on August 8, 2012.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
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`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 5 of 29 Page|D #: 18975
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`893 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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`In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must give the non-moving party,
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`“as [the] verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the
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`evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor, and in general, view the
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`record in the light most favorable to him.” Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344,
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`1348 (3d Cir. 1991); Perkin—Elmer Corp., 732 F .2d at 893. The court may not determine the
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`credibility of the witnesses nor “substitute its choice for that of the jury between conflicting
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`elements of the evidence.” Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F .2d at 893. Rather, the court must
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`determine whether the evidence reasonably supports the j ury’s verdict. See Dawn Equip. Co. v.
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`Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs. Inc., 71
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`F .3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing standard as “whether there is evidence upon which a
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`reasonable jury could properly have found its verdict”); 9B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
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`Procedure § 2524 (3d ed. 2008) (“The question is not whether there is literally no evidence
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`supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon
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`which the jury properly could find a verdict for that party.”).
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`B.
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`Motion for a New Trial
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides, in pertinent part:
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`A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
`part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial by
`jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
`been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.
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`New trials are commonly granted in the following situations: (1) where the jury’s verdict is
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`against the clear weight of the evidence, and a new trial must be granted to prevent a miscarriage
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`ofjustice; (2) where newly-discovered evidence exists that would likely alter the outcome of the
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`trial; (3) where improper conduct by an attorney or the court unfairly influenced the verdict; or
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`(4) where the jury’s verdict was facially inconsistent. See Zarow-Smith v. N../. Transit Rail
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`Operations, 953 F. Supp. 581, 584 (D. N.J. 1997) (citations omitted).
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`The decision to grant or deny a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the
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`district court. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Dazflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Olefins Trading,
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`Inc. v. Han Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993) (reviewing district court’s grant or
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`denial of new trial motion under deferential “abuse of discretion” standard). However, where the
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`ground for a new trial is that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, the
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`court should ‘proceed cautiously, because such a ruling would necessarily substitute the court’s
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`judgment for that of the jury. See Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993).
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`Although the standard for grant of a new trial is less rigorous than the standard for grant of
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`judgment as a matter of law — in that the court need not view the evidence in the light most
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`favorable to the verdict winner -— a new trial should only be granted where “a miscarriage of
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`justice would result if the verdict were to stand,” the verdict “cries out to be overturned,” or
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`where the verdict “shocks [the] conscience.” Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1352-53.
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`III.
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`POWER INTEGRATIONS’ POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
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`A.
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`P0wer’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of Invalidity of the ‘972
`Patent, or for a New Trial
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`Power moves for judgment as a matter of law that claims 6, 7, 18, and 19 of Fairchild’s
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`‘972 patent are invalid as obvious. (D.I. 625) In the alternative, Power seeks a new trial. The
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`Court will deny the motion.
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`1.
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`‘Judgment as a Matter of Law
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`At trial, Power argued that claims 6, 7, 18, and 19 of the ‘972 patent are invalid as
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`obvious over the combination of the Majid ‘242 patent and Power’s ‘876 patent. The jury
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`disagreed. Power now contends that the jury reached the wrong result. According to Power,
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`both sides agreed that the combination of the ‘242 and ‘876 patents showed every element of the
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`asserted claims, leaving only two issues in dispute: (1) whether the ‘242 and ‘876 patents could
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`be combined to reach a conclusion of obviousness; and (2) whether secondary considerations
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`support a conclusion of non-obviousness. (D.I. 635 at 1) With respect to the first issue, Power
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`contends that Fairchild’s arguments were legally irrelevant and insufficient in view of the
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`obviousness standard set forth in KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). (D.I.
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`635 at 6) According to Power, Fairchild’s expert, Dr. Wei, improperly relied on several
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`“unclaimed elements” to support his arguments. (D.I. 635 at 6) By contrast, Power contends that
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`its expert, Dr. Kelley, explained precisely where each element of the claims is found in the prior
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`art and why Power’s proposed combination was appropriate.
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`(D.I. 635 at 6-7) For secondary
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`considerations, Power contends that Fairchild failed to link any evidence of long-felt need and
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`commercial success to the claims of the ‘972 patent. (D.l. 635 at 7-12) According to Power,
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`Fairchild also admitted that the products forming the basis of its commercial success argument
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`do not practice the ‘972 patent. (D.I. 635 at 11)
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`There is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. As patents are presumed valid,
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`Power had the burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. See 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 282; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lamb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1990). At trial,
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`Dr. Wei testified regarding the differences between the claims of the ‘972 patent and the prior art,
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`the difficulty in making the combination that Power proposed, and the inconsistencies in the
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`testimony offered by Power’s expert, Dr. Kelley. (Tr. at 2207-11) In view of the conflicting
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`expert testimony, it was up to the jury “to determine the experts’ credibility and weigh the
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`evidence appropriately.” Belden Technologies Inc. v. Superior Essex Communications LP, 802
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`F. Supp. 2d 555, 563 (D. Del. 2011); see also ArcelorMittal France v. AK Steel Corp., 811 F.
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`Supp. 2d 960, 967 (D. Del. 2011) (“[T]he jury was free to give whatever weight it felt
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`appropriate to the testimony of the various experts and fact witnesses.”). Fairchild also offered
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`evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness, which was sufficiently linked to the
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`‘972 patent. The jury heard the evidence presented by both sides at trial and found that the
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`asserted claims were valid. Giving Fairchild the benefit of all logical inferences, and resolving
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`all conflicts in the evidence in Fairchild’s favor, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion.
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`2.
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`New Trial
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`Power contends that a new trial is necessary because: (1) Dr. Wei’s testimony went
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`beyond the scope of his expert report; and (2) the verdict is against the great weight of the
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`evidence. (D.I. 635 at 12) For the first issue, Power identifies four purported violations of Rule
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`26 relating to Dr. Wei’s testimony about the difficulty of combining a primary side controller
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`with frequency hopping. Fairchild disagrees that the testimony went beyond the scope and
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`further contends that an evaluation of the merits is not necessary because Power failed to object
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`at trial, thereby waiving the objection. Power responds that an objection was not necessary,
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`because “[a]s explained at the pre-trial conference, the Court does not rule on Rule 26 objections
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`at trial but rather does so in the context of post-trial briefing.” (D.I. 635 at 12)
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`The Court does not agree with Power’s interpretation of the Court’s procedures for Rule
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`3 l12§133
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`26 objections. During the pre-trial conference, the Court explained that:
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`I don’t rule, on objections that expert testimony is beyond the
`scope of the expert report, I don’t rule on that during trial. You can
`note that objection and I will indicate that it’s noted, but if you
`wish to have a ruling on an objection that expert testimony is
`beyond the scope, then you need to renew that objection in
`post-trial motions, you need to brief it, and I will make a ruling in
`connection with post-trial motions.
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`(D.I. 561 at 52) It appears both parties understood that an objection must be made at trial to be
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`preserved, since both parties raised such objections at trial. (See Tr. at 1615 (“MR. POLLACK:
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`Objection, your Honor. That is beyond the scope. He never provided such opinions before in
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`this case.”), Tr. at 1636 (“MR. McMAHON: Objection your Honor. This isexpert testimony.
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`It’s not disclosed, Rule 26.”)) The Court further explained its procedures several times during
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`trial.
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`(See, e.g., Tr. at 1175-76, 1547)
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`The Court is not persuaded by Power’s contention that the offending testimony “came as
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`a complete surprise.” (D.I. 708 at 7) Dr. Wei was asked to explain the basis for his non-
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`obviousness opinion and he did so. There is no reason Power could not have objected to the
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`testimony. Without an objection at trial, there was no opport1mity for Fairchild to attempt to cure
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`any prejudice, including by withdrawing the purportedly offending testimony. In these
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`circumstances, the Court finds that Power waived its objection.
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`The Court also disagrees with Power’s contention that the juIy’s finding of non-
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`obviousness was against the great weight of the evidence. To the contrary, as discussed above,
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`the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. For these reasons, the Court will deny Power’s
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`request for a new trial.
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`Q3
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`B.
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`Power’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of Non-Infringement of the
`‘972 Patent, or for a New Trial
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`Power seeks judgment as a matter of law that: (l) Fairchild failed to prove direct
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`infringement of the ‘972 patent; and (2) Fairchild failed to prove infringement under the doctrine
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`of equivalents. In the alternative, Power seeks a new trial. The Court will deny Power’s motion.
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`1.
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`Direct Infringement
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`“In order to prove direct infringement, a patentee must either point to specific instances of
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`direct infringement or show that the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.”
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`ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks
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`C0., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Power
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`contends that it cannot directly infringe any claim of the ‘972 patent because its accused
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`LinkSwitch-II product does not include the claimed “transformer” element, and because Fairchild
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`failed to present legally sufficient evidence to show that the accused LinkSwitch-II product
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`“necessarily infringes.” (D.I. 620 at 2)
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`The Court finds that Fairchild has offered substantial evidence to support a direct
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`infringement verdict. For instance, Fairchild’s expert presented testimony describing the
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`presence of a transformer in power supplies that incorporate the accused LinkSwitch-II product.
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`(Tr. at 2094-2100) Power does not dispute that its products are regularly incorporated into power
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`supplies that include transformers. (D.I. 620 at 4) Fairchild has also offered circumstantial
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`evidence in support of its direct infringement theory, including Power’s application notes
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`containing detailed instructions for incorporating the accused product into power supplies (DX-
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`374), as well as testimony from witnesses suggesting that Power designs fiilly integrated power
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`supplies for customers and seeks to sell its products in the U.S. market (Tr. at 648-63). Even if
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`this testimony was general in nature, as Power contends, the jury was free to draw reasonable
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`inferences from the evidence presented. Given the totality of the evidence, and resolving all
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`evidentiary conflicts in Fairchild’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Power directly
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`2.
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` infringed the ‘972 patent.4
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`Doctrine of Equivalents
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`Power moves for judgment as a matter of law that the ‘972 patent is not infringed under
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`the doctrine of equivalents because: (1) the verdict violates the “all elements” rule by vitiating an
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`element of the claim; and (2) Fairchild failed to provide “particularized testimony and linking
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`4Additionally, although the jury did not know it, Fairchild and the Court reasonably believed that
`Power did not contest the presence of a transformer, for reasons explained in Fairchild’s brief.
`(D.I. 671 at 3-14)
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`argument .
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`. with respect to the function, way, result test.” (D.I. 620 at 14)
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`Power contends that Fairchild’s arguments at trial vitiated the requirement that the “first
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`feedback signal” must be distinct from the “second feedback signal.” (D.I. 620 at 8) The dispute
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`at trial centered on whether the accused products have a distinct “second feedback signal.” The
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`jury returned a verdict of no literal infringement, but found that Power infringed under the
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`doctrine of equivalents. According to Power, the no literal infringement verdict required the jury
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`to agree that the accused product does not have a distinct second feedback signal. From this,
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`Power concludes that the jury must have improperly equated two non-distinct signals to find
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`infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. According to Power, this conclusion is legally
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`incorrect — “two signals are either distinct, or they are not.” (D.I. 620 at 10)
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`The Court does not agree that the verdict is legally erroneous. At trial, Power’s expert,
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`Dr. Kelly, offered two separate reasons for non—infringement: ( 1) that the current signal identified
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`by Dr. Wei as the “second feedback signal” is not actually a “feedback” signal (Tr. at 2145); and
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`(2) that the two signals identified by Dr. Wei are not “distinct” (Tr. at 2153-54). Given these
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`separate arguments, the jury’s doctrine of equivalents verdict does not necessarily vitiate any
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`element of the claim. The jury may have agreed with one, but not both, of Dr. Kelley’s opinions
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`in reaching its verdict. The jury likewise could have concluded that Fairchild failed to carry its
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`burden for literal infiingement, but satisfied the burden for the doctrine of equivalents.
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`The Court also finds that substantial evidence supports the jury’s doctrine of equivalents
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`verdict. Dr. Wei offered extensive testimony regarding the structure and fiinction of the accused
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`devices, explaining his reasoning for both literal infringement and infringement under the
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`doctrine of equivalents. (Tr. at 2084-88, 2139-41) Dr. Wei was not required to “re-start his
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`testimony at square one when transitioning [from literal infringement] to a doctrine of
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`equivalents analysis.” Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`An expert may explicitly or implicitly incorporate his earlier testimony into the DOE analysis.
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`See id. In view of the complexity of the technology, the Court finds linking arguments by both
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`Fairchild’s expert and counsel in closing to have been appropriate. Power’s motion will be
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`denied.
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`3.
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`New Trial
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`Power argues, in the alternative, that a new trial is warranted because: (1) Fairchild was
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`awarded a verdict without any evidence of direct infringement; and (2) Fairchild provided only a
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`single conclusory statement on the doctrine of equivalents issue. As discussed above, there was
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`substantial evidence to support Fairchild’s claims of direct infringement and infringement under
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`the doctrine of equivalents. Therefore, the Court will deny Power’s motion.
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 13 of 29 PageID #: 18983
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 13 of 29 Page|D #: 18983
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`C.
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`Power’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of Anticipation of the ‘595
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`Patent, or for a New Trial
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`Power seeks judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims of the ‘595 patent are
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`invalid because: (1) the evidence of anticipation was undisputed; and (2) Fairchild’s rebuttal
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`evidence conflicted with the Court’s claim construction order. (D.I. 637) Alternatively, Power
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`seeks a new trial. The Court will deny Power’s motion.
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`1.
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`Judgment as a Matter of Law
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`Anticipation requires that a single prior art reference disclose all of the limitations of the
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`claim in dispute. See Zenith Elec. Corp. v. PDI Comm. Sys. Inc, 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
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`2008); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102. Power’s anticipation argument is based on a single prior art
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`reference: the Phillips TEA1401T Datasheet. While Power contends that the evidence of
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`anticipation was “undisputed” (D.I. 637 at 2), this is not so. The parties’ experts offered complex
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`and conflicting testimony as to whether the ROUT compensation block of the TEA1401T
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`Datasheet met the “first reference signal” limitation of the ‘595 patent. (Compare Tr. at 2186
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`with Tr. at 2212-13) After hearing the testimony, it was for the jury to evaluate the experts’
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`credibility, weigh the evidence, and render a decision. Viewing the evidence in the light most
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`favorable Fairchild, the Court concludes it must deny Power’s motion.
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`Power also contends that Fairchild violated the Court’s claim construction Order (D.I.
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`212) by reading into the patent an unstated “cable compensation” limitation. According to
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`Power, the jury improperly relied on this argument to reach its verdict. Fairchild responds that it
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`simply offered an explanation of how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the “first
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`reference signal” limitation, since the Court had previously ruled that this phrase “does not
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`require construction” and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (D.I. 672 at 8-11) The
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 14 of 29 PageID #: 18984
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 14 of 29 Page|D #: 18984
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`Court agrees with Fairchild. When this issue came up at summary judgment, the Court stated
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`that “Power will be entitled to cross-examine and otherwise challenge Wei’s opinion at trial.”
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`(D.I. 348 at 38-39) Power had its chance to cross-examine Dr. Wei at trial. Power also did not
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`object to Dr. Wei’s testimony as being inconsistent with the Court’s claim construction.
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`(See
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`generally D.I. 516 at 36) (Court stating at pre-trial conference that if there were objections to
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`testimony as being inconsistent with the Court’s claim construction, “we’ll have to deal with that
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`as it comes up during the trial”) For these reasons the Court will deny Power’s motion for
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`judgment as a matter of law.
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`2.
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`New Trial
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`Power’s request for a new trial will also be denied. Power had the burden to prove
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`invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1467. The
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`parties’ experts offered conflicting testimony, and the jury arrived at a verdict supported by the
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`evidence. The Court does not agree that Fairchild offered improper claim construction
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`arguments at trial. Therefore, a new trial is not warranted.
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`D.
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`P0wer’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of Infringement of the ‘605
`Patent, or for a New Trial
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`Power moves for judgment as a matter of law that Fairchild directly infringes the ‘605
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`patent and that Fairchild has induced infringement of the ‘605 patent. In the alternative, Power
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`seeks a new trial.
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`With respect to direct infringement, the Court will grant Power’s motion for judgment as
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`a matter of law. Fairchild admitted that it did “not present[] evidence of a defense with regard to
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`direct infringement.” (Tr. at 2269) In the absence of such evidence, no reasonable jury could
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`have returned a verdict on this issue in Fairchild’s favor.
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 15 of 29 PageID #: 18985
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 15 of 29 Page|D #: 18985
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`’
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`However,theCourtwilldenyPower’smotionwithrespecttoinducedinfringement.
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`Power contends that the inducement verdict was the result of Fairchild’s improper trial tactics.
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`After review of the record, the Court finds that its curative instruction was sufficient to eliminate
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`any unfair prejudice. Thus, despite Fairchild’s improper argument, judgment as a matter of law
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`is not warranted. Power had the burden to prove inducement at trial and failed to carry that
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`burden. The Court may not re-weigh the evidence. The Court will also deny Power’s request for
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`a new trial, for essentially the same reasons.
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`E.
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`Power’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law of Infringement of the ‘270
`Patent, or for a New Trial
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`1.
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`Judgment as a Matter of Law.
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`
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`Power seeks judgment as a matter of law that Fairchild infringes the ‘270 patent. The
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`parties agree that there was only one infiingement dispute at trial: whether the output current of
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`the accused products remained “substantially constant” with changes in input line voltage. (D.I.
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`633 at 3) According to Power, the evidence offered at trial on this issue was undisputed,
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`including Fairchild’s own Datasheets and internal testing, as well as the testimony of Power’s
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`expert.
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`(D.1. 633 at 2-3) Power contends that the jury could only have reached its non-
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`infringement verdict by relying on: (1) Fairchild’s improper and prejudicial claim construction
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`arguments; and (2) arguments minimizing the importance non-representative products.
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`Turning first to Power’s claim construction contentionsf the jury was tasked with
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`determining whether the output current was “substantially constant.” At trial, Dr. Wei opined
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`that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the phrase “substantially constant” to
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`require less than plus or minus 10% variation in output current. (Tr. at 1311-12) Power had an
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`5Power raised a similar objection at trial, which the Court denied. (Tr. at 1311-12)
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 16 of 29 PageID #: 18986
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 16 of 29 Page|D #: 18986
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`opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Wei and to explore the basis for his opinion. (Tr. at 1367-73)
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`Power’s expert testified that the amount of current variation is context dependent but, in his
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`experience, 15% variation was more typical in similar devices. (Tr. at 1096) It was for the jury
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`to evaluate the experts’ competing testimony and assign it the weight the jury deemed
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`appropriate. There is no basis for the Court to overturn the j ury’s verdict.
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`Power also urges the Court to reverse the verdict based on Fairchild’s arguments with
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`respect to non-representative products. According to Power, Fairchild’s arguments were
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`improper because “the basis for selecting a representative part was the fact that all ofthe parts
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`are substantially identical relative to the infringement analysis.” (D.I. 709 at 1) (emphasis
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`added) However, as stated in Power’s own brief, the evidence showed that the accused products
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`had different variations in output current (e.g., SG6741 at +/- 7.7%, SGP400 at +/- 5.22%, and
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`SG6859 at +/- 2.3%).
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`(D.I. 633 at 5-6) Because the accused products have different output
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`current variation, they are not necessarily “substantially identical” in all respects. The parties’
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`verdict sheet expressly asked the jury to determine infringement with respect to the representative
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`SG584lJ product.
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`(D.I. 576 at 2) Each party was free to present and highlight the evidence most
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`favorable to its case and allow the opposing party to attempt to bring out any weaknesses in the
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`evidence through its opposing presentation. The jury was free to accept or reject the testimony of
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`each witness in whole or in part. The Court finds that the evidence presented was sufficient to
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`support the jury’s non-infringement verdict.6
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`6The Court will also deny Power’s request for judgment as a matter of law on inducement.
`Power was required to prove inducement on a patent-by-patent basis.
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`Case 1:08-cv-00309-LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 17 of 29 PageID #: 18987
`Case 1:O8—cv—OO309—LPS Document 731 Filed 03/29/13 Page 17 of 29 Page|D #: 18987
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`2.
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`New Trial
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`In the alternative, Power seeks a new trial. The basis for this request is the same as
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`Power’s request for judgment as a matter of law, as well as the reasons articulated in Power’s
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`motion with respect to infringement of the ‘605 patent (D.I. 616). For the reasons stated above,
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`the Court will deny this motion.
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`F.
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`P0wer