`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`___________________________________________________
`
`Hyundai Motor Company Ltd., Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor
`
`Manufacturing Alabama, LLC, Kia Motors Corporation, Kia Motors America, Inc.,
`
`and Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc.,
`
`Petitioners
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`U.S. Patent Number 8,155,342
`
`_________________________________________________
`
`Case Number IPR2016-01557
`
`__________________________________________________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JOINDER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I. Introduction.
`
`Blitzsafe Texas LLC (“Patent Owner”) opposes Hyundai Motor Company
`
`Ltd., Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC,
`
`(collectively, “Hyundai”), Kia Motors Corporation, Kia Motors America, Inc., and
`
`Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc.’s (collectively, “Kia”) (collectively
`
`combined, “Petitioners” or “Hyundai/Kia”) motion to join inter partes review
`
`(“IPR”) number IPR2016-01557 (“Hyundai/Kia IPR”) to an earlier IPR filed by
`
`Toyota Motor Corporation (“Toyota”) IPR2016-00418 (“Toyota IPR”). Joinder
`
`should be denied for the following reasons.
`
`II. Joinder would violate statutory estoppel provisions under 35 U.S.C. §§
`315(b), 316(a)(11) and the Board should use its discretion to deny the
`motion for joinder.
`
`As the movant, Hyundai/Kia bears the burden to show that joinder is
`
`
`
`appropriate. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In order to find joinder, the rules state that the
`
`Board is to consider the impact of both substantive issues and procedural matters
`
`on the proceedings and other discretionary considerations. Joinder should be
`
`denied here for both substantive and procedural reasons.
`
`
`
`Hyundai/Kia filed its joinder Petition more than one year after it had been
`
`served with a complaint alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 (“the
`
`’342 Patent”) and both the Petition and joinder should be denied. Statutory
`
`estoppel provisions seek to “protect patent owners from harassment via successive
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`petitions by the same or related parties, to prevent parties from having a ‘second
`
`bite at the apple’ and to protect the integrity of both the USPTO and Federal Courts
`
`by assuring that all issues are promptly raised and vetted.” 77 FR 48759. Section
`
`315(b) bars institution “if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than
`
`1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the
`
`petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” This
`
`Petition was filed outside of the one year bar window and accordingly, only
`
`discretion of the Board can save the Petition.
`
`
`
`Hyundai/Kia already petitioned the Board on the same patent in IPR2016-
`
`01476 (The -01476 Petition”). The -01476 Petition was filed on July 21, 2016 and
`
`Hyundai/Kia alleges that it was served with a complaint as early as July 24, 2015.
`
`Despite its explicit acknowledgement of its one year bar date, Hyundai/Kia waited
`
`until August 08, 2016 to file the instant Petition––several weeks after its bar date
`
`had passed. Hyundai and Kia are large companies with extensive resources. There
`
`is no reason to employ discretion to save Hyundai/Kia from negligently failing to
`
`abide by the rules and Hyundai/Kia’s reckless disregard of the one year window
`
`could serve no purpose other than to delay and otherwise mire the proceedings.
`
`
`
`Moreover, by allowing joinder, Hyundai/Kia will effectively be afforded the
`
`opportunity to simultaneously argue two different positions. Hyunda/Kia’s earlier
`
`filed -01476 Petition includes some of the same claims and claim construction
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`issues present in the Toyota IPR. By joining this proceeding, Hyunda/Kia will be
`
`allowed to argue its case relying on different claim constructions and to potentially
`
`benefit from contradictory positions.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, the Petition should be denied institution based on the statutory
`
`bar and the motion for joinder should not allow Petitioner to circumvent the rules
`
`put in place to prevent conflicting findings and waste of judicial resources.
`
`III. Conclusion
`
`For the reasons stated above, the motion for joinder should be denied.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated September 8, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Peter Lambrianakos/
`
`Peter Lambrianakos (Reg. No. 58,279)
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
`
`Brown Rudnick LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Tel: 212-209-4800
`Fax: 212-209-4801
`Email: plambrianakos@brownrudnick.com
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e)(4) & 42.105(b)
`
`
`
`A copy of PATENT OWNER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
`
`JOINDER has been served on Petitioner at the correspondence of the Petitioner as
`
`follows:
`
`
`Paul R. Steadman, Reg. No. 43,932
`DLA Piper LLP (US)
`203 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1900
`Chicago, Illinois 60601-1293
`paul.steadman@dlapiper.com
`Telephone: 312.368.2135
`Facsimile: 312.251.2850
`
`
`September 8, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
` /Peter Lambrianakos/
`
`
`Peter Lambrianakos (Reg. No. 58,279)
`Lead Counsel for Patent Owner
`Brown Rudnick LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Tel: 212-209-4800
`Fax: 212-209-4801
`
`
`
`
`By: