Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper 9
`Entered: June 30, 2015
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2015-00457
`Patent 7,225,160 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
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`
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`IPR2015-00457
`Patent 7,225,160 B2
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`
`A.
`
`Background
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Apple Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) to institute
`
`an inter partes review of claims 1–11 and 23–29 (the “challenged claims”)
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`of U.S. Patent No. 7,225,160 B2 (Ex. 1011, “the ’160 patent”).
`
`ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response
`
`(Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`
`Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the
`
`information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable
`
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`
`claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We determine that
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`Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with
`
`respect to at least one of the claims of the ’160 patent. Accordingly, we
`
`deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review.
`
`B.
`
`Related Proceedings
`
`Petitioner discloses that the ’160 patent has been asserted in two
`
`infringement actions pending in the Eastern District of Texas, and one
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`infringement action pending in the Northern District of California. Pet. 2.
`
`Petitioner also indicates that the ’160 patent is the subject of another inter
`
`partes review proceeding, Apple Inc. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc., Case
`
`IPR2015-00458. Id.
`
`The ’160 patent was the subject of an earlier inter partes view in
`
`which the Board instituted a trial: ZTE Corp. v. ContendGuard Holdings,
`
`Inc., Case IPR2013-00134 (PTAB June 19, 2013) (Paper 12) (“ZTE”).
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`IPR2015-00457
`Patent 7,225,160 B2
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`
`C.
`
`The ’160 Patent
`
`The ’160 patent is directed to supporting commercial transactions
`
`involving “digital works,” and, in particular, to enforcing “usage rights” that
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`are associated with the digital works. Ex. 1011, Abstract, 1:15–16, 5:4–5.
`
`A “digital work” refers to any work that has been reduced to a digital
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`representation, including any audio, video, text, or multimedia work, and
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`any accompanying interpreter, e.g., software, which may be required to
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`recreate or render the content of the digital work. Id. at 5:20–24. “Usage
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`rights” are rights granted to a recipient of a digital work that define the
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`manner in which a digital work may be used and distributed. Id. at 5:26–30.
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`“Usage rights are permanently associated with the digital work. . . . the
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`usage rights and any associated fees assigned by a creator and subsequent
`
`distributor will always remain with a digital work.” Id. at 5:34–38.
`
`The Specification states that a digital work’s usage rights are enforced
`
`by “repositories.” Id. at 5:39–40. “[R]epositories are used to store digital
`
`works, control access to digital works, bill for access to digital works and
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`maintain the security and integrity of the system.” Id. at 5:40–43. A
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`repository has both “a hardware and functional embodiment,” with the
`
`functional embodiment typically being software executed on the hardware
`
`embodiment. Id. at 12:27–29.
`
`The ’160 patent discloses dividing a digital work into two files: a
`
`contents file and a description tree file. Id. at 7:65–67. The contents file is a
`
`stream of addressable bytes, the format of which depends on the interpreter
`
`or rendering engine used to play, display, or print the digital work. Id. at
`
`7:67–8:4. The description tree file contains the digital work’s usage rights,
`
`and makes it possible for the repository to examine the rights and fees
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`Patent 7,225,160 B2
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`associated with the digital work without reference to the content of the
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`digital work. Id. at 8:4–6, Fig. 7.
`
`Figure 5 of the ’160 patent, reproduced below, illustrates a contents
`
`file layout for a digital work. Id. at 4:16–18, 8:10.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`According to the contents file illustrated above, digital work 509
`
`includes story A 510, advertisement 511, story B 512, and story C 513. Id.
`
`at 8:11–12. Digital work 509 is stored starting at a relative address of 0,
`
`with story A 510 stored at address of 0–30,000, advertisement 511 stored at
`
`address 30,001–40,000, etc. Id. at 8:12–18.
`
`
`
`Figure 8 of the ’160 patent, reproduced below, illustrates the
`
`description tree structure for digital work 509. Id. at 4:26–27, 8:55–56.
`
`
`In the description tree illustrated above, digital work 509, as well as
`
`
`
`each of its components, has a corresponding descriptor block (“d-block”)
`
`arranged in a tree structure representing the relationship of the various
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`works. Id. at 8:56–58. Thus, d-block 820 corresponds to digital work 509
`
`and points to: (1) d-block 821 representing story A 510; (2) d-block 822
`
`representing advertisement 511; (3) d-block 823 representing story B 512;
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`and (4) d-block 824 representing story C 513. Id. at 8:58–61. Figure 9 of
`
`the ’160 patent further illustrates that d-block 821 is structured in much the
`
`same way, pointing to a separate d-block for each component of story A 510.
`
`Id. at 4:28–29, 8:62–63, Fig. 9.
`
`
`
`Figure 7 of the ’160 patent, reproduced below, illustrates the
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`information provided by each d-block:
`
`
`As depicted in Figure 7, each d-block contains, inter alia, unique
`
`
`
`identifier 701 for the digital work in the repository, starting address 702 of
`
`the first byte of the work, length 703 representing the number of bytes in the
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`work, and rights portion 704, which maintains the work’s granted usage
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`rights and their status data. Id. at 8:29–36. “The rights portion 704 will
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`contain a data structure, such as a look-up table, wherein the various
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`information associated with a right is maintained.” Id. at 8:42–44.
`
`D.
`
`Illustrative Claims
`
`Claims 1 and 23 are independent. Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
`
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`IPR2015-00457
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`A computer readable medium having embedded
`1.
`
`thereon a digital work adapted to be distributed within in a
`system for controlling the use of digital works, said digital work
`comprising:
`
`
`
`a digital content portion that is renderable by a rendering
`device;
`
`
`
`a usage rights portion associated with said digital content
`portion and comprising one or more computer readable
`instructions configured to permit or prohibit said rendering
`device to render said digital content portion, said usage rights
`portion being expressed as statements from a usage rights
`language having a grammar defining a valid sequence of
`symbols, and specifying a manner of use relating to one or
`more purposes for which the digital work can be used by an
`authorized party; and
`
`
`
`a description structure comprising a plurality of
`description blocks, each of said description blocks comprising
`address information for a least one part of said digital work, and
`a usage rights part for associating one or more usage rights
`portions.
`
`
`E.
`
`Prior Art Relied Upon
`
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior-art references:
`
`Stefik ’980
`
`US 5,629,980
`
`May 13, 1997 (filed
`Nov. 23, 1994)
`
`Ex. 1023
`
`Kahn
`
`
`
`US 6,135,646
`
`Oct. 24, 2000
`
`Ex. 1018
`
`F.
`
`Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`
`Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable under
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and/or 103 based on the following specific grounds (Pet. 2,
`
` 6
`
`
`
`56–57):
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`IPR2015-00457
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`Reference[s]
`
`Basis
`
`Claims Challenged
`
`Stefik ’980
`
`§ 102
`
`1–11 and 23–29
`
`Stefik ’980 and Kahn
`
`§ 103
`
`1 and 10
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Claim Construction
`
`
`
`The ’160 patent has expired. See Ex. 1011, 1:6–11; 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 154(a)(2). The Board interprets claim terms in expired patents as would a
`
`district court, by applying the claim construction principles outlined in
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In re
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`Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Only those terms in
`
`controversy need to be constructed, and only to the extent necessary to
`
`resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this case, we determine that no express
`
`claim construction is required.
`
`B. Whether Stefik ’980 is Prior Art
`
`Stefik ’980 issued May 13, 1997 from an application filed November
`
`23, 1994. Ex. 1023, at [22], [45]. The ’160 patent issued May 29, 2007
`
`from an application filed December 17, 2001, and asserts entitlement to the
`
`November 23, 1994 filing date of a great-grandparent application. Ex. 1011,
`
`at [22], [45], [60]. Petitioner contends that the’160 patent is not entitled to
`
`an effective filing date earlier than its actual filing date, because its parent
`
`application, U.S. Application No. 09/778,001 (“the ’001 application”) does
`
`not adequately describe the ’160 patent claims as required by 35 U.S.C. §
`
` 7
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`
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`120.
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`Priority claims to an earlier-filed U.S. patent application must comply
`
`with 35 U.S.C. § 120, which requires the earlier application to disclose the
`
`later-filed claims in the manner provided by § 112 ¶ 1.1 Petitioner’s dispute
`
`concerns the written-description requirement of § 112 ¶ 1. Pet. 7–10. A
`
`written description adequately supports a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1
`
`when it “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
`
`possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad
`
`Pharma., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
`
`banc). Thus, the issue is whether the ’001 application reasonably conveys to
`
`a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors had possession of the
`
`claimed subject matter of the ’160 patent.2
`
`The burden is on Petitioner to show a reasonable likelihood that it
`
`would prevail on a ground of unpatentability. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). This
`
`burden includes, inter alia, showing that any reference on which it relies is
`
`prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d
`
`1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that accused infringer “bore the burden
`
`of persuasion . . . on all issues relating to the status of [the asserted
`
`reference] as prior art”). But a patent is not presumed to be entitled to the
`
`earlier filing dates of an ancestral application that does not share the same
`
`disclosure with the patent. Polaris Wireless, Inc. v. TruePosition, Inc., Case
`
`
`1 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”) redesignated 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 as 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(a) when the act took effect on September 16, 2012. Because the ‘160
`patent has a filing date prior to September 16, 2012, we refer to the pre-AIA
`version of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
`2 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion applies to all of the
`claims at issue.
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`IPR2013-00323, slip op. at 29 (Nov. 15, 2013) (Paper 9). When, as here,
`
`Petitioner identifies differences between the ancestral application and the
`
`patent that allegedly result in the ancestral application’s failing to provide
`
`adequate written-description support for the patent claims, Patent Owner
`
`bears the burden of going forward3 with evidence showing its entitlement to
`
`the earlier filing date. Id. This requires Patent Owner “to show not only the
`
`existence of the earlier applications, but why the written description in the
`
`earlier application supports the claim.” Tech. Lic. Corp., 545 F.3d at 1327.
`
`Petitioner argues that the ’001 application does not adequately
`
`describe the ’160 patent claims for three primary reasons. First, Petitioner
`
`contends that although the ’001 application discloses that usage rights are
`
`“attached to” digital works, and portrays such attachment as a ‘key feature’
`
`and ‘fundamental’ component” of the invention, the challenged claims are
`
`drawn more broadly to digital works comprising usage rights that are
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`“associated with” the content of digital works. Pet. 10–16, 27–28. Second,
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`Petitioner contends that although the ’001 application defines “digital work”
`
`as “digital information to which is attached usage rights,” the ’160 patent
`
`redefines “digital work” to omit this requirement and make usage rights
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`“optional.” Id. at 17. Third, Petitioner argues that even though the ’001
`
`application makes clear that the use of repositories is an “essential” element
`
`of the invention, and does not provide support for anything that does not
`
`require the use of repositories, the ’160 patent claims do not recite the use of
`
`
`3 The burden of “going forward with evidence—sometimes referred to as the
`burden of production— . . . mean[s] both producing additional evidence and
`presenting persuasive argument based on new evidence or evidence already
`of record.” Tech. Lic. Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed.
`Cir. 2008)
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`repositories. Pet. 23–27. Petitioner argues that under Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
`
`Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the ’001 application
`
`does not support the claims because of their failure to recite this essential
`
`element. Pet. 25–27.
`
`1.
`
`“Associated” vs. “Attached” Usage Rights
`
`Petitioner contends that the ’001 application, which describes usage
`
`rights as being “attached to” a digital work, does not provide adequate
`
`written-description support for the claims of the ’160 patent, which recite
`
`usage rights that are “associated with” the digital work’s contents. Pet. 10–
`
`16. Petitioner asserts that the ’001 application “portrays as a ‘key feature’
`
`and ‘fundamental’ component of its putative invention that usage rights are
`
`permanently attached to digital works.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1053, 16, 26)
`
`(emphasis omitted). According to Petitioner, the ’160 patent’s “depiction of
`
`usage rights as being ‘associated’ with rather than ‘attached to’ digital works
`
`significantly broadens this element of the invention.” Id. at 13. Therefore,
`
`the ’001 application’s purportedly narrower disclosure of usage rights that
`
`are “attached to” digital works does provide adequate written-description
`
`support for the ’160 patent claims. Id.
`
`In opposition, Patent Owner contends that when the ’001 application
`
`uses the term “attached,” it “does not mean a literal permanent attachment as
`
`argued by Apple, [rather] ‘attachment’ is a metaphor for a logical
`
`association.” Prelim. Resp. 27. In support of this argument Patent Owner
`
`notes that “when the ’001 application states a ‘key feature of the present
`
`invention is that usage rights are permanently ‘attached’ to the digital work’
`
`(Ex. 1053 at 16), the term ‘attached’ is put into quotation marks.” Id. at 25–
`
`26. Patent Owner further observes that in the preferred embodiment
`
`
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`10
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`described by the ’001 application, usage rights that are “attached to” a digital
`
`work are actually stored in a separate file from the contents. Id. (citing Ex.
`
`1053, 22–23, Figs. 5–7). According to Patent Owner, “Figures 5 and 6
`
`illustrate the digital work of the preferred embodiment separate and distinct
`
`from any fees or usage rights[, and] Figure 7 illustrates the ‘attachment’
`
`between the usage rights file and the contents file of the preferred
`
`embodiment consisting of an address or pointer that associates the usage
`
`rights file with the work.” Id. at 27 (citing Ex. 1053, 22–23, Figs. 5–7).
`
`Thus, Patent Owner disputes that the term “attached to” as used in the
`
`’001 application is narrower than “associated with,” and therefore relies on
`
`those excerpts from the ’001 application that discuss usage rights that are
`
`“attached to” digital works to provide sufficient written description support
`
`for the claim limitation reciting usage rights “associated with” digital work
`
`contents. Patent Owner has met its burden of coming forward with evidence
`
`on this point. Although the terms “attached to” and “associated with” are
`
`different, a difference in terminology does not establish a difference in
`
`scope. See Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294,
`
`1303–04 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that amending claim term “remote
`
`location beyond the range of direct visual contact” to read “remote location
`
`beyond the range of direct manual contact” did not broaden the scope of the
`
`claim); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 969 (CCPA 1971) (stating that
`
`“invention claimed does not have to be described in ipsis verbis in order to
`
`satisfy the description requirement of § 112”).
`
`Moreover, as Patent Owner argues, the ’001 application’s placement
`
`of quotation marks around “attached” suggests that it is using the term
`
`metaphorically. One usually thinks of “to attach” as referring to the joining
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`together of physical objects, but usage rights and digital works exist only as
`
`digital information or files. The ’001 application does not define, expressly,
`
`what it means to “attach” digital files together. The application makes clear
`
`only what it does not mean: combining usage rights and digital work
`
`contents into a single file. As Patent Owner notes, in the preferred
`
`embodiment described by the ’001 application, a digital work is divided into
`
`two separate files, one file containing the “contents” of the digital work, and
`
`the other file—a “description tree” file—containing the usage rights. Ex.
`
`1053, 22. Therefore, because “attached” in this context does not mean
`
`combined into the same file, the record supports Patent Owner’s position
`
`that “attached” refers to an “association” of usage rights and digital works,
`
`which Patent Owner asserts is depicted in Figure 7. Prelim. Resp. 7.
`
`Petitioner makes two arguments in support of its position that the
`
`“attached to” disclosure is narrower than the “associated with” claim
`
`limitation. First, Petitioner contends that usage rights can be “associated
`
`with a digital work, yet be stored in a different repository than the repository
`
`in which the digital work is stored,” whereas usage rights that are “attached
`
`to” a digital work, as described by the ’001 application, must be stored
`
`together with the digital work in the same repository. Pet. 14–15. Petitioner
`
`apparently bases this contention on the fact that claim 10 of the ’160 patent
`
`recites that the “digital content portion” and the “usage rights portion” of the
`
`digital work are stored on different physical devices. Id. at 15. Petitioner
`
`acknowledges that the ’001 application describes just such a configuration,
`
`but asserts that the ’001 application makes clear that the two storage devices
`
`are part of “a single storage system that is within a single repository.” Id. at
`
`15–16 (citing Ex. 1053, 32–33) (emphasis omitted).
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`We do not find this argument persuasive. We have reviewed the ’160
`
`patent and found nothing that teaches or suggests that usage rights can be
`
`associated with digital work contents and yet be stored in a different
`
`repository than the contents. Further, as Petitioner acknowledges, the ’001
`
`application describes the configuration recited in claim 10, i.e., one in which
`
`the usage rights and the contents of the digital work are stored on different
`
`physical devices. Ex. 1053, 32. Although the ’001 application makes clear
`
`that these two physical devices are contained in a single repository, the ’160
`
`patent does so as well. In fact, the same language in the ’001 application on
`
`which Petitioner relies to make this point appears in the ’160 patent.
`
`Compare Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1053, 32–33), with Ex. 1011, 12:37–39, 54–
`
`64.
`
`Second, Petitioner contends that the ’001 application “differentiates
`
`‘attachment’ of usage rights from the more general and informal concept of
`
`‘association’” in the following excerpt:
`
`Assuming that a session can be established, Repository 2 may
`then request access to the Digital Work for a stated purpose,
`i.e., manner of use step 104. . . . Repository 1 checks the usage
`rights associated with the digital work to determine if the
`access to the digital work may be granted, step 105. The check
`of the usage rights essentially involves a determination of
`whether a right associated with the access request [from
`Repository 2] has been attached to the digital work and if all
`conditions associated with the right are satisfied.
`
`Id. at 12–13 (quoting Ex. 1053, 17) (bracketed material in original)
`
`(emphasis modified). We do not read this excerpt as differentiating
`
`“attached to” from “associated with.” Instead, the excerpt appears to use the
`
`terms interchangeably. It discusses, for example checking usage rights
`
`“associated with” the digital work, which involves determining whether a
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`right associated with the access request has been “attached to” the digital
`
`work. Thus, “associated with” and “attached to” refer to the same
`
`relationship between usage rights and a digital work.
`
`2.
`
`Alleged Redefinition by the ’160 patent of “Digital
`Work”
`
`Petitioner argues that although the ’001 application defines “digital
`
`work” as “digital information to which is attached usage rights,” the ’160
`
`patent redefines “digital work” to omit this requirement and make usage
`
`rights “optional.” Pet. 17 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner also contends that
`
`the ’160 patent “recasts ‘content’ from being the digital work itself (i.e., the
`
`‘raw bits’ representing the digital work) as is expressly stated in the ’001
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`application to being simply something derived from rendering of a digital
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`work (i.e., information obtained by rendering the digital work).” Id. at 17–
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`18 (emphasis omitted). Finally, Petitioner asserts that the ’160 patent
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`“redefines ‘usage rights’ to omit the requirement that each usage right
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`specify one manner of use of the digital work, changing this requirement to
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`be simply an “indication” of a manner by which a digital work can be used
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`or distributed.” Id. at 20.
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`We do not find this argument persuasive. Setting aside the question
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`whether the ’160 patent does, in fact, redefine these terms in any meaningful
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`way, we note that the Petitioner’s argument is based on the comparison of
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`the ’001 application with the ’160 patent’s Specification. Our inquiry,
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`however, requires a comparison of the ’001 application with the ’160
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`patent’s claims, to determine whether the former provides to the latter
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`adequate written-description support under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. Petitioner’s
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`argument is not particularly relevant to this inquiry. For example, even if
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`the ’160 patent Specification suggests that usage rights may be an optional
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`components of a digital work—and we are not convinced that a person of
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`ordinary skill, reading the Specification as a whole, would reach this
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`conclusion—the claims are drawn expressly to digital works comprising
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`usage rights.
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`3.
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`Claims Do Not Require Repositories
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`Finally, Petitioner argues that the claims do not require repositories,
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`the use of which the ’001 application makes clear is an “essential” element
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`of the invention. Pet. 23–27. Petitioner argues that under Gentry Gallery,
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`Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the ’001
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`application would not support these claims because of their failure to recite
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`this essential element. Id. at 25–27.
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`In opposition, Patent Owner asserts that “the ’160 patent’s claims are
`
`not directed to a repository, so [Petitioner’s] argument that an ‘essential
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`element is missing is misplaced.” Prelim. Resp. 35. Patent Owner contends
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`that claims 1 and 23 “recite a structure for the digital work itself, comprising
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`content, usage rights, and a description structure,” and that Petitioner “is
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`trying to force another and separately inventive aspect of the Stefik system,
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`the handling of a digital work by and among repositories, into claims to the
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`structure of the digital work itself.”
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`We are not persuaded that the absence of a specific limitation directed
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`to the use of repositories means that the ’001 application fails to provide
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`written-description support for the ’160 patent claims. Our reviewing court
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`has stated that “it is not necessary that a claim recite each and every element
`
`needed for the practical utilization of the claimed subject matter, as it is
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`entirely appropriate, and consistent with § 112, to present claims to only one
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`aspect.” Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1991) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Patent
`
`Owner argues that claims are directed to one aspect of its invention—digital
`
`works comprising content, usage rights, and a description structure—and not
`
`to another aspect of its invention, the handling of a digital work by and
`
`among repositories.” It stands to reason, therefore, that the claims do not
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`recite, expressly, the use of repositories.
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`C.
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`Petitioner’s Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
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`Petitioner has not persuaded us that Stefik ‘980 qualifies as prior art
`
`such that it could be used in a ground raised under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103
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`in an inter partes review of the ‘’160 patent. See U.S.C. § 311(b).
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`Consequently, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing
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`on its proposed grounds of unpatentability, both of which rely, at least in
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`part, on Stefik ‘980.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`We determine that the Petition fails to show that there is a reasonable
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`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the
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`claims challenged in the Petition
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`IV. ORDER
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`For the reasons given, it is
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`
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`
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`ORDERED that the Petition is denied and no trial is instituted.
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`IPR2015-00457
`Patent 7,225,160 B2
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`PETITIONER:
`
`Jeffrey P. Kushan
`Michael Franzinger
`iprnotices@sidley.com
`
`PATENT OWNER:
`
`Nicholas T. Peters
`ntpete@fitcheven.com
`
`Timothy P. Maloney
`tpmalo@fitcheven.com
`
`Robert A. Cote
`rcote@mckoolsmith.com
`
`
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