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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01520
`Patent 8,559,635 B1
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: October 26, 2017
`____________
`
`
`ORDER
`Amended Trial Hearing
`37 C.F.R. § 42.70
`
`
`
`
`Before KARL D. EASTHOM, KEVIN F. TURNER, and GEORGIANNA
`W. BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01520
`Patent 8,559,635 B1
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`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`MARCUS E. SERNEL, ESQUIRE
`Kirkland & Ellis LLP
`300 North LaSalle Street
`1300 I Street, N.W.
`Chicago, IL 60654
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`DOUGLAS J. KLINE, ESQUIRE
`Goodwin Proctor LLP
`100 Northern Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Thursday, October
`
`26, 2017, at 1 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Madison
`Building East, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
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`Case IPR2016-01520
`Patent 8,559,635 B1
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`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Welcome to the Patent Trial & Appeal Board.
`This is IPR2016-01520, U.S. patent No. 8,559,635, Personalized Media
`Communications LLC v. Apple, Inc. We have Judge Braden in Dallas and
`Judge Turner over to the – on the screen. He’s in San Jose. So if you would
`just remember when you’re speaking to try to reference the slide numbers.
`We have some slidesin this case.
`Why don’t we start out with introducing yourselves for the record, and
`start with Petitioner, please.
`MR. SERNEL: Your Honors, my name is Marc Sernel. I represent
`Apple. With me today is Joel Merken (phonetic) –
`JUDGE BRADEN: I’m sorry, counselor. Could we remind you to
`please go to the podium and please speak into the microphone for the remote
`judges.
`MR. SERNEL: My apologies. My name is Marc Sernel. I represent
`Petitioner Apple Incorporated. With me today are Joel Merken and Alan
`Rabinowitz.
`MR. KLINE: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name is Doug
`Kline. I represent Personalized Media Communications, LLC, the Patent
`Owner in this matter. With me are Steve Schreiner, Fong Den (phonetic),
`Tom Scott, Jennifer Albert. Thank you.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Welcome. Okay. Just a couple of
`preliminaries. We’ve scheduled 45 minutes per side. We understand
`Petitioner – well Patent Owner raised an issue with respect to another
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`proceeding IPR2016-00754, I believe claims 4, 7 and 13 in that case where -
`- in a final written decision so it raises a 315 issue here and I understand the
`Parties want to address that issue preliminarily or do you want to wait until -
`- I think, why don’t we just get that over with. It looks like Petitioner, from
`your slides, it looks like you’re not going to discuss those here; is that
`correct?
`MR. SERNEL: That’s correct. We don’t intend to present any
`argument with respect to those three claims.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay. And Patent Owner?
`MR. KLINE: We should be able to accomplish the same thing, Your
`Honor.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay.
`MR. KLINE: Thanks.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Thank you. So are you going to withdraw your
`motion to –
`MR. KLINE: Well no. I mean we think they should be dismissed
`from the case, from this proceeding, and I understand that the request to file
`the motion came in recently so it hasn’t been able to -- the Board hasn’t been
`able to consider it and resolve it yet today, but I think for purposes of this
`hearing I don’t think it’s going to influence significantly how this hearing
`proceeds. But we would like to file the motion because we do think those
`claims should be dismissed from this proceeding.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: It’s Mr. Kline, right?
`MR. KLINE: Yes, I’m sorry, yes.
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`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay, okay. Mr. Kline, I understand your
`argument.
`MR. KLINE: Right.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: The way I think the panel views it is that
`Petitioner cannot proceed on those claims but we’ve gone so far now that --
`and because Petitioner can’t proceed, they can’t maintain it -- they’re not
`going to present argument here and that’s their view of it.
`MR. KLINE: Right.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: I think that’s a reasonable view. So we can go
`ahead and proceed on those claims --
`MR. KLINE: Right.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: -- and the way we look at it without any more
`input from Petitioner on them. But you’re free to make an argument if you
`want to about your motion and then we’ll entertain it probably later.
`MR. KLINE: Sure. I mean the argument I would make about the
`motion is the Statute provides that when the claims are subject to a final
`written decision, they’re -- Petitioner is estopped from proceeding here, so --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay.
`MR. KLINE: -- that’s the argument.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: I understand. Thank you, Mr. Kline.
`MR. KLINE: Right, thank you.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay.
`JUDGE BRADEN: Actually, Judge Easthom, I have a question for
`the Patent Owner. Looking at the Rule it specifically says that Petitioner
`may not maintain the claims within the IPR proceeding. Do you have
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`anything to support your argument saying that the Board itself could not
`maintain the claims within the proceeding?
`MR. KLINE: I do not off the top of my head, Your Honor.
`JUDGE BRADEN: All right. Thank you very much.
`MR. KLINE: Thank you.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Okay. So, Mr. Sernel, are you going to proceed
`with --
`MR. SERNEL: Yes, Your Honor, and I’d like to reserve I think ten
`minutes for rebuttal, and I also have for people here hard copies of the slides
`if that would be helpful?
`JUDGE EASTHOM: That would help me at least.
`MR. SERNEL: May I approach?
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Please, please.
`
`(Counsel approached the bench.)
`MR. SERNEL: May I proceed, Your Honor?
`JUDGE EASTHOM: Please do. Thank you.
`MR. SERNEL: And certainly Judges Braden and Turner, please
`interrupt at any time. I sometimes go quickly but I certainly welcome any
`questions and please interrupt me when you have a question.
`In terms of this proceeding, there are the following instituted grounds.
`This is slide 1. As we’ve greyed out here and as we just discussed, I don’t
`intend to address claims 4, 7 and 13 which were already found unpatentable
`in the 754 proceeding. I plan to focus on claims 3, 18, 20, 32 and 33 and the
`arguments with respect to Campbell and Chandra and the related arguments.
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`So this is the 635 patent. The Board is very familiar with the PMC
`patent family and in particular the 635 patent. Again, these are a set of pre-
`GATT filed applications that date back to priority applications file in the
`1981 and then in the 1987 time frame. One of the key issues in this
`proceeding is whether the claims at issue are entitled to 1981 priority or not
`and I will discuss that in detail in a few minutes.
`Just to set the stage, again here’s the implicated claims. Not going to
`touch 2, 4, 7 or 13, 2 was actually disclaimed back as a result of the 754
`proceeding, 4, 7, and 13 we talked about. I’m going to focus on the
`remaining five claims.
`So the disputed issues that we will just tackle here today, there are
`issues relating to the priority date and several issues there that we will
`discuss. In terms of claim construction there are some issues that have been
`briefed with respect to claim construction but as we’ll talk about in a few
`minutes, I think many of those have been dealt with or the main ones have
`already been dealt with in the 754 proceeding. We’ll then move into the
`prior art and, as I said, Campbell and Chandra being the focus, and then I’ll
`spend probably a few minutes on PMC’s motion to amend at the end.
`So moving onto slide 5, this just sets forth the different issues with
`respect to the priority date and you can see we’ve identified the claims that
`each issue pertains to. I’m going to focus mostly on programming which
`has already been dealt with, and then the fourth issue there is probably the
`main issue that will get the most attention at this hearing which relates to
`claims 18, 20, 32 and 33.
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`JUDGE TURNER: Counsel, before you go on, while you’re on slide
`5, let me ask you a quick question. I’m assuming you’re acquainted with
`our IPR 2016 754 with respect to the same patent?
`MR. SERNEL: Yes, absolutely.
`JUDGE TURNER: Okay. And in terms of the arguments here with
`respect to priority date, are there any that are subsequently different or can
`you highlight -- I mean I’m assuming -- I’ll probably ask the same question
`of the Patent owner -- but are there any things here that are particularly
`different between those two so you’ve already considered a lot of these
`arguments with respect to priority date?
`MR. SERNEL: So I think the issues, and going back to slide 5, the
`issues 2, 4 and 5 are different, have not been tackled directly in the 754
`proceeding. Issue 1 with respect to programming has been dealt with in
`detail in the 754 proceeding and so I think that one I’m not going to spend a
`lot of time on. I think that’s already been dealt with.
`JUDGE TURNER: Okay. Thank you.
`MR. SERNEL: So moving on to slide 6, and again I don’t want to
`spend a lot of time on this because the Board is familiar with this issue and
`has already dealt with this issue. This is the issue of whether the 1981
`specification, and we usually shorthand that by referring to the 490 patent
`which reflects what was in the 1981 specification, whether the 1981
`specification provides written description support for the concept of
`programming as that term was defined in a much broader sense in the 1987
`specification. Again, this has been dealt with and you can see there at the
`bottom of slide 6 we call out Exhibit 1082 which is the final written decision
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`in the 755 proceeding which actually related to a different patent, the 091
`patent, but it was the same exact issue, same exact specification, question
`being is this concept of programming described in 1981 and the decision
`was it was not. And then it was also dealt with in a similar fashion in the
`1527 proceeding, that’s Exhibit 1037 at page 34.
`And so, again, I think PMC is estopped from challenging that analysis
`and that decision from the 755 proceeding. I believe this is decided and it’s
`decided that programming is not described in 1981 and so claim 3 and the
`other claims 4 and 7 are not entitled to 1981 priority date on that basis.
`I’d like to skip ahead now to slide 10 and I’d like to focus on, and this
`is one of the new issues that’s presented by the claims in this proceeding,
`and that is this concept of encrypted digital information transmission
`unaccompanied by any non-digital information transmission. And so this
`term appears in 18, 20, 32 and 33 and where I’d like to start with this is to
`first say, there is not any kind of explicit express mention of anything like
`this limitation in the 1981 specification. These words, or anything like it,
`appear nowhere in the 1981 specification. This is something that was sort of
`manufactured, concocted over the decades of prosecution and is something
`that found its way into the claims, but you can look far and wide in the 1981
`specification and find nothing like these words.
`So what we have here and what the issues that are presented to the
`Board are that PMC has had to try to rummage through different
`embodiments to try to say even though this is not expressly there, this is not
`explicitly called out, try to find this concept of encrypted digital information
`transmission unaccompanied by any non-digital information transmission,
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`try to find that somewhere in the disclosure, and we’re going to go through
`four different embodiments where they try to find different pieces and make
`different arguments to try to find this. And I think it’s important to keep in
`mind as we go through this analysis what the law says is what’s required to
`show written description when you’re looking at a limitation and you’re
`trying to find it in a priority document.
`You can see here we’ve called out, and these are some of the cases
`cited in our briefs, the first one there is the Hyatt v. Boone case which makes
`the point that it’s -- the fact that you might be able to construct what is now
`claimed in the claims is not enough. It has to be unambiguously described
`and all limitations need to be unambiguously described in order to establish
`that there’s written description. You can look at the Lockwood v. Am.
`Airlines, Inc., case that’s down at the bottom left of slide 10. The point there
`is it’s not enough to say well, even though it’s not described, it’s not in this
`embodiment, it would be obvious to make this change. It would be obvious
`to implement it this way even though it’s not there. That’s not enough for
`written description either, to show that you’ve possessed the invention is not
`enough to say oh, this would be an obvious change or it would be obvious to
`combine one embodiment with another. That’s not enough.
`It’s also not enough, and this is the Novozymes A/S v. DuPoint
`Nutrition Biosciences APS case from the Federal Circuit, to go through and
`try to pluck -- and these are the words from the Novozyme court -- saying
`derive written description support from an amalgamum of disclosure
`plucked selectively from an application. You can’t go and find bits and
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`pieces in different embodiments and say, okay, with hindsight I’m going to
`construct this claim limitation or this claim from what’s in the disclosure.
`So that’s -- I think when we go through this you’re going to see that’s
`PMC has to do because they don’t have any express disclosure of this
`limitation, they don’t have a single embodiment that discloses it and so what
`they’re doing is exactly what these cases say you can’t do, to find written
`description in the 1981 specification.
`So moving on now to slide 11, this sets forth what PMC tries to point
`to point to find support for this encrypted digital information transmission
`unaccompanied by any non-digital information transmission limitation, and
`again PMC can’t find explicit disclosure, they can’t even find a specific
`embodiment to say okay, this is my all digital encrypted transmission
`embodiment, let’s focus on this particular embodiment, this is where you can
`find it. What they have in their brief is essentially four different arguments -
`- okay, if one doesn’t work let’s try the next one -- and so they walk through
`four different embodiments in the 1981 specification to try to find this
`support that, quite frankly, simply isn’t there.
`And at times I’ll point out in their brief it gets confusing because there
`are times when they’re talking about one of the embodiments but then
`they’ll mix and match and say okay, well but you can take this thing from
`the 6D embodiment and put it into 6C, that sort of thing. so you’ve got to
`read very carefully their brief and I know when I’ve gone through it you
`have to be very careful and look back and look at their citations to make sure
`wait, are we still talking about the embodiment that they say they’re talking
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`about or are they trying to insert something in from another embodiment to
`try to fill a gap or a hole.
`What we’re going to do, and we’re going to walk through each of
`these in sequence, is none of these embodiments you’re going to see are
`described in the 1981 specification and there’s sort of two main
`requirements. It’s got to be digital only. It can’t have any analog
`information as part of the information transmission, and it’s got to contain
`encrypted digital information and so we’re going to see or go through and
`see how none of these embodiments meet those two basic requirements. All
`four of them fail in one or both of those grounds.
`One thing I’ll also mention is it’s been kind of an iterative process
`where they try to search for finding this description. In their preliminary
`response they didn’t even mention, for example, the telephone link. It was
`more focused on an example they don’t even put forth in their response and
`in the How to Grow Grass example they’ve sort of continued to add things
`to say well, let’s try this now and see if we can find it. None of them have it.
`I’ve now moved on to slide 12 and slide 12 deals with the first
`argument to find written description and that’s this description of a
`telephone link, and so with respect to the telephone transmission there’s not
`a detailed discussion of a particular embodiment using a telephone
`transmission, but there are mentions of telephone transmissions. But at
`every point where there’s a mention of telephone transmission, you will
`never find any disclosure or description of any encrypted information
`transmission being sent over a telephone transmission.
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`What you will find is every time they talk about the telephone link
`embodiment, or this telephone link argument, they always have to then point
`to a cable TV transmission, a television transmission, to try to find any kind
`of communication of encrypted information and so this telephone
`transmission argument fails because it never shows sending an encrypted
`transmission -- encrypted digital information -- over a telephone link. It fails
`on that basis. And you can see here we’ve called out a couple of examples.
`These are things in their brief where they try to find the aspect that’s
`encrypted in transmission and you can see, for example, in the 490 patent,
`this is Exhibit 1004 at column 50 and 11 and 19, they’re always pointing to
`something where it’s talking about television transmission, television
`programming, not telephone transmission, and so they’re mixing and
`matching embodiments, that’s improper. The telephone link embodiment
`doesn’t do it for them.
`If we turn now to slide 13, and you can see here I’ve got the little
`bubbles. This argument or this problem with PMC’s arguments actually
`relates to both their second and third embodiments that they try to point to.
`Both of those are cable TV transmission embodiments and so the same
`problem, first problem with those, applies to both and that problem is that
`you can see here, this is figure 6C and figure 6D side by side from the 490
`patent, Exhibit 1004, and you can see that the input, the transmission that
`comes into both of these is a multi-channel cable transmission. And so
`you’re always going to have, as part of both of these, a multi-channel cable
`transmission which is always going to have analog channels as part of it at
`the very least as well as it will be transmitted over an analog transmission
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`medium, and so for sort of two reasons there’s always going to be analog or
`non-digital information accompanying anything that might be sent as part of
`this transmission. So, for that reason, both of these arguments Nos. 2 and 3 -
`- which relate to figure 6C and figure 6D -- both of them fail.
`If I can now move ahead to slide 14, you can see here that you don’t
`have to rely on me for that, we can look at what PMC’s own arguments and
`what PMC’s expert has said about these transmissions and you can see on
`the left of slide 14 -- this is paper 17, PMC’s response at 31 to 32 and then
`35 -- where they’re talking about this multi-channel cable transmission that’s
`sort of the input for figure 6C and figure 6D and you can see it’s multiple
`channels of data, at least one of which is a digital data channel. So if it was
`enough to have one digital data channel, the problem is they’re going to
`have other channels that are going to be analog channels that will
`accompany that digital information and so it fails to meet what’s required
`here by this limitation where there can be no analog or non-digital
`information as part of it.
`The second piece of this you can see below, this is that it talks about
`cable converter box 222 tunes to one channel of several available channels
`and it’s talking about -- this is, we’re getting ahead of ourselves, but this is
`the French Chef, the Julia Child embodiment, this is the figure 6D
`embodiment -- but it talks about how one way that’s described in the
`specification of doing that is to send an all digital recipe embedded in an
`analog NTSC transmission, and so even when you’re sending digital
`information as part of these embodiments it’s going to be sent in the
`conventional way that television wat transmitted in 1981, in an analog
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`NTSC transmission. You can see here on the right PMC’s expert admits
`unequivocally that anything transmitted as an NTSC compliant television
`transmission, as was done in 1981, would necessarily not satisfy the 635
`patent claim requirement for digital information transmission
`unaccompanied by any non-digital information transmission. He agrees
`with that.
`Put another way, there was no way to send any kind of conventional
`NTSC compliant television transmission without containing some kind of
`analog information with it. There were analog synchronization signals that
`would always be part of that transmission, thus excluding it from tying up
`with what’s required by the claim language in claims 18, 20, 32 and 33.
`JUDGE EASTHOM: I didn’t understand your argument on your slide
`on the left when you were talking about multiple channels of data, at least
`one of which is a digital data channel. Is that testimony by the expert or is
`that in the spec? I don’t see it in the spec.
`MR. SERNEL: So this is PMC’s response characterizing what’s
`going on in the figure 6C embodiment and so I flipped back just like 13 --
`JUDGE EASTHOM: If one of them is only -- if one of them is digital
`channel, it seems to be a fair argument that that’s not accompanying another
`channel of information.
`MR. SERNEL: Well you can see here that the input to figure 6C is a
`multi-channel cable transmission. So this is a transmission that contains
`multiple channels. Even if one of them is digital, it is going to be
`accompanied by other channels that are analog and so I think on that basis it
`fails.
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`Now even if it was a multi-channel, you know, all digital channels
`cable transmission I would still say that that would fail because that would
`be -- even though the channels may be digital -- they would be transmitted in
`an analog form with analog synchronization signals. That’s how it was done
`in 1981, and so it would fail on that additional basis as well.
`So there’s always going to be analog information either in the form of
`other channels or in the form of analog synchronization signals as part of
`any transmission done in this time frame. You can see here their expert, and
`this is Exhibit 1051, Weaver transcript at page 22, lines 6 to 13 -- I’m back
`on slide 14 -- admitting that.
`So figures 6C and 6D are sort of their second and third embodiments
`as I’ve grouped them fail on that basis right out of the starting block. Now
`let’s talk about another basis for which they fail and let’s look specifically at
`the Wall Street Week example, and that’s the figure 6C example. You can
`see this one has a problem in addition to losing on the all digital
`requirement. Even though it’s got that one digital data channel, there’s
`nothing in the Wall Street Week example that says anything about sending
`an encrypted transmission over that digital data channel. Not a breath of it,
`and again you can -- all we need to do is look at what PMC’s expert agreed,
`this is Exhibit 1051 again at page 44, lines 2 to 10 -- where he agrees
`nothing in the Wall Street Week example that says anything about sending
`anything encrypted over that digital data channel that’s mentioned. So that’s
`another reason why the Wall Street Week example fails.
`Now let’s look at another reason why the Julia Child or French Chef
`embodiment fails. You can see here, this is figure 6D, and in figure 6D --
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`different than figure 6C -- there’s not even a mention of an all digital data
`channel or, sorry, a digital data channel. In figure 6C, the Wall Street Week,
`at least at least they’ve got the one digital data channel. That doesn’t even
`appear in figure 6D and this is an issue that, again, all of this wasn’t
`addressed by the Board but this issue was addressed, to some extent, in the
`755 proceeding and you can see at the bottom left of slide 16, this is Exhibit
`1082 of 755 written decision at page 13, where the Board walked through
`the French Chef embodiment and concluded these 490 patent passages do
`not describe the transmissions as all digital and so I think this is an issue
`that’s already been analyzed, addressed and it’s been concluded that French
`Chef or Julia Child -- those are sort of synonymous terms -- does not
`disclose any all digital transmission. It fails for that additional reason.
`One argument that was made -- I don’t want to spend a lot of time on
`this, but this is slide 17 -- PMC’s expert made an argument about well, I
`don’t see things that suggest that, and this is back to the figure 6C -- the
`cable converter box, there’s nothing specifically disclosed there that
`suggests that you’re going to take something and have to demodulate it off
`of a signal and because that’s not there, I then assume that this must be
`coming in all digital form into the system. I think it just technically doesn’t
`make any sense, I would just direct the Board’s attention to Exhibit 1053,
`this is Mr. Wechselberger’s declaration at paragraph 6 that explains how the
`premise is incorrect, how these systems would work and how it absolutely
`would be the case that it would be sent over an analog transmission medium
`and just because there’s not specific boxes there showing that it’s
`demodulated that would be required and necessary to make this system
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`work. I’ll just quickly mention that in terms of being an expert in television,
`Mr. Wechselberger has extensive experience and worked in the industry in
`the early ‘80’s in this cable television industry. PMC’s expert you can see
`there on the right, not really an expert -- more of a decryption person -- not
`really an expert in the television area, maybe explaining why this argument
`was made.
`If I could now move on to slide 18. This is the fourth embodiment
`that PMC tries to find this limitation of encrypted digital information
`transmission unaccompanied by the non-digital information transmission.
`This one relates to -- a reference to a conventional laser video disk and
`essentially what’s going on here is it’s sort of a virtual bookstore type
`concept and using this conventional laser video disk equipment and then
`transmitting electronic books from that equipment, and so PMC’s argument
`on this one is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would look at the
`reference to conventional laser video disk and immediately conclude oh, that
`must be an all digital system and then sort of extend that to say okay,
`because it must be an all digital system that this somehow provides written
`description support for this limitation.
`I’ll start by pointing out Exhibit 1051 again. This is on the bottom
`right of slide 18 PMC’s expert at 66 lines 9 to 12, acknowledging that in
`1981 conventional laser video disk systems could be an analog storage and
`transmission systems, you know, straight up admits that. So then the
`question becomes okay, well would a person of ordinary skill in the art
`looking at what’s in the 490 patent at column 21, lines 9 to 15, conclude that
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`this must be an all digital system as is required. We’re going to see the
`answer to that is an emphatic no.
`So I’ve moved on to slide 19 and you can see here this is some of the
`evidence in the record. On the left is Exhibit 1048. This is the Kenney
`reference at pages 329 and 330 talking about video disk systems from the
`1981 time frame talking about them being NTSC television standard
`compliant which was, again, an analog transmission standard. We can see
`here on the right of slide 19 Exhibit 1047, this is the Marsh reference at page
`2 talking about optical video disk reflective laser systems. You can see that
`these were available for prices in the 1981 time frame and talk about how
`they were based with -- they had an analog FM signal encoded. This was an
`analog system.
`So PMC then makes an argument and actually points to this Marsh
`reference and said well, in that Marsh 1981 reference there’s actually
`another system mentioned and that is a system called an optical digital disk
`system and suggests that that is somehow the system that must have been
`referred to when the 490 patent mentions a conventional laser video disk
`system well known in the art. But you can see here we asked Dr. Weaver,
`PMC’s expert, some questions about this and this is from page 77, lines 8 to
`12, and pages 80 and 81 of the Weaver transcript, Exhibit 1051, where he
`acknowledged that that Marsh reference describes two different systems, one
`being this optical digital disk system and a different one that is the
`consumer video disk system, and then he acknowledges the consumer video
`disk system is an analog system.
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`And so, if we move on we can look at -- and this is slide 21 and this is
`another call out from the Marsh reference. The thing that PMC points to,
`this optical digital disk technology, you can see the Marsh reference itself
`and this is at page 14 of Exhibit 1047, acknowledges that no computer
`manufacturer is known to have integrated that system at that time in 1981
`and so asking Dr. Weaver, PMC’s expert, this is on the bottom at page 75 of
`Exhibit 1051, saying wait a second, is something that hasn’t even been
`integrated or launched or commercially available at the filing date of 1981,
`would that be conventional technology? I don’t know. But he clearly
`acknowledges that the analog laser video disk system was available in
`November 1981. That was conventional technology.
`So, again, the question is when there’s a reference without mentioning
`it being digital, audio, or analog or whatever in the 490 specification where
`it says a conventional laser video disk system well known in the art. We can
`see the contemporaneous literature when it talks about laser video disk
`systems, th
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