UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`___________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`
`
`BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED and
`BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`PACKERS PLUS ENERGY SERVICES INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
`___________________
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`
`
`
`
`EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE RAPID COMPLETIONS LLC’S
`RESPONSE TO PETIONER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`___________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`
`
`BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED and
`BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`PACKERS PLUS ENERGY SERVICES INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
`___________________
`
`
`
`
`
`EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE RAPID COMPLETIONS LLC’S
`RESPONSE TO PETIONER’S MOTION FOR JOINDER
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
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`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
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`
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`B.
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`C.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS’ STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS . 2
`II.
`III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW ................................................................................... 2
`IV. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 6
`A.
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Joinder Would Increase
`Efficiency for the Board or the Parties. ................................................. 6
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Joinder Would Not Prejudice
`Rapid Completions. ............................................................................... 9
`Petitioners’ Motion Should Be Denied as an Improper Attempt to
`Circumvent Statutory Safeguards. ...................................................... 10
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Their Motion is Authorized
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). ................................................................... 12
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 14
`
`
`D.
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`V.
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`- i -
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`Table of Authorities
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`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
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`
`Cases
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`Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation, Ltd.,
`
`Case IPR2013-00250, Paper 4 (PTAB Apr. 19, 2013) ................................... 2
`
`Compare Skyhawke Technologies, LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLC,
`IPR2014–01485, Paper 13 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) ....................................... 13
`
`
`Heckler v. Chaney
`470 U.S. 821 (1985)......................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Killip v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.
`
`991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .......................................................... 13
`
`Lyng v. Payne
`
`476 U.S. 926 (1986)....................................................................................... 13
`
`Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc.
`
`IPR2014-1409 Paper 14 (PTAB Feb. 18, 2015) ............................................. 4
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.
`
`Case IPR2013-00109, Paper 15 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2014) .................................. 3
`
`NetApp, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC
`
`IPR2013-00319, Paper 18 (July 22, 2013) ...................................................... 3
`
`NetApp, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC
`
`IPR2013-00319, Paper 18 (PTAB July 22, 2013) ........................................... 8
`
`Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. NOxBOX Limited
`
`IPR2016-00781, Paper 10 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2016) ........................................ 11
`
`Reloaded Games, Inc. v. Parallel Networks LLC
`
`IPR2014-00950, Paper 12 (PTAB Oct. 22, 2014) ........................................... 5
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC
`
`IPR2015-820, Paper 12 (PTAB May 15, 2015) .............................................. 4
`
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`-ii-
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP
`
`IPR2015-555, Paper 20 (PTAB June 19, 2015) .............................................. 4
`
`Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.
`
`IPR2014–00508, Paper 28 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2015) ........................................ 13
`
`Toyota Motor Corp. v. American Vehicular Sciences LLC
`
`IPR2015-00262, Paper 10 (PTAB Jan. 29, 2015) ........................................... 4
`
`Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc.
`
`Case IPR2015-01423, Paper 7 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2015) .................................... 5
`
`Unilever Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble
`
`IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 (PTAB July 7, 2014) ............................................. 9
`
`US Endontics, LLC v. Gold Standard Instruments, LLC
`
`IPR2015-01476, Paper 13 (PTAB Oct. 26, 2015) ........................................... 5
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(c) ..................................................................................................... 2
`
`35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) .............................................................................. 2, 10, 11, 12
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) .................................................................................................... 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) ................................................................................................ 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) ................................................................................................... 2
`
`Rules
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012) ..................................................... 3
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`-iii-
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`Exhibit
`2003
`
`Exhibit List
`Description
`October 3, 2016 Email from Mark Garrett to Justin
`Nemunaitis
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`-iv-
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`I.
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`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
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`INTRODUCTION1
`The present motion requests joinder of two proceedings currently before the
`
`Board. However, Petitioners have actually filed nine separate petitions against
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`Rapid Completions’ patents. In evaluating joinder, the Board should consider the
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`most efficient way to resolve all of these proceedings, not just the subset
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`highlighted in Petitioners’ motion. When these other proceedings are considered,
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`it is clear that joinder will lead to duplicative discovery, increased costs, and
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`unnecessary delay. This is because the Board has already set a consolidated
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`schedule for all six of the currently instituted proceedings, and joinder would
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`destroy the benefits of that schedule. It would also lead to the bizarre result that
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`the Board and the parties would need to prepare for two separate trials to address
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`all of the Thomson and Ellsworth theories that are currently instituted. The delay
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`caused by this proposal, and the serious risk that Petitioners would obtain an unfair
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`‘do-over’ to assert theories based on the exact same prior art references, is
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`extremely prejudicial to Rapid Completions.
`
`The fact that Petitioners would even request joinder in the face of these
`
`serious substantive and procedural problems demonstrates that this motion has
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`never been about deciding the most efficient way to handle multiple proceedings.
`
`
`1 For ease of reading, all of the responses filed in the 1496, 1505, and 1506
`proceedings are substantively identical.
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`
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`-1-
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`Rather, it is an effort by Petitioners to obtain a second bite at the apple by ensuring
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`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
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`that a final decision in its earlier-filed petitions does not lead to termination of its
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`redundant, later-filed petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1). In other proceedings,
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`the Board has overwhelmingly denied joinder when a petitioner seeks to
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`circumvent a statutory safeguard designed to protect patent owners, and it should
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`follow that precedent here. Rapid Completions respectfully requests that the
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`motion be denied.
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`II. RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS’ STATEMENT OF MATERIAL
`FACTS
`
`Rapid Completions objects to Petitioners assertions regarding its discovery
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`of Lane-Wells (paras. 2, 3, 4). These assertions are entirely unsubstantiated and
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`Petitioners have refused to provide any basis for them. See Ex. 2001.
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`III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
`The decision to grant joinder is discretionary. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.122(b). When exercising that discretion, the Board is mindful that patent trial
`
`regulations, including the rules for joinder, must be construed to secure the just,
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`speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`Petitioner, as the moving party, carries the burden of proof. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).
`
`Joinder may be appropriate when it is jointly requested, or when necessary
`
`to account for changes in circumstances. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis
`
`
`
`
`-2-
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`
`
`Innovation, Ltd., Case IPR2013-00250, Paper 4 at 3 (PTAB Apr. 19, 2013)
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`(requesting joinder when a new product was launched, leading to a threat of new
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`assertions of infringement); id. at Paper 25 (Decision Granting Motion for Joinder)
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`(PTAB Sep. 3, 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., Case IPR2013-00109,
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`Paper 15 at 3, 5 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2014) (granting joinder when additional claims
`
`had been asserted against petitioner in concurrent district court litigation).
`
`Joinder is not appropriate when it would add new substantive issues to a
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`proceeding or create procedural problems. See e.g., NetApp, Inc. v. PersonalWeb
`
`Technologies, LLC, IPR2013-00319, Paper 18 at 5-6 (July 22, 2013). For
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`example, if joinder would complicate matters for other related proceedings, it is
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`inappropriate. Id.
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`Moreover, when a petitioner seeks to join a new petition with an earlier filed
`
`petition, the Board considers whether the grounds in the new petition could have
`
`been raised earlier. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012) (noting
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`that the statute is designed “to protect patent owners from harassment via
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`successive petitions by the same or related parties, to prevent parties from having a
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`‘second bite at the apple,’ and to protect the integrity of both the USPTO and
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`Federal Courts by assuring that all issues are promptly raised and vetted”); see also
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`Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining that an agency must
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`determine whether its resources are best spent on one matter or another).
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`-3-
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`The burden is on the petitioner to justify joinder and/or institution of a
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`
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`second-filed petition. The Board has consistently denied joinder and/or institution
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`when it would allow a petitioner to assert new arguments that could have been
`
`raised in an earlier filed IPR petition:
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` Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP, IPR2015-555, Paper
`
`20 at 7-8 (PTAB June 19, 2015) (Paper 20) (“Permitting second chances in
`
`cases like this one ties up the Board’s limited resources; we must be mindful
`
`not only of this proceeding, but of ‘every proceeding.’”)
`
` Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, IPR2015-820, Paper 12 at
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`5 (PTAB May 15, 2015) (denying joinder and explaining that “[i]nterpreting
`
`our rules to allow Petitioner another chance to argue the unpatentability of
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`the challenged claims would not lead to the just, speedy, and inexpensive
`
`resolution of the proceedings”)
`
` Micro Motion, Inc. v. Invensys Sys., Inc., IPR2014-1409 Paper 14 at 14
`
`(PTAB Feb. 18, 2015) (denying joinder because petitioner’s second IPR
`
`petition amounted to a “second bite at the apple”)
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` Toyota Motor Corp. v. American Vehicular Sciences LLC, IPR2015-00262,
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`Paper 10 at 3 (PTAB Jan. 29, 2015) (“Petitioner could have presented in the
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`earlier petition the grounds and arguments it now asserts, but it did not do
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`so. Nor has Petitioner explained sufficiently why the petition in IPR2013-
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`00424 did not contain the grounds and arguments set forth in the Petition in
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`this proceeding….”)
`
` Reloaded Games, Inc. v. Parallel Networks LLC, IPR2014-00950, Paper 12
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`at 4-5 (PTAB Oct. 22, 2014) (denying joinder because petitioner sought a
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`“second bite of the apple” and because it had not “raised any grounds of
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`unpatentability that could not have been raised when filing the [earlier]
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`Petition”)
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`Relatedly, Panels have consistently denied joinder and/or institution where
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`the petitioner used the patent owner preliminary response or an institution decision
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`to revise its theories. See, e.g., US Endontics, LLC v. Gold Standard Instruments,
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`LLC, IPR2015-01476, Paper 13 at 9-10 (PTAB Oct. 26, 2015) (explaining that the
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`Board generally should not allow a second-filed petition after the patent owner
`
`files a preliminary response as it would amount to a petitioner “reply” that is
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`forbidden by statute); Toyota Motor Corp. v. Cellport Sys., Inc., Case IPR2015-
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`01423, Paper 7 at 8 (PTAB Oct. 28, 2015) (“the opportunity to read Patent
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`Owner’s Preliminary Response in IPR2015-00634, prior to filing the Petition here,
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`is unjust.”).
`
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`-5-
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`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Joinder Would Increase
`Efficiency for the Board or the Parties.
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`Petitioners severely underestimate the procedural, substantive, and logistical
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`challenges that joinder would cause. The 598 proceeding has been instituted and
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`set for trial on a consolidated schedule with six other instituted proceedings—
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`IPR2016-00596, IPR2016-00597, IPR2016-00598, IPR2016-00650, IPR2016-
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`00656, IPR2016-00657. That trial has been set for May 17, 2017. All of these
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`proceedings involve at least one asserted ground based on Thomson and Ellsworth.
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`Some of these proceedings involve only Thomson and Ellsworth for most of the
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`claims at issue.
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`The 1506 proceeding is one of three later filed proceedings that have not
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`been instituted—IPR2016-01496, IPR2016-01505, IPR2016-01506. If these
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`proceedings are ultimately instituted, those decisions will be issued in
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`approximately February 2017, they will be set for trial in approximately November
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`2017. All of these proceedings assert grounds based on Lane-Wells; none assert a
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`theory based on Thomson.
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`Absent joinder, the parties will conduct depositions, any additional
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`discovery, and prepare for trial on all of Petitioners’ Thomson and Ellsworth
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`theories in a timely and efficient manner. If Petitioners’ second round of petitions
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`-6-
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`are actually instituted (and as will be more fully explained in the Preliminary
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`Responses, they should not be instituted), then the parties could similarly proceed
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`on a consolidated schedule for those proceedings.
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`In contrast, if Petitioners’ motions for joinder were granted, the parties
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`would proceed to a May 17, 2017 trial on only a subset of Petitioners’ Thomson
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`and Ellsworth theories—those related to the ’936, ’009, and ’451 patents. The 596,
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`597, and 598 proceedings would be put on hold while the parties await institution
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`decisions for the 1496, 1505, and 1506 proceedings. If the Board denies institution
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`of those later-filed proceedings—as it should—then the delay for the 596, 597, and
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`598 proceedings would have needlessly extended those proceedings past the one-
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`year statutory deadline. The parties would then redo discovery and complete
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`briefing on Petitioners’ Thomson and Ellsworth theories for the patents at issue in
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`the delayed proceedings. This approach is highly inefficient and it would destroy
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`the benefits of the Board’s consolidated schedule for the currently instituted
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`proceedings.
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`Even if the Board ultimately institutes review in the later-filed proceedings,
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`joinder will inject unnecessary complexity. In the joined proceedings, the parties
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`will still need to redo discovery and briefing related to Thomson and Ellsworth
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`while also conducting new discovery and briefing on Petitioners’ Lane-Wells
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`theories. Because the joined proceedings will be significantly more complicated—
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`-7-
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`involving additional asserted grounds and additional declarations—the parties will
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`likely need additional deposition time, pages for briefing, and time for oral
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`argument. While Petitioners argue that joinder could lead to fewer depositions and
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`more limited discovery, they are simply wrong. Joinder is guaranteed to lead to
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`duplicative discovery and briefing and increased costs and time for the parties and
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`the Board. Because the parties must prepare for May 17, 2017 trials for at least
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`some of Petitioners’ Thomson and Ellsworth theories regardless of the outcome of
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`this motion, it makes no sense to delay resolution of a subset of Petitioners’
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`Thomson and Ellsworth theories while the parties await an institution decision for
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`Petitioners’ second-filed petitions. Under similar circumstances, another Panel has
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`recognized that these significant procedural and substantive problems weigh
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`strongly against joinder. See NetApp, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC,
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`IPR2013-00319, Paper 18 at 5-6 (PTAB July 22, 2013) (Denying joinder because
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`“NetApp does not provide adequate explanations as to how its new declarations
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`and additional substantive issues would not substantially affect the coordinated
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`discovery and increase costs. Moreover, NetApp fails to address sufficiently the
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`impact joinder would have on the synchronized trial schedule [of other related
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`proceedings].”). The same decision is appropriate here.
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`B.
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Joinder Would Not
`Prejudice Rapid Completions.
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`As noted above, if Petitioners’ motion were granted, the Panel will conduct
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`at least one trial for Petitioners’ Thomson and Ellsworth theories in May 2017, and
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`a second trial related to those same references in November 2017. At best, this
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`approach would needlessly the increase the cost of these proceedings and inject
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`unnecessary delay. At worst, they would allow Petitioners to adapt and change
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`their tactics based on the Board’s final decision in the earlier proceedings. This
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`result would be extremely prejudicial to Rapid Completions. Indeed, the Board
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`has consistently terminated proceedings where a petitioners sought to benefit from
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`reviewing a mere institution decision. See, e.g., Unilever Inc. v. Proctor &
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`Gamble, IPR2014-00506, Paper 17 at 6, 8 (PTAB July 7, 2014). Allowing
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`Petitioners this second bite at the apple based on a final decision would be
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`fundamentally unfair to Rapid Completions and a waste of the Board’s resources.
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`In addition, the prejudice from delay should not be underestimated.
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`Petitioners minimize this concern because the underlying litigation is currently
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`stayed and because they believe the Board will institute the 1496, 1505, and 1506
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`proceedings. However, petitioners are not guaranteed institution of later filed
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`petitions. Quite the contrary, the Board is likely to deny institution of these
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`proceedings as redundant and unfair. Thus, there is no reason to delay Rapid
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`-9-
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`Completions’ ability to enforce its patent rights past the one-year deadline. Rapid
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`Completions is entitled to timely adjudication as much as any other patent owner
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`or exclusive licensee. Because joinder would significantly prejudice Rapid
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`Completions, without providing any logistical benefits, this motion should be
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`denied.
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`C.
`Petitioners’ Motion Should Be Denied as an Improper Attempt to
`Circumvent Statutory Safeguards.
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`As noted above, there is no logistical justification for this motion.
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`Petitioners filed it for one reason and one reason only—to circumvent statutory
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`safeguards designed to protect patent owners from excessive IPR filings. The
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`statutory framework of the AIA encourages petitioners to present their best
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`invalidity arguments when filing a petition for inter partes review. This is
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`important to ensure that the IPR process is used to efficiently resolve disputes over
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`patentability, not as a tool to serially harass patent owners. It also protects the
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`Board from wasteful expenditure of judicial resources on petitions that are only
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`intended to act as placeholders for better art or better arguments in later petitions.
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`This fundamental goal of the IPR process is embodied in several AIA
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`provisions, including 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1):
`
`The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under
`this chapter that results in a final written decision under section
`318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
`request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that
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`-10-
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`claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
`have raised during that inter partes review.
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`Absent joinder, § 315(e)(1) will estop Petitioners from maintaining the 1496, 1505,
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`Case IPR2016-01506
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`and 1506 proceedings once a final decision is reached in the instituted proceedings.
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`This result is entirely fair and important for achieving the goals of the AIA.
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`Petitioners seek to avoid this result by limiting the Board to issuing a single final
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`decision for the earlier filed petitions and the later-filed petitions. This is pure
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`gamesmanship. Indeed, when confronted about this very issue, Petitioners did not
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`even deny that this was the real goal of their motion. See Ex. 2001.
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`The one way that Petitioners could demonstrate that this motion is not based
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`on an improper purpose would be to demonstrate that § 315(e)(1) is inapplicable,
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`i.e., that the Lane-Wells grounds asserted in the later filed petitions could not have
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`been raised during the instituted reviews. But Petitioners are well aware that they
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`cannot meet this burden. See Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. NOxBOX Limited,
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`IPR2016-00781, Paper 10 at 10 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2016) (noting that the petitioner
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`bears the burden of demonstrating that § 315(e)(1) is inapplicable).
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`In their motion, Petitioners argue that § 315(e)(1) concerns should not weigh
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`against joinder, because they did not discover Lane-Wells until shortly after Rapid
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`Completions filed its preliminary response. Mot. at 5-6. However, they provided
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`no evidence to support this claim. When Rapid Completions pressed for discovery
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`-11-
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`or at least some explanation for the representations made in Petitioners’ motion,
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`they refused. Ex. 2001. Despite their affirmative representations to the Board that
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`estoppel concerns should not weigh against joinder, they refused any further
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`dialogue on this issue because, they now claimed that estoppel is “not at issue” at
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`this stage. Id. While Petitioners are certainly free to refuse discovery when there
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`is a legal basis for doing so, they cannot expect the Panel to credit their
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`unsubstantiated assertions when they refuse to back them up with actual evidence.
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`Petitioners’ references to § 315(e)(1) estoppel in their own motion
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`demonstrate that they are well aware that this is an important issue to their motion.
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`Petitioners bear the burden on this issue, and they had an opportunity to come
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`forward with evidence to meet that burden when they filed their motion and again
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`when Rapid Completions asked for their supporting evidence. They chose not to
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`do so, and they must now suffer the consequences. This motion should be
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`recognized for what it is, an attempted end-run around § 315(e)(1) estoppel that
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`would be highly prejudicial to Rapid Completions. As the Board has done in
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`numerous other cases, it should prevent this behavior by denying joinder.
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`D.
`Petitioners Have Failed to Show that Their Motion is Authorized
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
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`Aside from the more specific legal and factual issues mentioned above,
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`Petitioners have failed to identify statutory authorization for their requested relief.
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`-12-
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`While Petitioners casually assert that same-party joinder is permissible, there is
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`actually a split of authority on this issue. Compare Skyhawke Technologies, LLC
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`v. L&H Concepts, LLC, IPR2014–01485, Paper 13 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2015) (§
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`315(c) does not allow same party joinder) with Target Corp. v. Destination
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`Maternity Corp., IPR2014–00508, Paper 28 at 1–17 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2015)
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`(allowing same party joinder).
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`This dispute stems from a fundamental disagreement about the scope of
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`PTAB authority. As noted in dissent in Target, “[t]he majority reads § 315(c) as if
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`it grants discretion for the Board to act in any way not expressly prohibited by the
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`statute. By contrast, we interpret § 315(c) to grant discretion for the Board to act
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`only in ways that are stated expressly in the statute.” See Target, IPR2014-00508
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`dissent at 2 (Fitzpatrick, J. dissenting). While Judge Fitzpatrick wrote in dissent,
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`his conclusions are supported by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, which
`
`have explained that the Board’s authority “is no greater than that delegated to it by
`
`Congress.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937(1986); see also Killip v. Office of
`
`Pers. Mgmt., 991 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An agency is but a creature
`
`of statute. Any and all authority pursuant to which an agency may act ultimately
`
`must be grounded in an express grant from Congress.”). Thus, the Panel should
`
`conclude that § 315(c) does not authorize same-party joinder and deny institution
`
`on that basis as well.
`
`
`
`
`-13-
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
`
`
`V. CONCLUSION
`Joinder is inappropriate for the reasons stated above.
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By /Hamad M. Hamad/
`
`Hamad M. Hamad, Reg. No. 64,641
`Bradley W. Caldwell (pro hac pending)
`Justin T. Nemunaitis (pro hac pending)
`CALDWELL CASSADY CURRY, P.C.
`2101 Cedar Springs Road, Suite 1000
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`Telephone: 214.888.4848
`Facsimile: 214.888.4849
`hhamad@caldwellcc.com
`bcaldwell@caldwellcc.com
`jnemunaitis@caldwellcc.com
`rapid@caldwellcc.com
`
`Dr. Gregory Gonsalves, Re. No. 43,639
`GONSALVES LAW FIRM
`2216 Beacon Lane
`Falls Church, Virginia 22043
`Telephone: 571.419.7252
`gonsalves@gonsalveslawfirm.com
`
`Attorneys for Exclusive Licensee
`
`
`
`Date: October 21, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`-14-
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing RESPONSE TO
`
`Case IPR2016-01506
`Patent 7,861,774
`
`
`
`
`
`PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR JOINDER was served electronically via e-mail in
`
`its entirety on the following counsel of record for Petitioner:
`
`Mark T. Garrett (Lead Counsel)
`Eagle H. Robinson (Back-up Counsel)
`NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
`mark.garrett@nortonrosefulbright.com
`eagle.robinson@nortonrosefulbright.com
`
`
`Date: October 21, 2016
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Hamad M. Hamad/
`Hamad M. Hamad, Reg. No. 64,641
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