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Paper No. 6
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`______________
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED
`and
`BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`PACKERS PLUS ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
`Patent Owner
`
`______________
`
`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`______________
`
`
`
`MOTION FOR JOINDER WITH CASE IPR2016-00596
`
`
`
`27557001.1
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b), Petitioners move
`
`for joinder of this IPR (the “1496 Proceeding”) with instituted IPR2016-00596 (the
`
`“596 Proceeding”), which involves the same patent, the same challenged claims,
`
`the same proposed claim constructions, the same parties, and the same expert for
`
`Petitioners. The primary reference (Lane-Wells) in the 1496 Proceeding—which
`
`Petitioners discovered several months after filing the 596 Proceeding—is different
`
`than the primary reference (Thomson) of the 596 Proceeding, but the secondary
`
`references in the 1496 Proceeding (Hartley, Echols, and Ellsworth) are the same.
`
`Petitioners have requested permission to file a motion to change the Due
`
`Dates in the 596 Proceeding to approximate the Due Dates of the 1496 Proceeding
`
`if it is instituted. But, if allowed, this scheduling change should only minimally
`
`prejudice Patent Owner (if at all) because in the underlying litigation involving the
`
`challenged patent, the parties have stipulated to a stay that would extend through
`
`the conclusion of the 1496 Proceeding. Furthermore, no deposition of Petitioners’
`
`expert in the 596 Proceeding has been scheduled, so consolidation would allow for
`
`only one deposition of him. Petitioners are also agreeable to any deposition time-
`
`limit, word-count, and page-limit increases that Patent Owner believes are
`
`necessary, provided Petitioners receive comparable increases.
`
`27557001.1
`
`1
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
`
`1.
`
`On February 12, 2016, Petitioners filed IPR2016-00596 against claims
`
`1-7, 11, and 14-27 of U.S. Pat. No. 7,134,505 (“the ’505 Patent”). The petition
`
`raised eight grounds of unpatentability: (1) claims 1-7, 11, 14-22, and 24-26 are
`
`anticipated by Thomson (SPE Paper 37482, published in 1997); (2) claim 15 is
`
`obvious over Thomson and Hartley (U.S. Patent No. 5,449,039); (3) claims 23 and
`
`27 are obvious over Thomson and Ellsworth (a paper co-authored by one of the
`
`inventors (Themig) and published in the proceedings of a 1999 conference in
`
`Calgary); (4) claim 11 is obvious over Thomson and Echols (U.S. Patent No.
`
`5,375,662); (5) claims 1-7, 11, 14-22, and 24-26 are obvious over Thomson and
`
`Brown (U.S. Patent No. 4,018,272); (6) claim 15 is obvious over Thomson,
`
`Hartley, and Brown; (7) claims 23 and 27 are obvious over Thomson, Ellsworth,
`
`and Brown; and (8) claim 11 is obvious over Thomson, Echols, and Brown.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Petitioners became aware of Lane-Wells on or around June 20, 2016.
`
`Lane-Wells was published in 1955 as part of an annual publication
`
`known as the Composite Catalog, and was not text-searchable. See Ex. 1002.
`
`4.
`
`Petitioners are not aware of a corresponding patent directed to the tool
`
`(the “Tubing Port Valve”) in Lane-Wells on which Petitioners rely in this
`
`proceeding.
`
`27557001.1
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`On July 30, 2016, prior to the one-year litigation bar of 35 U.S.C.
`
`5.
`
`§ 315(b), the 1496 Proceeding was filed. Its petition includes four grounds of
`
`unpatentability: (1) claims 1-7 and 14-27 are obvious over Lane-Wells and
`
`Ellsworth; (2) claim 15 is obvious over Lane-Wells, Ellsworth, and Hartley;
`
`(3) claim 11 is obvious over Lane-Wells, Ellsworth, and Echols; and (4) claims 7
`
`and 19 are obvious over Lane-Wells, Ellsworth, and the knowledge of a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), as reflected, for example, in Brown and
`
`Thomson.
`
`6.
`
`On August 24, 216, the Board instituted the 596 Proceeding on all
`
`challenged claims and all grounds. See IPR2016-00596 at Paper 13.
`
`7.
`
`On September 7, 2016, Petitioners (as Defendants) renewed a motion
`
`to stay Civil Action No. 6:15-cv-724 (“the Litigation”), in which Rapid
`
`Completions LLC, Patent Owner’s exclusive licensee and the acting party in these
`
`proceedings, sued Petitioners for allegedly infringing the ’505 Patent. See Rapid
`
`Completions LLC v. Baker Hughes Incorporated, et al., Civil Action No. 6:15-cv-
`
`724-RWS-KNM at Dkt. No. 228.
`
`8.
`
`On September 9, 2016, Rapid Completions LLC filed a response,
`
`opposing the stay, at least in part because Petitioners would not agree to estoppel
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) based on the July 29, 2016 IPR filed by co-Defendant
`
`Weatherford International, LLC (IPR2016-01517). See id. at Dkt. No. 229.
`
`27557001.1
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`On September 16, 2016, Rapid Completions LLC and Petitioners
`
`9.
`
`reached an agreement in which Rapid Completions LLC would agree to an
`
`immediate stay “through all final written decisions in IPR trials instituted on
`
`presently-filed [as of September 16] IPR petitions on the 505, 634, 774, 009, and
`
`451 patents-in-suit,” and Petitioners would agree to be estopped under Section
`
`315(e)(2) based on the Weatherford IPR. The parties filed a notice of this
`
`stipulation and corresponding proposed order. See id. at Dkt. Nos. 233 and 233-1.
`
`10. Since that filing, an issue arose about whether Petitioners should be
`
`estopped based on the Weatherford IPR, as reflected in a joint notice the parties
`
`filed on September 23, 2016. See id. at Dkt. Nos. 242 and 242-1; see also id. at
`
`Dkt. Nos. 240 and 240-1, and 241 and 241-1. In the September 23, 2016 joint
`
`notice, the parties indicate that they “believe that this issue is better addressed
`
`when and if the stay is ultimately lifted should the issue then remain.” See id. at
`
`Dkt. Nos. 242 and 242-1. Despite this issue, the parties remain in agreement that
`
`the Litigation should be stayed through all final written decisions in both
`
`proceedings. See id.
`
`11. As of the date of this Motion, the Court has not yet granted the
`
`September 23, 2016 stipulated stay.
`
`12. On September 20, 2016, Petitioners requested the Board’s permission
`
`to seek to change the Due Dates in the 596 Proceeding to approximate the Due
`
`27557001.1
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`Dates of the 1496 Proceeding if it is instituted. The Board has indicated by email
`
`that this request remains under consideration.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`The Board has discretion to decide whether to grant joinder. 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As indicated in the legislative history, the Board
`
`determines whether to grant joinder on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
`
`the particular facts of each case. See 157 Cong. Rec. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
`
`2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (when determining whether and when to allow
`
`joinder, the Office may consider factors including the breadth or unusualness of the
`
`claim scope, claim construction issues, and consent of the patent owner). Relevant
`
`to that determination, the patent trial regulations, including those for joinder, must
`
`be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
`
`proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).
`
`A. Reasons Joinder Is Appropriate
`Joinder is appropriate here for several reasons. This motion is timely
`
`because it is made within one month of August 24, 2016, the institution date of the
`
`596 Proceeding (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.7(a) and
`
`42.1(a)), and it is not made to avoid the one-year litigation bar under Section
`
`315(b). Same-party joinder (or issue joinder) has been recognized as appropriate
`
`under Section 315(c). See Kofax, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., Case IPR2015-01207,
`
`27557001.1
`
`5
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`slip op. at 8-9 (Paper 22) (P.T.A.B. June 2, 2016); Target Corp. v. Destination
`
`Maternity Corp., Case IPR2014-00508, slip op. at 6-17 (Paper 28) (P.T.A.B. Feb.
`
`12, 2015); Oxford Nanopore Techs. v. Univ. of Washington, Case IPR2015-00057,
`
`slip op. at 22-24 (Paper 28) (P.T.A.B. April 27, 2015). However, should the Board
`
`disagree, it may also consolidate the two proceedings under Section 315(d),
`
`especially here, where both proceedings were filed prior to the one-year litigation
`
`bar. See Target Corp., slip op. at 14-15 (Paper 28); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a).
`
`Importantly, both proceedings involve the same parties, the same patent (the
`
`’505 Patent), and the same challenged claims (1-7, 11, and 14-27). Further, the
`
`1496 Proceeding does not present any different claim construction issues than the
`
`596 Proceeding. Compare Case IPR2016-01496, Paper 1 at 25-30 with Case
`
`IPR2016-00596, Paper 10 (authorized replacement petition) at 21-27. Thus,
`
`joinder will conserve the parties’ and Board’s resources that might otherwise be
`
`spent on duplicated efforts for the same or similar tasks.
`
`Further, the parties have jointly agreed to staying the underlying litigation of
`
`the ’505 Patent through the conclusion of the 1496 Proceeding. See supra at
`
`Section II., material facts (MF) 9 and 10. Any change to the 596 Proceeding’s
`
`schedule that may be required to accommodate joinder should therefore have
`
`minimal, if any, prejudicial effect. Moreover, should the 1496 Proceeding be
`
`instituted and no joinder granted, it would not be subject to termination under
`
`27557001.1
`
`6
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`Section 315(e)(1) upon final written decision in the 596 Proceeding because the
`
`1496 Proceeding’s grounds could not reasonably have been raised in the 596
`
`Proceeding. For example, none of multiple, diligent searches conducted by skilled,
`
`professional searchers prior to filing the 596 Proceeding discovered Lane-Wells,
`
`nor should they have, given that Lane-Wells was not in a text-searchable form, and
`
`does not appear to have been depicted in any patent.
`
`The grounds in the two proceedings are similar in many respects. While the
`
`primary references are different, the secondary references are the same.
`
`In the 596 Proceeding, the primary reference is Thomson, a 1997 reference
`
`that shows an assembly with ball-actuated sliding sleeves and multi-element, solid
`
`body packers that was used for acidizing in a cased hole. See Case IPR2016-
`
`00596, Paper 10 at 1-2. In the 1496 Proceeding, the primary reference is Lane-
`
`Wells, an excerpt from a 1955 catalog insert that discusses the use of multiple ball-
`
`actuated sliding sleeves (Tubing Port Valves) and packers to acidize in an open
`
`hole. See Case IPR2016-01496, Paper 1 at 1-2.
`
`The secondary references common to both proceedings are Hartley,
`
`Ellsworth, and Echols. Hartley is used for the same purpose in both proceedings:
`
`as teaching the plug of dependent claim 15, to the extent not already disclosed.
`
`Compare Case IPR2016-00596, Paper 10 at 45-46 with Case 2016-01496, Paper 1
`
`at 58-59. Echols is also used for the same purpose in both proceedings: as
`
`27557001.1
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`teaching the first sleeve of dependent claim 11. Compare Case IPR2016-00596,
`
`Paper 10 at 49-53 with Case 2016-01496, Paper 1 at 59-62. Ellsworth is used in
`
`the 596 Proceeding for its teaching of open hole completions to show why the use
`
`of Thomson’s assembly in an open hole is obvious, thus invalidating dependent
`
`claims 23 and 27. See Case IPR2016-00596, Paper 10 at, e.g., 46-49. In the 1496
`
`Proceeding, Lane-Wells already teaches the use of its assembly in an open hole,
`
`and Petitioners rely on Ellsworth to render obvious the use of solid body packers in
`
`the Lane-Wells assembly, thus meeting those limitations of the same claims (and
`
`all other challenged claims). See Case IPR2016-01496, Paper 1 at, e.g., 35-39.
`
`But there are no inconsistencies between the uses of Ellsworth in both proceedings.
`
`In addition, the 1496 Proceeding uses the solid body packers in both
`
`Thomson and Brown as reflecting the solid body packer knowledge of a POSITA
`
`with respect to the compression ring and piston limitations of claims 7 and 19 (see
`
`Case IPR2016-01496, Paper 1 at 63-67), which is consistent with how they are
`
`used in the 596 Proceeding to teach those same solid body packer limitations (see
`
`Case IPR2016-00596, Paper 10 at, e.g., 33, 39, 42-43 (for Thomson) and 53-59
`
`(for Brown)).
`
`B.
`
`Identification of New Grounds of Unpatentability Asserted in the
`1496 Proceeding
`
`The grounds of unpatentability in the 1496 Proceeding are described above
`
`in MF 5 in Section II, and the difference between them and the unpatentability
`
`27557001.1
`
`8
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`grounds in the 596 Proceedings is clear through a comparison of MF 5 to MF 1.
`
`See also supra at Section III.A.
`
`Impact on Trial Schedule of 596 Proceeding
`
`C.
`The schedule for the trial of the 596 Proceeding is set forth in Paper 14 of
`
`Case IPR2016-00596. Petitioners have requested permission to seek to change the
`
`Due Dates in that schedule by 5 ½ months, to approximate what the Due Dates of
`
`the 1496 Proceeding may be if instituted. While this would extend the trial
`
`schedule of the 596 Proceeding beyond one year, such a change is explicitly
`
`authorized in Section 316(a)(11). Furthermore, prejudice to Patent Owner is
`
`minimized through Patent Owner’s own agreement to a stay through the
`
`conclusion of the 1496 Proceeding. See supra at MF 9, 10.
`
`D. Briefing and Discovery
`Petitioners will agree to whatever word-count or page-limit increases Patent
`
`Owner desires for its relevant briefing (i.e., its response to the petition, motion to
`
`amend the patent, reply to Petitioners’ opposition to any motion to amend, motion
`
`to exclude evidence and any supporting reply), provided Petitioners are given
`
`commensurate word-count and/or page-limit increases for its relevant briefing.
`
`Patent Owner has not yet sought any discovery from Petitioners in the 596
`
`Proceeding, other than to indicate today a desire to take Dr. Daneshy’s deposition.
`
`Dr. Daneshy is Petitioners’ expert in both proceedings. As a result, consolidation
`
`27557001.1
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case IPR2016-01496
`Patent 7,134,505
`could allow for a single deposition of Dr. Daneshy instead of two. Petitioners
`
`would agree to reasonable changes to the direct and redirect examination time
`
`limits for Dr. Daneshy’s deposition, to allow Patent Owner to cover the grounds in
`
`both proceedings, provided Patent Owner grants Petitioners similar reasonable
`
`increases in cross-examination time for Patent Owner’s expert(s). Should Patent
`
`Owner similarly use a single expert for both proceedings, Petitioners would agree
`
`to a single deposition, with commensurate time-limit changes.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Joinder is appropriate for the reasons above.
`
`Dated: September 26, 2016
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Mark T. Garrett/
`Mark T. Garrett, Lead Counsel
`Reg. No. 44,699
`Tel: 512.536.3031; Fax: 512.536.4598
`mark.garrett@nortonrosefulbright.com
`
`Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1100
`Austin, TX 78701
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`27557001.1
`
`10
`
`

`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(e), the undersigned certifies that on September
`
`26, 2016, a complete copy of MOTION FOR JOINDER WITH CASE IPR2016-
`
`00596 was served on Patent Owner’s Exclusive Licensee via email (by consent), as
`
`follows:
`
`mray-PTAB@skgf.com
`lgordon-PTAB@skgf.com
`kconklin-PTAB@skgf.com
`ptab@skgf.com
`
`
`
`/Mark T. Garrett/
`Mark T. Garrett(Reg. No. 44,699)
`
`27557001.1

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