`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`HYUNDAI MOTOR COMPANY LTD., HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA,
`HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA LLC, KIA MOTORS
`CORPORATION, KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., AND KIA MOTORS
`MANUFACTURING GEORGIA, INC.
`
`Petitioners
`
`v.
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
`
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Patent No. 8,155,342
`Issue Date: April 10, 2012
`Title: MULTIMEDIA DEVICE INTEGRATION SYSTEM
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01476
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page No(s).
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................... 1
`
`PETITIONER’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS AND PRIORITY
`STATEMENT ARE ERRONEOUS ............................................................... 5
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PETITIONERS
`HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF SUCCESS FOR GROUNDS 1-5 .............................................................. 6
`
`A. Ground 1 Should Be Denied Institution Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Anticipated By Shibasaki ............................................ 6
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. §
`103. ...................................................................................................... 13
`
`Grounds 2-5 Should Not Be Instituted Because Petitioners Fail
`To Establish Fundamental Requirements for Proving
`Obviousness ......................................................................................... 16
`
`D. Ground 2 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Obvious Over Shibasaki and the Knowledge of
`a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art .................................................. 17
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Ground 3 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Tong
`Reference Is Not Offered To Disclose, Nor Does Tong
`Disclose, “Audio Generated By the Portable Device” and “the
`Interface Subsystem” As Required By the Challenged Claims .......... 19
`
`Ground 4 Should Not Be Instituted Because the AVRCP 1.0
`Reference Is Not Offered To Disclose, Nor Does AVRCP 1.0
`Disclose, “Audio Generated By the Portable Device” and “the
`Interface Subsystem” As Required By the Challenged Claims .......... 20
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`G. Ground 5 Should Not Be Instituted Because the AD2P 1.0
`Reference Is Not Offered to Disclose, Nor Does AD2P 1.0
`Disclose, “the Interface Subsystem,” and AD2P 1.0 Does Not
`Disclose “Audio Generated by the Portable Device” as
`Required by the Challenged Claims .................................................... 21
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 23
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00355 (PTAB, June 26, 2015) ............................................................ 14
`
`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.,
` IPR2013-00387 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014) ........................................................... 15
`
`Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454 (PTAB, Aug. 29, 2014) ............................................................ 15
`
`GN Resound A/S v. Oticon A/S,
`IPR2015-00103 (PTAB, June 18, 2015) .............................................................. 2
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ................................................................................ 4, 13, 15, 16
`
`Indus. v. Zipshade Indus.,
`IPR2015-00488 (PTAB, July 24, 2015) ............................................................. 14
`
`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 14
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................ 14, 15, 16
`
`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939 (PTAB, Dec. 17, 2014) ............................................................ 15
`
`Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
`868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ............................................................................ 6
`
`Toyota Motor Corporation, v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2016-00419 (PTAB, August 31, 2016) ........................................................ 11
`
`Unified Patents Inc., v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2016-00118 (PTAB, April 27, 2016) ..................................................... 11, 12
`
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California,
`814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .............................................................................. 6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .................................................................................................... 8, 13
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) .......................................................................................... 4, 14
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) .......................................................................................... 1, 2
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .................................................................................... 1, 2, 3
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner, Blitzsafe Texas, LLC (“Patent Owner”), submits this
`
`Preliminary Response to the Petition filed by Hyundai Motor Company Ltd.,
`
`Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC, Kia
`
`Motors Corporation, Kia Motors America, Inc., and Kia Motors Manufacturing
`
`Georgia, Inc., (collectively “Petitioners”) requesting inter partes review of
`
`Claims 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 71, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 95, 97,
`
`99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110,111, and 120 (the “Challenged Claims”) of
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 (“the ’342 Patent”). The Petition is deficient on each
`
`alleged Ground and should not be instituted.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
`
`II.
`As a preliminary matter, the Petition fails to meet the statutory burdens
`
`requiring specificity and detailed explanations for its anticipation and obviousness
`
`grounds. The Board requires that “[t]he petition must specify where each element
`
`of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.”
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). The Board also requires “[a] full statement of the reasons
`
`for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the
`
`evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). The Petition falls short of this standard in
`
`each ground.
`
`For example, Petitioners introduce Ground 1 with an “Overview of
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`Shibasaki” which summarizes the reference without referring to any claim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`elements or explaining how Shibasaki maps to any claim limitations. (Pet. at 17-
`
`19.) Petitioners then present bare claim charts, listing the claims in a formulaic
`
`and repetitive pattern: a bare statement that Shibasaki discloses the claimed
`
`limitation, written verbatim; a citation to the expert report without explanation; and
`
`quotations from and bare citations to Shibasaki. Nowhere do Petitioners present
`
`“[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed
`
`explanation of the significance of the evidence” as required by 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.22(a)(2). This approach is repeated in obviousness Grounds 2-5.
`
`Petitioners’ claim charts do not cure the Petition of these deficiencies
`
`because this Board has expressly held that claim charts alone are not enough to
`
`show a reasonable likelihood of success, and that merely presenting citations and
`
`quotes in claim charts alone is a violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). See, GN
`
`Resound A/S v. Oticon A/S, IPR2015-00103, Paper 13 at 6 (June 18, 2015). As
`
`described below, the relationship between the Shibasaki reference and the ’342
`
`Patent claims are not self-evident, and Petitioners’ failure to explain how Shibasaki
`
`teaches specific claim elements and limitations improperly shifts the burden to the
`
`Patent Owner and the Board to create arguments for Petitioners.
`
`Grounds 1 through 5 fail because Shibasaki, alone and in combination with
`
`each of Tong, AVRCP 1.0, and AD2P 1.0, is silent regarding “audio generated by
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`the portable device.” Shibasaki describes transferring a file that is compressed and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`encoded, instead of sending the required generated audio. Shibasaki teaches that
`
`decoding is performed at the data processing section 109 and converting music
`
`data into sound for output occurs at the playback section 111––both sections being
`
`internal to the car audio apparatus 10. (Ex. 1006 at 10:38-46.).
`
`Moreover, Shibasaki does not teach or disclose an “integration subsystem”
`
`as required by the claims. Petitioners fail to demonstrate that cherry-picked
`
`sections of the car audio apparatus constitute an “integration subsystem” under the
`
`claims, and nowhere do Petitioners explain how the sections are a “subsystem,”
`
`i.e., “subordinate to another system” as required by the Board. Petitioners’ choice
`
`of components to label as the “integration subsystem” is an exercise in hindsight in
`
`an attempt to meet the limitations of the Challenged Claims.
`
`
`
`Last, in addition to the above deficiencies, Petitioners’ request for inter
`
`partes review should be denied for at least the following reasons addressed more
`
`fully below in this Preliminary Response:
`
`(1) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is found
`
`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon,” as required by
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), because the Petition has at least one of the following
`
`deficiencies: (i) failing to map each claim term to a specific teaching from an
`
`asserted reference; (ii) providing citations to the asserted references that do not
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`teach the claim elements against which such citations are applied; and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(iii) mischaracterizing the citations to the asserted references.
`
`(2) The Petition fails to identify the difference(s) between the claims and the
`
`asserted references as required by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
`
`(1966).
`
`(3) The Petition improperly attempts to support its assertions of obviousness
`
`with mere conclusory statements and by impermissibly incorporating, by
`
`reference, arguments from the Kyriakakis Declaration (Ex. 1003) in violation of
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).
`
`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not establish “a
`
`reasonable likelihood that the Petitioners would prevail with respect to at least one
`
`of the claims challenged in the Petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Patent Owner
`
`explicitly reserves the right to provide further distinctions between the prior art and
`
`the Challenged Claims. The deficiencies of the Petition noted herein, however, are
`
`sufficient for the Board to find that Petitioners have not met their burden to
`
`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail in showing
`
`unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Patent Owner, therefore,
`
`respectfully requests denial of the Petition.
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`III. PETITIONER’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS AND PRIORITY
`STATEMENT ARE ERRONEOUS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Several of Petitioner’s constructions are inaccurate. Specifically with regard
`
`to the “generated . . . for playing on the car audio/video system,” and “format
`
`incompatible with the portable device” limitations, Petitioner cites to the Joint
`
`Claim Construction Chart from the District Court Litigation pending in the Eastern
`
`District of Texas.1 Pet. at 16. The arguments advanced in the Joint Claim
`
`Construction Statement have no bearing on the present proceeding where the claim
`
`construction standard is “broadest reasonable construction.” Moreover, the Board
`
`has already interpreted these very claim limitations in several Petitions (e.g.,
`
`IPR2016-00118; IPR2016-00418 and IPR2016-00419), and Patent Owner adopts
`
`the constructions and claim interpretations set forth by the Board therein.
`
`Patent Owner also notes that Petitioner alleges that the claims of the ’342
`
`Patent have an effective filing date no later than June 27, 2006. Patent Owner
`
`disagrees with this statement, and, while not relevant to Patent Owner’s arguments
`
`
`1 Petitioner also inaccurately characterizes Patent Owner’s infringement
`
`contentions, which do not allege that a control command merely being transmitted
`
`over a Bluetooth link could satisfy format conversion. Additionally, the
`
`contentions were preliminary and submitted prior to the production of any source
`
`code in the District Court Litigations.
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`advanced herein, Patent Owner is entitled to priority at least as early as January
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2005, as was set forth in IPR2016-00418.
`
`IV. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE PETITIONERS
`HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD
`OF SUCCESS FOR GROUNDS 1-5
`A. Ground 1 Should Be Denied Institution Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Anticipated By Shibasaki
`
`
`
`Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is a high bar to meet. A claim is
`
`anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either
`
`expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros.
`
`v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The identical
`
`invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the claim.
`
`Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Shibasaki
`
`misses the mark with respect to numerous limitations.
`
`
`
`The Shibasaki reference is silent regarding “audio generated by the portable
`
`device,” as recited in both Claims 49 and 120. Specifically, Shibasaki fails to
`
`disclose or teach “wherein said integration subsystem…receives audio generated
`
`by the portable device over said wireless communication link for playing on the car
`
`audio/video system,” as recited in Claim 49. Similarly, Shibasaki fails to disclose
`
`“wherein said integration subsystem channels audio generated by the portable
`
`device to the car audio/video system, as recited in Claim 120.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`While Petitioners fail to map a specific portion of Shibasaki to this
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`limitation, it appears that Petitioners characterize the reference, with respect to the
`
`limitation “audio generated by the portable device,” as follows:
`
`The data processing section processes music data received through the
`BT transmission/reception section 115. The playback section 111
`converts the music data into sound. The display section 113 displays
`music data. Ex. 1006 at 10:4-53.
`
`Pet. at 18. Petitioners also characterize Shibasaki as disclosing: “instructing the
`
`device 20 to play music, receiving the music from the device 20, and playing the
`
`music (e.g., steps 429-435). Ex. 1006 at 12:27-33 and 13:16-58.” Id. at 19. To be
`
`clear, both characterizations are erroneous, and the Shibasaki reference alone fails
`
`to disclose the transferring or channeling of audio, i.e., “audio generated by the
`
`portable device.”
`
`
`
`Petitioners’ Shibasaki citation “Ex. 1006 at 10:4-53” does not describe
`
`“audio generated by the portable device.” Instead, this lengthy section describes
`
`internally transferring music data within the car audio apparatus 10––from section
`
`BT Transmission/Reception Section 115 to Data Processing Section 109––to
`
`compress (encode) the music data. Here, Shibasaki also describes reading music
`
`data from an external storage section 103, which is also an internal section of the
`
`car audio apparatus.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Petitioners’ Shibasaki citation “Ex. 1006 at 12:27-33” also fails to describe
`
`“audio generated by the portable device.” Remarkably, this section describes a
`
`file-type compatibility determination, i.e., whether a music file (not generated
`
`audio) can be played using the car audio apparatus 10 (not a portable device).
`
`Petitioners’ cited section reads as follows:
`
`Next, the car audio apparatus 10 performs determination processing of
`determining whether or not the MP3 player 20-2 has a music file that
`can be played in the car audio apparatus 10 based on the attribute
`information of the MP3 player 20-2 obtained at step S413 (the headers
`of the files that the MP3 player 20-2 has) (step S415).
`
`Ex. 1006 at 12:27-33. Nothing in the above-cited section shows that the
`
`integration subsystem receives “audio generated by the portable device” as recited
`
`in the claims.
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`Not surprisingly, Petitioners’ Shibasaki citation to “13:16-58” also misses
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the mark. In this section, Shibasaki defines “music data” as a music file in a
`
`compressed format. (Ex. 1006 at 13:22-30.) Shibasaki describes the contents of a
`
`music list, which is wholly irrelevant. (Ex. 1006 at 13:30-35.) Shibasaki then
`
`describes transferring a “playback instruction” to the MP3 player 20-2 and, in
`
`response:
`
`the MP3 player 20-2 storing the music file transmits the music file
`corresponding to the given playback instruction through the BT radio
`communication system (step S433), and the car audio apparatus 10
`performs streaming of encoding the received music file in real time
`and performing play processing (step S435).
`
`(Ex. 1006 at 13: 46-52 (emphasis added).) The above-cited portion teaches the
`
`exact opposite of the claimed invention. Instead of “generated audio,” Shibasaki
`
`teaches a compressed and encoded music file. Instead of “audio generated by the
`
`portable device,” Shibasaki teaches play processing by the car radio. Shibasaki
`
`also defines streaming as “encoding the received music file in real time and
`
`performing play processing” and teaches that streaming is performed at the car
`
`audio apparatus 10. Shibasaki could not be further from meeting the claimed
`
`limitation.
`
`
`
`The claim charts largely point to the same citations with two additions. The
`
`claim charts cite to 8:15-17, which merely explains that Figure 4 is a sequence
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`chart. Petitioners outline a section of Figure 4 explained by the cited portion above
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(Ex. 1006 at 13:46-52.), but Figure 4 itself adds nothing to teach the claimed
`
`limitation at issue.
`
`The second addition is the inclusion of an unsupported blanket statement:
`
`A POSITA would understand that [car audio apparatus 10 performs
`streaming of encoding the received music file in real time] to mean
`the car audio apparatus receives Bluetooth-encoded streaming audio
`from the portable device after initiating playback on the portable
`device.
`
`(Pet. at 28.) This statement works against Petitioners for several reasons. As noted
`
`above, anticipation must be found expressly or inherently. Since Petitioners do not
`
`contend that the claimed limitation is inherently found in Shibasaki, Petitioners
`
`must demonstrate that “audio generated by the portable device” is expressly found
`
`in Shibasaki. But instead, Petitioners contend that a POSITA would change both
`
`the functionality of the car audio apparatus 10 and meaning of streaming explicitly
`
`set forth by Shibasaki to meet this limitation. Petitioner appears to be looking
`
`outside the context of Shibasaki, and its argument is nothing more than a failed
`
`single-reference obviousness challenge improperly inserted into a Ground based on
`
`anticipation. Petitioner’s Ground must fail for at least this reason
`
`
`
`In any event, Shibasaki explicitly states that an audio “file,” not generated
`
`audio, is received by the car audio apparatus 10 of Shibasaki. Upon receipt of a
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`playback instruction, Shibasaki teaches that “the MP3 player 20-2 storing the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`music file transmits the music file corresponding to the given playback instruction”
`
`to the car stereo 10 for playback. (Ex. 1006 at 13:46-52.) The decoding of the
`
`music file is performed at the data processing section 109, and converting music
`
`data into sound for output occurs at the playback section 111––both sections being
`
`internal to the car audio apparatus 10. (Ex. 1006 at 10:38-46.)
`
`
`
`Therefore, Shibasaki does not teach or disclose each and every element as
`
`set forth in Claims 49 and 120 because Shibasaki is silent regarding “audio
`
`generated by the portable device.”
`
`
`
`This teaching is exactly the same type of disclosure as was the case in the
`
`Ohmura reference, which the Board has repeatedly found to lack the disclosure of
`
`“audio generated by the portable device.” See, Unified Patents Inc., v. Blitzsafe
`
`Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00118, Paper No. 19, Decision Denying Institution at 20,
`
`(P.T.A.B., April 27, 2016); Toyota Motor Corporation, v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`
`IPR2016-00419, Paper No. 13, Decision Denying Institution at 27-28, (P.T.A.B.,
`
`July 19, 2016); Toyota Motor Corporation, v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, IPR2016-
`
`00419, Paper No. 15, Decision on Request for Rehearing at 5, (P.T.A.B., August
`
`31, 2016).
`
`Shibasaki also fails to disclose or teach the “integration subsystem” as
`
`recited in Claims 49 and 120. As discussed above, the Board has found that the
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`integration subsystem must be subordinate to another system in order to comply
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`with the plain meaning of “subsystem.” See Unified Patents Inc., v. Blitzsafe
`
`Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00118, Paper No. 19, Decision Denying Institution at 10,
`
`(P.T.A.B., April 27, 2016). In its overview, Petitioners argue:
`
`The car audio apparatus 10 includes, inter alia, a system control
`section 101, an operation section 107, a data processing section 109, a
`playback section 111, a display section 113, and a BT
`transmission/reception section 115. The control section 101 controls
`the components of the car audio apparatus 10. The operating section
`107 accepts user inputs. The BT transmission/ reception section 115
`communicates with other components of the piconet (e.g., MP3
`players or other media devices). The data processing section processes
`music data received through the BT transmission/reception section
`115. The playback section 111 converts the music data into sound.
`The display section 113 displays music data. Ex. 1006 at 10:4-53.
`
`(Pet. at 18.) In the claim charts, Petitioners state that Shibasaki’s integration
`
`subsystem “includes the BT Transmission/Reception section 115, system control
`
`section 101, and data processing section 109.” (Pet. at 20.) However, Shibasaki
`
`does not teach or disclose that the portions of the car audio apparatus 10 cherry-
`
`picked by Petitioners are, together, a “subsystem” subordinate to the remainder of
`
`the apparatus 10. Petitioners argue that these selected components constitute an
`
`“integration subsystem” under the claims, but nowhere do Petitioners explain how
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`the sections are a “subsystem,” i.e., “subordinate to another system” as required by
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the Board. Petitioners simply label the Shibasaki sections as a subsystem and
`
`describe how the each section performs the functions of the integration subsystem
`
`without identifying the system to which it is subordinate. Petitioners have,
`
`therefore, failed to point to the claimed “integration subsystem” in Shibasaki.
`
`Petitioners’ attempt to construct an integration subsystem from a selection of
`
`components made solely for invalidity purposes should be rejected.
`
`
`
`Patent Owner respectfully submits that Claims 50-52, 54, 56, 62-64, and 71
`
`depend from Claim 49 are not anticipated for at least the same reasons above.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, Ground 1 should be denied institution because Petitioners fail
`
`to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any one of the
`
`Challenged Claims.
`
`B. Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`
`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of
`
`skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations.
`
`Graham, 383 U.S. 1, at 17–18. The Board has held that a failure to identify the
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is fatal to an
`
`obviousness challenge. See, Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-
`13
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`00355, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 9 at 9–10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(PTAB, June 26, 2015) (denying institution for failure to identify the differences
`
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art).
`
`Furthermore, in proposing that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
`
`of the invention would have combined the references in a particular way to meet
`
`the claimed invention, an obviousness analysis must support the proposed
`
`combination with “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning.”
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441
`
`F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). A proposed combination cannot be supported
`
`based on “mere conclusory statements.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
`
`In a petition seeking institution of an inter partes review, “articulated
`
`reasons with rational underpinnings” must be found in the petition itself. Whole
`
`Space Indus. v. Zipshade Indus., IPR2015-00488, Decision Denying Institution of
`
`Inter Partes Review, Paper 14 at 17 (PTAB, July 24, 2015) (“[C]onclusory labels
`
`do not substitute for a fact-based analysis in the Petition establishing what is being
`
`modified, and why it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to
`
`make the modification”). The arguments needed to support a conclusion of
`
`obviousness may not be incorporated by reference to another document. 37 C.F.R.
`
`§ 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one
`
`document into another document.”); Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00454, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 12 at
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10 (PTAB, Aug. 29, 2014); see also Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`
`IPR2014-00939, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 8 at
`
`15 (PTAB Dec. 17, 2014).
`
`
`
`As set forth below, the Petition is deficient because it fails to meet the
`
`fundamental requirements for demonstrating invalidity. The Petition does not
`
`explain how the combinations of references teach each element of each claim. See,
`
`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V., IPR2013-00387, Paper 43 at
`
`30–31 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014). Additionally, the Petition fails to satisfy the tests of
`
`KSR and Graham because it does not identify the differences between the claims
`
`and the asserted references; neglects to provide a fact-based rationale for
`
`combining the references; and does not explain the specific ways the references are
`
`to be combined. Whole Space Indus., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 9 (“[R]egarding
`
`the grounds based on obviousness, the Petition does not articulate specific
`
`modifications of the references that support its asserted obviousness grounds, nor
`
`does it provide a persuasive rationale for the proposed combinations of
`
`references.”).
`
`
`
`Accordingly, Grounds 2-5 should be denied institution because Petitioners
`
`fail to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any one of
`
`the Challenged Claims.
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`C. Grounds 2-5 Should Not Be Instituted Because Petitioners Fail To
`Establish Fundamental Requirements for Proving Obviousness
`The Petition fails to even acknowledge the Graham and KSR requirements
`
`
`
`for determining obviousness. Petitioners fail to recite any of these factors, and
`
`instead rely on mere conclusory statements regarding the alleged obviousness of
`
`each combination.
`
`
`
`Petitioners do not explain how the combinations teach each element of each
`
`claim. Petitioners fail to satisfy the tests of KSR and Graham because they do not
`
`identify the differences between the claims and the asserted references; neglect to
`
`provide a fact-based rationale for combining the references; and do not explain the
`
`specific ways the references are to be combined. The Petition does not articulate
`
`any specific modifications of the references that support its asserted obviousness
`
`grounds, nor does it provide a persuasive rationale for the proposed combinations
`
`of references.
`
`Finally, the motivations to combine set forth by Petitioners are all
`
`conclusory and lack the “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning”
`
`required by KSR. The motivations to combine set forth by Petitioners are
`
`essentially all based on the similarities of the references tied with a boilerplate mix
`
`of predictable results, uses of known techniques, and obvious to try assertions.
`
`These boilerplate statements are not sufficient motivation to combine and the
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`
`Petition should be denied as deficient.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`Accordingly, Grounds 2-5 should be denied institution because Petitioners
`
`fail to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any one of
`
`the Challenged Claims.
`
`D. Ground 2 Should Not Be Instituted Because the Challenged
`Claims Are Not Obvious Over Shibasaki and the Knowledge of a
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`
`
`Shibasaki fails to disclose or teach “wherein said integration subsystem . . .
`
`receives audio generated by the portable device over said wireless communication
`
`link for playing on the car audio/video system,” as required by Claims 53 (as it
`
`depends from Claim 49) and Claim 73. Similarly, Shibasaki fails to disclose
`
`“wherein said integration subsystem channels audio generated by the portable
`
`device to the car audio/video system,” as recited in Claim 97. Commonly, the
`
`Shibasaki reference is silent regarding “audio generated by the portable device,” as
`
`required in Claims 53, 73, and 97. Shibasaki also fails to disclose or teach the
`
`“integration subsystem” as required in Claims 53, 73, and 97.
`
`
`
`For Ground 2, the Petition lacks any detailed argument or explanation.
`
`Petitioners only present claim charts for Claims 53, 73, and 97, and the claim
`
`charts largely cite back to or mirror the charts for Claim 49. Because Petitioners’
`
`claim charts merely cite back to or mirror information already discussed above,
`
`Patent Owner submits that Claims 53, 73, and 97 do not disclose the “audio
`17
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01476
`
`PATENT NO. 8,155,342
`
`
`
`
`generated by the portable device” and “the integration subsystem” limitations for
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the same reasons as those presented for Ground 1 in Section IV-A above.
`
`
`
`Patent Owner respectfully submits that Petitioners do not explain why either
`
`of these limitations would have been obvious in view of the knowledge of a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art. Because Petitioners have not shown that the knowledge
`
`of a person of ordinary skill in the art cures