Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`
`
`
`
`
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` Paper 9
`
`
`
` Entered: January 24, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and KERRY BEGLEY,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01473
`Patent 8,155,342 B2
`____________
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper 9
`
`
`
` Entered: January 24, 2017
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and KERRY BEGLEY,
`Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`QUINN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01473
`Patent 8,155,342 B2
`____________
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2016-01473
`Patent 8,155,342 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Petitioner, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., filed a Petition
`requesting an inter partes review of claims 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73,
`77, and 78 of U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 B2 (“the ’342 patent”). Paper 2
`(“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, filed a Preliminary Response.
`Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`For the reasons that follow, we deny the Petition.
`
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner asserts that the ’342 patent is the subject matter of district
`court litigation in Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 2-15-cv-
`01274-JRG-RSP (Lead Case). Pet. 53. Various ongoing litigation matters
`have been identified as also involving the ’342 patent: Blitzsafe Texas, LLC
`v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2-15-cv-01276; Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Toyota
`Motor Corp., 2-15-cv-01277; Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of
`Am., Inc., 2-15-cv-01278; and Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co.,
`2-15-cv-01275. Id.
`Patent Owner asserts that, in addition to the above-identified five
`district court litigations, the ’342 patent was asserted in Marlowe Patent
`Holdings LLC v. DICE Electronics, LLC, 3:10-cv-01199 (D. NJ) and
`Marlowe Patent Holdings LLC v. Ford Motor Company, 3:10-cv-07044 (D.
`NJ). Paper 5, 1−2. According to Patent Owner, these cases are no longer
`pending due to settlement. Id. at 2.
`The ’342 patent is the subject matter of an ongoing inter partes
`review, Toyota Motor Corporation v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, Case
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`IPR2016-00418. Pet. 53. The ’342 patent is also involved in IPR2016-
`00118 (denied), IPR2016-00419 (denied), IPR2016-01445, IPR20916-
`01449, IPR2016-01473, IPR2016-01476, IPR2016-01533, and IPR2016-
`01557. Paper 5, 2. Related U.S. Patent No. 7,489,786 B2 is involved in
`IPR2016-00421, IPR2016-00422, IPR2016-01472, and IPR2016-01477. Id.
`
`B. The ’342 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’342 patent is titled “Multimedia Device Integration System.”
`Ex. 1001, [54]. The ’342 patent describes that a “particular problem with
`integrating after-market audio and video system with existing car stereo and
`video systems is that signals generated by both systems are in proprietary
`formats, and are not capable of being processed by the after-market system.”
`Id. at 1:54−58. “Thus, in order to integrate after-market systems with
`existing car stereo and video systems, it is necessary to convert signals
`between such systems.” Id. at 1:60−63.
`Certain embodiments of the ’342 patent provide a multimedia device
`integration system that allows “for the wireless integration of a portable
`audio and/or video device with a car audio and/or video system.” Id. at
`5:7−10. “The portable device could comprise a CD changer, CD player,
`satellite receiver (e.g., XM or Sirius), digital media device (e.g., MP3, MP4,
`WMV, or Apple iPod device), video device (e.g., DVD player), or a cellular
`telephone.” Id. at 5:9−13. In particular, an integration module, which could
`be positioned within the car system, receives data from the portable device
`(including track information, song information, artist information, time
`information, and other related information) and processes the data into a
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`format compatible with the car system. Id. at 5:23−30. One embodiment
`illustrated in Figure 19, reproduced below, for example, shows an
`integration subsystem. Id. at 8:3−8.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 19, integration subsystem 1032 positioned within car
`audio/video system 1010 allows information (data and control signals) to be
`exchanged between portable device 1024 and car audio/video system 1010,
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`and processes and formats data accordingly so that instructions and data
`from car audio/video system 1010 are processed by portable device 1024,
`and vice versa. See id. at 33:43–35:62, Fig. 19. Wireless interface 1016 in
`the car system and wireless interface 1026 in the portable device form
`wireless link 1022. Id. at 34:15–18; see id. at 35:21–23.
`
`
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claims 49 and 73 are independent.
`Claim 49, reproduced below, is illustrative.
`49. A multimedia device integration system, comprising:
`an integration subsystem in communication with a car
`audio/video system; and
`a first wireless interface in communication with said
`integration subsystem, said first wireless interface establishing a
`wireless communication link with a second wireless interface in
`communication with a portable device external to the car
`audio/video system,
`wherein said integration subsystem obtains, using said
`wireless communication link, information about an audio file
`stored on the portable device, transmits the information to the car
`audio/video system for subsequent display of the information on
`a display of the car audio/video system, instructs the portable
`device to play the audio file in response to a user selecting the
`audio file using controls of the car audio/video system, and
`receives audio generated by the portable device over said
`wireless communication link for playing on the car audio/video
`system.
`Ex. 1001, 42:29–47.
`
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`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`
`
`
`Petitioner relies upon the following prior art references:
`Reference
`Date
`
`Exhibit
`
`Riggs
`
`US 2003/007649 A1
`
`Jan. 9, 2003
`
`Ex. 1012
`
`Silvester
`
`US 2003/0171834 A1
`
`Sept. 11, 2003 Ex. 1014
`
`Bhogal
`
`US 6,629,197
`
`Sept. 30, 2003 Ex. 1013
`
`Marlowe
`
`US 2003/0215102 A1
`
`Nov. 20, 2003 Ex. 1009
`
`Simon
`
`Kandler
`
`US 2005/0281414 A1
`
`Dec. 22, 2005 Ex. 1015
`
`App. Pub. CA 2347648 A1
`
`Dec. 1, 2001
`
`Ex. 1016
`
`App. Pub. DE 10101702 A1
`
`Plagge
`
`Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of James T. Geier. Ex. 1007.
`
`July 18, 2002 Ex. 10111
`
`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner challenges claims 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73, 77, and
`78 of the ’342 patent based on the following grounds:
`
`Challenged Claim(s)
`49, 53, 54, 56, 62, 66, 70,
`73, 77, and 78
`57
`
`Basis
`
`Reference(s)
`
`§ 103(a) Marlowe and Plagge
`§ 103(a) Marlowe, Plagge, and
`Riggs
`
`
`1 The German version of Plagge is filed as Exhibit 1010. Citations in our
`Decision refer to the certified translation of Plagge filed as Exhibit 1011.
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`
`Challenged Claim(s)
`49, 53, 54, 56, 62, 66, 70,
`73, 77, and 78
`49, 53, 62, 66, 70, 73, and
`77
`54, 56, and 78
`57
`49, 53, 54, 56, 62, 66, 70,
`73, 77, and 78
`
`Reference(s)
`Basis
`§ 103(a) Marlowe, Plagge, and
`Bhogal
`Silvester
`Silvester and Simon
`Silvester and Kandler
`Simon and Bhogal
`
`§ 102(b)
`§ 103(a)
`§ 103(a)
`§ 103(a)
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`One seeking to establish obviousness based on more than one reference also
`must articulate sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to combine
`teachings. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
`Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes anything specific to
`reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine, however, that in
`this case no express articulation in that regard is necessary and that the level
`of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima
`v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc.,
`57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA
`1978).
`
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`
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are
`interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016).
`Consistent with that standard, claim terms also are given their ordinary and
`customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
`art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.,
`504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There are, however, two exceptions
`to that rule: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own
`lexicographer,” and “2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim
`term either in the specification or during prosecution.” See Thorner v. Sony
`Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`If an inventor acts as his or her own lexicographer, the definition must
`be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and
`precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,
`1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Although it is improper to read a limitation from the
`specification into the claims, In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
`Cir. 1993), claims still must be read in view of the specification of which
`they are a part. Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340,
`1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to
`the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Wellman, Inc. v.
`Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vivid Techs.,
`Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Because
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`it is dispositive of our determination whether to institute inter partes review,
`we address below only the construction of the claim term “integration
`subsystem.”
`Integration subsystem
`Each of independent claims 49 and 73 recites an “integration
`subsystem.” Petitioner argues that a previous Board Decision on Institution
`in IPR2016-001182 provided a construction for this claim term as:
`A subsystem to perform at least: (1) connecting one or more
`portable devices or inputs to the car audio/video system via an
`interface, (2) processing and handling signals, audio, and/or
`video information, (3) allowing a user to control the one or more
`portable devices via
`the car audio/video system, and
`(4) displaying data from the one or more portable devices on the
`car audio/video system.
`
`Pet. 7 (quoting 118-IPR Decision 11). Petitioner states that for “purposes of
`this petition, Petitioner adopts the same construction.” Id. Patent Owner
`does not address any claim construction issues in its Preliminary Response.
`
`The Board previously construed the term “integration subsystem” in
`the 118-IPR Decision as well as Decisions on Institution in IPR2016-004183
`and IPR2016-00419.4 See 118-IPR Decision 11–12; 418-IPR Decision 15;
`419-IPR Decision 15–16. By way of a summary, the Board determined
`
`
`2 Unified Patents Inc. v. Blitzsafe Texas LLC, Case IPR2016-00118,
`Paper 19 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2016) (“118-IPR Decision”).
`3 Toyota Motor Corp. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, Case IPR2016-00418,
`Paper 13 (PTAB July 8, 2016) (“418-IPR Decision”).
`4 Toyota Motor Corp. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, Case IPR2016-00419,
`Paper 13 (PTAB July 19, 2016) (“419-IPR Decision”).
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`previously that the “integration subsystem” performs “integration” as
`defined in the ’342 patent. See 418-IPR Decision 14. In particular, the
`following passage of the Specification, which defines “integration,” supports
`the Board’s construction:
`As used herein, the term “integration” or “integrated” is intended
`to mean [1] connecting one or more external devices or inputs to
`an existing car stereo or video system via an interface,
`[2] processing and handling signals, audio, and/or video
`information, [3] allowing a user to control the [external] devices
`via the car stereo or video system, and [4] displaying data from
`the devices on the car stereo or video system.
`Ex. 1001, 8:64–9:3 (emphases and brackets added). Accordingly, guided by
`the express definition in the Specification, we adopted the above-described
`functions as the definition of “integration” subsystem.
`
`The passage above, however, focuses on “integration” and does not
`expressly address the term “subsystem.” With regard to “subsystem,” the
`Board noted in the 418- and 419-IPR Decisions that a “subsystem” is
`subordinate to another system. 418-IPR Decision 14; 419-IPR Decision 14.
`This interpretation necessitates explanation given the parties’ positions in
`this proceeding. For example, to resolve the parties’ dispute, we must
`determine whether a “subsystem” is itself a “system” that is subordinate to
`another system.
`
`We conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word
`“subsystem” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art requires
`that both the “subsystem” and the “system” to which it is subordinate must
`be “systems.” As evidence of this construction, we note that a dictionary of
`electrical and electronics terms defines “subsystem” as “[a] system which is
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`IPR2016-01473
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`subordinate to another system.” Subsystem, WILEY ELECTRICAL AND
`ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 755 (2004) (also defining the term
`as “[a] system which is a part of, or assists, a larger system”) (Ex. 3001); see
`also subsystem, ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND
`TECHNOLOGY 2126 (1992) (“a portion of a system that can be treated as a
`single element in the main system, but that can also be considered a distinct
`system itself”) (Ex. 3002).
`
`We also note that, although the Specification does not define the term,
`it describes the “integration subsystem” consistently with the
`above-referenced dictionary definition. Figures 18 and 19, for example,
`illustrate that integration subsystem 932, 1032 may be subordinate either to
`portable audio/video device 924 or car audio/video system 1010, depending
`on where the integration subsystem is located. Ex. 1001, Figs. 18−19; see
`also id. at Figs. 20−23 (similary depicting or describing the integration
`subsystem). More particularly, the written description corresponding to
`Figure 18 provides that for Figure 18, the portable device includes its own
`device electronics (“e.g., circuitry and components provided by the portable
`device manufacturer”) in addition to an integration subsystem or module and
`a wireless interface/transceiver. Id. at 34:9−13. For Figure 19, the
`Specification also states that the car audio/video system includes the
`integration subsystem in addition to the car system electronics (“e.g.,
`circuitry and components provided by an OEM [(original equipment
`manufacturer)] or after-market car audio and/or video system
`manufacturer”), wireless interface/transceiver, display, control panel, and an
`optional external interface port. Id. at 33:57−62, 35:21−28. That is,
`11
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`regardless of where it is positioned, the integration subsystem is a system
`distinct from any other system (e.g., the car audio/video system).
`
`Accordingly, based on the express definition of the term “integration”
`provided by the ’342 patent, we reiterate here our previous construction of
`the term “integration subsystem” from IPR2016-00118, IPR2016-00418, and
`IPR2016-00419 for purposes of this Decision:
`A subsystem to perform at least: (1) connecting one or more
`portable devices or inputs to the car audio/video system via an
`interface, (2) processing and handling signals, audio, and/or
`video information, (3) allowing a user to control the one or more
`portable devices via
`the car audio/video system, and
`(4) displaying data from the one or more portable devices on the
`car audio/video system.
`
`To the above definition, consistent with the broadest reasonable
`interpretation in light of the specification, we add that the “integration
`subsystem” is a “system which is subordinate to another system.”
`
`B. Obviousness Grounds Based, at Least in Part, on Marlowe
`Petitioner proffers three grounds of unpatentability that rely primarily
`
`on the combination of Marlowe and Plagge. Pet. 6. A short summary of
`these references and our analysis of these grounds follow.
`(1) Marlowe: Exhibit 1009
`Marlowe is titled “Audio Device Integration System.” Ex. 1009, [54].
`
`It relates to an “audio device integration system for integrating after-market
`components such as satellite receivers, CD players, CD changers, MP3
`players, Digital Audio Broadcast (DAB) receivers, auxiliary audio sources,
`
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`and the like with factory-installed (OEM) or after-market car stereo
`systems.” Id. ¶ 2. It describes an “integration system” that “connects to and
`interacts with the car stereo.” Id. ¶ 10. Marlowe describes formatting
`commands received from the car stereo’s control panel so the after-market
`audio device is able to recognize the command. Id. Audio from the audio
`device is channeled to the car stereo and information from the audio device
`is converted to a format recognizable to the car stereo for display on the car
`stereo’s display. Id. Marlowe describes the audio device, such as an MP3
`player, electronically connected to an interface and the interface
`electronically connected with the car stereo. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44.
`(2) Plagge: Exhibit 1011
`Plagge is titled “Vehicle Audio Device.” Ex. 1011, [54]. It describes
`
`a vehicle audio device that includes an interface for a CD changer and an
`interface emulator connected to the interface for the CD changer of the
`vehicle radio for playback of audio data stored in compressed form, such as
`audio stored in an MP3 player. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 8. The output of the playback
`device (MP3 player) for the digital audio signals is connected directly to an
`input of the vehicle audio device. Id. ¶ 9. The output signals of the MP3
`player, usually output to headphones, can be output directly to an audio
`input 3 of vehicle radio 1, from which the signals may be forwarded to the
`loudspeakers in the motor vehicle. Id. ¶ 17.
`
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`(3) Analysis
`
`Marlowe and Plagge5
`
`Petitioner asserts that Marlowe does not disclose the claim limitation
`
`of “a first wireless interface in communication with said integration
`subsystem.” Pet. 12.6 Although it admits that Marlowe does not disclose
`the recited wireless communication link, Petitioner asserts that Marlowe
`discloses the limitation requiring that the integration subsystem “receive[]
`audio generated by the portable device over said wireless communication
`link for playing on the car audio/video system.” Id. at 13−14. For this
`“receive audio” claim limitation, Petitioner focuses solely on Marlowe’s
`disclosure of an MP3 player connected to the car stereo system to allow
`audio from the MP3 player to be played through the car stereo. Id. at 14; see
`also id. at 16 (citing only Marlowe as disclosing the “receive audio”
`limitation identified by Petitioner as limitation (g)).
`On this point, Patent Owner points out two problems with Petitioner’s
`assertions. First, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s claim chart and
`explanations pointing out how the prior art allegedly meets the “receive
`
`
`5 This analysis also pertains to the ground relying on the combination of
`Marlowe, Plagge, and Riggs, concerning claim 57, as Riggs is relied upon
`for its teachings of spoken commands (Pet. 22−23), and does not cure any of
`the deficiencies identified with regard to the asserted combination of
`Marlowe and Plagge.
`6 For the wireless interface limitation, the Petition addresses Plagge’s
`disclosure of a wireless interface. Pet. 12. The claim chart for this ground
`and the accompanying explanation for the “receive audio” limitation,
`however, omit discussion or citations to Plagge.
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`audio” limitation are insufficient. Prelim. Resp. 18. In particular, Petitioner
`admits that Marlowe does not disclose a wireless communication link, yet
`Petitioner offers a contradictory position that Marlowe alone teaches or
`suggests receiving audio generated by a portable device over said wireless
`communication link. Id. 18−19. On this point, we agree with Patent Owner
`that the Petition is confusing. Reading the Petition broadly, however,
`Petitioner appears to rely on Plagge for teaching the use a wireless
`communication link for all the claimed wireless communications. Pet. 12
`(“Plagge discloses that interface emulator 4 (the integration subsystem)
`includes a wireless interface 5.”); Pet. 17 (“But unlike the interface of
`Marlowe, the interface emulator of Plagge is designed to communicate with
`a portable device via a wireless communication link.”).
`Notwithstanding our broad reading of the Petition, the arguments and
`evidence proffered with regards to the motivations to combine is
`insufficient. This is the second problem that Patent Owner points out.
`Prelim. Resp. 10. Specifically, Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that in
`Plagge, the audio from the portable device is transmitted through a wire
`connection, despite the disclosure of a wireless interface. Id. (citing Ex.
`1011 ¶ 17). This fact presents two questions. First, why would a person of
`ordinary skill in the art rely on a teaching of using the wireless interface in
`Plagge for receiving audio, when Plagge specifically teaches using wireless
`communication for control signals, but not audio. On the record before us,
`Petitioner fails to allege sufficiently how both Marlowe and Plagge would
`have been modified to implement wireless communication of control signals
`and audio generated by a portable device for playing. In other words, the
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`combination Petitioner puts forward applies “the wireless capability of the
`interface emulator of Plagge to the interface of Marlowe.” Id. But that
`proffered combination would not yield the claim limitation of wirelessly
`receiving audio from the portable device, unless both Marlowe and Plagge
`were modified to do so, a modification that Petitioner fails to allege
`expressly and we do not infer from the Petition.
`Second, even if we were to accept that a person of ordinary skill in the
`art would know generally to implement a wireless communication link
`instead of cables (as in Marlowe) for both audio and control signals,
`Petitioner’s mere allegation that improving versatility and ease of use would
`motivate such an implementation is insufficient. Pet. 17−18; see Prelim.
`Resp. 22 (Patent Owner arguing that “the motivations to combine set forth
`by Petitioner are all conclusory” and constitute boilerplate statements that
`lack rational underpinning under KSR). We agree with Patent Owner that
`the proffered rationale to combine the teachings of Marlowe and Plagge is
`conclusory and lacks a rational underpinning. Seeking “versatility” and
`“ease of use” is too generic a motivation, which, without more, fails to
`constitute a reasonable rationale with a rational underpinning. Petitioner
`offers no explanation of what versatility would be gained or what aspects of
`the system would be easier to use. There is no factual support for
`concluding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated by
`seeking some generic “versatility” and “ease of use.” Finally, relying on the
`Geier Declaration (Ex. 1007 ¶ 57) as support is insufficient, when, as here,
`the cited paragraphs in the Declaration are repeated in the Petition verbatim,
`and, thus, offer no more explanation or factual support than what appears in
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`the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Therefore, we are not persuaded that
`Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing with respect to the
`grounds that rely on the combination of (1) Marlowe and Plagge; and (2)
`Marlowe, Plagge, and Riggs.7
`Marlowe, Plagge, and Bhogal
`We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s assertion that “[i]t would
`have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to apply the
`wireless capabilities taught in Bhogal with the combined teachings of
`Marlowe and Plage to arrive at the claimed subject matter of claims 49
`and 73.” Pet. 25. Here, Petitioner admits that Plagge does not expressly
`disclose audio signals transmitted wirelessly from the MP3 player to the
`interface emulator. Id. at 26. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that Bhogal
`teaches transmitting wirelessly both commands and audio. Id. (citing
`Ex. 1013, 5:44−51, 7:39−42, 8:10−14). The portions of Bhogal that
`Petitioner cites, however, do not support the contention that Bhogal’s audio
`from the CD-changer unit is transmitted wirelessly to the interface emulator.
`For instance, Petitioner points to the “pass-thru mode” in which
`“commands” and “data” are being exchanged. Ex. 1013, 7:39−42. Further,
`the emulator may also read “tracks and track information” from the CD-
`changer unit. Id. at 8:10−14. These passages teach that Bhogal’s emulator
`handles commands, but not audio.
`
`
`7 See supra n.5.
`
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`Furthermore, to the extent Bhogal discloses use of a wireless
`communication link generally for connecting the emulator, car stereo and
`CD-changer units, Petitioner does not show that such a disclosure teaches or
`suggests that Bhogal also transmits audio wirelessly. See id. at 5:44−51. A
`teaching or suggestion of wireless transmission of audio for playing appears
`particularly suspect considering that Bhogal is concerned with “providing
`access to hardcopy digital audio files stored on CDs that are stored within
`the CD-changer.” Ex. 1013, 4:67−5:4; see also id. at 10:21−25 (“the
`emulator unit interprets the CD-changer control signals from the base unit to
`retrieve the digital audio data from the proper CD track or softcopy file and
`to send the digital audio data to the base unit from among the virtual CDs”).
`Petitioner fails to explain how Bhogal’s disclosure of accessing or retrieving
`digital audio files in any way constitutes receiving audio generated by the
`portable device over said wireless communication link.
`Notwithstanding the failure to show adequately that Bhogal teaches
`the “receive audio” limitation, Petitioner’s assertion of unpatentability
`regarding Bhogal suffers from the same deficiencies addressed above with
`regards to the proffered rationale to combine. For instance, Petitioner argues
`that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the
`time to apply the wireless capabilities disclosed in Bhogal to improve the
`interface of Marlowe, in view of Plagge, to improve its versatility and ease
`of use.” Pet. 26 (relying on Ex. 1007 (Geier Decl.) ¶ 95) (emphasis added).
`For the same reasons state above, the proffered rationale of “versatility” and
`“ease of use” is insufficient.
`
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`Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertions that the challenged
`claims are unpatentable over Marlowe, Plagge, and Bhogal.
`
`
`C. Anticipation and Obviousness Grounds Based on Silvester
`Silvester is titled “Method and Apparatus for Connecting a Portable
`Media Player Wirelessly to an Automobile Entertainment System.”
`Ex. 1014, [54]. It describes an automobile entertainment system that
`includes a compact disk player, a tuner, a cassette player, a set of
`loudspeakers, a video display, and a microphone, all of which are connected
`to a controller that controls their operation. Id. ¶ 18.
`In addressing the asserted ground of anticipation by Silvester,
`Petitioner contends that Silvester discloses the limitation “an integration
`subsystem in communication with a car audio/video system” by pointing to
`the automobile entertainment system. Pet. 27. In particular, Petitioner
`asserts that Silvester’s automobile entertainment system corresponds to the
`recited car audio/video system, and that various components of the same
`automobile entertainment system correspond to the recited “integration
`subsystem.” Id. Reproduced below is an annotated Figure 1 of Silvester
`(depicting the automobile entertainment system), which discloses, according
`to Petitioner, “system 100 and a subordinate integration system comprised
`of” the components identified in red. Id.
`
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`Figure 1 shows a block diagram of an automobile entertainment
`system 100, comprising controller 122 and various other components. Ex.
`1014 ¶¶ 3, 17−18.
`Patent Owner responds that Silvester does not disclose an “integration
`subsystem.” Prelim. Resp. 24−25. In particular, Patent Owner contends that
`the components identified by Petitioner in Silvester’s automobile
`
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`entertainment system do not comprise any “subsystem” that is subordinate to
`the remainder of system 100. Id. at 25. We agree with Patent Owner.
`As we stated above in our construction of “integration subsystem,” the
`subsystem and the system to which it is subordinate must both be systems.
`Petitioner’s selection of components from Silvester’s automobile
`entertainment system that allegedly form an integration subsystem
`eviscerates the system to which it is supposedly subordinate. For example,
`once the controller is identified as part of the “integration subsystem,” the
`automobile entertainment system has no controller with which to control the
`remaining (or non-selected) components of that system. Additionally, it is
`not enough to “cherry pick,” as Patent Owner points out, various
`components of the automobile entertainment system and label them a
`“subsystem.” Rather, Petitioner must show that the collection of the selected
`Silvester components within the automobile entertainment system operate
`together as a distinct system. An arbitrary collection of parts, without
`evidence of cooperation or coordination to serve a purpose or objective, is
`not a system. In sum, we are not persuaded that Silvester discloses the
`“integration subsystem” because Petitioner has not shown that the selected
`components of the automobile entertainment system comprise a system.
`Although Petitioner proffers additional obviousness grounds based on
`Silvester, those additional grounds pertain to claims that depend from
`claims 49 and 73, and none of those grounds cure the deficiency noted above
`with respect to the “integration subsystem” limitation. Pet. 6, 38−43.
`Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable
`likelihood of prevailing regarding unpatentability of all the claims
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`challenged on the basis of Silvester, either alone or in combination with
`other references.
`
`D. Obviousness Ground Based on Simon and Bhogal
`Petitioner contends that Simon teaches all the limitations of the
`challenged independent claims, except for the wireless communication link.
`Pet. 43−49. For the wireless communication link limitation, Petitioner relies
`on Bhogal. Id. In particular, Petitioner asserts that Simon does not disclose
`audio signals being transmitted over a wireless communication link. Id. at
`45. But “[i]t would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the
`art to apply the wireless capabilities taught in Bhogal to the teachings of
`Simon to arrive at the claimed subject matter of claims 49 and 73.” Id. As
`support, Petitioner states that “Bhogal teaches the use
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