IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
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`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
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`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
`Patent Owner
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`
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`Patent No. 7,489,786
`Issue Date: Feb. 10, 2009
`Title: AUDIO DEVICE INTEGRATION SYSTEM
`__________________________________________________________________
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`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`Case No. IPR2016-01448
`__________________________________________________________________
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`__________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`__________________________________________________________________
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`VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
`Petitioner
`v.
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`Patent No. 7,489,786
`Issue Date: Feb. 10, 2009
`Title: AUDIO DEVICE INTEGRATION SYSTEM
`__________________________________________________________________
`
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PETITION
`FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`Case No. IPR2016-01448
`__________________________________________________________________
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`Page No(s).
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`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED BECAUSE
`PETITIONER'S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ARE INCORRECT IN
`LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION, CLAIMS, AND THE LAW ................. 5
`PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONBLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS FOR ANY OF GROUNDS 1-4 AND
`THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED. ...................................................... 7
`A.
`Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. §
`103. ........................................................................................................ 7
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`B.
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`Claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 23, 24, 44, and 47 are Not Obvious Over
`Owens in View of Beckert and Cooper (Ground 1) ............................ 10
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`Interface and Connectors .......................................................... 10
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`First Code Portion ..................................................................... 16
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`Second Code Portion (Claims 1, 2, 4-8, 13, 14, 23, 24,
`57, 58, 60-65, 90, 01, 92, 94, 97, and 98) ................................. 21
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`Obviousness .............................................................................. 23
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`Claims 7 and 8 Are Not Obvious over Owens, Beckert, Cooper,
`and Ohmura. (Ground 2) .................................................................... 28
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`Claims 4-6, 57, 58, 60, 63-65, 86, 88-92, 94, and 97 Are Not
`Obvious over Owens, Beckert, Cooper, and Berry. (Ground 3) ........ 29
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`Claims 61 and 62 Are Not Obvious over Owens, Beckert,
`Cooper, Berry, and Ohmura. (Ground 4) ........................................... 29
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 29
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Federal Cases
`Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc.,
`IPR2015-00355 (PTAB, June 26, 2015) ........................................................ 8, 24
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`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.,
`IPR2013-00387 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014) .............................................................. 9
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`Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
`IPR2014-00454 (PTAB, Aug. 29, 2014) .................................................... 2, 9, 26
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`GN Resound A/S v. Oticon A/S,
`IPR2015-00103 (PTAB, June 18, 2015) ...................................................... 24, 25
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`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) .................................................................................... 4, 8, 9, 26
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`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 8
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) .......................................................................... 3, 8, 9, 25, 26
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`Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00939 (PTAB, Dec. 17, 2014) .............................................................. 9
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`Toyota Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2016-00422 (PTAB, July 6, 2016) ......................................................... 2, 5, 6
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`Whole Space Indus. v. Zipshade Indus.,
`IPR2015-00488 (PTAB, July 24, 2015) ........................................................... 8, 9
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`Federal Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 .......................................................................................................... 7
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ..................................................................................................... 4
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`Other Authorities
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ........................................................................................ 3, 4, 9
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ..................................................................................................... 6
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) ................................................................................................ 4
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`37 CFR 42.65(a) ....................................................................................................... 26
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`37 CFR § 42.63(a) ...................................................................................................... 6
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`37 CFR § 42.104(b)(4) ................................................................................... 3, 11, 24
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`EXHIBIT LIST
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`Exhibit #
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`Exhibit Name
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`2001
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`2002
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`2003
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`Joint Claim Construction Chart from Blitzsafe v. Honda 15-cv-
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`01274 (consolidated) (E.D. Tex.)
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`Volkswagen’s Motion to Stay from Blitzsafe v. Honda 15-cv-
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`01274 (consolidated) (E.D. Tex)
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`IPR2016-00421, No. 13 Decision Granting Institution -
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`Decision to Institute Inter Partes Review (P.T.A.B. Jul. 7, 2016)
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`IPR2016-00422, No. 12 Decision Denying Institution -
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`2004
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`Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review (P.T.A.B.
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`Jul. 6, 2016)
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On July 20, 2016, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”)
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`submitted a Petition (the “Petition”) to institute inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S.
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`Patent No. 7,489,786 (Ex. 1001, “the ’786 Patent”), challenging claims 1, 2, 4-8,
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`13, 14, 23, 24, 44, 47, 57, 58, 60-65, 86, 88-92, 94, 97, and 98 (“the Challenged
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`Claims”). Petitioner on the same day also filed two additional Petitions alleging
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`unpatentability of the related U.S. Patent No. 8,155,342 (“the ’342 Patent”)
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`(IPR2016-01445 and -01449).
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`Most of the Challenged Claims have already survived multiple attacks by
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`Toyota, Petitioner’s co-defendant in the related Texas Litigation. See Pet. at 1.
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`The Board denied institution as to all claims in IPR2016-00422 and as to all claims
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`in IPR2016-00421except for claims 44 and 47. Volkswagen repeats Toyota’s
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`mistakes, and this second salvo of art succumbs to at least the same critical
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`deficiencies.
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`The Petition should be denied because there is not a reasonable likelihood
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`that Petitioner will succeed on any of its four grounds of unpatentability, all of
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`which rely on obviousness combinations based on U.S. Patent Application No.
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`2002/0084910 (“Owens”), U.S. Patent No. 6,175,789 to Beckert (“Beckert”), and
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`U.S. Patent No. 5,774,793 to Cooper (“Cooper”). None of these references teach
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`or disclose the “interface” of the claims. All of the claims, other than claims 44
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`1
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`and 47, require a “first pre-programmed code portion” that performs command
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`conversion, and a “second pre-programmed code portion” that performs data
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`reformatting. None of the references teach either of these pre-programmed code
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`portions, and Petitioner does not even attempt to locate and point to code portions
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`in the amalgam of references. Instead, Petitioner resorts to broad generalizations
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`and base conclusions that reek of hindsight.
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`Furthermore, Petitioner ignores the Board’s prior construction of the term
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`“interface,” which is present in every Challenged Claim. In IPR2016-00422, the
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`Board stated:
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`Construing the term “interface” in light of the Specification, other
`language in the claims, as well as the prosecution history noted by
`Petitioner, we determine that—interface is a physical unit that
`connects one device to another and that has a functional and
`structural identity separate from that of both connected devices.
`In the specific context of claims 1 and 86, the connected devices are
`the car stereo and an after-market device. In the specific context of
`claims 44, 57, and 92, the connected devices are the car stereo and a
`portable device. Each of claims 1, 44, 57, 86, and 92 further requires
`the interface to include a microcontroller.
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`Toyota Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00422, Decision Denying
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`Institution, Paper No. 12 at 15. (P.T.A.B., July 6, 2016) (emphasis in original).
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`Because Petitioner ignored the Board’s prior construction and failed to identify
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`where the claimed “interface” element is found in any of the references, the
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`Petition is deficient pursuant to 37 CFR § 42.104(b)(4).
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`This is not a case of mere sloppiness or ignorance. Volkswagen ignored the
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`Board’s construction of “interface” because none of the references teach or
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`disclose the claimed “interface.” Thus, even if Petitioner had applied the Board’s
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`prior construction, it would have still been impossible to reconstruct the claims
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`from the prior art.
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`Furthermore, Petitioner’s obviousness arguments are woefully inadequate.
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`Petitioner fails to identify any differences between the prior art and the claims and
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`leaves such tasks to Patent Owner and to the Board. Moreover, the boilerplate
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`used by Petitioner does not pass muster under KSR. Even something as basic as
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`the “level of skill in the art” is left to the imagination––Petitioner does not include
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`it. The Petition should not be saved by the Andrews Declaration, which is
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`similarly insufficient. Additionally, to the extent there were to be more robust
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`arguments in an expert declaration, merely citing to that declaration without
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`discussing its substance would be an impermissible incorporation by reference
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`under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3).
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`In view of these and other fundamental deficiencies, Petitioner’s request for
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`inter partes review should be denied for at least the following reasons addressed
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`more fully below in this Preliminary Response:
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`(1) The Petition fails to properly construe several claim terms.
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`(2) The Petition does not “specify where each element of the claim is found
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`in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon,” as required by 37
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`C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4), because each Ground has at least one of the following
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`deficiencies: (i) failing to map each claim term to a specific teaching from an
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`asserted reference; (ii) providing citations to the asserted references that do not
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`teach the claim elements against which such citations are applied; and
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`(iii) mischaracterizing the citations to the asserted references.
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`(3) The Petition fails to identify the difference(s) between the claims and the
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`asserted references as required by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
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`(1966).
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`(4) The Petition fails to identify the level of skill in the art as required by
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`Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18.
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`(5) The Petition improperly attempts to support its assertions of obviousness
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`with mere conclusory statements and by impermissibly incorporating by reference
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`arguments from the Andrews Declaration (Ex. 1002) in violation of 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.6(a)(3).
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`Due to at least these deficiencies, the Petition does not establish “a
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`reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one
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`of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Patent Owner
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`explicitly reserves the right to provide further distinctions between the prior art and
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`the Challenged Claims. The deficiencies of the Petition noted herein, however, are
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`sufficient for the Board to find that Petitioner has not met its burden to
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`demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing
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`unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims.
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`II. THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED BECAUSE
`PETITIONER'S CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ARE INCORRECT IN
`LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION, CLAIMS, AND THE LAW
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`Petitioner failed to properly address the scope of the claim limitation
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`“interface” in its Petition, which term appears in every Challenged Claim and was
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`at the heart of Petitioner’s claim construction arguments in Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v.
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`Honda Motor Co., Ltd., et al., 2:15-cv-01274 (consolidated) (E.D. Tex.) (the
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`“Texas Litigation”). Moreover, the Board already analyzed the “interface” term at
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`length in the related IPR2016-00421 and -00422 proceedings where Petitioner’s
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`co-defendant Toyota challenged the same claims. In both the Texas Litigation and
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`in the prior PTAB proceedings, the Court/PTAB adopted a narrow construction of
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`the term “interface.” As described above, the Board held that the claimed
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`“interface” must have a separate structural and functional identity from both the
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`car stereo and from the portable device/after-market device. Toyota Motor Co. v.
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`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, IPR2016-00422, Decision Denying Institution, Paper No. 12
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`at 15. (P.T.A.B., July 6, 2016) (emphasis in original). The Board considered more
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`than just the parties’ positions in arriving at the construction above––it conducted
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`an extensive review of the intrinsic record and arrived at the above construction
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`independently of the parties. The Board’s construction was based on the
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`specification, other language of the claims, as well as the prosecution history.1 Id.
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`at 12-15. The Petition should be denied at least because Petitioner did not set forth
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`a construction for the “interface” term as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104.
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`Petitioner was not merely sloppy in drafting its Petition; the failure to
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`address the “interface” term must have been deliberate. Volkswagen should have
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`known that the “interface” term was relevant because (1) it advanced a narrow
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`construction at Markman in the Texas Litigation (see Ex. 2001 at 2); and
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`(2) Petitioner undoubtedly read and appreciated Toyota’s earlier-filed Petitions, as
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`evidenced by their participation in the joint defense group in the Texas Litigation
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`and in light of Volkswagen’s motion to stay in the Texas Litigation relying on the
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`PTAB decisions on institution (see Ex. 2002 at n. 10). Petitioner had ample time
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`in the weeks prior to filing this Petition to review and analyze the Board’s
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`1 Petitioner also notes that Patent Owner failed to include a copy of the prosecution
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`history of the ’786 Patent, despite citing to several portions of the record.
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`Petitioner has failed to follow 37 CFR § 42.63(a), which requires that “[a]ll
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`evidence must be filed in the form of an exhibit.” Accordingly, the Petition should
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`be denied for this additional reason.
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`Decisions in the -00421 and -00422 Denials (Ex. 2003 and 2004) and to appreciate
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`that the Board had already construed this term.
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`Petitioner’s tactical omission is transparent. The prior art advanced in the
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`instant Petition is simply not as robust as the art advanced by Toyota in the -00421
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`and -00422 Petitions, which have been denied on most grounds. Moreover, this
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`backup Petition does not point to any interfaces that are structurally or functionally
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`separate, as required by the Board’s construction, because the prior art advanced
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`herein does not teach such interfaces.
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`Should the Board determine that the “interface” term should be construed
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`consistently across IPR proceedings, the Petition should be denied because
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`Petitioner failed to point out where the previously construed interface exists in the
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`prior art.
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`As described in further detail below, the Petition should be denied on all
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`grounds.
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`III. PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A REASONBLE
`LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS FOR ANY OF GROUNDS 1-4 AND
`THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED.
`A. Requirements for Showing Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
`The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
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`determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any
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`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations.
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`Graham, 383 U.S at 17-18. The Board has held that a failure to identify the
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`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art is fatal to an
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`obviousness challenge. See, Apple, Inc. v. Contentguard Holdings, Inc., IPR2015-
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`00355, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 9 at 9-10
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`(PTAB June 26, 2015) (denying institution for failure to identify the differences
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`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art).
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`Furthermore, in proposing that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
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`of the invention would have combined the references in a particular way to meet
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`the claimed invention, an obviousness analysis must support the proposed
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`combination with “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning.”
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441
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`F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). A proposed combination cannot be supported
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`based on “mere conclusory statements.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. In a petition
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`seeking institution of an inter partes review, “articulated reasons with rational
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`underpinnings” must be found in the petition itself. Whole Space Indus. v.
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`Zipshade Indus., IPR2015-00488, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes
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`Review, Paper 14 at 15 (PTAB July 24, 2015) (“[C]onclusory labels do not
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`substitute for a fact-based analysis in the Petition establishing what is being
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`modified, and why it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`make the modification”). Id. at 17. The arguments needed to support a conclusion
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`of obviousness may not be incorporated by reference to another document. 37
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`C.F.R. §42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one
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`document into another document.”); Cisco Sys., Inc., v. C-Cation Techs., LLC,
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`IPR2014-00454, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 12 at
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`10 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014); see also Plant Science, Inc. v. The Andersons, Inc.,
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`IPR2014-00939, Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, Paper 8 at
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`15 (PTAB Dec. 17, 2014).
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`As set forth below, this Petition is deficient because it fails to meet the
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`fundamental requirements for demonstrating invalidity. First, the Petition does not
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`explain how the combinations of references teach each element of each claim. See,
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`C.B. Distributors, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V., IPR2013-00387, Paper 43 at 30-
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`31 (PTAB, Dec. 24, 2014). Second, the Petition fails to satisfy the tests of KSR
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`and Graham, the Petition does not identify the differences between the claims and
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`the asserted references; neglects to provide a fact-based rationale for combining the
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`references; and does not explain the specific ways the references are to be
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`combined. Whole Space Indus., IPR2015-00488, Paper 14 at 9 (“[R]egarding the
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`grounds based on obviousness, the Petition does not articulate specific
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`modifications of the references that support its asserted obviousness grounds, nor
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`does it provide a persuasive rationale for the proposed combinations of
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`references.”).
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`B. Claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 23, 24, 44, and 47 are Not Obvious Over
`Owens in View of Beckert and Cooper (Ground 1)
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`Petitioner’s arguments regarding the Owens reference miss the mark. As
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`Petitioner admits, Owens and Beckert were already considered by the Examiner
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`during prosecution. Pet. at 4-7. While these references relate to the “general
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`concept of interfacing auxiliary after-market devices with a car stereo,” they fail to
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`teach or disclose the claimed arrangements that include a microcontroller pre-
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`programmed to execute code portions that allow for the communication of
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`incompatible audio devices. Pet. at 6. This critical difference resonates through
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`each of the claim limitations, and the prior art set forth by Petitioner fails to teach
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`or disclose (i) the structure of the claimed interface, (ii) the “first code portion”,
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`and (iii) the “second code portion.” Without addressing these missing limitations,
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`Petitioner’s bare assertions that the claims would have been obvious due to design
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`choice or simple substitution cannot prevail.
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`Interface and Connectors
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`1.
`As a preliminary matter, and as set forth above, the Board has previously
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`held that the “interface” requires structural and functional separation between three
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`components: (1) the car stereo, (2) the interface, and (3) the aftermarket/portable
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`device. Petitioner, however, has not pointed out any such separation between the
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`components in the cited references. Additionally, while Petitioner generally points
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`to Owens, Beckert, and Cooper as allegedly disclosing the “interface” and
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`connectors, Petitioner does not specify where each element of the claim is found in
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`the prior art with any particularity. Petitioner’s claim charts do not cure these
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`deficiencies because this Board has expressly held that claim charts alone are not
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`enough to show a reasonable likelihood of success, and that merely presenting
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`citations and quotes in claim charts alone is a violation of 37 CFR § 42.104(b)(4).
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`See, GN Resound A/S v. Oticon A/S, IPR2015-00103, Paper 13 at 6 (June 18,
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`2015) (“It is a requirement of a Petition to align the evidence and arguments with
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`the various limitations of the challenged claims.”).
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`Even setting aside whether Petitioner failed to properly construe the term
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`“interface” as structurally and functionally separate from the car stereo and
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`aftermarket/portable device, the plain language of the claims requires that the
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`interface must include a microcontroller and be disposed between the first
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`connector and the second connector. Petitioner fails to point to such a
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`configuration in any of the references.
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`First, regarding Owens, Petitioner points to conflicting disclosures and does
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`not identify the interface. Petitioner cites to Figures 1 and 7, which are reproduced
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`below:
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`IPR2016-01448
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`PATENT NO. 7,489,786
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`Ex. 1003 at Figs. 1 and 7. Petitioner points to “the bus cable 17” as the first
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`connector, and appears to point to the “adapter harness 35” as the “second
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`connector.” Pet. at 25-26. Petitioner does not identify the specific component of
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`Owens that it alleges is the “interface.” For this reason alone, Ground 1 should
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`fail.
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`In the alternative, if one were to assume that Petitioner is relying on the
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`“A/V Interface Module” as a disclosure of an “interface,” Ground 1 still must fail.
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`The A/V Interface Module cannot be the claimed interface because it does not
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`include a microcontrolleras explicitly required by the claims. Petitioner
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`mischaracterizes the disclosure of Owens, specifically with regard to the disclosure
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`of a “master microprocessor” in paragraph 34. Petitioner sets forth the full quote
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`from Owens, which states that the microprocessor is in the head unit 10 and not
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`in the A/V Interface:
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`Each one of the peripheral modules is a digital data source which is
`assigned a time slot for communication with the master
`microprocessor in the head unit.
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`Ex. 1003 at ¶ 0027 (emphasis added). Below is an annotated version of Figure 1 of
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`Owens that depicts Patent Owner’s best understanding of Petitioner’s arguments:
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`Microcontroller
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`First Connector
`Second Connector
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`Ex. 1003 at Fig. 1 (annotations added). Under the Petitioner’s arguments, the
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`microcontroller is simply not in the interface because the head unit 10 is not
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`situated between the first connector and second connector as required by the
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`claims. Petitioner does not address this issue.
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`Next, regarding Beckert, Petitioner again does not identify an “interface”
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`disposed between two connectors for integrating an after-market audio device with
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`a car stereo. Beckert discloses a computer for vehicles, but does not contemplate
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`integrating after-market audio devices into a car stereo. Petitioner states that the
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`“support module” is the interface, that the “computer module” is the car stereo
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`(first electrical connection), and that the “USB hub” is the aftermarket device
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`(second electrical connection). Pet. at 16. However, the Petition includes no
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`support from Beckert for the “first connector” between the “support module”
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`(interface) and the “computer module.” Neither the body of the Petition nor the
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`claim chart contains a citation to a “first connector” disclosed in Beckert. Pet. at
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`14, 25
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`In addition, it is apparent from the physical embodiment of Beckert’s
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`computer 22 shown in Figure 1, reproduced below, that Beckert does not disclose
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`integrating after-market audio devices into a car stereo.
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`Ex. 1004 at Fig. 1. Petitioner does not identify which of the elements in Figure 1
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`are “car stereo” elements, which of the elements are “interface” elements, and
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`which of the elements are “after-market audio device” elements. Accordingly,
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`Petitoner has not shown that Beckert discloses the claimed interface and
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`connectors.
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`Finally, the Cooper reference is related to incorporating cellular telephones
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`into car stereos for making cellular calls and connecting the audio through the car’s
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`speakers. However, Cooper does not disclose sending any data over the cable 40,
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`which Petitioner alleges is the second connector. Instead, Cooper only discloses
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`two types of communication across the cable 40: (1) control signals, and (2) audio.
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`Ex. 1005 at 3:28-40; 4:11-20. Below is an annotated depiction of Figure 2 from
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`Cooper:
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`Alleged Second
`Connector
`Only Audio or
`“muting” signal
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`Ex. 1005 at Fig. 2 (annotation added). The lack of data transfer capabilities is
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`consistent with the lack of a “display” in the car stereo systems disclosed by
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`Cooper. In order to display information from the cellular phones, Cooper requires
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`an additional “visual display device” that is not provided by the automobile.
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`Ex. 1005 at 4:4-10. Thus, there is no use for any “data” to be sent across the cable
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`40. Accordingly, Cooper does not disclose the claimed “interface” because the
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`interface unit 36 does not receive data from the cellular telephone.
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`Even without taking into consideration the “structural and functional
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`separation” issue, the references, when combined, do not teach or disclose the first
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`connector and second connector connected to an interface that includes “a
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`microcontroller in electrical communication with said first and second electrical
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`connectors.” Petitioner does not acknowledge this deficiency, and Petitioner’s
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`boilerplate obviousness arguments do not remedy the lack of disclosure.
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`Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood
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`that it will prevail on Ground 1, and Ground 1 should be denied.
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`First Code Portion
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`2.
`Petitioner cites to various portions of Owens, Cooper, and Beckert as
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`allegedly teaching the “first code portion” limitation, however, none of these
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`references are configured in a way to make use of such a code portion. The “first
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`code portion” limitation requires:
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`a first pre-programmed code portion for remotely controlling the
`after-market audio device using the car stereo by receiving a control
`command from the car stereo through said first connector in a format
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`incompatible with the aftermarket audio device, processing the
`received control command into a formatted command compatible with
`the after-market audio device, and transmitting the formatted
`command to the after-market audio device through said second
`connector for execution by the after-market audio device
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`Ex. 1001 at Claim 1 (exemplary). This code portion performs three steps,
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`(1) receiving a control command from the car stereo through the first connector in
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`a format incompatible with the aftermarket audio device, (2) processing the
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`received control command into a formatted command compatible with the after-
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`market audio device, and (3) transmitting the formatted command to the after-
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`market audio device through said connector for execution by the after-market
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`audio device. Thus, a conversion is performed between the stereo’s control
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`commands and the after-market audio device’s control commands. Even assuming
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`that the references teach “control commands,” none of the references teach
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`conversion of control commands from a stereo format to an after-market audio
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`device format.
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`As described above, the microcontroller of Owens is located in the head unit
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`and not in what Petitioner alleges is the interface. See § III.B.1. Thus, Owens
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`cannot convert control commands in the interface, even if such conversion were
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`necessary.
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`Beckert does not contemplate or describe control commands being received
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`17
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`by a processor in a format incompatible with an after-market audio device.
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`According to Petitioner, “[o]nce the appropriate software for a new peripheral
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`device is installed, the system in Beckert integrates the device and transforms
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`commands to or from the peripheral device into the right format.” Pet. at 17-18.
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`However, Petitioner’s description of Beckert is misleading. Beckert does not
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`explicitly disclose any command conversion. Instead, Petitioner relies on citations
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`to “installing additional programs.” Ex. 1004 at 2:8-30. Even if Beckert does
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`disclose adding new programs and modules and enabling communication
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`therebetween, Beckert never states that conversion is necessary during normal
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`operation of the system. Accordingly, Beckert does not teach or disclose this
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`limitation.
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`Finally, Cooper only contemplates commands originating in the interface
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`itself. Petitioner alleges that “The after-market cell phones can be controlled
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`through commands from the automotive head unit.” Pet. at 18. However, none of
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`the passages identified by Petitioner actually disclose such control by the head
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`unit. First, petitioner relies on the following passage:
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`A first external signal path cable 40 connects the interface unit 36
`with the selected cellular telephone 42 for communicating control
`signals therebetween for controlling and/or monitoring the operation
`of the selected cellular telephone 42. Cable 40 also has a selected
`signal path configuration chosen from a plurality of such
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`18
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`configurations. Each configuration is adapted to select at least one
`pair of hardware and firmware drivers having, respectively, the
`operating circuitry and commands necessary for controlling the
`selected cellular telephone 42 to communicate command signals over
`cable 40 in response to the pair of hardware and firmware drivers
`selected to permit the control of cellular telephone 42.
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`Ex. 1005 at 3:29-41. This passage only describes control signals communicated
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`between the alleged interface and the cellular phone, not the head unit. There is no
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`indication that the signals originate in the head unit. Instead, the signals likely
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`originate within the interface itself.
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`Second, Petitioner relies on the followin
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