UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
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`Case No. 14-cv-13864
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`HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH
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`SIGNAL IP, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FIAT U.S.A., INC., et al.,
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`Defendants.
`________________________/
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`
`OPINION AND ORDER
`(1) CONSTRUING DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS; AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT
`DEFENDANT FCA US LLC’S MOTION FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST
`SIGNAL IP ON CERTAIN CLAIM TERMS (Dkt. 38.)
`
`
`
`This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiff Signal IP, Inc. alleges that Defendant
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`FCA US LLC has infringed upon four of its patents.
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`Pursuant to this Court’s standard procedure, the parties were to identify the disputed
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`claim terms within the four patents that they feel are material to the infringement and validity
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`issues in this case. The parties have submitted written briefs explaining their positions on how
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`the disputed claim terms should be construed (Dkts. 32, 39, 41). On August 3, 2016, the Court
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`held oral argument. In this opinion and order, the Court will construe the disputed claim terms
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`identified by the parties, pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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`Also before the Court is FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel against Signal on certain
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`claim terms (Dkt. 38). The issue is whether Signal should be collaterally estopped from
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`litigating the construction of the claim terms “unlock threshold” and “at a level indicative of an
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`empty seat” in U.S. Patent No. 6,012,007 because the United States District Court for the Central
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`District of California has already construed the terms, in whole or part, in another case involving
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`
`
`1
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`Toyota v. Signal IP
`IPR2016-01382, Ex. 2001
`
`

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`Signal. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies as moot FCA’s motion for collateral
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`estoppel.
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`
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`I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`On or about April 23, 2014, Signal filed 13 similar cases alleging patent infringement in
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`the United States District Court for the Central District of California against most of the major
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`automobile manufacturers, including this case against FCA.1 In this case against FCA, Signal
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`has asserted four patents involving three different types of technologies: (i) automobile airbag
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`deployment systems, (ii) a radar detection system to detect blind spots while driving, and (iii) a
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`tire pressure monitoring system. The four patents are: (i) U.S. Patent No. 6,012,007, entitled
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`“Occupant Detection Method and Apparatus for Air Bag System” (“’007 Patent”); (ii) U.S.
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`Patent No. 5,732,375, entitled “Method of Inhibiting or Allowing Airbag Deployment” (“’375
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`Patent”); (iii) U.S. Patent No. 5,714,927, entitled “Method of Improving Zone of Coverage
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`Response of Automotive Radar” (“’927 Patent”); and (iv) U.S. Patent No. 5,463,374, entitled
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`“Method and Apparatus for Pressure Monitoring and for Shared Keyless Entry Control” (“’374
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`Patent”).
`
`On October 7, 2014, Judge John A. Kronstadt of the United States District Court for the
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`Central District of California transferred this case to the Eastern District of Michigan (Dkt. 4).
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`This case was originally assigned to Judge Arthur J. Tarnow, but it was reassigned to this Court
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`on January 30, 2015 (Dkt. 17). On April 17, 2015, the United States District Court for the
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`Central District of California issued an order construing thirty six disputed patent claim terms,
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`including some of the claim terms at issue in this case.
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`1 On or about December 16, 2014, Chrysler Group LLC changed its named to FCA US LLC.
`“FCA” stands for “Fiat Chrysler Automobiles.”
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`
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`2
`
`Toyota v. Signal IP
`IPR2016-01382, Ex. 2001
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`

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`On May 11, 2016, FCA filed a motion for collateral estoppel against Signal on certain
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`claim terms (Dkt. 38). In the motion, FCA argues that Signal should be estopped from re-
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`litigating the constructions of two disputed claim terms in this case because those claim terms
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`were already construed by Judge Kronstadt in cases involving Signal against other automobile
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`manufacturers. FCA argues that it would be a waste of judicial resources to re-litigate the proper
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`construction of those claim terms in this case. Because FCA’s motion involves the construction
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`of disputed patent claim terms, the Court will consider FCA’s motion as part of this order on
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`claim construction.
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`On August 3, 2016, the Court heard oral argument from the parties regarding the proper
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`construction of the disputed claim terms, as well as FCA’s motion for collateral estoppel. At oral
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`argument, the parties, working with the Court’s special master, were able to come to an
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`agreement on the proper construction for some of the disputed claim limitations.
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`
`
`II. LAW OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Claims of a patent are short and concise statements, expressed with great formality, of the
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`metes and bounds of the patent invention. Each claim is written in the form of a single sentence.
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`Claim construction is the manner in which courts determine the meaning of a disputed term in a
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`claim. “The construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
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`language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claim.” Scripps
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`Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled in
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`part on other grounds by Abbott Labs v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
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`banc). The construction of key terms in patent claims plays a critical role in nearly every patent
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`infringement case. Claim construction is central to both a determination of infringement and
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`
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`3
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`Toyota v. Signal IP
`IPR2016-01382, Ex. 2001
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`validity of a patent. The judge, not a jury, is to determine the meaning of the disputed claim
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`terms as a matter of law. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 391.
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`
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`A court has two primary goals in construing the disputed claim terms. The first goal is to
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`determine the scope of the patented invention by interpreting the disputed claim terms to the
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`extent needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. The second goal is to provide a
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`construction that will be understood by the jury, which might otherwise misunderstand a claim
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`term in the context of the patent specification and prosecution history of the patent. See, e.g.,
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`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The terms, as
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`construed by the court, must ensure that the jury fully understands the court’s claim construction
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`rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103
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`F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed
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`meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary, to explain what the patentee
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`covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.”). The Court’s claim
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`construction ruling forms the basis for the ultimate jury instructions, although that is not to say
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`that the Court cannot modify its wording for the jury instructions after ruling on claim
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`construction. See IPPV Enters., LLC v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D.
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`Del. 2000).
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`The seminal case setting forth the principles for construing disputed claim terms is
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). According to Phillips, the
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`words of the claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary” meaning, i.e. “the
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`meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
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`the invention.” Id. at 1312-1313. The person of ordinary skill in the art views the claim term in
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`light of the entire intrinsic record, which is the entire claim, the other parts of the patent, and, if
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`
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`4
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`Toyota v. Signal IP
`IPR2016-01382, Ex. 2001
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`in evidence, the prosecution history of the patent before the United States Patent and Trademark
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`Office (“USPTO”). Id. at 1313-1314. Although a claim must be construed in view of the entire
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`patent, the court should normally not read limitations or features of the exemplary embodiments
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`discussed in the patent specification into the claims. Id. at 1323-1324.
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`The prosecution history of the patent can often inform the meaning of the claim language
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`by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
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`invention during the course of prosecution by his statements, making the claim scope narrower
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`than it would otherwise be. However, because the prosecution history is an ongoing negotiation
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`between the patent office and the patent owner, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it
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`often lacks the clarity of the patent itself and is generally less useful for claim construction
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`purposes. Id. at 1317.
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`In discerning the meaning of claim terms, resorting to dictionaries and treatises also may
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`be helpful. Id. at 1320-1323. However, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that
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`it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the indisputable public records
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`consisting of the claims, the specification of the patent and the prosecution history, thereby
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`undermining the public notice function of patents. Id. In the end, the construction that stays true
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`to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will
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`be the correct construction. Id. at 1316.
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`It is proper for the Court to construe the disputed claim terms in the context of the
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`infringement or invalidity dispute by viewing the accused device or prior art. Viewing the
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`accused device or prior art allows the Court to construe the claims in the context of the dispute
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`between the parties, not in the abstract. “While a trial court should certainly not prejudge the
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`ultimate infringement analysis by construing claims with an aim to include or exclude an accused
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`5
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`product or process, knowledge of that product or process provides meaningful context for the
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`first step of the infringement analysis, claim construction.” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
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`Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1326-1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit has
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`held that without “the vital contextual knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim
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`construction decision “takes on the attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava
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`Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`
`
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ANALYSIS FOR THE DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
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`In their briefs, the parties have requested that the Court construe eight claim terms from
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`four patents. The Court will address each disputed claim term in the following sections and note
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`where the parties have resolved their dispute regarding certain terms.
`
`A. Airbag Deployment System Patent: ‘375 Patent
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`1. Background on the ‘375 Patent
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`The USPTO issued the ‘375 Patent on March 24, 1998 to Delco Electronics Corporation,
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`which, according to publicly available information, was owned by General Motors Corporation
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`at that time and later spun off by General Motors Corporation into Delphi Corporation.
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`The ‘375 Patent is directed to a method of inhibiting or allowing deployment of an airbag
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`for a passenger seat of an automobile based on whether readings from sensors located in or on
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`the passenger seat indicate that the seat is occupied by an adult or a small child. The ‘375 Patent
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`explains that it is desirable to not deploy the airbag for a passenger seat if the seat is unoccupied
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`or occupied by a child. Moreover, research has shown that an airbag should not be deployed if
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`an infant carrier is facing rearward on a passenger seat. The ‘375 Patent teaches an improved
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`design for determining whether an adult or child is sitting in the passenger seat, or whether an
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`infant or child carrier located on the passenger seat is facing rearward, and then deciding whether
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`to deploy the airbag based on the determination of who is located on the passenger seat. For
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`example, in the “Summary of the Invention” section, the ‘375 Patent states:
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`It is therefore an object of the invention to detect a comprehensive
`range of vehicle seat occupants including infant seats for a
`determination of whether an airbag deployment should be
`permitted. Another object in such a system is to determine
`whether an infant seat is facing the front or rear.
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`‘375 Pat. at col. 1:44-49 (Dkt. 33-3).
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`
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`The ‘375 Patent teaches that locating sensors on the passenger seat in a symmetrical way
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`along the seat centerline can gather sufficient pressure and pressure distribution information to
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`allow determinations of the occupant type and infant seat position. More specifically, a
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`computer is programmed to obtain pressure readings from each sensor, to sum the readings from
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`all the pressure sensors, and determine the patterns of pressure distribution by evaluating groups
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`of sensors. Based on this information, the computer can determine whether the occupant is an
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`adult or a child, whether an infant carrier is present and whether the infant carrier is facing
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`forward or rearward, and then decide whether or not to deploy the airbag. Reproduced below is
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`Figure 2 of the ‘375 Patent which shows the layout of the sensors on a passenger seat according
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`to an embodiment of the patented invention.
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`
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`The ‘375 Patent states a microprocessor reads each sensor four times, and the values are
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`then averaged and bias corrected. The microprocessor then essentially compares the sensor
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`readings to a table stored in the computer’s memory which correlates the readings from the
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`sensors to whether an infant carrier is present on the seat and the direction that the infant carrier
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`is facing. The Summary of the Invention section of the ‘375 Patent, reproduced below, describes
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`the processes performed by the microprocessor in more detail:
`
`Total force [summed from all the sensors] is sufficient for proper
`detection of adults in the seat, but the pattern recognition provides
`improved detection of small children and infant seats. To detect
`infant seats, all patterns of sensor loading which correspond to the
`imprints of various seats are stored in a table and the detected
`sensor pattern is compared to the table entries. Front and rear
`facing seats are discriminated on the basis of total force and the
`loading of sensors in the front of the seat.
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`The pattern recognition for detecting children is made possible by
`applying fuzzy logic concepts to the pressure readings for each
`sensor in the array and assigning a load rating to each sensor.
`Pattern recognition is also enhanced by sampling several pairs of
`sensors, applying leveling technique to them, and computing a
`measure for the area of the seat covered by each pair. For all
`measures calculated within the algorithm, a contribution is made to
`an overall fuzzy rating which is used to handle marginal cases.
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`’375 Pat. at col. 2:4-21. The overall method of the invention is shown in Figure 3 of the ‘375
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`Patent, which is reproduced below.
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`
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`Figure 7 of the ‘375 Patent, reproduced below, shows how localized areas are checked for
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`force or weight concentrations. The sensors are divided into overlapping front, left, right and
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`rear areas, and the algorithm used by the computer determines whether all of the pressure is
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`concentrated in particular groups of sensors. The microprocessor then compares the readings of
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`the sensors to the table stored in the computer’s memory which determines whether the sensor
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`readings correlate with rails of an infant carrier and whether the infant carrier is facing forward
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`or rearward. The computer then determines whether or not to allow the airbag to deploy.
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`
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`Signal has alleged that FCA has infringed Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent. The parties
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`request that the Court construe two claim terms in Claim 11: (i) “on the passenger seat” and (ii)
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`“load rating.” Below the Court will address the proper construction of these claim terms.
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`
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`The Court reserves
`the right to address
`this claim
`construction at
`summary judgment or
`trial, if necessary.
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`2. “on the passenger seat”
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`Signal’s Proposed
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
`
`FCA’s Proposed
`Construction
`Located in or on the
`bottom cushion of the
`seat
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`Disputed Term
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`“on the passenger
`seat”
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`
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`FCA requests that the Court construe the term “on the passenger seat” in Claim 11 of the
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`‘375 Patent.
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`Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
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`11. A method of airbag control in a vehicle having an array of
`force sensors on the passenger seat coupled to a controller for
`determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
`force and force distribution comprising the steps of:
`
`measuring the force sensed by each sensor;
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`calculating the total force of the sensor array;
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`10
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`allowing deployment if the total force is above a total threshold
`force;
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`assigning a load rating to each sensor based on its measured force,
`said load ratings being limited to maximum value;
`
`summing the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a
`total load rating; and
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`allowing deployment if the total load rating is above a predefined
`total load threshold, whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed
`forces are distributed over the passenger seat, even if the total force
`is less than the total threshold force.
`
`
`‘375 Pat. at col. 7 (emphasis added).
`
`Claim 11 states that the patented system has “an array of force sensors on the passenger
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`seat.” Thus, the term “on the passenger seat” refers to the location of the sensors. The readings
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`from the sensors are used “for determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
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`force and force distribution” over the passenger seat. ‘375 Pat. at col. 7:3-4.
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`Signal argues that the claim language “sensors on the passenger seat” is clear and
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`understandable, and therefore does not need to be construed. Signal argues that FCA’s
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`construction improperly imports example embodiments of the invention from the written
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`description section of the patent into the claims, specifically, by proposing a claim construction
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`that requires the sensors be “located in or on the bottom of the cushion of the seat.” Signal
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`argues that FCA’s proposed construction “‘violates the fundamental canon of claim
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`construction . . . that limitations from the specification may not be read into the claims.’” Pl. Br.
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`at 14 (Dkt. 32) (quoting Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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`FCA argues that “on the passenger seat” should be construed to mean “located in or on
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`the bottom cushion of the seat.” FCA argues that it is not importing limitations from the written
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`description section of the patent into the claims. Rather, FCA states that its proposed
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`
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`construction just makes clear that the sensors are located in or on the seat cushion itself and not,
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`for example, in the seat rails on the floor of the car. FCA correctly points out that the
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`specification repeatedly and consistently refers to the sensors being located either “in” or “on”
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`the seat and no other location is disclosed. For example, the “Abstract” section of the ‘375
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`Patent states “sensors on a vehicle passenger seat . . . .” The “Summary of the Invention” section
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`of the ‘375 Patent states “A dozen sensors, judicially [sic] located in the seat. . . .” Id. at col 1:59.
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`Likewise, the “Description of the Invention” section of the ‘375 Patent states “The mounting
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`arrangement of sensors 28 on a bottom bucket seat cushion is shown in Figure 2” and “It will
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`thus be seen that airbag deployment can be allowed or inhibited by a pattern of resistive sensors
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`embedded in a seat cushion. . . .” Id. at cols. 3:21-22 and 5:31-37. FCA also notes that the
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`relevant figures of the ‘375 Patent show the sensors in or on the seat cushion. Specifically,
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`Figures 2 and 7, reproduced below, show the sensors distributed in or on the bottom cushion of
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`the passenger seat.
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`
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`At oral argument, Signal stated that the construction of this claim limitation is not
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`material to the outcome of this case (i.e., not material to the infringement or invalidity issues in
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`this case). 8/3/2016 Hr’g Tr. at 7 (Dkt. 53). Signal stated it opposed FCA’s proposed
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`construction simply because it may have collateral estoppel or otherwise be limiting in future
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`cases against unknown defendants.
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`On the other hand, at oral argument, FCA stated that the construction of this claim
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`limitation is material to the outcome of this case. Id. at 8. FCA stated that the accused infringing
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`FCA vehicles have sensors on the frame or rails that support the vehicle seat. FCA stated: “The
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`dispute is whether the term [is] broad enough to capture the supporting frame for the seat,
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`sensors in the supporting frame for the seat or whether they’re limited to the seat part which is
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`the cushion in our view. . . .” Id. at 9. However, the parties did not submit evidence of the
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`accused seats so that the Court can understand the context of the infringement dispute and give a
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`construction that is fully tailored to the issues involved in the case.
`
`At this point in the case, given the disagreement between the parties as to the materiality
`
`of this claim limitation and also due to the fact that parties have not briefed the Court as to
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`context of the claim construction dispute to the ultimate infringement or invalidity issues in the
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`case, the Court will exercise its discretion and wait to construe this claim limitation, if needed,
`
`
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`Disputed Term
`
`“load rating”
`
`Signal’s Proposed
`Construction
`Plain and ordinary
`meaning, or “a
`measure of whether
`the sensor is
`detecting some load”
`
`FCA’s Proposed
`Construction
`A measure of
`whether the sensor is
`detecting some load,
`which is different
`than the claimed
`‘force,’ and is used
`for pattern
`recognition purposes.
`
`Court’s
`Construction
`The load rating a
`measure of whether
`the sensor is
`detecting some load
`and is used for
`pattern recognition
`purposes.
`
`
`
`
`
`until summary judgment motions are filed or until trial. As stated earlier, without “the vital
`
`knowledge of the accused products,” a court’s claim construction decision “takes on the
`
`attributes of something akin to an advisory opinion.” Lava Trading, 445 F.3d at 1350. To the
`
`extent that nuanced constructions are proper and relevant to the infringement or invalidity
`
`arguments, the Court can re-address its claim construction at summary judgment or trial, if
`
`necessary. At summary judgment or trial, the Court can also determine whether the dispute is
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`one of claim construction for a district court judge to resolve or whether the dispute is really a
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`dispute of infringement to be decided by a jury.
`
`3. “load rating”
`
`FCA requests that the Court construe the term “load rating” in Claim 11 of the ‘375
`
`Patent.
`
`Claim 11 of the ‘375 Patent is reproduced below with the disputed claim term underlined:
`
`11. A method of airbag control in a vehicle having an array of
`force sensors on the passenger seat coupled to a controller for
`determining whether to allow airbag deployment based on sensed
`force and force distribution comprising the steps of:
`
`measuring the force sensed by each sensor;
`
`calculating the total force of the sensor array;
`
`allowing deployment if the total force is above a total threshold
`force;
`
`
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`
`assigning a load rating to each sensor based on its measured force,
`said load ratings being limited to [a] maximum value;
`
`summing the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a
`total load rating; and
`
`allowing deployment if the total load rating is above a predefined
`total load threshold, whereby deployment is allowed if the sensed
`forces are distributed over the passenger seat, even if the total force
`is less than the total threshold force.
`
`
`‘375 Pat. at col. 7 (emphasis added).
`
`The parties dispute whether the claim term “load rating” can be the same as the
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`separately recited “force” value measured from each sensor. Signal argues it can; FCA argues
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`that the plain language of the claim dictates that it cannot. Signal also disputes whether “load
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`rating” must be used for “pattern recognition purposes,” despite what appears to be a clear
`
`statement that it is used for such purposes in the written description section of the patent.
`
`Claim 11 includes both the terms “force” and “load rating.” Claim 11 states that the
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`patented system “[measure[s] the force sensed by each sensor;” then “calculat[es] the total force
`
`of the sensor array;” and then “allows deployment [of the airbag] if the total force is above a total
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`threshold force. . . .” Claim 11 ‘375 Pat. at col. 7:6-10. Even if the total force is below the total
`
`force threshold required for deployment of the airbag, the system will assign a load rating to each
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`sensor based on its measured force, said load ratings being limited to [a] maximum value;” then
`
`the computer/controller will “sum[] the assigned load ratings for all the sensors to derive a total
`
`load rating; and then allow[] deployment [of the airbag] if the total load rating is above a
`
`predefined total load threshold. . . .” Id. at col. 7:11-17.
`
`
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`Signal argues that the claim term “load rating” does not need to be construed and should
`
`be left to its plain and ordinary meaning or be construed to mean “a measure of whether the
`
`sensor is detecting some load.” Pl. Br. at 14.
`
`FCA argues that this claim term should be construed to mean “a measure of whether the
`
`sensor is detecting some load, which is different than the claimed ‘force,’ and is used for pattern
`
`recognition purposes.” Def. Br. at 13 (Dkt. 39).
`
`
`
`Both parties point out that the “Description of the Invention” section of the ‘375 Patent
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`gives a full or partial explicit definition or explanation of the term “load rating.” It states: “The
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`load rating a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for pattern
`
`recognition purposes.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:2-4.
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`
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`FCA also points out that the prosecution history evidences that “load rating” and “force”
`
`have different meanings. To overcome the prior art during prosecution, the patent owner
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`amended Claim 11, explaining that “Claim 11 has been re-written in independent format, and
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`recites a method of airbag control in which deployment is allowed based on total force above a
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`threshold or a total load rating above a threshold.” File Wrapper for ‘375 Patent, Ex. 10 pg. 2 of
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`FCA’s resp. br. (emphasis added); see also Ex. 10 pgs. 3-4 (distinguishing force from load rating
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`to overcome prior art).
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`
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`As explained below, the Court finds that the term “load rating” should be construed to
`
`mean “a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for pattern recognition
`
`purposes.” The Court reserves the right to modify or add to this claim construction as the
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`litigation issues become more clear or as needed to fully explain the concept of a load rating to
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`the jury.2
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`Both parties agree that the patent owner acted as its own lexicographer when it stated that
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`“[t]he load rating is a measure of whether the sensor is detecting some load and is used for
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`pattern recognition purposes.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:2-4. By submitting the definition directly into
`
`the written description section of the patent the patent owner acted as his own “lexicographer.”
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`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that to be a
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`lexicographer a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” other
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`than its plain and ordinary meaning). At this point in the case, the Court will adopt the exact
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`language set forth in the written description of the ‘375 Patent.
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`The Court’s construction differs slightly from the construction proposed by either party.
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`The Court did not adopt FCA’s proposed language that the “load rating be different from the
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`claimed ‘force.’” While the language of the claim requires that the load rating be “based on” the
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`“measured force,” the language of the claim does not require that the values be different numbers.
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`It may be possible that some systems could be designed where the load rating and force are the
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`same value in some scenarios, although the “units” may be different. For example, the written
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`description section of the ‘375 Patent gives an example embodiment of the invention within the
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`scope of the ‘375 Patent. It states “if a load is below a base value d, which may be four, the
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`rating is zero and if it is above the base value it is the difference between the base load and the
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`measured load up to a limit value of, say four.” ‘375 Pat. at col. 4:6-8; see also Claim 12 at col.
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`7:21-27. In this embodiment, the load rating and the force would be the same — not different —
`
`
`2 In their written briefs, the parties did not explain why this claim term needs to be construed in
`light of the infringement or invalidity issues in the case. Lava Trading, 445 F.3d at 1350
`(holding that a court should construe a claim term in the context of the infringement or invalidity
`dispute).
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`if either “d” or the force has a zero value. Requiring the load rating to be “different from” the
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`force, at least numerically, may be therefore inconsistent with the embodiment in the written
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`description.
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`The Court also rejects Signal’s proposed construction at this time to the extent that it
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`removes the language “for the purposes of pattern recognition” from the definition set forth by
`
`the patent owner in the written description section of the patent. This language makes clear that
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`the load rating “is used for pattern recognition purposes.” Quoting from Marrin v. Griffin, 599
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`F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010), Signal argues claim language such as this “merely states the
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`purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the
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`claim.” Signal argues that “[h]ere, the purpose is recited in the specification, so there is even less
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`of a reason to limit the claim in this manner.” Pl. Br. at 16.
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`Marrin v. Griffin is distinguishable from this case. Marrin addressed whether claim
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`language in the preamble of a claim should be interpreted to be a claim limitation. The Federal
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`Circuit noted that language from the preamble is normally not construed as a claim limitation,
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`especially language from the preamble of an apparatus claim that merely states the use or
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`intended purpose of the invention. Id. Moreover, the patent owner in Marrin expressly stated in
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`the prosecution history that the disputed language in the preamble was not a requirement of the
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`claim. Id. In contrast, the present case does not involve language in the preamble, but rather
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`language in the written description section of the patent expressly defining a claim term located
`
`in the body of the claim and describing its purpose. In Marrin, the Federal Circuit noted that
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`statements of purpose or intended use are generally not treated as claim limitations for apparatus
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`claims which normally set forth structure. The claim at issue here, Claim 11, is a method claim.
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`Disputed Term
`
`“whereby deployment
`is allowed if the
`sensed forces are
`distributed over the
`passenger seat, even if
`the total force is less
`than the total threshold
`force”
`
`Defendant’s
`Proposed
`Construction
`Defendant adopts
`Signal’s alternate
`prop