UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`YMAX CORPORATION,
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`Petitioner
`
`v.
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`FOCAL IP, LLC,
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`Patent Owner
`
`________________
`
`Case IPR2016-01260
`Patent Number: 8,457,113
`________________
`
`
`
`
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`PATENT OWNER FOCAL IP, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`TO PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
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`

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`Case IPR2016-001260
`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 7
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................. 2
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`DISCUSSION OF THE PSTN AND OVERVIEW OF THE ’113
`PATENT ................................................................................................. 3
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS.........................................................................10
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`Standard for Review...........................................................................10
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`Obviousness .......................................................................................11
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`Claims Cannot be Found Obvious if an Element is Absent ...........11
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`Reason to Combine or Modify Must Have Rational Underpinning
` ........................................................................................................11
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`Broadest Reasonable Interpretation ...................................................12
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`BRI Cannot be so Broad to Include Elements That Have Been
`Disclaimed or Disavowed ..................................................................14
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`GENERAL DISCLAIMER OF CONTROLLERS CONNECTED TO
`EDGE SWITCHES ...............................................................................22
`
`Disparaging Statements in the ’113 Patent ........................................22
`
`Applicants’ Statements in the Prosecution History to Distinguish
`over Schwab .......................................................................................28
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`’777 Patent Prosecution - First Response to an Office Action .......28
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`’777 Patent Prosecution - Second Response to an Office Action ..30
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`ii
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`III.
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`IV.
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`A.
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`B.
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`1.
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`2.
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`C.
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`D.
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`V.
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`A.
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`B.
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`2.
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`Case IPR2016-001260
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`VI.
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`A.
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`B.
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`VII.
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`A.
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`B.
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`VIII.
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`A.
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`Scope of General Disclaimer .............................................................34
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ................................................................35
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`“Switching Facility” ...........................................................................35
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`“Coupled To” .....................................................................................41
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`SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES .................................................43
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`SUMMARY OF SHTIVELMAN ......................................................43
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`SUMMARY OF O’NEAL .................................................................45
`
`ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................50
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 1 Are not Anticipated by
`Shtivelman..........................................................................................50
`
`The Claimed “Switching Facility” Cannot Be an Edge Switch .....51
`
`The Purported “Switching Facility” in Shtivelman is an Edge
`Switch .............................................................................................52
`
`Petitioner’s Secondary Argument Regarding the Breadth of
`“Coupled To” are Equally Deficient ..............................................53
`
`that has Been
`Shtivelman only Discloses Subject Matter
`Disclaimed ......................................................................................54
`
`Independent Claim 1 and Its Dependent Claims are not Anticipated
`by Shtivelman .................................................................................54
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`Dependent Claim 17 Is not Anticipated by Shtivelman .................55
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`Dependent Claims 18 and 19 Are Not Anticipated by Shtivelman
` ........................................................................................................55
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`iii
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 2 are not Anticipated by O’Neal ..
` ............................................................................................................56
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`The Claimed “Switching Facility” Cannot be an Edge Switch ......57
`
`The Purported “Switching Facility” in O’Neal is an Edge Switch,
`and the Purported “Call Processing System” is an Edge Device ...57
`
`Petitioner’s Secondary Argument Regarding The Breadth of
`“Coupled To” Are Equally Deficient .............................................58
`
`O’Neal only Discloses Subject Matter that has Been Disclaimed .58
`
`Independent Claim 1 and Its Dependent Claims are not Anticipated
`by O’Neal .......................................................................................59
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`Dependent Claim 17 is not Anticipated by O’Neal ........................59
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`Dependent Claims 18 and 19 are not Anticipated by O’Neal ........59
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 3 are not Obvious in View of
`O’Neal ................................................................................................60
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 4 Are Not Obvious by Shtivelman
`in View of O’Neal ..............................................................................61
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`CONCLUSION .....................................................................................61
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`iv
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`B.
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`C.
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`D.
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`IX.
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`Case IPR2016-001260
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`Paper No. 7
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.,
`Case IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 35, (PTAB August 24, 2015) ....................... 13
`
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................... 36
`
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp.,
`349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 11
`
`
`Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 16-18
`
`
`Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc.,
`Case IPR2014-00599, Paper 72 (PTAB September 16, 2015) .......................... 15
`
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................................................... 16
`
`
`Google Inc., et al. v. Arendi S.A.R.L.,
`Case IPR 2014-00452, Paper 31, (PTAB August 18, 2015) ............................. 15
`
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ............................................................................................... 11
`
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc.,
`452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................... 20-21
`
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ......................................................................... 12
`
`
`In re Baker Hughes, Inc.,
`215 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ......................................................................... 12
`
`
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`Case IPR2016-001260
`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 7
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`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................. 12
`
`
`In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC,
`822 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................... 14
`
`
`In re Rijckaert,
`9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ................................................................................... 11
`
`
`In re Royka,
`490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ................................................................................ 11
`
`
`Kingston Tech. Co., Inc. v. Imation Corp.,
`Case IPR2015-00066, Paper 19 (PTAB March 24, 2016) ...................................... 15
`
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................................ 11
`
`
`LG Electronics., Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
`Case IPR2015-00324, Paper 39 (PTAB May 23, 2016) ......................................... 15
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................... 13
`
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).................................................................... 12-13, 15
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................... 14
`
`
`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC,
`815 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................. 13
`
`
`Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`808 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 18-20
`
`
`Reckitt Benckiser Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84276 (D. Del. June 29, 2016) ..................................... 16-17
`
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`Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson,
`712 F.3d 549 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................... 16
`
`
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......................................................................... 13
`
`
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ......................................................... 16-18, 21-22
`
`
`Smith v. Snow,
`294 U.S. 1 (1935) ............................................................................................... 14
`
`
`Sony Corp. et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLC,
`Case IPR2015-00158, Paper 35 (PTAB May 19, 2016) ................................... 14
`
`
`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F. 3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 13
`
`
`The Scotts Co. LLC v. Encap, LLC,
`Case IPR2013-00110, Paper 79 (PTAB June 24, 2014) ................................... 14
`
`
`TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
`812 F. 3d 1056, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................ 12
`
`
`
`Rules and Statutes:
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................. 12
`
`37 C.F.R § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) ....................................................................................... 12, 61
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) .............................................................................................. 10
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`35 U.S.C. § 102 ................................................................................................... 1, 50
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`Paper No. 7
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ................................................................................................... 1, 50
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`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) .................................................................................................. 11
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`35 U.S.C. § 313 ......................................................................................................... 1
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ............................................................................................ 10, 61
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`Case IPR2016-001260
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`Paper No. 7
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`Declaration of Regis J. “Bud” Bates (“BatesDec”)
`Ray Horak, Communications Systems & Networks, (2nd ed. 2000)
`Ray Horak, Webster’s New World Telecom Dictionary (2008)
`Ray Horak, Telecommunications and Data Communications (2007)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 7,764,777 (“’777ProsHist”)
`Harry Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary, (23rd ed. 2007)
`
`
`2001
`2002
`2003
`2004
`2005
`2006
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`ix
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`

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`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R § 42.107, Focal IP, LLC (“Patent
`
`Owner”), the owner of U.S. Patent No. 8,457,113 (“’113 Patent”), respectfully
`
`submits this preliminary response to YMax Corporation’s (“Petitioner”) Petition
`for Inter Partes Review (“Petition”). As discussed in detail below, trial should not
`
`be instituted in this matter because Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a
`
`reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’113 Patent
`
`(Ex. 1001) is unpatentable. Accordingly, Patent Owner respectfully requests that
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`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the “Board”) issue a decision in favor of the
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`Patent Owner on all grounds.
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`On June 23, 2016, Petitioner filed the Petition seeking inter partes review of
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`Claims 1, 2, 8, 11, and 15, and 17-19 of the ’113 Patent (the “Challenged Claims”).
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`Specifically, Petitioner argues that these claims are unpatentable under the
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`following four grounds:
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`• Ground 1: Claims 1, 2, 8, 15, and 17-19 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. §
`102 by International Publication No. WO 99/14924 to Shtivelman et al.
`
`(“Shtivelman”).
`
`• Ground 2: Claims 1, 2, 8, 11, 15, and 17-19 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102 by U.S. Patent No. 6,463,145 to O’Neal et al. (“O’Neal).
`
`• Ground 3: Claims 1, 11, and 15-17 are obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in
`light of O’Neal.
`
`• Ground 4: Claims 1, 2, 8, 15, and 17-19 are obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103
`
`over Shtivelman in light of O’Neal.
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`Petition, p. 4 (hereinafter “Pet.”).
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`Patent Owner submits that the Challenged Claims are patentable over the
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`references cited in Grounds 1, 2, 3, and 4 above because the references fail to
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`disclose, alone or in combination, each element of the independent Challenged
`Claims (i.e., Claim 1). Further, Petitioner failed to meet its burden, by a
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`preponderance of the evidence, that any of the Challenged Claims are obvious
`
`because Petitioner has not sufficiently shown any reasons, with rational
`
`underpinning, to combine the references.
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`II.
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`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`After analyzing the claim language, specification, and prosecution history, a
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`person of skill in the art (a “POSA”) would clearly understand that (i) Applicants
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`disclaimed application of call control features through an edge switch or an edge
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`device; and (ii) the Challenged Claims’ “controller”/“call processing system” is in
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`communication with or coupled to a “switching facility,” and that such “switching
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`facility” cannot be edge switch or edge device.
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`
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`Both Shtivelman and O’Neal, alone or in combination, are totally devoid of
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`any teaching, suggestion, or disclosure of “the call processing system coupled to at
`
`least one switching facility of the telecommunications network,” as recited in
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`independent Challenged Claim 1. Rather, Shtivelman and O’Neal only teach that
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`their purported “call processing system” is coupled to an edge switch.
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`For at least the foregoing reasons, the Petition falls far short of providing a
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`preponderance of the evidence that Grounds 1, 2, 3, or 4 render any of the
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`Challenged Claims unpatentable.
`
`III. DISCUSSION OF THE PSTN AND OVERVIEW OF THE ’113
`
`PATENT
`Before discussing ’113 Patent, a general description of the public telephone
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`network is in order. The public telephone network is often associated with the
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`acronym PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network). While Petitioner and
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`Patent Owner disagree over what is and is not included in the PSTN, there are
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`areas of agreement. All parties seemingly agree that the core networks of
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`“traditional” telecommunications companies (e.g., AT&T) used to route voice calls
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`from one phone to another are part of the PSTN. For example, a voice call from a
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`“wired” analog telephone in California on an AT&T network to another “wired”
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`analog telephone in New York on a Verizon network will traverse the PSTN.
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`EX2001 (“BatesDec”), ¶36.
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`To connect phones in distant locations, the PSTN employs various
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`equipment to route calls. This equipment includes switches and databases, and is
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`arranged in a hierarchical fashion:
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`Class 1
`.‘nternat:‘cma.‘
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`Gateway Exchange
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`Class 2
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`Class 3
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`Telephone Exchange
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`Class 4
`Tandem Switch
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`Class 5
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`4
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`BatesDec, ¶37. Notably, the same hierarchical levels/equipment may be referred
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`to by a variety of names. In both examples above, the class 4 level refers to both a
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`“toll center” and a “tandem switch.” This understanding is important because the
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`’113 Patent and prior art references sometimes use different terminology to refer to
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`the same hierarchical level. BatesDec, ¶37.
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`At the top of the hierarchy are regional toll centers (class 1 offices). These
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`offices are interconnected with sectional toll centers (class 2 offices), which in turn
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`connect to primary centers (class 3 offices). As a point of reference, in 1984 (the
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`year AT&T was broken up into the “Baby Bells”), there were 10 class 1 centers, 67
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`class 2 centers, and 200 class 3 centers. Ray Horak, Communications Systems &
`Networks 159-61, (2nd ed. 2000) (Ex. 2002).
`Class 4 and 5 levels comprise the rest of the hierarchy and are of particular
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`relevance to the ’113 Patent. Class 4 centers contain tandem switches. Class 4
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`centers are also referred to as toll centers, and tandem switches are also referred to
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`as Class 4 switches or toll switches. As a point of reference, in 1984, there were
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`approximately 940 tandem switches. Id.; BatesDec, ¶39.
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`Tandem switches have been defined as:
`High-capacity switch[es] positioned in the physical core, or backbone,
`of [the PSTN], where [they] serve to interconnect edge switches, or
`Central Office (CO) switches.
`
`Ray Horak, Webster’s New World Telecom Dictionary (2008), 474 (“Telecom.
`
`Dict.”) (Ex. 2003); and
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`[N]etwork switches that serve in partnership with lesser switches,
`linking them together. In other words and in the classic sense, tandem
`switches serve no end users directly; rather, they serve to interconnect
`switches over dedicated
`interoffice
`trunks,
`forming a
`fully
`interconnected and toll-free metropolitan calling area in the process.
`
`Ray Horak, Telecommunications and Data Communications (2007), 212 (Ex.
`
`2004). The ’113 Patent refers to a “PSTN tandem switch” as “exchanges that
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`direct telephone calls (or other traffic) to central offices [] or to other tandem
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`switches.” ’113 Patent, 4:47-49; BatesDec, ¶40.
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`As stated above, tandem switches serve to interconnect Class 5 offices that
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`contain edge switches. Edge switches are sometimes referred to as central offices
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`(“COs”), and vice versa. In 1984, there were thousands of COs containing edge
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`switches in the U.S. Central offices have been defined as:
`[Offices] which serve end users through local loop connections [local
`loops are the actual copper wires that run from a customer’s premises
`to the central office].
`
`Ex2002 at 159; and
`. . . a CO traditionally houses one or more voice-optimized circuit
`switches to interconnect subscriber lines within a local area known as
`the carrier serving area (CSA) and to connect subscriber local loops to
`network trunks.
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`Ex2003 at 102; BatesDec, ¶41.
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`These dictionary definitions are consistent with the disclosures of tandem
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`switches and edge switches in the ’113 Patent:
`The [PSTN] consists of a plurality of edge switches connected to
`telephones on one side and to a network of tandem switches on the
`other. The tandem switch network allows connectivity between all of
`the edge switches, and a signaling system is used by the PSTN to
`allow calling and to transmit both calling and called party identity.
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`’113 Patent, 1:45-51 and Fig. 2. The most salient points regarding tandem
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`switches and edge switches, as confirmed by both extrinsic and intrinsic evidence,
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`are (1) edge switches are connected directly to subscribers or edge devices via end-
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`lines (i.e., there are copper wires (or other media) that run directly between the
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`edge switches and subscribers); and (2) tandem switches are not directly connected
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`to subscribers or edge devices, but are instead connected to edge switches and
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`other tandem switches. BatesDec, ¶42.
`
`In the PSTN, before one subscriber is able to have a voice communication
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`with another subscriber, the call must be “set up.” Setting-up a call refers to the
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`exchange of control signaling that cause the establishment of a path over which
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`voice data can flow. In the PSTN, voice paths are established on demand, as
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`needed, in order to conserve resources. BatesDec, ¶43.
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`At the time of the inventions, the PSTN utilized the Signaling System 7
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`(“SS7”) protocol to set up calls. SS7 signaling flows between one CO and another,
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`including all switches in between (e.g., tandem switches). SS7 signaling does not
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`flow past COs to edge devices, as edge devices are not equipped to process and
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`respond to SS7 signaling. BatesDec, ¶44.
`
`Generally, the ’113 Patent relates to the provision of call control features in
`
`a public telephone network. Call forwarding (e.g., transferring a voice call
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`originally directed to 703-555-1212 to an alternate telephone number) is an
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`exemplary call control feature. The ’113 Patent discloses a Tandem Access
`
`Controller (“TAC”) that implements call control features. The TAC is a
`
`combination of computing hardware and software
`
`that
`
`is appropriately
`
`programmed to process calls. ’113 Patent, 4:35-39; BatesDec, ¶45.
`
`The Background section acknowledges that, at the time of the invention,
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`various devices existed to provide call control features. One novel and important
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`aspect of the ’113 Patent concerns where in the PSTN such call control features are
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`implemented. As discussed in more detail below, the ’113 Patent expressly
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`recognizes that prior art call control devices were attached to an edge device (e.g.,
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`phones and PBXs) or an edge switch located in a central office. ’113 Patent 1:51-
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`67; 2:40-44. These prior art edge devices receive a call on one line, dial out on
`
`another line, and connect the two lines together at an edge switch. BatesDec, ¶46.
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`By contrast, the ’113 Patent discloses connecting the TAC to a tandem
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`switch (hence the name Tandem Access Controller). This arrangement allows
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`calls to be intercepted and processed before they are handed off to the CO (edge
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`switch) associated with the called party. Stated differently, instead of a call being
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`passed to a destination CO, then on to a controller connected to the CO which
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`would a perform call control feature, the TAC processes the call at a tandem switch
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`before it is ever routed to the destination CO. BatesDec, ¶47.
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`This novel arrangement has several advantages. The first advantage
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`concerns costs. Calls coming into and out of controllers connected to COs
`incurred charges for each incoming and outgoing call. See ’113 Patent 2:17-21
`
`(discussing this scenario). BatesDec, ¶48.
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`In a call forwarding scenario using the present invention, the TAC intercepts
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`the call at the Class 4 level before it reaches the destination CO edge switch. As a
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`result, the call from called party to the calling party is processed by the TAC
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`before it reaches the CO associated with the called number. The TAC then
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`initiates call signaling to set up the call to the forwarding number, and connects the
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`original call to the one arranged by the TAC. This process is invisible to the called
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`and calling parties, and incurs less tolls than the prior art solutions discussed in the
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`’113 Patent. ’113 Patent, 4:55-5:3. BatesDec, ¶49.
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`Another advantage regarding the TAC’s placement at a tandem switch
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`concerns call quality. Running an analog voice signal from an edge switch to an
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`edge device over copper wire degrades the quality of the signal (an edge device is a
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`device connected to an edge switch, typically on a customer’s premises, such as a
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`private branch exchange (PBX) or a generic telephone – see ’113 Patent, 5:4-6).
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`The prior art call forwarding solution suffers from this degradation twice: once
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`from the calling party’s call to the controller connected to the CO, and once from
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`the controller’s call to the forwarding number. On the other hand, handling calls at
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`the tandem level maintains the quality of the call, as it is processed within the
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`PSTN, where the signal may be in digital form and/or carried over high-quality
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`lines (as compared to the local loops that carry a call from a CO to a phone). ’113
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`Patent, 1:59-65; 2:41-51; BatesDec, ¶50.
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`IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
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`Standard for Review
`A.
`The Board may grant a petition for inter partes review only where “the
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`information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood
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`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
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`in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
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`B. Obviousness
`Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that “[a] patent may not be obtained .
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`. . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
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`art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
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`the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
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`subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The obviousness analysis requires a
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`number of threshold inquiries. The level of a POSA must be established, the scope
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`and content of the prior art must be determined, and any differences between the
`prior art and the claims at issue must be ascertained. Graham v. John Deere Co. of
`Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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`Claims Cannot be Found Obvious if an Element is Absent
`1.
`If a single element of the claim is absent from the prior art, the claims cannot
`be considered obvious. See CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333,
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`1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[O]bviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a
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`claim.”) (citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); In re Rijckaert, 9
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`F.3d 1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing obviousness rejection where prior art
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`did not teach or suggest all claim limitations).
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`Reason to Combine or Modify Must Have Rational
`2.
`Underpinning
`The conclusion of obviousness based on a combination of references must
`be supported with explicit analysis of a reason to combine those references. KSR
`Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The Federal Circuit has stated
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`that such reasons must be more than “mere conclusory statements; instead, there
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`must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
`legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
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`accord Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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`(agreeing with the district court’s reasoning that “some kind of motivation must be
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`shown from some source, so that the jury can understand why a person of ordinary
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`skill would have thought of either combining two or more references or modifying
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`one to achieve the patented method”).
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`C. Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
`The Board interprets claims in an unexpired patent using the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation (BRI) in light of the specification of the patent in which
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`they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation,
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`words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is
`inconsistent with the specification and prosecution history.” TriVascular, Inc. v.
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`Samuels, 812 F. 3d 1056, 1062, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949, *7 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Under this standard, “claims should always be read in light of the specification and
`teachings in the underlying patent claim.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789
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`F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[T]he Board’s construction ‘cannot be
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`divorced from the specification and the record evidence,’ and ‘must be consistent
`with the one that those skilled in the art would reach.’” Id. The construction must
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`be “reasonable in light of the totality of the written description.” In re Baker
`Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`It is important to note that there are practical limits to how “broad” an
`interpretation may be. “Above all, [it] must be reasonable in light of the claims
`and specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC,
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`815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); see also SAS Institute,
`Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While we
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`have endorsed the Board’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in
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`IPR proceedings, we also take case to not read ‘reasonable’ out of the standard.”).
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`The Federal Circuit has indicated that the prosecution history may be an
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`important component of intrinsic evidence in construing claims, even when a
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`broadest reasonable construction standard applies. Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.,
`IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 35 (citing Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.
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`3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In claim construction, this court gives primacy to
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`the language of the claims, followed by the specification. Additionally, the
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`prosecution history, while not literally within the patent document, serves as
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`intrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction. This remains true in
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`construing patent claims before the PTO.”)); see also Microsoft Corp. v.
`Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The PTO should also
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`consult the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has
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`been brought back to the agency for a second review.”) (citing Tempo Lighting,
`742 F.3d at 977); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1349
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`Additionally, the Federal Circuit has found it reasonable to infer that the
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`Patent Office would not have issued an invalid patent—particularly in cases
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`involving prior art that the Patent Office expressly considered during original
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`examination. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`(“[W]e have looked to whether it is reasonable to infer that the PTO would not
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`have issued an invalid patent, and that the ambiguity in the claim language should
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`therefore be resolved in a manner that would preserve the patent’s validity.”)
`Under Phillips and Supreme Court jurisprudence, an issued patent is entitled to an
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`interpretation that preserves its validity: “In such circumstances, if the claim were
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`fairly susceptible of two constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to
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`the patentee his actual invention, rather than to adopt a construction fatal to the
`grant.” Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
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`D. BRI Cannot be so Broad to Include Elements That Have Been
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`Disclaimed or Disavowed
`The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of
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`a claim term cannot be so broad as to include a configuration expressly disclaimed
`in the specification.” In re Man Mach. Interface T