`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`YMAX CORPORATION
`
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`FOCAL IP, LLC,
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`Patent Owner
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`________________
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`Case IPR2016-01256
`Patent Number: 8,155,298
`________________
`
`
`
`
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`PATENT OWNER FOCAL IP, LLC’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`TO PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW
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`Case IPR2016-001256
`Patent 8,155,298
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`Paper No. 7
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` I.
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................. 1
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`DISCUSSION OF THE PSTN AND OVERVIEW OF THE ’298
`PATENT ................................................................................................. 2
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`LEGAL STANDARDS.........................................................................10
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`Standard for Review...........................................................................10
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`Obviousness .......................................................................................10
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`Claims Cannot be Found Obvious if an Element is Absent ..................11
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`Reason to Combine or Modify Must Have Rational Underpinning ......11
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`Broadest Reasonable Interpretation ...................................................12
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`BRI Cannot be so Broad to Include Elements That Have Been
`Disclaimed or Disavowed ..................................................................14
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`GENERAL DISCLAIMER OF CONTROLLERS CONNECTED TO
`EDGE SWITCHES ...............................................................................21
`
`Disparaging Statements in the ’298 Patent ........................................21
`
`Applicants’ Statements in the Prosecution History to Distinguish over
`Schwab ...............................................................................................27
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`’777 Patent Prosecution - First Response to an Office Action ..............27
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`’777 Patent Prosecution - Second Response to an Office Action .........29
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`Scope of General Disclaimer .............................................................32
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`ii
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`1.
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`2.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`V.
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`A.
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`B.
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`1.
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`2.
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`C.
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`VI.
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`VII.
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`A.
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`VIII.
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`A.
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS ................................................................33
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`“Switching Facility” ...........................................................................34
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`“Coupled To” .....................................................................................40
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`“Controller” ........................................................................................41
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`SUMMARY OF THE REFERENCES .................................................42
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`Summary of O’Neal ...........................................................................42
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`ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................46
`
`The Challenged Claims of Ground 1 Are not Anticipated by
`O’Neal ................................................................................................47
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`The Claimed “Switching Facility” Cannot Be an Edge Switch ............47
`
`The Purported “Switching Facility” in O’Neal is an Edge Switch, and the
`Purported “Eeb-Enabled Processing System” is an Edge Device .........48
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`Petitioner’s Secondary Argument Regarding The Breadth of “Coupled
`To” Are Equally Deficient .....................................................................49
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`O’Neal only Discloses Subject Matter that has Been Disclaimed ........50
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 2 are not Obvious by O’Neal in
`View of McMullin .............................................................................50
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`The Challenged Claims of Ground 3 Are Not Obvious by O’Neal in
`View of Chang ...................................................................................51
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`CONCLUSION .....................................................................................51
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`iii
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`B.
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`C.
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`IX.
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases:
`
`Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.,
`Case IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 35, (PTAB August 24, 2015) ....................... 13
`
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................... 35
`
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp.,
`349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 11
`
`
`Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 15-17
`
`
`Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc.,
`Case IPR2014-00599, Paper 72, (PTAB September 16, 2015) ......................... 14
`
`
`GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc.,
`750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................................................... 15
`
`
`Google Inc., et al. v. Arendi S.A.R.L.,
`Case IPR 2014-00452, Paper 31, (PTAB August 18, 2015) ............................. 15
`
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
`383 U.S. 1 (1966) ............................................................................................... 11
`
`
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc.,
`452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................... 19-20
`
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ......................................................................... 11
`
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`In re Baker Hughes, Inc.,
`215 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ......................................................................... 12
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`In re Kahn,
`441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................... 11
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`In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC,
`822 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......................................................................... 14
`
`
`In re Rijckaert,
`9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ............................................................................. 11
`
`
`In re Royka,
`490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ........................................................................... 11
`
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`Kingston Tech. Co., Inc. v. Imation Corp.,
`Case IPR2015-00066, Paper 19, (PTAB March 24, 2016) ............................... 14
`
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`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ........................................................................................... 11
`
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`LG Electronics., Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
`Case IPR2015-00324, Paper 39, (PTAB May 23, 2016) .................................. 14
`
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ......................................................................... 13
`
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 12-13, 15
`
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`Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`808 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................... 17-19
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ......................................................................... 13
`
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`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC,
`815 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................... 12
`
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`Reckitt Benckiser Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84276 (D. Del. June 29, 2016) .................................... 16
`v
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`Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson,
`712 F.3d 549 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................... 16
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`SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......................................................................... 12
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`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .............................................................. 16, 20-21
`
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`Smith v. Snow,
`294 U.S. 1 (1935) ............................................................................................... 14
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`Sony Corp. et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLC,
`Case IPR2015-00158, Paper 35, (PTAB May 19, 2016) .................................. 14
`
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`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F. 3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 13
`
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`The Scotts Co. LLC v. Encap, LLC,
`Case IPR2013-00110, Paper 79, (PTAB June 24, 2014) .................................. 14
`
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`TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
`812 F. 3d 1056, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................ 12
`
`
`Rules and Statutes:
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................. 12
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) ............................................................................................. 51
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) .............................................................................................. 10
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`35 U.S.C. § 102 ....................................................................................................... 46
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ....................................................................................................... 46
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`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) .................................................................................................. 10
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`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ............................................................................................ 10, 51
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`LIST OF EXHIBITS
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`2001
`2002
`2003
`2004
`2005
`2006
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`Declaration of Regis J. “Bud” Bates (“BatesDec”)
`Ray Horak, Communications Systems & Networks, (2nd ed. 2000)
`Ray Horak, Webster’s New World Telecom Dictionary (2008)
`Ray Horak, Telecommunications and Data Communications (2007)
`Prosecution History of U.S. Patent No. 7,764,777 (“’777ProsHist”)
`Harry Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary, (23rd ed. 2007)
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`viii
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner filed this Petition seeking inter partes review of Claim 1 of the ’298
`Patent (the “Challenged Claims”) based on one ground. As set forth herein, the
`Challenged Claims are patentable over the references cited in Ground 1 because (i)
`the primary reference discloses a system whose configuration was expressly
`disclaimed by Applicants from the scope of their invention, and (ii) all references
`fail to disclose, alone or in combination, each element of the independent Challenged
`Claim. Further, Petitioner failed to meet its burden, by a preponderance of the
`evidence, that the Challenged Claim is obvious because the Petition does not
`demonstrate reasons, with rational underpinning, to combine the references.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`II.
`After analyzing the claim language, specification, and prosecution history, a
`
`person of skill in the art (a “POSA”) would clearly understand that (i) Applicants
`disclaimed application of call control features through an edge switch or an edge
`device; and (ii) the Challenged Claim’s “web-enabled processing system” is coupled
`to at least one “switching facility,” and that such “switching facility” cannot be edge
`switch or edge device. U.S. Pat. No. 6,463,145 to O’Neal (“O’Neal”) is a prior art
`reference that discloses application of call processing features using an edge device
`that is coupled to an edge switch, which is the configuration disclaimed by
`Applicants. Moreover, O’Neal is devoid of any teaching, suggestion, or disclosure
`of “the web-enabled processing system coupled to at least one of the switching
`facilities.” For at least the aforementioned reasons, Ground 1 should be denied.
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`Grounds 2 and 3 do not address the aforementioned deficiencies of O’Neal, and
`Grounds 2 and 3 should be denied for similar reasons.
`
`III. DISCUSSION OF THE PSTN AND OVERVIEW OF THE ’298
`
`PATENT
`Before discussing ’298 Patent, a general description of the public telephone
`network is in order. The public telephone network is often associated with the
`acronym PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network). While Petitioner and Patent
`Owner disagree over what is and is not included in the PSTN, there are areas of
`agreement. All parties seemingly agree that the core networks of “traditional”
`telecommunications companies (e.g., AT&T) used to route voice calls from one
`phone to another are part of the PSTN. For example, a voice call from a “wired”
`analog telephone in California on an AT&T network to another “wired” analog
`telephone in New York on a Verizon network will traverse the PSTN. EX2001
`(“BatesDec”), ¶36.
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`To connect phones in distant locations, the PSTN employs various equipment
`to route calls. This equipment includes switches and databases, and is arranged in a
`hierarchical fashion:
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`BatesDec, ¶37. Notably, the same hierarchical levels/equipment may be referred to
`by a variety of names. In both examples above, the class 4 level refers to both a “toll
`center” and a “tandem switch.” This understanding is important because the ’298
`Patent and prior art references sometimes use different terminology to refer to the
`same hierarchical level. Id.
`At the top of the hierarchy are regional toll centers (class 1 offices). These
`offices are interconnected with sectional toll centers (class 2 offices), which in turn
`connect to primary centers (class 3 offices). As a point of reference, in 1984 (the
`year AT&T was broken up into the “Baby Bells”), there were 10 class 1 centers, 67
`class 2 centers, and 200 class 3 centers. Ray Horak, Communications Systems &
`Networks 159-61, (2nd ed. 2000) (Ex. 2002).
`Class 4 and 5 levels comprise the rest of the hierarchy and are of particular
`relevance to the ’298 Patent. Class 4 centers contain tandem switches. Class 4
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`centers are also referred to as toll centers, and tandem switches are also referred to
`as Class 4 switches or toll switches. As a point of reference, in 1984, there were
`approximately 940 tandem switches. Id.; BatesDec, ¶38.
`Tandem switches have been defined as:
`High-capacity switch[es] positioned in the physical core, or backbone,
`of [the PSTN], where [they] serve to interconnect edge switches, or
`Central Office (CO) switches.
`
`Ray Horak, Webster’s New World Telecom Dictionary (2008), 474 (“Telecom.
`Dict.”) (Ex. 2003); and
`[N]etwork switches that serve in partnership with lesser switches,
`linking them together. In other words and in the classic sense, tandem
`switches serve no end users directly; rather, they serve to interconnect
`switches over dedicated
`interoffice
`trunks,
`forming a
`fully
`interconnected and toll-free metropolitan calling area in the process.
`
`Ray Horak, Telecommunications and Data Communications (2007), 212 (Ex. 2004).
`The ’298 Patent refers to a “PSTN tandem switch” as “exchanges that direct
`telephone calls (or other traffic) to central offices [] or to other tandem switches.”
`’298 Patent, 4:65-6; BatesDec, ¶40.
`As stated above, tandem switches serve to interconnect Class 5 offices that
`contain edge switches. Edge switches are sometimes referred to as central offices
`(“COs”), and vice versa. In 1984, there were thousands of COs containing edge
`switches in the U.S. Central offices have been defined as:
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`[Offices] which serve end users through local loop connections [local
`loops are the actual copper wires that run from a customer’s premises
`to the central office].
`
`Ex2002 at 159; and
`. . . a CO traditionally houses one or more voice-optimized circuit
`switches to interconnect subscriber lines within a local area known as
`the carrier serving area (CSA) and to connect subscriber local loops to
`network trunks.
`
`Ex2003 at 102; BatesDec, ¶41.
`These dictionary definitions are consistent with the disclosures of tandem
`switches and edge switches in the ’298 Patent:
`The [PSTN] consists of a plurality of edge switches connected to
`telephones on one side and to a network of tandem switches on the
`other. The tandem switch network allows connectivity between all of
`the edge switches, and a signaling system is used by the PSTN to allow
`calling and to transmit both calling and called party identity.
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`’298 Patent, 1:42-8 and Fig. 2. The most salient points regarding tandem switches
`and edge switches, as confirmed by both extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, are (1)
`edge switches are connected directly to subscribers or edge devices via end-lines
`(i.e., there are copper wires (or other media) that run directly between the edge
`switches and subscribers); and (2) tandem switches are not directly connected to
`subscribers or edge devices, but are instead connected to edge switches and other
`tandem switches. BatesDec, ¶42.
`In the PSTN, before one subscriber is able to have a voice communication
`with another subscriber, the call must be “set up.” Setting-up a call refers to the
`exchange of control signaling that causes the establishment of a path over which
`voice data can flow. In the PSTN, voice paths are established on demand, as needed,
`in order to conserve resources.
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`At the time of the inventions, the PSTN utilized the Signaling System 7
`(“SS7”) protocol to set up calls. SS7 signaling flows between one CO and another,
`including all switches in between (e.g., tandem switches). SS7 signaling does not
`flow past COs to edge devices, as edge devices are not equipped to process and
`respond to SS7 signaling. Id., ¶¶43-4.
`Generally, the ’298 Patent relates to the provision of call control features in a
`public telephone network. Call forwarding (e.g., transferring a voice call originally
`directed to 703-555-1212 to an alternate telephone number) is an exemplary call
`control feature. The ’298 Patent discloses a Tandem Access Controller (“TAC”)
`that implements call control features. The TAC is a combination of computing
`hardware and software that is appropriately programmed to process calls. ’298
`Patent, 4:56-9.
`The Background section acknowledges that, at the time of the invention,
`various devices existed to provide call control features. One novel and important
`aspect of the ’298 Patent concerns where in the PSTN such call control features are
`implemented. As discussed in more detail below, the ’298 Patent expressly
`recognizes that prior art call control devices were attached to an edge device (e.g.,
`phones and PBXs) or an edge switch located in a CO. ’298 Patent 1:49-64; 2:37-41.
`These prior art edge devices receive a call on one line, dial out on another line, and
`connect the two lines together. BatesDec, ¶46.
`By contrast, the ’298 Patent discloses connecting the TAC to a tandem switch
`(hence the name Tandem Access Controller). This arrangement allows calls to be
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`intercepted and processed before they are handed off to the CO (edge switch)
`associated with the called party. Stated differently, instead of a call being passed to
`a destination CO, then on to a controller connected to the CO which would a perform
`call control feature, the TAC processes the call at a tandem switch before it is ever
`routed to the destination CO. Id., ¶47.
`This novel arrangement has several advantages. The first advantage concerns
`costs. Calls coming into and out of controllers connected to COs incurred charges
`for each incoming and outgoing call. See ’298 Patent 2:14-18 (discussing this
`scenario). BatesDec, ¶48.
`In a call forwarding scenario using the present invention, the TAC intercepts
`the call at the Class 4 level before it reaches the destination CO edge switch. As a
`result, the call from called party to the calling party is processed by the TAC before
`it reaches the CO associated with the called number. The TAC then initiates call
`signaling to set up the call to the forwarding number, and connects the original call
`to the one arranged by the TAC. This process is invisible to the called and calling
`parties, and incurs less tolls than the prior art solutions discussed in the ’298 Patent.
`’298 Patent, 4:7-11. BatesDec, ¶49.
`Another advantage regarding the TAC’s placement at a tandem switch
`concerns call quality. Running an analog voice signal from an edge switch to an
`edge device over copper wire degrades the quality of the signal (an edge device is a
`device connected to an edge switch, typically on a customer’s premises, such as a
`private branch exchange (PBX) or a generic telephone – see ’298 Patent, 5:4-6). The
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`prior art call forwarding solution suffers from this degradation twice: once from the
`calling party’s call to the controller connected to the CO, and once from the
`controller’s call to the forwarding number. On the other hand, handling calls at the
`tandem level maintains the quality of the call, as it is processed within the PSTN,
`where the signal may be in digital form and/or carried over high-quality lines (as
`compared to the end lines that carry a call from a CO to a phone). ’298 Patent, 1:59-
`65; 2:43-52; BatesDec, ¶50.
`
`IV. LEGAL STANDARDS
`Standard for Review
`A.
`The Board may grant a petition for inter partes review only where “the
`information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
`in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
`
`B. Obviousness
`Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that “[a] patent may not be obtained .
`. . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
`art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
`the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The obviousness analysis requires a
`number of threshold inquiries. The level of a POSA must be established, the scope
`and content of the prior art must be determined, and any differences between the
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`prior art and the claims at issue must be ascertained. Graham v. John Deere Co. of
`Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
`
` Claims Cannot be Found Obvious if an Element is Absent
`1.
`If a single element of the claim is absent from the prior art, the claims cannot
`be considered obvious. See CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342
`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[O]bviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim.”)
`(citing In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d
`1531, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing obviousness rejection where prior art did not
`teach or suggest all claim limitations).
`
`Reason to Combine or Modify Must Have Rational
`2.
`Underpinning
`
`The conclusion of obviousness based on a combination of references must be
`supported with explicit analysis of a reason to combine those references. KSR Int’l
`Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The Federal Circuit has stated that
`such reasons must be more than “mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be
`some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
`conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); accord
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (agreeing
`with the district court’s reasoning that “some kind of motivation must be shown from
`some source, so that the jury can understand why a person of ordinary skill would
`have thought of either combining two or more references or modifying one to
`achieve the patented method”).
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`C. Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
`The Board interprets claims in an unexpired patent using the broadest
`reasonable interpretation (BRI) in light of the specification of the patent in which
`they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation,
`words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is
`inconsistent with the specification and prosecution history.” TriVascular, Inc. v.
`Samuels, 812 F. 3d 1056, 1062, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1949, *7 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Under this standard, “claims should always be read in light of the specification and
`teachings in the underlying patent claim.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789
`F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[T]he Board’s construction ‘cannot be divorced
`from the specification and the record evidence,’ and ‘must be consistent with the one
`that those skilled in the art would reach.’” Id. The construction must be “reasonable
`in light of the totality of the written description.” In re Baker Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d
`1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`It is important to note that there are practical limits to how “broad” an
`interpretation may be. “Above all, [it] must be reasonable in light of the claims and
`specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC, 815
`F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v.
`ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While we have
`endorsed the Board’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in IPR
`proceedings, we also take case to not read ‘reasonable’ out of the standard.”).
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`The Federal Circuit has indicated that the prosecution history may be an
`important component of intrinsic evidence in construing claims, even when a
`broadest reasonable construction standard applies. Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.,
`IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 35 (citing Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F. 3d
`973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In claim construction, this court gives primacy to the
`language of the claims, followed by the specification. Additionally, the prosecution
`history, while not literally within the patent document, serves as intrinsic evidence
`for purposes of claim construction. This remains true in construing patent claims
`before the PTO.”)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292,
`1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The PTO should also consult the patent’s prosecution history
`in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the agency for a second
`review.”) (citing Tempo Lighting, 742 F.3d at 977); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech
`Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`Additionally, the Federal Circuit has found it reasonable to infer that the
`Patent Office would not have issued an invalid patent—particularly in cases
`involving prior art that the Patent Office expressly considered during original
`examination. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`(“[W]e have looked to whether it is reasonable to infer that the PTO would not have
`issued an invalid patent, and that the ambiguity in the claim language should
`therefore be resolved in a manner that would preserve the patent’s validity.”) Under
`Phillips and Supreme Court jurisprudence, an issued patent is entitled to an
`interpretation that preserves its validity: “In such circumstances, if the claim were
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`fairly susceptible of two constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to
`the patentee his actual invention, rather than to adopt a construction fatal to the
`grant.” Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
`
`D. BRI Cannot be so Broad to Include Elements That Have Been
`
`Disclaimed or Disavowed
`The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of
`a claim term cannot be so broad as to include a configuration expressly disclaimed
`in the specification.” In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). The PTAB follows Federal Circuit authority regarding disclaimer
`(or disavowal) when analyzing claims in an IPR context using the BRI standard.
`See, e.g., Sony Corp. et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLC, Case IPR2015-00158, Paper
`35 (PTAB May 19, 2016); The Scotts Co. LLC v. Encap, LLC, Case IPR2013-00110,
`Paper 79 (PTAB June 24, 2014) (applying Federal Circuit authority regarding
`disclaimer, and finding disclaimer based on statements made during prosecution, in
`the context of a BRI analysis); LG Electronics., Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
`Inc., Case IPR2015-00324, Paper 39 (PTAB May 23, 2016); Kingston Tech. Co.,
`Inc. v. Imation Corp., Case IPR2015-00066, Paper 19 (PTAB March 24, 2016);
`Edmund Optics, Inc. v. Semrock, Inc., Case IPR2014-00599, Paper 72 (PTAB
`September 16, 2015).
`Although the disclaimers at issue in this case are fully supported by the
`specification alone, the prosecution history also evidences the disclaimers. With
`respect to disclaimers made in by an applicant in the prosecution history, the Final
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`Written Decision in the matter of Google Inc., et al. v. Arendi S.A.R.L., Case IPR
`2014-00452, Paper 31, pp. 16-20 (PTAB August 18, 2015), is instructive. There,
`the PTAB performed claim construction using the BRI standard. Patent Owner
`argued that the prosecution history of the claim term at issue presented a case of
`“clear disavowal.” Petitioner argued that the PTAB should not consider prosecution
`history when construing claims in an inter parties review. Citing to Microsoft Corp.
`v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the PTAB acknowledged
`that “the Federal Circuit has admonished that ‘[t]he PTO should also consult the
`patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought
`back to the agency for a second review.’” Accordingly, the PTAB analyzed the
`prosecution history to determine whether the Patent Owner’s disclaimed subject
`matter.
`Turning to Federal Circuit authority concerning disclaimer, claim terms are
`given their plain meaning unless the specification or prosecution history evidences
`that the patentee acted as his own lexicographer or disavowed claim scope. GE
`Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
`standard for finding disavowal requires that either the specification or prosecution
`history indicate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. “Where
`the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature,
`that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though
`the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be
`considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” Chi. Bd. Options
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`Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341
`(Fed. Cir. 2001)). “Disavowal need not be explicitly stated as long as a POSA would
`understand—after reading the claims, specification, and prosecution history—that
`the invention does not encompass a particular feature.”1 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms.,
`Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84276, *22 (D. Del. June
`29, 2016) (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1344).
`A review