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`Patent 8,457,113
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`FOCAL IP, LLC,
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`Patent Owner
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`________________
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`Case IPR2016-01254
`Patent Number: 8,457,113
`________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 17
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
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`CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`Petitioner
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`v.
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`FOCAL IP, LLC,
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`Patent Owner
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`________________
`
`Case IPR2016-01254
`Patent Number: 8,457,113
`________________
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S REQUEST FOR REHEARING
`UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)
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`
`
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`Case IPR2016-01254
`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 17
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1
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`RELIEF REQUESTED ........................................................................... 1
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`LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................. 1
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`BECAUSE THE BOARD MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED
`THE CLAIM LANGUAGE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`REGARDING “SWITCHING FACILITY” AND PATENT OWNER’S
`ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
`“SWITCHING FACILITY”, THE DECISION WAS CLEARLY
`ERRONEOUS ........................................................................................ 2
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`BECAUSE THE BOARD MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED
`THE SPECIFICATION’S TEACHINGS AND DISCLAIMERS, THE
`DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS ....................................... 5
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`CONCLUSION .....................................................................................15
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`VI.
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases:
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`Arnold P’ship v. Duda,
`362 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................. 2
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`Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 6
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`In re Baker Hughes, Inc.,
`215 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 6
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`In re Gartside,
`203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 2
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`In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC,
`822 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................... 2, 9, 15
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................. 5
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`PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC,
`815 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) .......................................... 5
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`SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC,
`825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 5
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`SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............................................................................. 6
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`Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States,
`393 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................. 2
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`TD Ameritrade v. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc.,
`Case No. CBM2014-00137, Paper No. 34 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 2, 2015)..................... 2
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`Tempo Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC,
`742 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 2
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`Regulations:
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (c) ................................................................................................. 1
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (d) ................................................................................................ 1
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (c)-(d), Patent Owner FOCAL IP, LLC requests
`a rehearing of the Board’s Decision granting institution of inter partes review
`entered December 28, 2016 (Paper No. 15) (“Decision”) regarding Claims 38 and
`65 of the ’113 Patent (collectively, the “Challenged Claims”). The Decision was
`based upon erroneous claim constructions of “switching facility” and “call
`processing system.”
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`II. RELIEF REQUESTED
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`The Board misapprehended or overlooked Patent Owner’s argument as to the
`construction of the terms “switching facility” and “call processing system” of the
`Challenged Claims. Accordingly, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (c)-(d), Patent
`Owner requests that the Board reconsider its Decision of the Challenged Claims in
`light of the proper constructions of these terms, as proposed by Patent Owner, and
`deny instituting inter partes review of the Challenged Claims of the ’113 Patent.
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`III.
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` LEGAL STANDARD
`A request for rehearing is appropriate when the requesting party believes “the
`Board misapprehended or overlooked” a matter that was previously addressed in the
`record. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The request “must specifically identify all matters
`the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where
`each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. In
`reviewing such a request, the “panel will review the decision for an abuse of
`discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (c). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision
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`is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or on erroneous facts. See Star
`Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship
`v. Duda, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 13-
`15-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Abuse also occurs “if a factual finding is not supported by
`substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in
`weighing relevant factors.” TD Ameritrade v. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc., CBM2014-
`00137, Paper No. 34 at 3 (Feb. 2, 2015).
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`IV. BECAUSE THE BOARD MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED
`THE CLAIM LANGUAGE OF THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`REGARDING “SWITCHING FACILITY” AND PATENT OWNER’S
`ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF “SWITCHING
`FACILITY”, THE DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
`The Board misapprehended or overlooked the requirements of the Challenged
`Claims regarding the term “switching facility” and Patent Owner’s arguments as to
`the same. Accordingly, the Board’s Decision was based on an erroneous conclusion
`of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, and inter partes review of the
`Challenged Claims should be denied in light of the proper construction for
`“switching facility.”
`In its Decision, the Board recognized that the preamble of the Challenged
`Claims is limiting, but the Board failed to analyze the claim language regarding
`“switching facility”, especially as this term relates to the term “edge switch.”
`Decision at 7-10. Specifically, the Board quoted a claim limitation from Claim 38
`within the preamble:
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`The preamble of that claim recites “the circuit-switched network
`comprising edge switches for routing calls from and to subscribers
`within a local geographic area and switching facilities for routing calls
`to other edge switches or other switching facilities local or in other
`geographic areas.”
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`Decision at 8. The Board’s only analysis of the claims is directed to the subset of
`the claim describing the functionality of “switching facilities” without any analysis
`or recognition of how Claim 38 distinguishes the term “edge switch” from the term
`“switching facility.” Id.
`Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the Board’s analysis must give
`“primacy to the language of the claims, followed by the specification.” Tempo
`Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, 742 F.3d 973. 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, the
`Board’s claim construction analysis primarily relied on extrinsic evidence and the
`prosecution history of a related patent without considering the most important
`factors -- the language of the claims and the specification. Decision at 7-8. As
`explained in more detail below in Section V, the specification also fully supports
`Patent Owner’s construction. “The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim
`term cannot be so broad as to include a configuration expressly disclaimed in the
`specification.” Paper No. 8 at 13 citing In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822
`F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`Patent Owner proposed a construction for “switching facility” which excluded
`edge switches and edge devices. Paper No. 8 at 33. Patent Owner’s argument
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`regarding the proper construction of “switching facility” first analyzed the claim
`language of a representative claim. Id. at 33-34. Patent Owner noted that the claim
`language expressly distinguishes that a “switching facility” is not an “edge switch.”
`Id. A quick reading of the relevant limitation shows that the claim language
`expressly distinguishes a “switching facility” from an “edge switch” in at least two
`instances. Id. In the first instance, the representative claim recites “a network
`comprising edge switches … and switching facilities …” Id. at 34. (emphasis
`added). In the second instance, the claim recites “switching facilities for routing
`calls to other edge switches or other switching facilities …” Id. (emphasis added).
`Patent Owner further highlighted that the representative claim recites
`functionality for a “switching facility” that is different than the claimed functionality
`for an “edge switch.” Id. at 33-34. The preamble of the representative claim defines
`the architecture of a PSTN by reciting that the claimed “network” includes “edge
`switches” that are “for routing calls from and to users within a local geographic
`area,” and “switching facilities” that are “for routing calls to other edge switches or
`other switching facilities local or in other geographic areas.” Id. at 34. (emphasis
`in original). Edge switches can only communicate within a local geographic area,
`as recited by the claim, because edge switches “connect calling parties to called
`parties only within a local geographic area.” See Paper No. 8 at 35 and related
`argument at 35-39. Other switches make up the interior of the network and are not
`directly connected to subscribers or edge devices, but are instead connected to edge
`switches or other interior switches. Id. at 37.
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`Respectfully, based on the claim language alone, the Board’s construction
`regarding “switching facility” was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or
`clearly erroneous factual findings, and inter partes review of the Challenged Claims
`should be denied in light of the proper construction for “switching facility.”
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`V. BECAUSE THE BOARD MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED
`THE SPECIFICATION’S TEACHINGS AND DISCLAIMERS, THE
`DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
`In addition to misapprehending or overlooking the language of the Challenged
`Claims, the Board also misapprehended or overlooked Patent Owner’s arguments
`regarding the teachings of the invention and disclaimers expressly disclosed in the
`specification. Paper No. 8 at 1-9, 20-39, including internal citations to the Bates
`Declaration. It is important to note that there are practical limits to how “broad” an
`interpretation may be. Paper No. 8 at 11-12. “Above all, [it] must be reasonable in
`light of the claims and specification.” Id at 12. citing PPC Broadband, Inc. v.
`Corning Optical Commc’ns. RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
`in original); see also SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341,
`1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While we have endorsed the Board’s use of the broadest
`reasonable interpretation standard in IPR proceedings, we also take care to not read
`‘reasonable’ out of the standard.”). Under a broadest reasonable interpretation,
`“claims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the
`underlying patent claim.” Paper No. 8 at 11 citing Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn,
`Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[T]he Board’s construction ‘cannot be
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`divorced from the specification and the record evidence,’ and ‘must be consistent
`with the one that those skilled in the art would reach.’” Id. The construction must
`be “reasonable in light of the totality of the written description.” Paper No. 8 at 11
`citing In re Baker Hughes, Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`In its Decision, the Board focused on “switching facility” not being expressly
`discussed in the specification, but the Board failed to analyze the specification’s
`express disclosure of the invention’s novel architecture of not applying call features
`by or through an edge switch or edge device, including the specification’s express
`disclaimers and disparagement of prior art systems applying call features by or
`through an edge switch or edge device. Decision at 7-9. “Where the specification
`makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is
`deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language
`of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad
`enough to encompass the feature in question.” Paper No. 8 at 15 citing Chi. Bd.
`Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Secs. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`(citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
`1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
`The specification of the ’113 Patent recognizes that prior art systems and
`methods applied call control features through an edge switch or an edge device.
`Paper No. 8 at 20. The ’113 Patent disparages these prior art attempts as suffering
`from various shortcomings that the present inventions specifically seek to remedy.
`Id. at 20-21. Indeed, Applicants repeatedly criticized applying call control features
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`through an edge switch or an edge device, and in fact distinguished their inventions
`over such prior art. Id. By making such statements, Applicants unequivocally
`disclaimed call processing systems that applied call control features through an edge
`switch, or call processing systems that were themselves an edge device, from the
`scope of their inventions. Id. at 21.
`Applicants’ disparaging statements begin in the Background of the Invention
`section of the ’113 Patent. Id. In discussing various prior art systems and their
`perceived disadvantages, Applicants specifically disparage the application of call
`control features at an edge switch:
`There are also edge devices in each of the public telephone company’s
`central offices which provide local control, but offer an extremely
`limited number of features and do not provide true 3rd-party call
`control.
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`’113 Patent, 1:34-37; Paper No. 8 at 21; and
`In the past, numerous devices have been built that allow the connection
`of two lines together at an edge switch. These devices can be used to
`add features to a telephone network by receiving a call on one line and
`then dialing out on another line. The problem with these devices is that,
`because they are connected through an edge switch, transmission losses
`and impairments occur, degrading the overall connection. In addition,
`signaling limitations prevent full control, by the subscriber or the
`system, over the call.
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`’113 Patent, 1:59-67; BatesDec, ¶52; Paper No. 8 at 21.
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`In addition to these disparaging statements, Applicants further distinguish
`their invention from call processing systems that are edge devices, and note the
`numerous disadvantages of applying call control features using an edge device:
`In addition to these [1-800] services, there are edge devices that
`perform some of the same services. Edge devices such as phones and
`PBXs that include voice mail, inter-active voice response, call
`forwarding, speed calling, etc., have been used to provide additional
`call control. These devices allow the phone user direct control over
`incoming and outgoing calls. The disadvantage of edge devices is that
`they add cost, degrade voice and transmission quality, can be difficult
`to program, are not easily programmed remotely, can require the user
`to pay for two lines, provide lower quality of service, and cannot
`provide the same level of functionality as a system that controls the
`PSTN directly.
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`’113 Patent, 2:40-54; BatesDec, ¶53; Paper No. 8 at 22.
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`In sum, the ’113 Patent’s specification expressly recognizes that prior art
`systems and methods provided call control features through an edge switch or an
`edge device, but notes that there are numerous disadvantages with carrying out call
`control features in this manner; namely, the addition of costs, voice quality
`problems, and the requirement of a user to pay for the use of multiple telephone lines
`(in order to handle incoming and outgoing calls simultaneously). Paper No. 8 at 22.
`A POSA could not possibly read the passages preceding the “Detailed Description
`of The Invention” and comprehend that call processing systems coupled to edge
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`switches, or that were an edge device, are within the scope of Applicants’ claims.
`Id. at 22-23; BatesDec, ¶54.
`It is unreasonable and clear error to construe the claims so broadly to include
`configurations expressly disclaimed in the specification. The Federal Circuit has
`held that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term cannot be so broad
`as to include a configuration expressly disclaimed in the specification.” Paper No.
`8 at 13 citing In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
`2016); see also Patent Owner’s analysis of other Federal Circuit cases applying
`reasonable claim scope based on disclaimers in the specification at Paper No. 8 at
`14-20.
`In contrast to the criticized prior art solution of providing call features through
`an edge switch or edge device, the specification is replete with commentary
`describing the benefits of connecting to switches other than edge switches:
`A preferred embodiment of the inventive system described herein
`connects at the tandem [switch], thereby eliminating these problems
`[the problems identified in 1:59-67 regarding the provision of call
`features at an edge switch].
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`’113 Patent, 2:1-3; Paper No. 8 at 23;
`Connecting directly to the PSTN tandem switch (or embedding the
`system into the tandem switch) eliminates the signal degradation
`problems previously described [i.e., those associated with connecting
`at a CO].
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`’113 Patent, 3:37-40; Paper No. 8 at 23; and
`FIG. 1 illustrates the tandem access controller (TAC) in one
`embodiment of the present invention connected to the existing PSTN
`tandem switch, the TAC providing features for the subscriber’s
`telephone as requested by the subscriber via the web.
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`’113 Patent, 3:65-4:3; Paper No. 8 at 23.
`It is unreasonable and clear error to construe the claims so broadly to eliminate the
`objectives of the invention, such as signal degradation and toll charges associated
`with applying call features through an edge switch or edge device, as described
`above. See, e.g., Paper No. 8 at 7-9. Yet, construing “switching facility” to include
`edge switches does just that.
`The Board overlooked or misconstrued Patent Owner’s arguments regarding
`the novel architecture disclosed and taught by the ’113 Patent. The ’113 Patent is
`consistent in showing the claimed call processing system always being directly
`connected to a tandem switch, not an edge switch, to access the PSTN. Paper No. 8
`at 24-25. For example, Fig. 1 of the ’113 Patent shows Tandem Access Controller
`10 connected to PSTN Tandem Switch 16, not CO 17 or 18. Id.
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`This is also true for Figs. 2, 7, and 8 of the ’113 Patent - TACs 10 are directly
`connected to PSTN tandem switches 16, not COs 17 and 18 (i.e., edge switches).
`BatesDec, ¶56; Paper No. 8 at 25. As discussed above, the specification criticizes
`and disclaims a direct connection to a CO or edge switch. Yet, construing “switching
`facility” as including edge switches would bring within the scope of the ‘113 Patent
`allowing the call processing system to be connected to an edge switch – something
`not contemplated in the ’113 Patent.
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`In the Decision, doubt is casts on accuracy of Patent Owner’s statement that
`the TACs are “always connected to a tandem switch, not an edge switch.” Decision
`at 13. Patent Owner stands by this statement. Figures 1 and 2 do, in fact, show the
`TAC being connected to a tandem switch, in addition to the Web. The Decision also
`notes that the ‘113 Patent discusses making VoIP calls over the Web as if this
`somehow lessens the impact of the criticism of the providing call control using an
`edge switch. Id. This simply doesn’t make sense. The Web and edge switches are
`completely different entities involving different technologies. Criticism of
`providing call control features involving edge switches in conjunction with the
`PSTN has nothing to do with also allowing VoIP calls. The portions of the
`specification cited at the bottom of page 13 of the Decision do not in any way
`contradict the clear teachings found elsewhere in the ’113 Patent of the
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`disadvantages associated with providing call control features involving an edge
`switch.
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`The exclusion of edge switches from the construction of “switching facility”
`is further supported in the prosecution history of the related ’777 Patent, where
`“Applicant’s architecture” is repeatedly distinguished over that of Schwab.
`’777ProsHist, 80-83, 110; Paper No. 8 at 32-33. Like the ’113 Patent itself, a POSA
`reviewing the prosecution history would clearly understand that a call processing
`system applying call control logic at an edge switch or edge device is not within the
`scope of the claimed inventions. BatesDec, ¶66; Paper No. 8 at 32-33. Under
`Federal Circuit authority, these disclaimers attached to all claims issuing from the
`’777 Patent, as well as related patents such as the ’113 Patent.
`The Board misapprehended or overlooked the express teachings of the
`specification and disclaimers expressly disclosed in the specification. See generally
`Decision. Indeed, the Board failed to even analyze the disclosure of the specification
`in this regard. Id. Specifically, the Board misapprehended or overlooked that the
`’113 Patent makes clear that applying call features through an edge switch or edge
`device is (1) known in the prior art, and (2) suffers from problems which the present
`invention seeks to remedy. Paper No. 8 at 25-26. In addition, every embodiment of
`the ’113 Patent (1) illustrates a call processing system connected to a tandem switch
`(i.e., “switching facility”), and (2) describes the benefits of this configuration over
`the prior art. Id. A POSA could not possibly read the ’113 Patent specification and
`believe that call processing systems connected to edge switches, or that are edge
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`devices, are within the scope of Applicants’ inventions. BatesDec, ¶57; Paper No.
`8 at 25-26. Respectfully, the Board’s claim construction of the term “switching
`facility” as including edge switches and edge devices is therefore based on an
`erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, and inter partes
`review should be denied on the Challenged Claims in light of the proper
`construction.
`Additionally, the Board misapprehended or overlooked the Applicants’
`arguments presented in the prosecution history of the ’777 Patent. The Board’s
`analysis regarding “switching facility” in the prosecution history of the ’777 Patent
`is limited to a footnote provided by the Applicants. Decision at 8-10. However, the
`Board wholly failed to consider the clarifying remarks presented by the Applicants
`in the main body of its arguments explaining the novelty of the invention. For
`example, the Board failed to consider the clarifying remarks of Applicants’ novel
`architecture where the footnote is found:
`Applicants’ architecture permits subscribers (called parties or third
`parties) to access call routing operations at the switching facilities (also
`referred to as tandem switching facilities1) that interconnect end office
`switches to other geographic areas that are not local to an end office
`switch.
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`’777ProsHist, Ex2005 at 82; Paper No. 8 at 35. Applicants’ remark that “switching
`facilities … interconnect end office switches to other geographic areas that are not
`local to an end office switch” is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed
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`construction and the claim language itself that “switching facilities” cannot include
`edge switches (end office switch). Likewise, the sentence preceding the one quoted
`above further confirms this construction – “Applicant’s architecture is not only
`distinct, but a significant improvement over Schwab or any of the other art asserted
`by the Examiner [] of record, because it facilities [sic] application of ‘features’ to
`call routing operations anywhere in the network (geographic areas beyond the local
`geographic area).” ’777ProsHist, Ex2005 at 82. As discussed, Schwab’s
`architecture is the same as what is disparaged in the Background of the Invention
`section of the ’113 Patent – a microprocessor-based system connected to an edge
`switch for applying call control features. Paper No. 8 at 26-27. This record
`demonstrates a clear and unambiguous disclaimer of using call processing systems
`connected to edge switches, or that are edge devices, to apply call control features.
`For analogous reasons, the Board also misapprehended or overlooked the
`express teachings of the specification and disclaimers expressly disclosed in the
`specification regarding the construction of “call processing system.” Decision at 9.
`The Challenged Claims’ “call processing system” is analogous to the ’113 Patent’s
`disclosure of a Tandem Access Controller. Paper No. 8 at 33. Applicants disclaimed
`a call processing system that applies call control features through an edge switch, or
`that is itself an edge device. Id. (citing to Section V in the POPR regarding the
`specification’s teaching and disclaimers presented herein). Thus, under a BRI
`analysis, a “call processing system” cannot apply call control features through an
`edge switch, or be an edge device. It is unreasonable and clear error to construe the
`14
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`Case IPR2016-01254
`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 17
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`claims so broadly to include configurations expressly disclaimed in the specification.
`Paper No. 8 at 13 citing In re Man Mach. Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286
`(Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Patent Owner’s analysis of other Federal Circuit cases
`applying reasonable claim scope based on disclaimers in the specification at Paper
`No. 8 at 13-20. Respectfully, the Board’s decision on claim construction regarding
`“call processing system” to apply call control features through an edge switch, or be
`an edge devices is therefore based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly
`erroneous factual findings, and inter partes review should be denied on the
`Challenged Claims in light of the proper construction.
`
`VI. CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, the Decision to Institute should be modified to
`reflect the proper constructions, and the Petition should be denied and a trial should
`not be instituted in light of the proper constructions.
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`Dated: January 11, 2017
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/s/ Brent N. Bumgardner
`Brent N. Bumgardner
`
`Registration No. 48,476
`NELSON BUMGARDNER, P.C.
`3131 W. 7th Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`Telephone: (817) 377-3490
`Email: brent@nelbum.com
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`15
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`Case IPR2016-01254
`Patent 8,457,113
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`Paper No. 17
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on this 11th day of January 2017, a copy of Patent Owner
`
`FOCAL IP, LLC’s Request for Rehearing has been served in its entirety via email
`
`on the following:
`
`Wayne Stacy
`BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
`2001 Ross Avenue
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Phone: (214) 953-6678
`Facsimile: (214) 661-4678
`wayne.stacy@bakerbotts.com
`
`Sarah J. Guske
`BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
`101 California Street, #3070
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Phone: (415) 291-6205
`Facsimile: (415) 291-6305
`sarah.guske@bakerbotts.com
`
`
`
`Dated: January 11, 2017
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`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/s/ Brent N. Bumgardner
`Brent N. Bumgardner
`
`Registration No. 48,476
`NELSON BUMGARDNER, P.C.
`3131 W. 7th Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`Telephone: (817) 377-3490
`Email: brent@nelbum.com
`
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`16
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