`By: Peter J. McAndrews
`Thomas J. Wimbiscus
`Scott P. McBride
`McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd.
`500 W. Madison St., 34th Floor
`Chicago, IL 60661
`Tel: 312-775-8000
`Fax: 312-775-8100
`E-mail: pmcandrews@mcandrews-ip.com
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`ARRIS GROUP, INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`TQ DELTA, LLC
`Patent Owner
`_____________
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01160
`Patent No. 8,611,404
`_____________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`SUMMARY OF THE 404 PATENT .............................................................. 5
`II.
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 6
`IV. NO REVIEW SHOULD BE INSTITUTED WITH
`RESPECT TO THE GROUNDS RAISED BY
`PETITIONER .................................................................................................. 7
`A. Ground 1: Obviousness of Claims 1-20 Over
`Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL Standard ................................. 10
`1.
`The Ground 1 References ......................................................... 10
`2.
`The Combination of Ground 1 References
`Fails to Disclose the Claimed “Storing in a
`Low Power Mode at Least One Parameter
`Associated with Full Power Mode of
`Operation” ................................................................................ 13
`a.
`None of Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and
`the ADSL Standard Discloses Storing,
`in Low Power Mode, a Fine Gain
`Parameter or
`a Bit Allocation
`Parameter ........................................................................ 13
`Petitioner’s
`Invalidity Arguments
`with Respect to the Storing Limitation
`Have No Merit ................................................................ 14
`Petitioner Fails to Provide Sufficient Non-
`Conclusory Evidence to Support a Reason
`to Combine Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and
`the ADSL Standard ................................................................. 19
`a.
`The Statements in the Petition ........................................ 20
`1)
`The First Statement .............................................. 20
`2)
`The Second Statement .......................................... 21
`3)
`The Third Statement ............................................. 22
`4)
`The Board Has Found Similarly
`Conclusory
`Statements
`i
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`
`
`b.
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`3.
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`b.
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`4.
`
`B.
`
`Obviousness
`Regarding
`Insufficient ............................................................ 23
`The Statements
`in
`the McNally
`Declaration ...................................................................... 26
`A Person of Skill in the Art Would Not
`Have Combined the Ground 1 References
`as Petitioner Proposes ............................................................. 27
`Ground 2: Obviousness of Claims 1-20 Over 97-
`161R1, 97-319, and the ADSL Standard ............................................ 31
`1.
`The Ground 2 References ......................................................... 31
`2.
`The 97-161R1 and 97-319 Contributions
`Are Not Prior Art ...................................................................... 33
`a.
`The
`97-161R1
`and
`97-319
`Contributions .................................................................. 35
`The T1 Committee Procedures and
`ATIS FCC Filing ............................................................ 35
`The McNally Testimony ................................................. 37
`The T1E1.4 Meeting Report ........................................... 39
`The “Wayback Machine” Printout ................................. 40
`The Contributions Are Not Printed
`Publications Under Samsung Even if
`Petitioner’s Allegations Are Accurate ............................ 42
`The Combination of 97-161R1, 97-319, and
`the ADSL Standard Fails to Disclose the
`Claimed “Storing in a Low Power Mode at
`least One Parameter Associated with Full
`Power Mode of Operation” ........................................................ 46
`Petitioner Fails to Provide Sufficient Non-
`Conclusory Evidence to Support a Reason
`to Combine the References ..................................................... 48
`a.
`The First Statement ......................................................... 49
`b.
`The Second Statement .................................................... 50
`c.
`The Third Statement ....................................................... 52
`
`b.
`
`c.
`d.
`e.
`f.
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`3.
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`4.
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`ii
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`d.
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`5.
`
`the McNally
`in
`The Statements
`Declaration ...................................................................... 54
`A Person of Skill in the Art Would Not
`Have Combined the Ground 2 References
`as Petitioner Proposes ............................................................. 56
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 58
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`
`V.
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`iii
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 01 Civ. 4872, 2004 WL 292321 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004) .......................... 38
`BSP Software, LLC v. Motio, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00307, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2013) ................................... 21, 50
`Customplay, LLC v. Clearplay, Inc.,
`IPR2013-00484, Paper 29 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014) .............................................. 7
`Daifuku Co., v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.,
`IPR2015-00084, 87, Paper 10 (P.T.A.B. May 4, 2015) ....................................... 25
`Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ 56
`Du Pont v. Monsanto Tech., LLC,
`IPR2014-00334, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. July 11, 2014) .............................................. 7
`In re Gordon,
`733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .............................................................................. 28
`In re ICON Health & Fitness,
`496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 28
`Jacobs Corp. v. Genesis III, Inc.,
`IPR2014-01267, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. January 22, 2015) ........................................ 8
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skyworks Solutions, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00529, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 23, 2014) ............................................ 25
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ...................................................................................... 16, 19
`Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v. Enthone, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00243, Paper 6 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) ...................................... 16, 19
`NJOY, Inc. v. Fontem Holdings 1 B.V.,
`IPR2015-01301, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2015) ...................................... 24, 54
`Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,
`363 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 36
`Oxford Nanopore Tech. Ltd. v. University of Washington,
`IPR2014-00512, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 15, 2014) ............................................ 9
`
`
`
`iv
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`
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP,
`IPR2014-00891, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2014) ................................ 34, 44, 45
`SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC,
`IPR2013-00581, Paper 15 (P.T.A.B. December 30, 2013) .................................... 8
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.,
`511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 33, 41
`Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc.,
`IPR2014-00148, Paper 41 (P.T.A.B. April 23, 2015) .......................................... 40
`Symantec Corp. v. Rpost Comm., Ltd.,
`IPR2014-00355, Paper 12 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2014) ............................................ 17
`TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00262, Paper 20 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2014) .......................................... 27
`TRW Automotive US LLC v. Magna Elecs., Inc.,
`IPR2014-00258, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 2014) ........................ 24, 48, 54, 56
`Wowza Media Sys., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`IPR2013-00054, Paper 16 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 2013) ..................................... 27, 56
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ....................................................................................... 4, 31, 33, 46
`37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) ........................................................................... 8, 16, 26, 54
`37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) ............................................................................. 9, 17, 26, 55
`
`v
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`Patent Owner TQ Delta, LLC (“TQ Delta” or “Patent Owner”) submits this
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`preliminary response to the Petition filed by Arris Group, Inc. (“Arris” or
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`“Petitioner”) requesting inter partes review of claims 1-20 of U.S. Pat. No.
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`8,611,404 (the “404 patent”).
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`The Petition fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that claims 1-20 of
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`the 404 patent are unpatentable. As an initial matter, two of the references
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`Petitioner relies upon for one of its grounds of alleged invalidity are not printed
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`publications and, thus, not even prior art. See infra at § IV.B.2. Moreover, each of
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`the asserted prior art references differs significantly from the inventions claimed by
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`the 404 patent, and certain claim limitations are missing from each of the asserted
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`prior art references. Therefore, and not surprisingly, each of Petitioner’s asserted
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`grounds for unpatentability relies on obviousness. Petitioner’s obviousness
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`arguments, however, cobble together various discrete features from multiple
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`different prior art references without evidence of any valid reason for doing so or
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`of any reasonable expectation of success.
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`The Board should, therefore, decline instituting trial on each of the two
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`proposed Grounds for at least the following reasons:
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`
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`Ground 1: The Petition asserts unpatentability of claims 1-20 under
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`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over U.S. Pat. No. 5,956,323 (“Bowie”) and U.S. Pat. No.
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`1
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`6,246,725 (“Vanzieleghem”) in view of the ANSI T1.413-1995 ADSL
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`Standard (the “ADSL Standard”).
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`Petitioner’s asserted obviousness combination does not disclose all of the
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`limitations of each of the challenged claims. None of the references discloses at
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`least “store [or storing], in the [or a] low power mode, at least one parameter
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`associated with the full power mode operation wherein the at least one parameter
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`comprises at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit allocation parameter,” as
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`required by claims 1-20. Indeed, Bowie does not disclose storing in low power
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`mode a fine gain or bit allocation parameter, and the ADSL Standard does not
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`disclose storing in low power mode parameters associated with full power mode
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`operation.1
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`Undoubtedly recognizing that it cannot show that any of the references
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`teaches this limitation, Petitioner (improperly) splits the limitation up and
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`(erroneously) argues that Bowie discloses storing in a low power mode at least one
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`parameter associated with the full power mode operation and that the “at least one
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`parameter compris[ing] at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit allocation
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`parameter” is obvious over Bowie and the ADSL Standard. The requirement that
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`the “at least one parameter comprises at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit
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`allocation parameter,” however, cannot be separated from the requirement that the
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`1 Petitioner does not allege that Vanzieleghem discloses this limitation.
`2
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`at least one parameter be “stored in the low power mode.” Moreover, Petitioner
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`only provides insufficient and conclusory arguments as to why a person of skill in
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`the art would combine Bowie with the ADSL Standard to arrive at the full teaching
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`of this limitation.
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`Further, Petitioner provides only insufficient and conclusory statements as to
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`why it allegedly would have been obvious to combine Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and
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`the ADSL Standard. Indeed, Petitioner never provides any “articulated reasoning
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`with rational underpinnings” for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have
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`been motivated to combine the teachings of the three references, how the
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`application of routine skill would have resulted in this combination, what the result
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`would be, or why the result would have been predictable. Moreover, Petitioner’s
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`citations to the declaration of its expert, Mr. McNally, do not remedy the lack of
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`reasoning and support in the Petition.
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`Lastly, it would not have been obvious to combine the references as
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`Petitioner proposes in Ground 1 because the references teach away from such a
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`combination.
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`Ground 2: The Petition asserts unpatentability of claims 1-20 under 35
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`U.S.C. § 103(a) over the T1E1.4/97-161R1 (“97-161R1”) and T1E1.4/97-319
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`(“97-319”) contributions to the T1E1.4 Working Group (collectively, the
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`“Contributions”) in view of the ADSL Standard.
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`3
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`To start with, Petitioner’s obviousness arguments must fail because
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`Petitioner has not shown that the 97-161R1 and 97-319 Contributions are prior art.
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`In particular, Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that either of the
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`Contributions is a “printed publication.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Indeed, the
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`evidence Petitioner relies upon does not demonstrate that the Contributions were
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`disseminated to the extent that a person interested and ordinarily skilled in the art,
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`exercising reasonable diligence, could locate them.
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`In addition, the proposed combination of Ground 2 references fails to
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`disclose all the limitations of claims 1-20. As with Ground 1, none of the
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`references discloses at least “store [or storing], in the [or a] low power mode, at
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`least one parameter associated with the full power mode operation wherein the at
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`least one parameter comprises at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit
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`allocation parameter,” as required by claims 1-20. Petitioner does not show that
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`97-161R1 teaches or suggests even being in a low power mode, let alone storing,
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`in a low power mode, a parameter associated with the full power mode operation.
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`As such, 97-161 does not teach the limitation, and Petitioner does not point to
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`anything in the other Ground 2 references that teaches the limitation.
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`In addition, the Petition again provides insufficient articulated reasoning to
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`support obviousness for Ground 2. Petitioner does not allege why a person of
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`ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of 97-
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`4
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`161R1, 97-319, and the ADSL Standard. Instead, as with Ground 1, Petitioner
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`only provides conclusory allegations regarding obviousness and cites to conclusory
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`statements regarding obviousness from its expert’s declaration. Furthermore, the
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`references of Ground 2 teach away from Petitioner’s proposed combination.
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`Accordingly, Petitioner has not carried its burden of showing that any of
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`claims 1-20 are unpatentable. Should the Board institute review, however, Patent
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`Owner reserves
`
`the right
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`to further explain why Petitioner’s proposed
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`combinations do not make sense from a technological standpoint. Patent Owner
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`also reserves the right to further explain how the cited references are incompatible
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`or would be rendered inoperable or unsuitable for their intended purposes, why the
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`prior art teaches away from the combinations, and why a person of ordinary skill in
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`the art would have reasons not to make the combinations. Patent Owner also
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`reserves the right to object to, and move to exclude, Petitioner’s non-authenticated
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`and hearsay evidence.
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`II.
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`SUMMARY OF THE 404 PATENT
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`The 404 patent is one of a series of patents by the named inventors in the
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`field of digital subscriber line (“DSL”) technology. DSL is a technology that
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`provides high-speed broadband access over the wires of a telephone network.
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`The inventors were substantial contributors of core technology to DSL
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`standards on behalf of TQ Delta’s predecessor in interest, Aware, Inc., a world-
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`leading innovator and provider of DSL technologies. Some of the core
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`technologies developed by Aware, including the inventions of the 404 Patent, have
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`been adopted for use in other communications protocols, such as the Multimedia
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`over Coax Alliance (“MoCA”) protocol, which
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`is used for high-speed
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`communication of content over coaxial cables within a home. Petitioner uses the
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`inventions of the 404 patent in both its DSL and MoCA products.
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Petitioner construes “synchronization signal” to mean “a signal allowing
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`frame synchronization between the transmitter of the signal and the receiver of the
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`signal.” See Pet. at 24. It is not necessary at this stage of the proceeding to
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`construe this limitation. Nevertheless, Patent Owner proposes that the broadest
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`reasonable interpretation of “synchronization signal” is “an indication used to
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`establish or maintain a timing relationship between transceivers.”
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`For purposes of determining whether to institute based on the Petition only,
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`Patent Owner does not construe any other claim terms of the 404 patent, but Patent
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`Owner does not waive its right to propose new or additional constructions in
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`litigation involving the 404 patent, or later in this proceeding if the Board should
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`decide to institute a trial.
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`6
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
`IV. NO REVIEW SHOULD BE INSTITUTED WITH RESPECT TO THE
`GROUNDS RAISED BY PETITIONER
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`The Petition fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that the challenged
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`claims are unpatentable. Specifically, the Petition proposes two grounds against
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`the 404 patent:
`
`
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`Ground 1. Unpatentability of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. §
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`103(a) over Bowie and Vanzieleghem in view of the ADSL Standard.
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`
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`Ground 2. Unpatentability of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. §
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`103(a) over the 97-161R1 and 97-319 Contributions in view of the ADSL
`
`Standard.
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`As explained in more detail below, the Board should deny institution for
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`several reasons. As an initial matter, the cited references do not, individually or
`
`collectively, disclose, teach, or suggest all of the elements of claims 1-20. Where
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`none of the references disclose an element of the claims, inter partes review for
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`obviousness cannot be instituted. See Customplay, LLC v. Clearplay, Inc.,
`
`IPR2013-00484, Paper 29 at p. 12 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014) (claims not
`
`unpatentable where none of the asserted prior art references disclosed a claim
`
`element); Du Pont v. Monsanto Tech., LLC, IPR2014-00334, Paper 16 at p. 8
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`(P.T.A.B. July 11, 2014) (denying institution where none of the asserted prior art
`
`disclosed a claim element).
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`7
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`Moreover, with respect to Ground 2, Petitioner has not even demonstrated
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`that the Contributions constitute prior art. Indeed, Petitioner fails to provide any
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`persuasive evidence that the Contributions are printed publications.
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`Additionally, with respect to both Grounds, the Petition fails to provide a
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`sufficient rationale or reason as to why the separate references would have been
`
`combined. “An obviousness analysis requires more than simply showing that each
`
`limitation is found in the prior art.” Jacobs Corp. v. Genesis III, Inc., IPR2014-
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`01267, Paper 12 at p. 8 (P.T.A.B. January 22, 2015). “Petitioner must also show
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`‘whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the
`
`fashion claimed by the patent at issue.’” Id. “Petitioner must set forth sufficient
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`articulated reasoning with rational underpinning
`
`to support
`
`its proposed
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`obviousness ground.” SAS Institute, Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, IPR2013-
`
`00581, Paper 15 at p. 12 (P.T.A.B. December 30, 2013). The Petition “has failed
`
`to address this latter, ‘reason to combine’ portion of the obviousness analysis.”
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`Jacobs Corp., IPR2014-01267, Paper 12 at p. 8.
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`Moreover, the Petition’s blanket citations to the McNally Declaration do
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`nothing to overcome the deficiencies in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)
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`(a petition must contain a “full statement of the reasons for the relief requested,
`
`including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). A Petition
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`cannot incorporate by reference a more detailed expert declaration. See 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 42.6(a)(3) (prohibiting arguments in a supporting document from being
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`incorporated by reference into a petition); Oxford Nanopore Tech. Ltd. v.
`
`University of Washington, IPR2014-00512, Paper 12 at p. 16 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 15,
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`2014) (“[E]ssentially none of the discussion in the cited paragraphs of the Branton
`
`Declaration, allegedly explaining why an ordinary artisan would have combined
`
`Akeson with Butler, Wong, or Faller, appears in the Petition. We decline to import
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`the extensive discussion regarding obviousness from
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`the declarations of
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`Petitioner’s experts into the Petition, based solely on the Petition’s citation of
`
`certain paragraphs within the declarations.”) (emphasis added).
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`In addition, even if such incorporation by reference were allowed, the
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`McNally Declaration is no better than the Petition in terms of providing reasons to
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`combine. As discussed in detail below, the McNally Declaration is full of its own
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`conclusory, unsupported statements regarding alleged reasons to combine the
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`disparate references. The statements fall far short of constituting articulated
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`reasoning with rational underpinning to support the proposed obviousness grounds.
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`For the foregoing reasons and as further discussed below, the Petition fails
`
`to establish a prima facie case of obviousness on either Ground. Accordingly,
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`the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims
`
`are unpatentable, and the Board should not institute an inter partes review.
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`9
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`A. Ground 1:
` Obviousness of Claims 1-20 Over Bowie,
`Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL Standard
`
`The combination of Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL Standard would not
`
`have rendered any of the claims of the 404 patent obvious. The combination of
`
`references does not teach, at least, “store [or storing], in the [or a] low power
`
`mode, at least one parameter associated with the full power mode operation
`
`wherein the at least one parameter comprises at least one of a fine gain parameter
`
`and a bit allocation parameter” (the “Storing Limitation”), as required by claims
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`1-20. Further, Petitioner’s stated rationales for combining Bowie, Vanzieleghem,
`
`and the ADSL Standard are conclusory and unsupported by any articulated
`
`reasoning and rational underpinning. In addition, the references teach away from
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`Petitioner’s proposed combination.
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`1.
`
`The Ground 1 References
`
`The three Ground 1 references disclose very different systems having very
`
`different functionalities. As shown below, Bowie discloses an ADSL unit 100 that
`
`includes signal processing electronics 111, modulated data transmit circuitry 112,
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`modulated data receive circuitry 113, and a resume signal detector 115.
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`10
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`
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`When Bowie’s ADSL unit 100 receives a shut down signal, the unit 100
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`enters a low power mode in which the signal processing electronics 111,
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`modulated data transmit circuitry 112, and modulated data receive circuitry 113 all
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`shut down. See Ex. 1005 at 5:25-28. The resume signal detector 115 remains
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`operational in order to receive a resume signal. See id. at 5:48-55. The unit 100
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`returns to full power after receiving a resume signal. See id. at 5:60-62. Bowie
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`does not disclose that the unit 100 is capable of receiving a synchronization signal
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`when in the low power mode. Bowie also does not disclose that the unit 100 stores
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`a fine gain parameter or a bit allocation parameter when in the low power mode.
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`11
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`IPR2016-01160
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`Rather, Bowie discloses storing “characteristics of the loop,” which do not
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`comprise a fine gain parameter or a bit allocation parameter. See id. at 5:17-24.
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`The system taught in Vanzieleghem operates differently. Vanzieleghem
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`discloses a transmitter that reduces power dissipation depending on the type of
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`input data it is being asked to transmit. The input data may be either effective data
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`or idle data. See Ex. 1006 at 5:33-35. When effective data is to be transmitted, the
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`transmitter uses all of its carriers (e.g., 256 carriers) to send the data – along with a
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`synchronization symbol – to a receiver. See id. at 5:66-6:15. When the transmitter
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`has only idle data to transmit, it reduces power dissipation by transmitting a
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`reduced number of carriers. See id. at 6:30-41. If the set of carriers is reduced to a
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`single carrier, the pilot tone is chosen to maintain frequency synchronization with a
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`receiver. See id. Vanzieleghem does not disclose storing in a low power mode any
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`parameters associated with the full power operation, including fine gain or bit
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`allocation parameters.
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`Lastly, the ADSL Standard presents the electrical characteristics of ASDL
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`signals appearing at a network interface and the requirements for transmission
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`between a network and customer installation. Ex. 1009 at 1. The ADSL Standard
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`does not discuss operation in a low power mode, and, like Bowie and
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`Vanzieleghem, the ADSL Standard does not disclose storing, in a lower power
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`mode, a fine gain parameter or a bit allocation parameter.
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`In view of the foregoing, claims 1-20 would not have been obvious over
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`Petitioner’s proposed combination of these three references.
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`2.
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`The Combination of Ground 1 References Fails to
`Disclose the Claimed “Storing in a Low Power Mode at
`Least One Parameter Associated with Full Power Mode
`of Operation”
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`a.
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`None of Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL
`Standard Discloses Storing, in Low Power Mode, a
`Fine Gain Parameter or a Bit Allocation Parameter
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`Petitioner fails to show that any of Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL
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`Standard disclose the Storing Limitation. Petitioner admits that Bowie does not
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`disclose storing a fine gain parameter or a bit allocation parameter in a low power
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`mode. See Ex. 1003 at ¶ 74 (“Bowie does not explicitly identify fine gain and bit
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`allocation parameters . . . .”). The ADSL Standard also does not disclose a low
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`power mode much less storing a fine gain parameter or a bit allocation parameter
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`in a low power mode. Petitioner cites to a section of the ADSL Standard that
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`merely discusses communicating “the number of bits and relative power levels to
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`be used on each DMT sub-carrier” from a receiver to a transmitter. Pet. at 40; Ex.
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`1009 at 87. However, even assuming that this discussion discloses “bit allocation”
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`and “fine gain” parameters, the cited ADSL Standard section does not disclose, or
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`even suggest, storing “the number of bits and relative power levels to be used on
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`IPR2016-01160
`each DMT sub-carrier” in a low power mode.2 Furthermore, Petitioner does not
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`allege that Vanzieleghem teaches the Storing Limitation.
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`Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden of establishing that any of
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`Bowie, Vanzieleghem, and the ADSL Standard disclose the Storing Limitation.
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`b.
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`Petitioner’s Invalidity Arguments with Respect to the
`Storing Limitation Have No Merit
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`In a transparent attempt to get around the fact that it cannot show that any of
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`the Ground 1 references disclose the Storing Limitation, Petitioner misleadingly
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`breaks up the limitation into two different parts and makes a different invalidity
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`argument with respect to each part. In that regard, Petitioner argues that Bowie
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`teaches “storing in the low power mode, at least one parameter associated with the
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`full power mode operation” and then argues that the requirement that “the at least
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`one parameter comprise[] at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit
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`allocation parameter” is “obvious over Bowie and the 1995 ADSL Standard.” Pet.
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`at 39-40. Petitioner’s “divide and conquer” argument has no merit.
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`First, Petitioner’s effort to break up the Storing Limitation is improper. The
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`“at least one parameter [that] comprises at least one of a fine gain parameter and a
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`bit allocation parameter” is the same “at least one parameter” that is “store[d], in
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`2 Petitioner’s expert acknowledges that the “1995 ADSL standard does not address
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`a low power mode of operation.” See Ex. 1003 at ¶ 195.
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`low power mode.” Thus, those two requirements related to the “at least one
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`parameter” are not discrete limitations and cannot be separated for purposes of an
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`invalidity analysis. Accordingly, Petitioner’s attempt to rewrite the recitation of
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`“at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit allocation parameter” to not require
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`that the parameter be “stored in the low power mode” in order to attack the Storing
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`Limitation with two different invalidity arguments must fail. Indeed, it betrays the
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`weakness of the Ground 1 references.
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`Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that (1) Bowie does disclose storing
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`“at least one parameter associated with the full power mode operation” and (2) the
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`ADSL Standard discloses at least one of a fine gain parameter and a bit allocation
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`parameter, Petitioner does not demonstrate why or how a person of skill in the art
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`would have modified Bowie to store, in a low power mode, the fine gain parameter
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`and/or bit allocation parameter of the ADSL Standard. Indeed, Petitioner’s entire
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`obviousness argument comes down to the following:
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`initialization process specifically
`The 1995 ADSL Standard’s
`mentions that determination of optimum subcarrier gains and bit
`allocations is the goal of the initialization sequence that the ‘404
`Patent and Bowie propose to avoid. Ex. 1009 at 87. Mr. McNally’s
`expert report describes how Bowie’s claims of storing
`loop
`characteristics must obviously include at least one of the two
`parameters in this limitation. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 74. Therefore, the
`limitation of at least one parameter comprising at least one of a fine
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`gain parameter and a bit allocation parameter is obvious over Bowie
`and the 1995 ADSL Standard. Ex. 1003 at ¶ 75.
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`Pet. at 40.
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`This statement falls woefully short of establishing obviousness. The first
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`sentence is just a characterization of the teachings of the ADSL Standard and does
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`not include any reason as to why a person of skill in the art would have combined
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`the alleged teachings of the ADSL Standard with Bowie as Petitioner proposes.
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`The second and third sentences are just conclusory statements. Such conclusory
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`statements, backed up with no explanation or evidence, cannot constitute evidence
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`of obviousness. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (an
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`assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements;
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`instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
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`to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”); Moses Lake Indus., Inc. v.
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`Enthone, Inc., IPR2014-00243, Paper 6 at p. 20 (P.T.A.B. June 18, 2014) (“MLI
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`must provide more than conclusory expert testimony, as discussed above,
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`and conclusory rationales to combine the teachings, to present a prima facie case of
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`obviousness.”).
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`In addition, while it references and cites to the McNally Declaration, mere
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`citation to an expert declaration does not excuse the failure to provide sufficient