UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
`INC., and AKORN INC., 1
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE and ALLERGAN, INC.,
`Patent Owners.2
`_____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01127 (8,685,930 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01128 (8,629,111 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01129 (8,642,556 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01130 (8,633,162 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01131 (8,648,048 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01132 (9,248,191 B2)
`_____________
`
`JOINT MOTION BY PATENT OWNER SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE
`AND ALLERGAN CONCERNING BOARD’S DIVESTED JURISDICTION
`OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A STAY PENDING THE APPEAL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Cases IPR2017-00576 and IPR2017-00594, IPR2017-00578 and IPR2017-
`00596, IPR2017-00579 and IPR2017-00598, IPR2017-00583 and IPR2017-
`00599, IPR2017-00585 and IPR2017-00600, and IPR2017-00586 and IPR2017-
`00601 have respectively been joined with the captioned proceedings (collectively
`the “Proceedings”). The word-for-word identical paper is filed in each proceeding
`identified in the caption pursuant to the Board’s Scheduling Order (Paper 10).
`2 The caption used in this Notice of Appeal was intended only to comply with the
`Board’s Order that the “caption for these proceedings shall reflect both Allergan’s
`and the Tribe’s status as ‘Patent Owners.’” Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe is the Patent
`Owner. By using this caption, neither Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe nor Allergan
`concede that Allergan is a “Patent Owner.”
`
`i
`
`

`

`I.
`II.
`
`Table of Contents
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 1
`A. The Tribe is entitled to immediate appellate review of the Board’s
`decision denying its assertion of sovereign immunity. .............................. 1
`B. The Tribe’s appeal divests the Board of jurisdiction. ................................. 3
`C. Alternatively, if the Board finds it has jurisdiction, it should still
`stay the proceedings under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a). ........................................ 7
`III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES:
`
`Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC,
`406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................... 7
`
`
`Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Malaterre,
`633 F.3d 680 (8th 2011) ............................................................................................ 3
`
`
`Apostol v. Gallion,
`870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,
`537 U.S. 149 (2003) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc.,
`625 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................................... 6
`
`
`Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.,
`128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Brock v. Pierce County,
`476 U.S. 253 (1986) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn,
`509 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc.,
`548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir, 2008) ..................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
`544 U.S. 280 (2005) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
`529 U.S. 120 (2000) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`
`Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,
`459 U.S. 56 (1982) ..................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`In re Board of Regents of The Univ. of Tex. Sys.,
`435 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 2
`
`
`In re Graves,
`69 F.3d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Ins. Co. of the West v. U.S.,
`243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 5
`
`
`Mitchell v. Forsyth,
`472 U.S. 511 (1985) ............................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`
`Osage Tribal Council ex rel. Osage Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
`187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................. 1
`
`
`Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany,
`998 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ....................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
`506 U.S. 139 (1993) ................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Saratoga Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.,
`879 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................. 8, 9
`
`
`Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
`517 U.S. 44 (1996) ..................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Tamiami Partners By & Through Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
`Indians of Fla.,
`63 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Turi v. Main Street Adoption Services, LLP,
`633 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................... 6
`
`
`U.S. v. Brooks,
`145 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................... 4
`
`
`Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A.,
`134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) ............................................................................................... 7
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation,
`512 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................... 2
`STATUTES:
`35 U.S.C. § 316 .......................................................................................................... 7, 8
`REGULATIONS:
`37 C.F.R. § 42.5 ............................................................................................... 1, 7, 8, 10
`
`ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS:
`
`Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc.,
`IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 19 (Jan. 25 2017) ...................................................... 10
`
`
`Ericsson Inc., et al v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
`IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 4 (Dec. 19, 2017) .................................................. 9, 10
`
`
`Ericsson Inc., et al v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn,
`IPR2017-01186, Paper 21 at 3-4 (Feb. 9, 2018) ..................................................... 10
`
`
` Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md. et al,
`IPR2016-00208, Paper 28 at 6-7 (May 23, 2017) ................................................... 10
`
`
`Reactive Surfaces Ltd, LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
`IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 at 7-8 (July 13, 2017) .................................................... 10
`
`
`Smart Microwave Sensor Gmbh,
`IPR2016-00488, 2017 WL 3669083 (Aug. 24, 2017) .............................................. 5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`I. INTRODUCTION
`The St. Regis Mohawk Tribe (“Tribe”) has invoked the collateral order doctrine
`
`to immediately appeal the Board’s February 23, 2018 Decision. When the
`
`Combined Notice of Appeal (the “Combined Notice”) was filed, the Board was
`
`divested of jurisdiction. Because the issue on appeal is whether the Board may
`
`proceed at all, the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction concurrently with the Federal
`
`Circuit. Sovereign immunity is immunity from suit, not immunity from liability.
`
`The Tribe would be irreparably harmed if the Board were to proceed in its absence
`
`since it is the Tribe’s immunity from the process itself that the Tribe seeks to
`
`protect on appeal. Thus, the Board should acknowledge that it is divested of
`
`jurisdiction to continue.
`
`Alternatively, even if the Board concludes that it is not divested of jurisdiction
`
`by the Combined Notice, it should issue a stay under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a). The
`
`issues raised in this proceeding are important matters of first impression not
`
`contemplated by the statutory scheme.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`A. The Tribe is entitled to immediate appellate review of the Board’s decision
`denying its assertion of sovereign immunity.
`The Board’s decision denying the Tribe’s assertion of sovereign immunity is
`
`immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Osage Tribal Council
`
`ex rel. Osage Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th
`
`1
`
`

`

`Cir. 1999) (holding that the denial of tribal immunity in an agency proceeding is an
`
`immediately appealable collateral order); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d
`
`921, 928 (7th Cir. 2008) (same). See also In re Board of Regents of The Univ. of
`
`Tex. Sys., 435 F. App’x 945, 947-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“the Board can of course
`
`immediately appeal” immunity decision.).
`
`The Supreme Court has long held that the collateral order doctrine permits
`
`interlocutory review of an order that “conclusively determine[s] the disputed
`
`question, resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
`
`action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
`
`Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 543 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part). A
`
`major characteristic of the collateral order doctrine is that unless the claim “can be
`
`reviewed before [the proceedings terminate], it can never be reviewed at all.” Id. at
`
`525. This falls under the “effectively unreviewable on appeal” prong of the test.
`
`Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that in a case of immunity “the denial of a
`
`substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final
`
`judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to
`
`have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.” Id.
`
`Tribes are entitled to this protection. “As with absolute, qualified, and Eleventh
`
`Amendment immunity, tribal sovereign immunity ‘is an immunity from suit rather
`
`than a mere defense to liability; and ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`permitted to go to trial.’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d
`
`1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007). This reasoning was echoed in Tamiami Partners By &
`
`Through Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d
`
`1030, 1050 (11th Cir. 1995), where the court held “[t]ribal sovereign immunity
`
`would be rendered meaningless if a suit against a tribe asserting its immunity were
`
`allowed to proceed to trial.”
`
`The Petitioners contend that the cases relied upon by the Tribe are not
`
`applicable because the Tribe is not being subjected to a “trial” but only the final
`
`hearing and issuance of a decision. A final hearing and a ruling from this Board are
`
`part of the adjudicatory process to which the Tribe claims absolute immunity. The
`
`fact that immunity was raised after pre-decision litigation, and before the Tribe was
`
`the patent owner, is irrelevant. Sovereign immunity may be raised at any time in a
`
`proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. See Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc.,
`
`548 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2008); Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Malaterre, 633
`
`F.3d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 2011). In this case, the Tribe raised its immunity at its first
`
`opportunity to do sothe day it acquired the patents. This is not a frivolous
`
`argument. The Tribe’s immunity presents a genuine issue of the jurisdictional
`
`scope of this Board.
`
`B. The Tribe’s appeal divests the Board of jurisdiction.
`Because immunity to the process once lost cannot be recovered, when a
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`collateral order on immunity is appealed, courts generally agree that the lower
`
`court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved. See Forsyth, 472 U.S.
`
`at 524-25. As stated in Apostol, a Forsyth appeal of “whether the case should be
`
`tried” or whether a claimed immunity should be honored, divests the lower court of
`
`jurisdiction to conduct the trial pending appeal because “[t]he justification for the
`
`interlocutory appeal is that the trial destroys rights created by the immunity.”
`
`Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1989).
`
`The interlocutory appeal of the Board’s Decision divests the Board of
`
`jurisdiction over “any matter touching upon, or involved in the appeal” while it is
`
`pending. U.S. v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 455 (1st Cir. 1998). Once the appeal is
`
`filed, jurisdiction is transferred from the court or agency below to the appellate
`
`court, both of which cannot exercise jurisdiction at the same time. See e.g. Griggs
`
`v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (holding that a notice
`
`of appeal divests district court of jurisdiction); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v.
`
`Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (issue is
`
`“whether there is any good reason why the district court may carry on once an
`
`appeal has been filed.”); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 998 F.2d 1, 1 (D.C.
`
`Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
`
`Both the Federal Circuit and the Board recognize this rule and have held that
`
`the Board is divested of jurisdiction when either party files a notice of appeal to the
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Federal Circuit. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[U]pon the
`
`filing of a notice of appeal from an appealable decision … the subject matter of the
`
`appeal is transferred to this court, and … thereafter until the appeal has been
`
`disposed of by us the tribunals of the Patent Office have no jurisdiction …”);
`
`Smart Microwave Sensor Gmbh, IPR2016-00488, 2017 WL 3669083, at *1 (Aug.
`
`24, 2017) (“The general rule is that the Board is divested of jurisdiction when
`
`either party files a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit.”).
`
`The issues on appeal are whether the Tribe’s sovereign immunity prevents the
`
`Board from going forward and whether the Board’s conclusion that Allergan is the
`
`“effective patent holder” would allow the Board to “work around” the Tribe’s
`
`immunity. If this Board went forward despite the appeal, the Tribe will be forced
`
`to choose between appearing before the Board, thereby losing its immunity, or risk
`
`losing its substantial property rights in absentia. For this reason, interlocutory
`
`appeals are the norm in cases involving assertions of sovereign immunity. See
`
`Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 52 (1996) (the “collateral order
`
`doctrine allows immediate appellate review of order denying [a] claim of Eleventh
`
`Amendment immunity”) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
`
`Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
`
`Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 289-90 (2005) (interlocutory appeal of assertion of
`
`foreign sovereign immunity); Ins. Co. of the West v. U.S., 243 F.3d 1367, 1370
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`(Fed. Cir. 2001) (same).
`
`While the Petitioners would suggest this case can proceed without the Tribe
`
`because the Board ruled Allergan is the “effective owner” of the patent, that
`
`question is “inextricably tied” to the question of immunity because the Federal
`
`Circuit will determine whether the Tribe is the Patent Owner and, if so, whether an
`
`inter partes review is the type of proceeding to which sovereign immunity applies.
`
`This makes the issue of ownership a pendant appellate claim. In Turi v. Main
`
`Street Adoption Services, LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit
`
`held that pendent appellate jurisdiction applies to claims “inextricably intertwined
`
`with an independently appealable issue.” Pendent appellate jurisdiction thus
`
`“allows an appellate court, in its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over issues that
`
`are not independently appealable.” Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 625 F.3d 283,
`
`286–87 (6th Cir. 2010).
`
`Whether the IPRs can proceed without the Tribe, using Allergan as a proxy for
`
`the Tribea proxy to which the Tribe has not assentedis “coterminous with, or
`
`subsumed in, the [Tribe’s] claim” of sovereign immunity because the Federal
`
`Circuit must first determine whether the Tribe is the “Patent Owner” as part of its
`
`determination of whether the Tribe’s sovereign immunity applies to these
`
`proceedings. This will also invariably require a determination of whether any
`
`statute or regulation allows PTAB to proceed with an IPR against an “effective
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`patent owner” in the absence of a sovereign “Patent Owner”.
`
`The Tribe will further argue that PTAB has no authority to create equitable or
`
`common law rules to facilitate the exercise of its Congressional mandate through
`
`its written decisions and orders in IPRs; only the Director has rulemaking authority
`
`under the AIA. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a); Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 698
`
`(D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting agencies have no constitutional or common law authority,
`
`only authority granted by Congress). PTAB has no implied authority to create ad
`
`hoc rules and new forms of PTAB standing to facilitate what it perceives to be its
`
`mission. The Supreme Court has held “[r]egardless of how serious the problem an
`
`administrative agency seeks to address, [an agency] may not exercise its authority
`
`in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress
`
`enacted into law.” Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
`
`529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). Doing so “would deal a
`
`severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers.” Utility Air Regulatory
`
`Group v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014). Thus, on appeal, the Tribe will
`
`argue that the Board erred when it deemed Allergan the “effective owner” in order
`
`to avoid the Tribe’s immunity as an impediment to Board jurisdiction.
`
`C. Alternatively, if the Board finds it has jurisdiction, it should still stay the
`proceedings under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a).
`The PTAB Rules provide the Board with authority to suspend the current June
`
`6, 2018 deadline. E.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a) (permitting the Board to “determine a
`7
`
`
`
`

`

`proper course of conduct in a proceeding for any situation not specifically
`
`covered” and to “set times by order.”). The sovereign immunity issues in this case
`
`are precisely the type of “situation not specifically covered” by the statutory
`
`scheme that warrants extraordinary relief under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a).
`
`It is also significant that suspending the current April 3, 2018 hearing date and
`
`June 6, 2018 decision deadline would not run afoul of any statutory or regulatory
`
`requirement. The relevant statute only requires the Director to “prescribe
`
`regulations … requiring that the final determination in an inter partes review be
`
`issued not later than 1 year” after instituted “except that the Director may, for good
`
`cause show, extend the 1-year period by not more than 6 months, and may adjust
`
`the time periods … in the case of joinder under section 315(c).” 35 U.S.C. §
`
`316(a)(11).
`
`Because the statute fails to set forth a consequence if these deadlines are not
`
`met, the deadlines are not considered jurisdictional or mandatory and failure to
`
`meet the statutory deadline would not void subsequent agency action. Brock v.
`
`Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986); see also Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,
`
`537 U.S. 149, 158 (2003) (“Nor, since Brock, have we ever construed a provision
`
`that the Government ‘shall’ act within a specified time, without more, as a
`
`jurisdictional limit precluding action later.”). Simply put, failing to “comply with a
`
`statutory time limit does not divest the agency of jurisdiction.” Saratoga Sav. &
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 879 F.2d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1989).
`
`From an equitable perspective, as the Board recognizes, the issues on appeal are
`
`matters of first impression and great public interest. There are at least three distinct
`
`and important issues that are subject to immediate appellate review and should be
`
`reviewed by the Federal Circuit before the Board goes forward.
`
`First is the issue of whether the Tribe is immune from suit in this forum. This
`
`Board has declined to adhere to decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence which
`
`expressly recognizes tribal sovereign immunity as a protection that cannot be
`
`overcome unless abrogated by Congress or expressly and unequivocally waived by
`
`the Tribe. Whether the Board’s reasoning is correct is important not only to the
`
`Tribe here, but to all tribes in the country, as the amicus briefs attest.
`
`Second, the Board’s Order has created an irreconcilable schism in the Board’s
`
`sovereign immunity jurisprudence because every prior panel to consider the issue
`
`has held that inter partes review “is an adjudicatory proceeding of a federal agency
`
`from which state entities are immune.” Ericsson Inc., et al v. Regents of the Univ.
`
`of Minn., IPR2017-01186, Paper 14 at 4 (Dec. 19, 2017) (collecting cases)
`
`(Ruschke, C.A.P.J.) (“Minnesota Order”).
`
`Third, the Board’s Order has also created an irreconcilable panel split
`
`concerning jurisdiction. This panel held that it exercises “jurisdiction over the
`
`challenged patent” but it does not have “personal jurisdiction over the patent
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`owner.” Paper No. 130 at 16. That departs from all prior panel decisions, which
`
`held that “inter partes review is an action against the patent owner.” Covidien LP
`
`v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., IPR2016-01274, Paper 21 at 19 (Jan. 25
`
`2017); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md. et al, Case IPR2016-00208, Paper 28 at 6-7
`
`(May 23, 2017); Reactive Surfaces Ltd, LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., Case
`
`IPR2016-01914, Paper 36 at 7-8 (July 13, 2017); Minnesota Order at 4-6.
`
`These are important jurisdictional issues that weigh in favor of staying these
`
`proceedings to maintain the status quo pending their resolution in the appeal, if the
`
`Board decides it has not been divested of jurisdiction. See Ericsson Inc., et al v.
`
`Regents of the Univ. of Minn., IPR2017-01186, Paper 21 at 3-4 (Feb. 9, 2018).
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`Sovereign immunity is a core part of the Tribe’s identity as a people. Whether
`
`the Tribe’s immunity is to be respected in these proceedings is an issue of national
`
`importance. The Board is required by binding precedents to respect the Tribe’s
`
`right to have the issue decided by the Federal Circuit and, if required, the United
`
`States Supreme Court. Thus, the Board should acknowledge that it is divested of
`
`jurisdiction to continue. Alternatively, the Board should stay the proceedings under
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a) given the important issues of first impression at stake.
`
`If necessary, the Tribe and Allergan intend to seek emergency relief from the
`
`Federal Circuit no later than March 16, 2018.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`/Alfonso Chan /
`Alfonso Chan
`Reg. No. 45,964
`achan@shorechan.com
`Michael Shore*
`mshore@shorechan.com
`Christopher Evans*
`cevans@shorechan.com
`SHORE CHAN DEPUMPO LLP
`901 Main Street, Suite 3300
`Dallas, TX 75202
`Tel: (214) 593-9110
`Fax: (214) 593-9111
`
`Marsha Schmidt*
`Attorney at Law
`14928 Perrywood Drive
`Burtonsville, MD 20866
`marsha@mkschmidtlaw.com
`Tel: (301) 949-5176
`*admitted pro hac vice
`
`Attorneys for Patent Owner
`Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Date: March 8, 2018
`
`
`/Michael Kane/ _
`Michael J. Kane
`Reg. No. 39,722
`Dorothy P. Whelan
`Reg. No. 33,814
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`60 South Sixth Street, Suite 3200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`Telephone: (612) 337-2508
`Facsimile: (612) 288-9696
`whelan@fish.com
`kane@fish.com
`
`
`Attorneys for Allergan, Inc.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(e)(4) and 42.205(b), the undersigned certifies
`
`that on March 8, 2018, a complete copy of Joint Motion by Patent Owner Saint Regis
`
`Mohawk Tribe and Allergan Concerning the Board’s Divested Jurisdiction or, in the
`
`Alternative, for a Stay Pending the Appeal was filed electronically through the Patent
`
`Trial and Appeal Board’s PTABE2E System and provided, via electronic service, to
`
`the Petitioners by serving the correspondence address of record as follows:
`
`Steven W. Parmelee
`Michael T. Rosato
`Jad A. Mills
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100
`Seattle, WA 98104-7036
`sparmelee@wsgr.com
`mrosato@wsgr.com
`jmills@wsgr.com
`
`Wendy L. Devine
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`One Market Street, Spear Tower Floor 33
`San Francisco, CA 94105-1126
`wdevine@wsgr.com
`
`Douglas H. Carsten
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`12235 El Camino Real, Suite 200
`San Diego, CA 92130
`dcarsten@wsgr.com
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Richard Torczon
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`1700 K Street NW, 5th Floor
`Washington, DC 20006
`rtorczon@wsgr.com
`
`Brandon M. White
`Crystal Canterbury
`Charles G. Curtis, Jr.
`Jennifer MacLean
`Benjamin S. Sharp
`Shannon M. Bloodworth
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`700 13th Street NW
`Washington DC 20005
`bmwhite@perkinscoie.com
`ccanterbury@perkinscoie.com
`ccurtis@perkinscoie.com
`jmaclean@perkinscoie.com
`bsharp@perkinscoie.com
`sbloodworth@perkinscoie.com
`
`Eric D. Miller
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
`Seattle, WA 98101-3099
`emiller@perkinscoie.com
`
`Counsel for Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`And upon the remaining Petitioners as follows:
`
`Michael R. Dzwonczyk
`Azy S. Kokabi
`Travis B. Ribar
`SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
`2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 800
`Washington, DC 20037
`mdzwonczyk@sughrue.com
`akokabi@sughrue.com
`tribar@sughrue.com
`
`Attorneys for Akorn Inc.
`
`Gary J. Speier
`Mark D. Schuman
`CARLSON, CASPERS, VANDENBURGH, LINDQUIST & SCHUMAN, P.A.
`225 South Sixth Street, Suite 4200
`Minneapolis, MN 55402
`gspeier@carlsoncaspers.com
`mschuman@carlsoncaspers.com
`IPRCyclosporine@carlsoncaspers.com
`
`Attorneys for Teva Pharmaceuticals
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Alfonso G. Chan/
`Alfonso G. Chan
`SHORE CHAN DEPUMPO LLP
`901 Main Street, Suite 3300
`Dallas, Texas 75202
`(214) 593-9110
`
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`