Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_____________
`
`MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC., TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
`INC., and AKORN INC., 1
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`
`ALLERGAN, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01127 (8,685,930 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01128 (8,629,111 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01129 (8,642,556 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01130 (8,633,162 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01131 (8,648,048 B2)
`Case IPR2016-01132 (9,248,191 B2)
`_____________
`
`Brief Amicus Curiae of the Seneca Nation
`in Support of the Patent Owner, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe
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`
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`1 Cases IPR2017-00576 and IPR2017-00594, IPR2017-00578 and IPR2017- 00596,
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`IPR2017-00579 and IPR2017-00598, IPR2017-00583 and IPR2017- 00599,
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`IPR2017-00585 and IPR2017-00600, and IPR2017-00586 and IPR2017-00601 have
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`respectively been joined with the captioned proceedings. The word-for-word
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`identical paper is filed in each proceeding identified in the caption pursuant to the
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`Board’s Scheduling Order (Paper 10).
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... iii
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`Page
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`STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................................................................................. 1
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`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 2
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`Dismissal Is Appropriate Where A Tribal Sovereign Cannot Be Joined .... 2
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`Third Party Representation Cannot Be Used To Justify Going Forward To
`Determine The Legal Rights Of A Sovereign Tribe ................................... 6
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`I.
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`II.
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`III. Tribes Have Been Held To Be Indispensable And The Case Dismissed In
`A Variety Of Contexts ................................................................................. 8
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`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 11
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................................... 12
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`ii
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`Cases
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`Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................... 3
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`Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) ..................................................... 9
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`Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 937
`(2004) ..................................................................................................................... 3
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`Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th
`Cir. 2002) ............................................................................................................3, 9
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`E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) ....................... 8-9
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`Enterprise Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890
`(10th Cir. 1989) ..................................................................................................3, 7
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`Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Authority, 928 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1991) ..... 5, 6-7
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`Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F.Supp.3d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2016) ............. 8
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`Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) ..................................................... 6
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`Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) ........................ 3
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`Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 87, 95 (2012), aff’d,
`541 Fed.Appx. 974 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................. 3, 4, 5
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`Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
`903 (1976) ................................................................................................... 4, 5, 8-9
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`Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) .................................... 5
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`Michigan v. Bay Mills, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014) .............................2, 11
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`Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 660 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D. Wyo. 2009) ...... 9
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`Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505
`(1991) ...................................................................................................................... 4
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`iii
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008) ....................................................... 4-5
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`Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977) ................ 3-4
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`Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................ 8
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`Rosales v. Dutschke, Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3730500 (E.D. Cal. 2017) ...................10
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`Rosales v. United States, 73 Fed.Appx. 913 (9th Cir. 2003) ..................................... 7
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`Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
`810 (1995) ........................................................................................................... 2-3
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`Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
`962 (1975) ............................................................................................................... 4
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`Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C.,
`476 U.S. 877 (1986) ............................................................................................... 2
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`Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Runyon, 2017 WL 923915 (D. Or. 2017) ...............10
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`United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) ........ 4
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`Vann v. Salazar, 883 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2011) ............................................ 9-10
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`White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................................. 3
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`
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`Statutes
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`37 CFR § 42.20(d) ..................................................................................................... 1
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`
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`Other Authorities
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`Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
`Bureau of Indian Affairs, 82 Fed. Reg. 4915 (Jan. 17, 2017) ................................ 1
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`Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 19 ................................................................................................ 2
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`iv
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`STATEMENT OF INTEREST
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`The Seneca Nation is a sovereign Indian nation comprised of more than
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`8,000 citizens, whom occupy five territories (Allegany, Cattaraugus, Oil Springs,
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`Niagara Falls, and Buffalo Creek) in Western New York, over which the Nation
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`exercises its governing authority. The Nation is part of the historic Six Nations
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`Confederacy and has governed itself in accordance with a written constitution
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`establishing a tripartite form of government consisting of legislative, executive,
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`and judicial functions since 1848. The Nation is a federally recognized Indian
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`nation. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
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`United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 82 Fed. Reg. 4915, 4918 (Jan. 17, 2017)
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`The Nation hereby submits this amicus brief in response to the Patent Trial
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`and Appeal Board (PTAB) request for briefing from amicus curiae, Paper No. 96
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`(Nov. 3, 2017), pursuant to 37 CFR § 42.20(d), in order to address incorrect legal
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`assertions made regarding the indispensable party analysis as it applies to tribal
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`sovereigns. The Nation has the strongest interest in assuring the doctrine of
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`sovereign immunity as applied to Indian nations is understood and respected in
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`federal legal and administrative proceedings. It is of significant importance that
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`this Board adhere to the longstanding practices of the application of the
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`indispensable party analysis and criteria in regards to Indian nations.
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`1
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`We understand that the Board does not have an indispensable party rule but
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`that it does refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. As we
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`explain below, under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 19, tribes have long been given deference
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`as a sovereign and consideration of whether a case can go forward without a tribe
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`is made with heightened scrutiny. The interests of sovereignty thus compel a
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`heightened deference to tribes in the application of general principles of sovereign
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`immunity, in accordance with what is now settled law.
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`
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`ARGUMENT
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`I. Dismissal Is Appropriate Where A Tribal Sovereign Cannot Be Joined.
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`Indian nations exercise inherent sovereign authority and, as self-governing
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`and self-determining entities, thereby possess sovereign immunity as a “necessary
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`corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.” Three Affiliated Tribes of
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`Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
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`This rule holds even for off-reservation commercial activity. See, e.g., Michigan v.
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`Bay Mills, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014) (hereafter “Bay Mills”)
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`(Declining to confine tribal sovereign immunity to reservations or to non-
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`commercial activities); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th
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`Cir. 1995) (Holding that the extra-territorial nature of commercial activity does not
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`strip the tribe of its right to assert sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 810
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`2
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`(1995); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998)
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`(hereafter “Kiowa”) (Holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred suits in
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`contract against the tribe, even when the contracts in question involved off-
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`reservation commercial activities).
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`Furthermore, there is a “strong policy that has favored dismissal when a
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`court cannot join a tribe because of sovereign immunity.” Klamath Tribe Claims
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`Comm. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 87, 95 (2012), aff’d, 541 Fed.Appx. 974
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`(Fed. Cir. 2013) (hereafter “Klamath”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d
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`951, 960 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 937 (2004)); See also Enterprise
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`Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 894
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`(10th Cir. 1989) (hereafter “Enterprise”) (“The dismissal of this suit is mandated
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`by the policy of tribal immunity.”).
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`Indeed, when a tribe is immune from suit, there is “very little need for
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`balancing Rule 19(b) factors because immunity itself may be viewed as the
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`compelling factor.” White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir.
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`2014) (internal quotes omitted). It follows that nearly every case has been
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`dismissed when the absent party is an Indian tribe protected by sovereign
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`immunity. See, e.g., Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.
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`2002); Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276
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`F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Department of Game of Wash.,
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`3
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`433 U.S. 165 (1977); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of
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`Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
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`Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.
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`1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976)); Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240
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`(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
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`The test applied to determine whether a tribe is an indispensable party but
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`cannot be joined because of its sovereign immunity is very similar to that
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`announced in Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 862–63, 873 (2008) (hereafter
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`“Pimentel”), in the context of foreign sovereigns. In Pimentel, the Supreme Court
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`held that “[a] case may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not
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`amenable to suit … where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the
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`sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is
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`a potential for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.” This rule holds even
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`if there is no alternative forum. Id. at 872.
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`A Pimentel-like analysis has applied in the context of Rule 19 and tribal
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`sovereign immunity both before and after the ruling in Pimentel. Like Pimentel,
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`the policy as applied to tribes has sometimes been defined as mandatory and
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`compelling. Klamath, 106 Fed. Cl. at 96 (“Pimentel stands for the proposition that
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`where a sovereign party should be joined in an action, but cannot be owing to
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`sovereign immunity, the entire case must be dismissed if there is the potential for
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`the interests of the sovereign to be injured.”). Like Pimentel, the lack of a forum
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`does not automatically prevent dismissal of the claims asserted. See Makah Indian
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`Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Sovereign immunity may leave
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`a party with no forum for [that party’s] claims.”) (citing Lomayaktewa v.
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`Hathaway, 520 F.2d at 1326); Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Authority, 928
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`F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The only branch with the ability to provide a forum
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`for resolution of the issues involved here is Congress.”)
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`The Petitioners have sought to distinguish Pimentel on the ground that the
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`sovereign in that case was a foreign sovereign while tribes are domestic dependent
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`sovereigns. See Petitioners’ Opp. brief at 21. This is a false distinction in any
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`event. It been well-established post-Pimentel that heightened deference is
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`provided to tribes, just as it is to foreign and domestic sovereigns. Klamath, 106
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`Fed. Cl. at 96 (“As subsequent cases confirm, this rationale applies to domestic
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`sovereigns, i.e., States and Indian nations, as much as it does to foreign sovereigns,
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`e.g., the Philippines”). The tribal immunity and indispensable party line of cases
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`also make it clear that tribes were given such deference long before Pimentel was
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`decided. See cases cited at supra, 4-5.
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`The vast majority of cases hold, both as a matter of sound law and good
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`policy, that where a tribe cannot be joined as an indispensable party due to its
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`sovereign immunity, the case should be dismissed. This Board should follow suit
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`and dismiss the present case on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity.
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`
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`II. Third Party Representation Cannot Be Used To Justify Going Forward To
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`Determine The Legal Rights Of A Sovereign Tribe.
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`
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`The Petitioners have taken the position, Opp. Brief at 13-14, that even if the
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`Tribe does hold an interest in the patent, that Allergan can adequately represent
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`any such interests as an existing party to the proceedings. This assertion is
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`repeated at p. 18, “Allergan can fully represent any ownership interests the Tribe
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`may have.”
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`To the contrary, courts have held in a number of contexts that tribes, as
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`indispensable parties with unique interests, cannot be adequately represented by
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`third parties unless a tribe consents. Without their consent, cases have resulted in
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`dismissal. See, e.g., Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (Finding that
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`litigating without the tribes would threaten their sovereignty by attempting to
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`disrupt their ability to govern themselves and to determine what is in their best
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`interests in balancing potential harms of mining operation against the benefits of
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`royalty payments); Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 928 F.2d 542 (2d Cir.
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`1991) (Finding in an action challenging the constitutionality of the Seneca Nation
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`Settlement Act of 1990, that “as the beneficiary of a substantial sum of money
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`from the federal government, it is manifest that the Nation has a vital interest in the
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`constitutionality of the 1990 Act.”).
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`This is so because it is generally understood that no external entity, even one
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`acting as a fiduciary or in a trust relationship with a tribe, such as the United
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`States, can represent the varied interests of a sovereign Indian tribe; only the tribe
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`itself can represent its own interests. In Enterprise, for example, the Tenth Circuit
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`considered whether the United States, as a defendant, could represent the Tribe in a
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`suit regarding a tribal contract. The Court held that if the suit went forward, the
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`Tribe’s immunity would be effectively abrogated since the suit would result in an
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`adjudication of its interest in that contract without its consent. Enterprise, 883
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`F.2d at 894. The Court concluded that the Tribe was an indispensable party and
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`dismissed the case, holding that the United States could not adequately represent
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`the Tribe’s interest because “the Tribe’s interest here in its sovereign right not to
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`have its legal duties judicially determined without consent is an interest which the
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`United States’ presence in this suit cannot protect.” Id. Similarly, in Rosales v.
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`United States, 73 Fed.Appx. 913, 914 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit, in
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`dismissing the suit, held that the Jamul Indian Village was a necessary and
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`indispensable party which could not be forced to appear and could not be
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`adequately represented by the United States.
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`7
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`It stems from this line of reasoning then, that if Indian nations cannot be
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`adequately represented by their fiduciary, they certainly cannot be represented by
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`any other entity including corporations and field-of-use licensees. Only the tribe
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`itself can represent its unique and varied interests before this Board.
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`III. Tribes Have Been Held To Be Indispensable And The Case Dismissed In A
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`Variety Of Contexts.
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`There are also specific factual contexts that establish that a third party
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`cannot represent a tribe. For example, in relation to property interests it has been
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`held that a case simply may not go forward when the question of a tribe’s property
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`ownership and rights are at issue and the Tribe cannot be joined. See Jamul Action
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`Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F.Supp.3d 1042, 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“[T]he Tribe’s
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`interests in its status, its sovereignty, its beneficial interests in real property, and its
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`contractual interests cannot be adjudicated without its formal presence.”); Quileute
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`Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994) (potential for tribe to
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`lose property interest renders tribe indispensable).
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`In terms of contracts, it has been held that third parties cannot represent
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`tribes in contract disputes. See E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 610 F.3d 1070,
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`1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘[n]o procedural
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`principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`[challenging the terms of] a contract, all parties who may be affected by the
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`determination of the action are indispensable.’”) (quoting Lomayaktewa v.
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`Hathaway, 520 F.2d at 1325); see also Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr.
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`Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reaffirming the
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`fundamental principle outlined in Lomayaktewa that “[A] party to a contract is
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`necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to
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`decimate that contract”, and finding that a judgment rendered in the absence of the
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`Navajo Nation would impair its “sovereign capacity to negotiate contracts and, in
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`general, to govern the Navajo reservation.”); Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081,
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`1088 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] district court cannot adjudicate an attack on the terms of
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`a negotiated agreement without jurisdiction over the parties to that agreement.”)
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`Cases presenting an infringement on tribal sovereign immunity in other
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`contexts produce similar results. In a case brought by the Northern Arapaho Tribe
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`alleging unlawful imposition of vehicle and excise taxes by state and county
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`governments, the District Court of Wyoming was compelled to dismiss the case
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`because the Eastern Shoshone Tribe could not be joined due to tribal sovereign
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`immunity. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, 660 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D.
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`Wyo. 2009). The Court determined that “[t]he sovereignty of each nation demands
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`equal respect, yet two of the affected sovereigns resist joinder … the Court finds
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`that this case cannot proceed without them.” Id. at 1287. See also Vann v.
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`9
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`Salazar, 883 F.Supp.2d 44, 49-51 (D.D.C. 2011) (Dismissing action against the
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`Secretary of the Interior alleging disenfranchisement of the Cherokee Freedmen
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`after finding the Cherokee Nation would be prejudiced if the action proceeded in
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`its absence); Rosales v. Dutschke, Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3730500, *6 (E.D. Cal.
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`2017) (Dismissing action against federal defendants because Tribe (Jamul Indian
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`Village) is an indispensable party and immune from suit; “JIV’s interest in
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`maintaining its sovereign immunity outweighs plaintiffs’ interest”); Union Pacific
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`Railroad Co. v. Runyon, 2017 WL 923915 (D. Or. 2017) (Dismissing action
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`because Indian tribes’ interest in treaty-reserved fishing rights could not be
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`adequately represented by the County board of commissioners, the Columbia River
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`Gorge Commission, or intervening environmental organizations).
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`Courts across the land have found that when a tribe is an indispensable party
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`in a case impacting their legal interests, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
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`necessitates dismissal. This rule has applied in a wide variety of contexts
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`involving subject matter from property and contractual interests to treaty-reserved
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`rights. This Board should take special care to fully examine and apply this general
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`principle of law to the context of proceedings before this Board: an Indian tribe
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`patent owner, as an indispensable and non-consenting sovereign, cannot have its
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`rights adequately represented by a third party.
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`10
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`CONCLUSION
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`
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`This Board needs to tread carefully. The Supreme Court has been very
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`deferential to Congress in terms of when and how to address tribal sovereign
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`immunity. It is a well-established principle of federal law that only Congress has
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`the authority to curtail tribal sovereign immunity. Just as the Supreme Court
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`refused to overstep its authority in Bay Mills, we urge this Board to not “create a
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`freestanding exception to tribal immunity for all off-reservation commercial
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`conduct.” Id. at 2039. The Board should not create new precedents but should
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`rely on sound legal reasoning that is grounded in the well-developed jurisprudence
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`of the Supreme Court and federal courts. Contrary to the Opposition’s contention,
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`while this may be a case of first impression to the Board, the case law and history
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`of tribal sovereign immunity is longstanding and robust and necessitates dismissal
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`of the present case.
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`Dated: December 1, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/Martin E. Seneca, Jr./
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`MARTIN E. SENECA, JR., Esq.
`General Counsel
`Seneca Nation
`12837 Route 438
`Irving, NY 14081
`(716) 532-4900 x 5053
`meseneca@sni.org
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae Seneca Nation
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`11
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on December 1, 2017, I caused the foregoing Amicus
`Curiae Brief of the Seneca Nation in Support of the Patent Owner, Saint Regis
`Mohawk Tribe, to be served by email on the following counsel of record:
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`PETITIONER MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.:
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`Steven W. Parmelee
`Michael T. Rosato
`Jad A. Mills
`Richard Torczon
`Wendy L. Devine
`Douglas H. Carsten
`Anna Phillips
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
`sparmelee@wsgr.com
`mrosato@wsgr.com
`jmills@wsgr.com
`rtorczon@wsgr.com
`wdevine@wsgr.com
`dcarsten@wsgr.com
`anphillips@wsgr.com
`
`Brandon M. White
`Shannon M. Bloodworth
`PERKINS COIE, LLP
`SBloodworth@perkinscoie.com
`BMWhite@perkinscoie.com
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`PETITIONER TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS:
`
`Gary J. Speier
`Mark D. Schuman
`CARLSON, CASPERS, VANDENBURGH, LINDQUIST & SCHUMAN, P.A.
`gspeier@carlsoncaspers.com
`mschuman@carlsoncaspers.com
`
`
`
`
`12
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
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`PETITIONER AKORN, INC.:
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`Michael R. Dzwonczyk
`Azadeh S. Kokabi
`Travis B. Ribar
`SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
`mdzwonczyk@sughrue.com
`akokabi@sughrue.com
`tribar@sughrue.com
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`PATENT OWNER:
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`Dorothy P. Whelan
`Michael Kane
`Susan Coletti
`Robert Oakes
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`whelan@fr.com
`PTABInbound@fr.com
`coletti@fr.com
`oakes@fr.com
`singer@fr.com
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`Alfonso G. Chan
`Joseph DePumpo
`Michael Shore
`Christopher Evans
`SHORE CHAN DEPUMPO LLP
`achan@shorechan.com
`jdepumpo@shorechan.com
`mshore@shorechan.com
`cevans@shorechan.com
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`Marsha Schmidt
`marsha@mkschmidtlaw.com
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`13
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`Proceeding No.: IPR2016-01127 to -01132
`
`Dated: December 1, 2017
`
`
`/Martin E. Seneca, Jr./
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`MARTIN E. SENECA, JR., Esq.
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae Seneca Nation
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`14
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