No. 16-712
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, PETITIONER
`v.
`GREENE’S ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
`
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`
`
` JEFFREY B. WALL
`Acting Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`CHAD A. READLER
`Acting Assistant Attorney
`General
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`WILLIAM E. HAVEMANN
`Attorneys
`Department of Justice
`Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
`SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
`(202) 514-2217
`
`
`
`MYLAN - EXHIBIT 1156
`Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al. v. Allergan, Inc.
`IPR2016-01127, -01128, -01129, -01130, -01131, -01132
`
`

`

`
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`1. Whether
`inter partes review comports with
`Article III and the Seventh Amendment.
`2. Whether the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`properly denied petitioner’s motion to amend its pa-
`tent during the inter partes review.
`3. Whether the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`correctly cancelled the disputed patent claims as an-
`ticipated by the prior art.
`
`(I)
`
`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
`Statement ...................................................................................... 2
`Argument ....................................................................................... 7
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 22
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`
`
`Aqua Prods., Inc., In re, 833 F.3d 1335
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................. 20, 22
`Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
`Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) ......................... 13, 14
`Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) ..................................... 13
`Cooper v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) ................................. 7, 16
`Cooper v. Square, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 475 (2016) .................. 7, 16
`Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 3
`Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
`261 U.S. 24 (1923) ............................................................... 10
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ................................................ passim
`Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) ............................ 21
`Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
`523 U.S. 340 (1998).............................................................. 15
`Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1851) .................. 10
`Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg,
`492 U.S. 33 (1989) ..................................................... 8, 13, 14
`Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697
`(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013) ................................................. 5, 19
`
`
`
`(III)
`
`

`

`IV
`
`Page
`
`Cases—Continued:
`Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell,
`135 U.S. 286 (1890).............................................................. 11
`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir.),
`cert. denied, 506 U.S. 829 (1992) ....................................... 12
`Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431 (2012) .................................... 9
`McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman,
`169 U.S. 606 (1898).............................................................. 11
`MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.:
`137 S. Ct. 292 (2016) .......................................................... 7
`812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
`137 S. Ct. 292 (2016) .................................. 7, 10, 15, 16
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................... 5, 17, 19, 20
`Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1872) .............. 15
`Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
`Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) ........................................ 8
`Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594
`(Fed. Cir.), modified on other grounds on reh’g,
`771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ......................................... 2, 12
`Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) ................. 13
`Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint.
`Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) ............................................ 9
`Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
`376 U.S. 225 (1964).......................................................... 9, 10
`Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) .............................. 8, 9
`Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
`473 U.S. 568 (1985).......................................................... 8, 12
`Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) .......................... 13
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`V
`
`Page
`
`Constitution, statutes, and regulations:
`U.S. Const.:
`Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8 .................................................................. 9
`Art. III ..................................................................... passim
`§ 1 ................................................................................. 8
`Amend. VII ................................................. 7, 13, 14, 15, 16
`Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
`94 Stat. 3015 (35 U.S.C. Ch. 30)........................................... 2
`35 U.S.C. 303(a) ................................................................. 2
`35 U.S.C. 304 ...................................................................... 2
`35 U.S.C. 311(a) ................................................................. 3
`35 U.S.C. 311(b) ................................................................. 3
`35 U.S.C. 311-318 (2000) ................................................... 2
`35 U.S.C. 312(a) (2000) ...................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. 313 (2000) .......................................................... 3
`35 U.S.C. 314(a) ................................................................. 4
`35 U.S.C. 315(b) ................................................................. 4
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(5) ............................................................. 4
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(8) ............................................................. 4
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(9) ....................................................... 4, 17
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(10) ........................................................... 4
`35 U.S.C. 316(d) ................................................................. 4
`35 U.S.C. 317(a) ................................................................. 5
`35 U.S.C. 318 .................................................................... 19
`35 U.S.C. 318(a) ................................................................. 5
`35 U.S.C. 318(b) ................................................................. 5
`35 U.S.C. 319 ...................................................................... 5
`35 U.S.C. 321(c) ................................................................. 3
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
`Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 ........................................ 3
`5 U.S.C. 8470 .......................................................................... 12
`35 U.S.C. 102 ............................................................................ 6
`
`
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`

`

`VI
`
`Page
`Statutes and regulations—Continued:
`35 U.S.C. 131 ............................................................................ 9
`35 U.S.C. 141 ............................................................................ 5
`38 U.S.C. 5302 ........................................................................ 12
`42 U.S.C. 404 .......................................................................... 12
`37 C.F.R.:
`Section 42.4(a) .................................................................... 4
`Section 42.20(c) ...................................................... 5, 17, 19
`Section 42.100(b) (2015) .................................................... 6
`Section 42.121(a)(2)(i) (2014) ............................................ 4
`Section 42.121(b) (2014) .................................................... 6
`Section 42.121(b)(1) (2014) .................................... 4, 17, 18
`
`Miscellaneous:
`Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ............................. 10
`H.R. Rep. No. 98, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1 (2011) .......... 3
`Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents
`Are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673 (2013) ............................. 15
`
`
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`
`
`

`

`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 16-712
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, PETITIONER
`v.
`GREENE’S ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
`
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-2) is
`not published in the Federal Reporter but is reprinted
`at 639 Fed. Appx. 639. The decision of the Patent Trial
`and Appeal Board (Pet. App. 3-36) is not published in
`the United States Patents Quarterly but is available
`at 2015 WL 2089371.
`JURISDICTION
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
`on May 4, 2016. A petition for rehearing was denied
`on July 26, 2016 (Pet. App. 37-38). On October 14,
`2016, the Chief Justice extended the time within which
`to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and includ-
`ing November 23, 2016, and the petition was filed on
`that date. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
`under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
`
`(1)
`
`

`

`2
`
`STATEMENT
`Respondent Greene’s Energy Group petitioned the
`United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
`to institute an inter partes review of petitioner’s pa-
`tent. The USPTO granted the petition and, after a
`hearing, determined that the challenged claims were
`unpatentable and that petitioner had failed to show
`that its proposed substitute claims would be patenta-
`ble. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished
`per curiam decision. Pet. App. 1-2.
`1. “For several decades,” Congress has provided
`administrative mechanisms for third parties to ask the
`USPTO to reconsider the patentability of the claims in
`an issued patent. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
`136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016). In 1980, Congress enact-
`ed the first statute authorizing ex parte reexamina-
`tion. Ibid. (citation omitted); see Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
`Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (35 U.S.C. Ch. 30).
`The statute specified that the USPTO could grant a
`request for ex parte reexamination if the request
`raised “a substantial new question of patentability.”
`35 U.S.C. 303(a), 304. Upon granting a petition for ex
`parte reexamination, the USPTO would reconsider the
`patentability of the previously granted claims. See
`generally Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594,
`604-605 (Fed. Cir.), modified on other grounds on
`reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
` In 1999, Congress expanded the USPTO’s auth-
`ority to review the patentability of claims in issued
`patents by creating inter partes reexamination. 35 U.S.C.
`311-318 (2000). Like ex parte reexamination, inter
`partes reexamination allowed a third party to petition
`the USPTO to reexamine the patentability of previ-
`ously granted patent claims through an administrative
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`proceeding, which the USPTO could institute if the
`petitioner raised “a substantial new question of pa-
`tentability.” 35 U.S.C. 312(a), 313 (2000). Inter partes
`reexamination differed from ex parte reexamination,
`however, in that the third-party petitioner could par-
`ticipate in the inter partes reexamination proceeding
`and, after 2002, in any subsequent appeal. See Cooper
`Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`In 2011, Congress made further changes to the
`framework for post-issuance review as part of the
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No.
`112-29, 125 Stat. 284. Congress enacted the AIA to
`“establish a more efficient and streamlined patent
`system that will improve patent quality and limit un-
`necessary and counterproductive litigation costs,” in
`response to “a growing sense that questionable pa-
`tents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to
`challenge.” H.R. Rep. No. 98, 112th Cong., 1st Sess.
`Pt. 1, at 39-40 (2011).
`For challenges to patentability brought within nine
`months after patent issuance, the AIA established a
`new procedure known as post-grant review. 35 U.S.C.
`321(c). For challenges brought after that nine-month
`period, the AIA established inter partes review, which
`replaced inter partes reexamination. See Cuozzo, 136
`S. Ct. at 2137. Inter partes review may be used to
`challenge patents based only on lack of novelty or
`obviousness. 35 U.S.C. 311(b). In general, any person
`other than the patent’s owner may petition for inter
`partes review. 35 U.S.C. 311(a). After receiving any
`response from the patent owner, the Director of the
`USPTO may institute an inter partes review if she
`determines that “there is a reasonable likelihood that
`the petitioner would prevail” with respect to at least
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`one of its challenges to the validity of a patent, 35 U.S.C.
`314(a), and no other provision of the AIA bars institu-
`tion under the circumstances, see, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
`315(b) (inter partes review may not be instituted if the
`petitioner was sued for infringement of the disputed
`patent more than one year before the filing of the
`petition). The Director has delegated the responsibil-
`ity for instituting inter partes reviews to the USPTO’s
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board). 37 C.F.R.
`42.4(a).
`Under the AIA, both parties in an inter partes re-
`view proceeding are entitled to take limited discovery,
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(5); to file affidavits and declarations,
`35 U.S.C. 316(a)(8); to request an oral hearing, 35 U.S.C.
`316(a)(10); and to file written memoranda, 35 U.S.C.
`316(a)(8). The patent owner in an inter partes review
`“may file 1 motion to amend the patent.” 35 U.S.C.
`316(d); see Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2145 (the patent own-
`er “may, at least once in the process, make a motion to
`* * * amend or narrow the claim”).
`Congress also authorized the USPTO to issue regu-
`lations elaborating on the inter partes review proce-
`dures, including, as relevant here, regulations that
`establish “standards and procedures for allowing the
`patent owner to move to amend the patent” during an
`inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. 316(a)(9). The USPTO’s
`regulations require, inter alia, that a proposed
`amendment must “respond to a ground of unpatenta-
`bility” at issue in the inter partes review, and that a
`motion to amend must set forth the “support in the
`original disclosure of the patent for each” proposed
`substitute claim. 37 C.F.R. 42.121(a)(2)(i) and (b)(1)
`(2014). USPTO regulations and adjudicative decisions
`further specify that the patent owner bears the bur-
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`den of establishing that it is entitled to the amend-
`ment, thereby requiring the patent owner to show that
`“its substitute claims are patentable over the prior art
`of record,” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789
`F.3d 1292, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (relying on 37 C.F.R.
`42.20(c) and Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 (P.T.A.B.
`June 11, 2013)).
`Unless an inter partes review is dismissed, the
`Board “shall issue a final written decision” addressing
`the patentability of the claims at issue in the instituted
`proceeding. 35 U.S.C. 318(a). The Board may issue
`its final written decision “even after the adverse party
`has settled.” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (citing 35 U.S.C.
`317(a)). The Board’s decision may then be appealed to
`the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. 141, 319.
`After the Board issues its decision and any appeals
`are exhausted, the USPTO issues a “certificate” can-
`celling any claims of the patent that were deemed
`unpatentable, confirming any claims of the patent that
`were deemed patentable, and “incorporating in the
`patent by operation of the certificate any new or
`amended claim determined to be patentable.” 35 U.S.C.
`318(b).
`2. a. Petitioner owns U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053
`(the ’053 patent), which relates to an apparatus and
`method for protecting wellheads during hydraulic
`fracturing, commonly known as fracking. Pet. App. 4-9.
`In 2012, petitioner filed an infringement suit against
`respondent in the United States District Court for the
`Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of the
`’053 patent. 12-CV-611 Compl. ¶¶ 27-35. Less than
`one year later, respondent filed a petition seeking
`inter partes review of two claims in the patent. 2015 WL
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`2089371, at *10. The Board granted the petition, con-
`ducted an inter partes review, and found the challenged
`patent claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 102 as
`anticipated by the prior art. 2015 WL 2089371, at *16.
`In its final written decision, the Board construed
`the disputed terms of the challenged patent “by apply-
`ing the broadest reasonable interpretation, in light of
`the specification.” Pet. App. 11; see 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b)
`(2015); see also Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144-2145 (af-
`firming the Board’s use of the broadest-reasonable-
`construction standard). The Board concluded that, so
`construed, the two challenged claims were anticipated
`by prior art disclosed in a Canadian patent application
`that had claimed a similar method for protecting well-
`heads during fracking. Pet. App. 23. The Board con-
`cluded that this prior art disclosed every element of
`the challenged claims, ibid., and enabled one skilled in
`the art to make the invention, id. at 26.
`The Board denied petitioner’s motion to amend the
`disputed patent claims. Pet. App. 36. The Board con-
`cluded that petitioner had failed to “satisf[y] its bur-
`den of showing written description support for the
`proposed substitute claims.” Id. at 34; see id. at 32-
`34; see also 37 C.F.R. 42.121(b) (2014). The Board
`explained that petitioner had instead relied on a chart
`containing “only string citations with no discussion of
`how the cited disclosures pertain to the additional
`claim language,” Pet. App. 32, and that these string
`citations did not “explain how the original disclosure
`of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to a
`person the features intended to be encompassed by
`the proposed substitute claims,” id. at 33. The Board
`found that petitioner’s “conclusory discussion” of the
`support for its proposed substitute claims did not
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`satisfy its burden of showing written claim support.
`Ibid.
`The Board concluded that petitioner had also failed
`to offer a construction of its proposed substitute
`claims that was “sufficient to support the distinction
`of the proposed substitute claim[s] over the prior art.”
`Pet. App. 34. The Board explained that, because peti-
`tioner had not provided an adequate construction of
`two key terms in its proposed substitute claims, peti-
`tioner had failed to satisfy its burden of showing that
`its proposed new claims were patentable over the
`prior art. Id. at 35-36.
`b. Petitioner appealed to the Federal Circuit, chal-
`lenging the Board’s patentability determination and
`its denial of the motion to amend. Petitioner also con-
`tended for the first time that inter partes review vio-
`lates Article III and the Seventh Amendment, but
`acknowledged that MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-
`Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
`denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016), foreclosed that argument.
`The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision in
`an unpublished per curiam order. Pet. App. 1-2.
`ARGUMENT
`Petitioner contends that inter partes review vio-
`lates Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Peti-
`tioner’s challenge lacks merit, and this Court has
`denied three recent petitions pressing comparable
`claims. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
`Co., 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016) (No. 15-1330); Cooper v. Lee,
`137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) (No. 15-955); Cooper v. Square,
`Inc., 137 S. Ct. 475 (2016) (No. 16-76). Petitioner also
`challenges the denial of its request to amend its pa-
`tent claims and the Board’s cancellation of its patent
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`claims. Those challenges lack merit and do not raise
`any question warranting this Court’s review.
`1. a. Article III provides that the “judicial Power
`of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
`Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
`may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S.
`Const. Art. III, § 1. “[I]n general,” this provision
`prevents Congress from withdrawing from Article III
`courts any matter involving the exercise of judicial
`power. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011).
`This Court, however, has recognized qualifications to
`that general rule. One such qualification authorizes
`Congress to designate public rights for adjudication in
`non-Article III tribunals. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v.
`Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
`272, 284 (1856); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
`Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985).
`Most critically, “what makes a right ‘public’ rather
`than private is that the right is integrally related to
`particular Federal Government action.” Stern, 564
`U.S. at 490-491. Where Congress has acted “for a
`valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional
`powers under Article I,” it may delegate even a
`“seemingly private right” to non-Article III courts if
`the right “is so closely integrated into a public regula-
`tory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
`resolution.” Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492
`U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (citation and internal quotation
`marks omitted). The federal government need not be
`a party to the agency adjudication. A dispute between
`private parties may implicate public rights if “the
`claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory
`scheme,” or if “resolution of the claim by an expert
`Government agency is deemed essential to a limited
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`
`regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”
`Stern, 564 U.S. at 490.
`Patents are quintessential public rights. Pursuant
`to its constitutional authority to “promote the Pro-
`gress of Science and useful Arts” by establishing a
`patent system, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, Congress
`created the USPTO, an agency with “special expertise
`in evaluating patent applications.” Kappos v. Hyatt,
`566 U.S. 431, 445 (2012). Congress directed that
`agency to issue a patent if “it appears that the appli-
`cant is entitled to a patent” under standards set by
`federal law, 35 U.S.C. 131. Patents accordingly confer
`rights that “exist only by virtue of statute.” Sears,
`Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964).
`Inter partes review exemplifies the sort of mecha-
`nism that Congress may create to administer a public-
`right scheme. Petitioner does not dispute that Con-
`gress may task the USPTO with examining patent
`applications and issuing patents in the first instance,
`and the “basic purpose[]” of inter partes review is
`simply “to reexamine [that] earlier agency decision,”
`Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144
`(2016). The process “helps protect the public’s ‘para-
`mount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . .
`are kept within their legitimate scope.’(cid:3032)” Ibid. (quoting
`Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint.
`Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). A procedure that
`gives the expert agency charged with allocating pa-
`tent rights “a second look at an earlier administrative
`grant of a patent,” ibid., is “integrally related” to the
`public-right scheme of patent issuance, Stern, 564
`U.S. at 490. Because “patent rights are public rights”
`that are “derive[d] from an extensive federal regula-
`tory scheme,” this Court’s decisions “compel the con-
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`clusion that assigning review of patent validity to the
`[USPTO] is consistent with Article III.” MCM Portfo-
`lio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1290,
`1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), cert.
`denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016).
`Petitioner contends (Pet. 18) that inter partes re-
`views must be adjudicated in Article III courts be-
`cause patent rights “stem[] from the common law.”
`That is incorrect. Unlike common law rights, see, e.g.,
`Black’s Law Dictionary 334-335 (10th ed. 2014), pa-
`tent rights “exist only by virtue of statute,” Stiffel, 376
`U.S. at 229 n.5 (citation omitted). “The [patent] mo-
`nopoly did not exist at common law, and the rights,
`therefore, which may be exercised under it cannot be
`regulated by the rules of the common law.” Gayler v.
`Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1851). Rather, the
`patent monopoly “is created by the act of Congress;
`and no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized
`by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes.”
`Ibid.; see Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach.
`Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923) (stating that, in issuing a
`patent, “[t]he Government is not granting the common
`law right to make, use and vend” an invention, but
`rather is granting the statutory right to exclude oth-
`ers from the invention). Because the USPTO possess-
`es statutory authority to grant or deny patents in the
`first instance, based on the patentability criteria
`enunciated by Congress, “[i]t would be odd indeed if
`Congress could not authorize the [USPTO] to recon-
`sider its own decisions.” MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at
`1291.
`Petitioner all but ignores this Court’s modern
`public-rights jurisprudence and, like the petitioner in
`MCM Portfolio, relies instead (Pet. 17) on 19th century
`
`
`
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`

`11
`
`decisions predating the advent of post-issuance patent
`review. In neither McCormick Harvesting Machine
`Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898), nor Iron Silver
`Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135 U.S. 286 (1890), however,
`did this Court base
`its decision on Article III.
`McCormick Harvesting Machine held only that the
`Patent Act in its then-current form provided no basis
`for cancelling an original patent based on the rejection
`of a later reissue application. See 169 U.S. at 610
`(explaining that, under the statute, “until the amended
`patent shall have been issued the original stands pre-
`cisely as if a reissue had never been applied for and
`must be returned to the owner upon demand”) (inter-
`nal citation omitted). In Iron Silver Mining, the
`Court held that, in light of “the purpose of Congress,”
`the land-patent statutes did not require a party who
`had obtained a land patent to defend that patent
`against adverse claimants in an administrative pro-
`ceeding. See 135 U.S. at 301 (explaining that the
`statutory provisions at issue were not “intended to
`apply to the case of a party who has a prior patent for
`the land which may be the subject of controversy
`before the register and receiver of the land-office”).
`Both McCormick Harvesting Machine and Iron Sil-
`ver Mining reflect the fact that, in the 19th century,
`Congress had not authorized the USPTO or any other
`administrative body to reconsider the validity of pre-
`viously issued patents. Congress has since provided
`the statutory authority that was previously lacking,
`and neither McCormick Harvesting Machine nor Iron
`Silver Mining casts doubt on the constitutionality of
`that authorization.
`“For several decades,” Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137,
`the USPTO has engaged in post-issuance review of
`
`
`
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`

`12
`
`patents to “remedy defective governmental * * *
`action” and “if need be to remove patents that should
`never have been granted,” Patlex Corp. v. Mossing-
`hoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir.), modified on other
`grounds on reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see
`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 229 (Fed.
`Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 829 (1992).1 Numerous other
`statutes contain similar provisions that allow agencies
`to correct their own errors, including by recovering
`erroneous disbursements of money to private parties.
`See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 8470 (authorizing the Executive
`Branch to recover overpayments of federal employee
`benefits); 38 U.S.C. 5302 (authorizing the Executive
`Branch to recover veterans’ benefits overpayments);
`42 U.S.C. 404 (authorizing the Executive Branch to
`recover Social Security overpayments).
`b. Petitioner’s Seventh Amendment argument
`(Pet. 12-19) adds nothing to its Article III challenge.
`The Seventh Amendment provides in pertinent part
`that, “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
`
`1 Petitioner attempts to distinguish inter partes review from ex
`parte reexamination on the ground that inter partes review is
`“adjudicatory in nature.” Pet. 17 n.6. But this Court in Cuozzo
`rejected the suggestion that inter partes review proceedings differ
`from other post-issuance review proceedings due to their “adjudi-
`catory characteristics.” 136 S. Ct. at 2143. The Court explained
`that, “[a]lthough Congress changed the name from ‘reexamination’
`to ‘review,’(cid:3032)” Congress sought to preserve the procedure’s “basic
`purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.” Id. at
`2144. In any event, the authority of administrative agencies to
`determine public rights through “quasi-adjudicative” rather than
`examinational proceedings is well-settled. Thomas, 473 U.S. at
`587. Given that Congress may permissibly authorize the USPTO
`to conduct post-issuance patent review, nothing prevents Congress
`from granting the parties to the proceeding the sorts of procedural
`safeguards that normally attend judicial proceedings.
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`

`13
`
`controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
`trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S. Const. Amend.
`VII. That provision guarantees the right to a jury
`trial only of claims that are adjudicated in Article III
`courts. Thus, “if the action must be tried under the
`auspices of an Article III court, then the Seventh
`Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury trial
`whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.”
`Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53. In contrast, if Con-
`gress has permissibly assigned “the adjudication of a
`statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal,
`then the Seventh Amendment poses no independent
`bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury
`factfinder.” Id. at 53-54; see id. at 55 n.10 (“Congress
`may decline to provide jury trials” where the action
`involves “statutory rights that are integral parts of a
`public regulatory scheme and whose adjudication
`Congress has assigned to an administrative agency”);
`Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987)
`(“[T]he Seventh Amendment is not applicable to ad-
`ministrative proceedings.”); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Oc-
`cupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
`442, 455 (1977) (“[W]hen Congress creates new statu-
`tory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their adjudication to
`an administrative agency with which a jury trial would
`be
`incompatible, without violating
`the Seventh
`Amendment[].”); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
`363, 383 (1974) (“[T]he Seventh Amendment is gener-
`ally
`inapplicable
`in administrative proceedings.”);
`Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921).
`Petitioner argues (Pet. 20-21) that litigants in pa-
`tent disputes are generally entitled to a jury trial, and
`that such disputes therefore must be tried in Article
`III courts. That argument gets the inquiry back-
`
`
`
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`

`14
`
`wards. Where Congress has assigned a cause of ac-
`tion to an administrative tribunal, a court must first
`ask whether that assignment is constitutional under
`Article III. If the administrative scheme comports
`with Article III, the Seventh Amendment “poses no
`independent bar.” Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54.
`Only where Article III compels Congress to assign
`adjudication of particular claims to federal courts, or
`where Congress chooses to do so, does the Seventh
`Amendment guarantee the parties “a right to a jury
`trial whenever the cause of action is legal in nature.”
`Id. at 53.
`This Court’s decision in Pernell, supra, illustrates
`that principle. Pernell involved a Seventh Amend-
`ment challenge to a statute that established a cause of
`action for parties to recover certain real property
`through a judicial proceeding. This Court held that
`the Seventh Amendment entitled the parties to a jury
`trial because th